

HISTORIOGRAPHIES OF WORLD WAR II, THE COLD WAR, AND WOUNDED KNEE

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Historiographies of World War II, the Cold War, and Wounded Knee

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ABSTRACT

This historiographical essay discusses three events in recent history— Germany in World War II, the beginnings of the Cold War, and the 1973 occupation of Wounded Knee. The purpose of these essays is to show what the authors of these subjects are discussing in their books and to critique their work as it relates to the particular theme of each essay. There are many different writers on these subjects, but it can be difficult to show how do they compare or contrast to one another with the information that they presenting. The first essay will cover the failures of Germany in World War II that led to its destruction at the end of the war The second essay on the beginnings of the Cold War will discuss how authors viewed the U.S. as being the main instigator behind the Cold War. The third essay covers the occupation of Wounded Knee and how its differing authors felt about its legitimacy and the reasoning for how it came about. To read these essays is to better understand the authors themselves as well as the finer points of subjects that they are discussing.

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I. THE BEGINNING OF THE END: HOW NAZI GERMANY LOST WORLD WAR II

The year is 1946. It is a sight that most watching the skies above New York could not believe. Europe lay in ruins as WWII continued to be fought. Britain and the U.S. remained, standing in the face of the might of the world's most dangerous country. On this day, flying above the city was the plane of a foreign enemy. Its markings were visible as the plane made a low level pass over the city, threatening to unleash its deadly payload of ordinance—the black swastika clearly showing against the backdrop of a white circle with a red flag around it—German. Nazi Germany had achieved what it had been working on in secret since 1942, its “*Amerika*” bomber, the Horten Ho 229. No longer was the Atlantic Ocean a buffer for the American homeland. Its citizens on this day realized that victory against Nazi Germany would no longer happen on the battlefields of Europe, but in their own backyard. War had come home to the U.S.

Fortunately for the U.S., this alternative history never happened, as Nazi Germany was utterly defeated in May of 1945, surrendering unconditionally to Allies. America's skies would never see a Nazi plane fly over their skies. But what if the war had dragged on into 1946? The Germans had grown increasingly desperate by 1944 as the American and British armies were closing in on them from the west and the Red Army of the Soviet Union was nearly at Germany's doorstep in the east. This desperation had bred many innovative ideas in the Germany military, including the development of very long range bombers capable of hitting the U.S., ballistic missiles, and a host of other technologically superior weapons. Had Germany had the time and resources, things could have been very different for the world. However, thanks to critical German mistakes, it would not come to pass.

So what were these flaws that doomed the Third Reich? There are many works that cover WWII and Nazi Germany and the mistakes that were made that ensure the defeat of Germany, but they are many in number and many are written on different parts of Nazi Germany. And not all are well received, while others are superb in their analysis of the war or Germany. How do some these works cover the subject of Germany's defeat in WWII? This essay will cover some of those works and will analyze them for their strengths and weaknesses and give an overall critique of the books. This essay will break down the issue by differing categories, including overall histories of WWII, German resistance movements, military mistakes, and other areas where Nazi mistakes led to Germany's defeat.

1.1. Comprehensive Accounts

Before getting into the different categories, comprehensive accounts are needed to set the stage for Germany. The first account is John Campbell's The Experience of World War II. In this historical account of WWII, he covers all of the experiences of the war, from the fronts of Europe and the Pacific to the home fronts on either side. He covers the comprehensive history of the war from the beginning of the conflict, showing just how successful Germany and Japan were at the beginning of the war, but he is sure to follow that with the turnaround battles at Stalingrad, El Alamein, and Midway. The book offers an impressive array of visual information to support the factual evidence being provided. He goes into the military of both sides, describing their tactics, weapons, and personnel. Later he describes the home fronts of the war and how each was affected by the war. He concludes with the results of the war and its impact on the emerging superpowers—the U.S. and Soviet Union—and the resulting start of the Cold War.

After looking at the overall coverage of the book, it is a good, short version of a world event that could be made so much longer and so much more in depth. He does a good job and pointing out all of the usual events (ex: D-Day, Pearl Harbor, Stalingrad, etc), but also throws in resistance movements, military tactics, and views from the home front. This makes the book more appealing and allows it to cover much more than similar books of its size can contain. Campbell gives a good, concise account of WWII and delivers it in a way that makes it stimulating for both the eyes and the mind. Any part of the book can be made into an individual research project. That, to me, is the purpose of a comprehensive historical account. Its subdivisions are meant to be further researched and gone into in far more depth than can be covered. This is important because it inspires other historians, like those that are about to be reviewed, to formulate their own theses that go into detail about certain areas of WWII that they feel need to be written about. Campbell's account leads into the specific categories and books on Germany in WWII about to be reviews.

Another excellent overview of Nazi Germany is covered in Michael Burleigh's extensive work, The Third Reich: A New History. Over the entirety of Burleigh's book, he does an excellent job of covering different areas of Nazi Germany that are not covered in many other books on the same time period. Burleigh first looks into the Weimar Republic period of Germany, covering how the government failed to bring Germany back from the depths of its defeat during World War I and the hated reparations that came as a result of its defeat. During this time of political upheaval, Hitler rose to prominence within the government after his release from prison for his part in staging the failed Beer Hall Putsch of 1924. In trying, and failing, to take down the Weimar Republic, Hitler

only hardened his position to obtain the chancellery of Germany and to have his National Socialist Party in power. Prison time, and his subsequent writing of Mein Kampf, also only steeled his resolve to find a solution to the “Jewish problem” in Germany and across Europe. Burleigh’s coverage of the rise of the Nazis during this time period is extensive and well researched.

Burleigh’s coverage of early incidents involving the Jews of Germany is a section that exposes the future for Jews living across Europe. Nazi persecution led many of its best civic and professional personnel to flee across the continent or head for the U.S. simply because they were Jews. But many still stayed, hoping that their situations would improve. Nazi concentration camps were already underway during this time period, as their first inhabitants began arriving early in Hitler’s reign in the 1930s. The idea of racial purification involved not only the Jews, but also those deemed by the Nazis as unfit for reproduction, such as the mentally insane, alcoholics, criminals, and many other groups. Burleigh’s coverage of the Nazi programs of eugenics and euthanasia is seen as an extension of the coming Holocaust as well as the extensive use of the Nazi ideology of a superior Aryan race as an excuse to butcher millions of people across Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. While other works do contain information on the Nazi’s use of eugenics to further their ideals, Burleigh covers the subject in a way that is sequentially correct while not overwhelming the reader with statistics and sticking to the time period before the war started.

Burleigh devotes much of the last half of his book to the invasion of the Soviet Union and the failure of the Germans to capture the country. Hailing it as the greatest military engagement of all time, Burleigh sets the stage for the invasion in a much more

detailed way than any other author the reader has read. Most writers describe the invasion and the subsequent early victories of Germany. Burleigh offers an interesting twist to this in that he points out that Stalin and the Soviet Union had ample warning that an invasion was coming. German preparations for war were observed in Berlin by Soviet ambassadors and documents were discovered by other Soviet agents. Stalin and his advisors continuously downplayed the information, believing that Hitler would not break the Non-Aggression pact with them yet. This is new information to many readers, who have read that the invasion came as a total surprise to the Soviet Union and that they had no warning of the coming invasion. This is an example of how much of an improvement Burleigh's *The Third Reich* is over other works on Nazi Germany.

Burleigh delves into the resistance forces within in Germany that were seeking to replace Hitler with another government. These included communists and Social Democrats in the political system, though the communists could not do anything openly for fear of arrest and death in the concentration camps. Hitler's own officers took steps to ensure that Hitler's objectives and orders were muddled or fell into enemy hands. Many risked their lives to try to end the war and negotiate with the Western Allies. This section of Burleigh's book is, however, the one part of the book that is lacking compared to the rest of the book. The section is relatively short and does not go as into depth as other sections. If parts were elaborated further, this section would be as good a section as Burleigh's others sections in The Third Reich.

The last section of the book covers America's appearance in Europe after Hitler decided to declare war on the U.S. Figuring that the U.S. would go after Japan first for the bombing of Pearl Harbor, Hitler was surprised that the U.S. had determined that

Europe would come first in order to help out the British and, to a lesser extent, the Soviets. His error in judgment would cost Germany the war, as the resources of the U.S. fed the Allied war machine with nearly unlimited supplies and weapons. Burleigh goes through the last years of the war, marking how Germany's efforts to beat back the Western Allies failed as the country struggled to stop the Soviet advance from the east until Berlin fell in May, 1945. Burleigh concludes his book discussing the splitting of post-war Germany and how the Allies took over the country. Much like most of his book, Burleigh shows in-depth research on the subject and keeps the history of Nazi Germany in perspective and continues to show just how excellent an example of writing The Third Reich is for historians.

Following the theme of books that looked at the war as a whole, Antony Beevor recorded his view of the war in his book, The Second World War. Not only does Beevor cover the European theater, but he also provides a comprehensive look at the Pacific theater as well. However, with the theme of this essay focused on Germany in WWII, I will be focusing only on his writings on the European theater. Beevor's work not only offers the reader a general overview of war, as most comprehensive works of the war are, but he also offers more research and insight into different parts of the war, in particular his subtext on Hitler's obsession with ridding Europe of the Jews. He also demonstrates more research from the Soviet side of the war, as he discusses the roles that Generals Zhukov and Konev played in not only surviving Stalin's purges of the 1930s, but how their leadership helped turn the tide of the war in the East and push the Germans back to their homeland. This in itself is research that a majority of WWII books do not explore, as most look at the war from the perspective of the Western Allies.

The first third of the book covers the start of the war and the rapid expansion of the Nazi empire, which reaches its maximum size by 1942. While the information on Hitler's victories in the Low Countries and France is not terribly new to the reader, his information about the lead up to Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union, is quite well researched. Beevor indicates that despite the evidence presented to Stalin that the Germans were building up their forces along the eastern border with the USSR, he continued to believe that Hitler would abide by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, even going so far as to continue shipping thousands of the tons of grain, fuel, oil, cotton, metals, and rubber to Germany that the Soviets had agreed to make in the pact.¹ Hitler had declared the invasion of the Soviet Union as a war of extermination, deeming its communist Slav population as subhuman and not worthy of existing, other than as slaves to the superior German race. This information about Stalin's blindness to the coming invasion is evidence of Beevor's careful research into not only showing the well-known facts of Operation Barbarossa, but always demonstrating just how deep Stalin's naivety went into his belief that Hitler would not invade the USSR. The fact that he kept sending Germany the material it would need to launch its war on the Soviet Union is evidence of this and Beevor's insight into this leaves quite the impression on a seasoned reader of WWII history.

Hitler's views on the Jews of Europe are widely known and debated about. Where Beevor provides more insight on how the "Final Solution" was implemented was where he discusses a secret meeting between members of Hitler's circle, including Reich Security Head Reinhard Heydrich and Lt. Col. Adolf Eichmann, and how at this meeting,

¹ Beevor, Antony. *The Second World War*. (New York, NY: Little, Brown, and Company. 2012), p. 189

the extermination of the Jews was planned and how it would be facilitated was mapped out.² Eichmann would draw out plans for the facilitation and the logistics of the operation, while others at the meeting would launch those plans with Hitler and Himmler's blessings. Six million Jews would die as a result of this meeting. The fact that Beevor points out that this meeting was where the plans for the extermination of the Jews was drawn up indicates that Hitler himself did not actually plan the designs, though it is obvious that this was one of his ultimate goals in launching the war. This is new information to the reader that was certainly not previously known and another indication of how thoroughly researched Beevor's book is.

The middle third of the book discusses where the war turned against Germany, beginning in the East at Stalingrad and in North Africa at El Alamein and with U.S. intervention in the war. The battle of Stalingrad turned the tide of the war in the USSR, as the Germans would remain on the defensive for the rest of the war. This is well known. Beevor explores more into North Africa than other historians. Here Hitler insisted on not giving up the territories it had gained there, despite the fact that the *Afrika Korps* could not be resupplied after British and American navy forces controlled the Mediterranean and reinforcements could not arrive. Hitler, more than anything according to Beevor, shares the responsibility of the loss of North Africa and its forces there, as nearly a quarter of a million troops and a dozen generals surrendered there. These forces could have been used in the East to stop the Russian advance or to shore up the Atlantic Coast for the inevitable Allied invasion.

² Ibid, p. 292

In the last third of the book, the world comes crashing down on Germany, but Beevor discusses another area here, that being of the commanding officers of the Western Allies as well as of the supreme leaders of the Allies. It is in these writings that Beevor exposes the ego of the Western Allied leadership, especially that of General Bernard Montgomery of the British army and U.S. General Mark Clark and his drive into Italy. Montgomery insisted on having his plans carried out and persuasive enough to get many other Allied commanders to follow along with his plans. Clark insisted on capturing Rome and driving the Italians from the war and his drive to clear the Germans from the country is shown strongly by Beevor as being responsible for, not only liberating Rome, but also would result in the deaths of the thousands of soldiers as he continued to pursue his goal.³ His egomania was his driving force. Beevor also demonstrated how Stalin played off of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at Yalta. Stalin is shown to be master of getting the British and Americans leaders to contradict each other's demands at the conference so that he could obtain the territory and influence in Eastern Europe that he wanted. Stalin especially sought to turn Roosevelt against Churchill by bringing their disagreements at the Tehran conference and the demands that Churchill made towards the Russians.⁴ This is a final example of Beevor's in-depth research and analysis of the war and another showing of how impressive his work on WWII is.

Beevor's The Second World War is an excellent example of what historians can do with newer works on the war today. New evidence and research yields details of events of the war that were previously not known to writers before. Even though Beevor's book is an overview of the war, which has been written about, by many other

³ Ibid, p. 571

⁴ Ibid, p. 710

historians, he offers new details that add exciting information into areas of the war that earlier researchers had overlooked or did not have access to. His examples of secret Nazi meetings, the egotistical attitudes of Allied commanders, and other indicated areas show that there is still new facts and research to do on the war despite the fact that it is one of the most frequently written about events in world history. So well written is the book that Nicholas Terry commented on his review of the book that “it is a virtual certainty that it will be found under countless Christmas trees at years end and be enjoyed for what it is rather than what it is not: a masterful narrative history.”⁵ That is an indication in itself how excellent of a scholarly work the book is.

Lastly in the reviews of overall histories of WWII is Gerhard Weinberg’s A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II. This book is considered to the first general history of WWII where the author not only uses past research on the subject, but also provides new information from the archives of the U.S. and Britain, as well as Germany. Most authors of WWII history divide the war up into two parts: the European and the Pacific theaters. Weinberg looks at things from a continuous global perspective, covering all parts simultaneously while making sure to convey that victory for the Allies was never guaranteed while Germany and Japan fought on, despite the overwhelming odds facing them. Weinberg covers all aspects of the war, from the home fronts of the rival nations to the roles of diplomacy, espionage and intelligence in the war, as well as how the war shaped the countries that were involved in it. In the process of giving an overall history of the war, Weinberg also seeks to convey very specific information of the

⁵ Terry, Nicholas. Review of *The Second World War* by Antony Beevor. *History Today*, Aug. 1, 2012. <http://0-web.b.ebscohost.com.rcpl.iii.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=5&sid=bb2cc015-0fb5-42d1-aca5-a4462542d790%40sessionmgr112&hid=123>

conflict to provide the reader with what is probably one the most definitive comprehensive histories of WWII.

Weinberg begins where many WWII historians begin, with the end of WWI and the problems that ensued within Germany that led to the rise of Hitler and the Nazis. Once in power, Hitler began to rebuild the German war machine. Here Weinberg offers new information on the buildup of the German military and its future territorial ambitions. For example, in 1934, Hitler had wanted to expand the German empire east in the near future and wanted to go to war with the Soviet Union.⁶ Here the bulk of the lands needed for German expansion would be taken over. Next, his armies would turn to Western Europe and eliminate the threats posed there by old enemies France and Britain. However, events unfolded in 1935 that made him change his mind and Hitler began planning for war in the West first before turning towards the East, though Weinberg is not specific on these events.⁷ This is an example of the new research that Weinberg provides for the reader, information that was not previously available to other WWII historians. To read that plans for war were already in place as Hitler was building the German war industry is a new development that catches the reader by surprise as it seems to be contradictory to that Hitler went to war with the West when they declared war on him following the invasion of Poland and agreement with the Soviet Union to split the country up.

Once the war begins, Weinberg begins to cover other areas of the war that most readers know little about, since most histories do not cover them or consider the events

⁶ Weinberg, Gerhard. *A World At Arms: A Global History of World War II*. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 1994), p. 21

⁷ Ibid, p. 21

worthy of recognition other than in footnotes. One area that received extensive coverage was in Spain and with its leader, Francisco Franco, whom the Nazis had helped come to power during the Spanish Civil War. Franco was courted by Germany to join the conflict on their side once France fell in 1940. But his territorial demands for areas in North Africa and islands in the Atlantic were more than the Germans were willing to concede to and Franco would not relent nor would he let the German navy use its bases on the coast for a holding area for U-boats. Hitler gave up on trying to bring Spain into his sphere as he began to turn his attention towards the Soviet Union, though he did plan on invading Spain should British intentions or diversionary actions begin there.⁸ Italy also receives attention here and Weinberg describes how apprehensive the Italians were to be in a partnership with the Germans, who they saw as barbaric after seeing their treatment of the conquered nations and their demands for the deportation of all Jews back to Germany for transport to the concentration camps. In kind, the German military saw the Italians as incompetent, given that the Germans had to bail out the Italian military in North Africa and in Greece. This would hurt the Italian cause once the country surrendered to the Allies in 1943 and German troops turned on their former allies. Even the fighting in the Middle East is given fair treatment from Weinberg, where he describes the situation in Iraq as the British tried and succeeded in putting down a rebellion by Rashid Ali al-Gaylani.⁹ Gaylani had wanted to side with Germany and tried unsuccessfully to push the British out of the country, but failed in his pursuit to do so. Germany was in no position to help him out at the time, as Axis forces were battling the British in North Africa. The Mediterranean theater and the Middle East almost never get mentioned in WWII histories

⁸ Ibid, p. 208

⁹ Ibid, p. 225

other than Italy's exploits in Ethiopia and the Allied invasions that followed and drove the Italians out of the war. South America gets into the picture here as well, as Germany tried to keep Argentina out of the war by not sinking its ships, but did attempt to sink ships of those nations on the continent that did declare war on it, especially Brazil.¹⁰ These examples are further vindication for Weinberg's book as being one of the most thoroughly researched histories on the conflict as even minor theaters are given preferential treatment. The reader cannot help but be impressed with the information and research that Weinberg did in his work.

As the book continues, the reader continues to be impressed with how Weinberg continues to cover the different aspects of the war simultaneously even as he delves into the plans for both sides in two year increments followed by what happened during those years. He explains these plans and how they were supposed to translate into victory for either and describes the climate within the countries. In the process, he does not lose the cohesiveness of the storyline, which is impressive giving the information and research that was done for the book. In going over the plans, the war takes on a new meaning for both sides and the roles of each are reversed. Germany and Japan went from being the aggressors to just trying to survive, while the U.S., Britain, and the Soviet Union went from being on the defensive to bringing the war home to each of the enemy nations. But Weinberg points out that it was not an easy alliance for the Allies. Weinberg describes periods of the war where the British and American militaries bickered amongst themselves about who would control the territories recovered from the Germans and about what would happen once Germany was defeated. Relations with the Soviet Union

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 372

are already well known among historians of the time period, but Weinberg delves more into the Anglo-American side of the Allies than others do and explores their problems. One wonders just how the Allies stayed together as long as they did, given their opinions of each other.

To finalize this review of Weinberg's book, it is obvious to the reader that his account of WWII should be a must read for anyone interested in learning about the war. His coverage of the conflict is beyond comprehension and information that he presents shows the level of research and documents that he had access to. His coverage of lesser known theaters and how the alliances worked or did not work is something that separates him from other WWII historians. He describes the entire war without dividing the book into different sections and shows how the war progressed on both sides of the globe without losing what was happening at the same time on either side. In his review of the book, Eliot Cohen commented that "in somber and powerful prose, he lays out the origins, course and consequence of the war in a way that will benefit even those quite familiar with the struggles of 1939-45."¹¹ I could not agree with him more. The benefit of reading this book has expanded the knowledge that one can learn about a war that is well recorded, but not covered in the way that Weinberg writes it.

Now that the past reviews have set the stage for Germany in the war, this essay will now delve into specific areas and errors that led to Germany's defeat. So what were these? There are many reasons why Germany lost WWII. And there are even more authors of WWII who have written about it. Many see different causes for Germany's

¹¹ Cohen, Eliot. Review of *A World At Arms: A Global History of World War II* by Gerhard Weinberg. *Foreign Affairs*, May 1, 1994. <http://0-web.a.ebscohost.com.rcpl.iii.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=4&sid=7e9fe0ed-49a7-4680-9ddc-803ee683fc16%40sessionmgr4002&hid=4112>

defeat and others have very similar hypotheses as to the end result for Germany. For this historiographical essay, I have chosen to cover authors who wrote about the failures of Germany in WWII. The areas covered in this essay will include German strategies, military campaigns, coverage of German servicemen, and German resistance. In the span of six years, Germany went from the world's most formidable military power to having its cities, industries, and military completely decimated. A chronological order of major events in Germany during these years is well known, but there is much literature that covers aspects of Nazi Germany that are not as known. There are accounts of resistance, death, among others, but there are also many works of speculation and dissection of Nazi Germany during the war. The list of works that will be briefly discussed will cover many of these aspects of Germany in WWII.

There are other areas where the Germans lost the war, but they are areas that the Allies were responsible for doing in an effort to defeat Germany. The British and Americans favored round-the-clock bombing raids on Germany's war production industry, the factories that churned out German tanks, planes, and munitions, the railways that transported German troops to the front lines, and in some cases, on the German civilian population. The firebombing of German cities, while not common, did happen as a result of the Allied bombing campaign. The city of Dresden was nearly destroyed by a series of British and U.S. firebombing raids over three days. Over 20,000 civilians died in the bombing and firestorm that grew as a result. The U.S. military concluded that the city had enough strategic value to warrant its destruction, but many historians debate this conclusion. Terrorizing the local population was not one of the West Allies' goals, but there were times when the tactic was applied, much the same as when the Germans began

bombing London in order to terrorize and demoralize its citizens into surrendering. It had the opposite effect, though, for the both the British as well as the Germans.

One book that covers the subject of effects of the Allied bombing campaign is Richard Overy's The Bombers and the Bombed: Allied Air War Over Europe, 1940-1945. Throughout his book, Overy seeks to demonstrate how the new military tactics developed in the 1930s on bombing a country's economic and social foundations were supposed to make a bombed country capitulate once its people were sufficiently demoralized from being bombed. However, as Overy points out and was stated before, the British people did not seek to have their government drop out of the war despite the devastation that rained down on them from German bomber raids in 1940 and 1941. In fact, he points out that as the German people continued to be bombed and suffer as a result of the near round the clock bombing raids, they actually became more dependent on the state to help and support them. Despite the failure of the Allied bombing campaign to demoralize the German population, it did, however, succeed in crippling Germany's ability to manufacture war material and transport troops to the fronts.

Overy seeks to explain how the bombing campaign did not achieve the desired goal of making Germany capitulate earlier than it did. The collective wisdom from military planners in the 1930s forecast that, in future wars, the ability to bomb a country's infrastructure, manufacturing, and civilian sectors would result in the local population rising up to its leaders to demand an end to the hostilities. In order to see how this policy failed in its intent, Overy states that issues of social, psychological, and cultural responses to the bombing has to be examined, which he sees as an approach that is rarely seen in

the history telling of the Allied bombing campaign.¹² This is an approach to telling the stories of those who suffered under the bombs that takes Overy's book into a totally different area when compared to other books on the Allied bombing campaign. It's a refreshing look at a subject of WWII that usually is composed of missions, bomber losses, Luftwaffe losses, and the devastation that the bombs caused that helped to bring down the Nazi war economy. Overy discusses the human side of the bombings and looks at the bombing campaign from the ground up instead of from the air down.

Overy highlights the bombing of Great Britain as an example of why the German bombing campaign failed. The purpose of the German air campaign after Hitler ended the strategic bombing phase of it was to bomb Britain's cities and demoralize its people into surrendering. The bombings only strengthened the British peoples' resolve to endure in the face of the bombs. Hitler's gaze was now fixated on the Soviet Union and he wanted to keep the bombing pressure on the British, as all ground forces were needed for the Soviet campaign.¹³ Many feared an increased intensity in the bombing campaign before Hitler would focus back on Britain if the Soviet Union were defeated quickly. This did not happen and soon Allied bombs were raining down on Germany nearly every day. But, like the British, the German people did not demand an end to hostilities. One wonders how this can be, given the sheer volume of bombs dropped on German cities and devastation that they caused. Overy explains that researchers must include the willingness of millions of local Germans to participate in civil defense work, first aid

¹² Overy, Richard. *The Bombers and the Bombed: Allied Air War Over Europe, 1940-1945*. (New York, NY: Penguin Group. 2013), p. 27

¹³ Ibid, p. 248

organization, and the provision of welfare to the suffering.¹⁴ One of the strongest points that Overy makes in regard to explaining his book is here, where he states that the effect of the bombing campaign did not drive the people to support capitulation, but actually drove them closer to the state and the Nazi Party to save them. Here is where the Nazi government exploited racial policy to satisfy German civilians by using Jewish dwellings as shelter and forced labor to clear away the debris that resulted from the bombings.¹⁵ This and other factors ensured no collapse of the Germany population.

Overy continues in the later chapters of his book to show the results and dilemmas that Nazi-occupied territories faced when the Allies bombed their own countries. This is particularly true of France, Belgium, and others in Europe under Nazi occupation. Allied bombs would fall on these countries as well and cause significant loss of life amongst the populations that the Allies were trying to liberate, leading to formal protests of officials from the bombed countries and a questioning of how effective the Allied bombing campaign was even as the people the Allies were trying to liberate were dying under Allied bombs. No more was this more evident than in France. The French wanted the Allies to win and the Germans to lose, but they suffered considerable casualties under Allied bombing runs. This is another strength of Overy's book, where he describes how friendly areas also suffered under the Allied bombing campaign. He tries to connect the reader with the local population who were under threat of death from bombers flying thousands of feet in the sky. It is facts like this and others discussed earlier that sets this book apart from any other book about the Allied bombing campaign. Many books are out there on the subject, but I cannot think of any of these books that look at the

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 316

¹⁵ Ibid, p. 317

campaign from the viewpoint of the bombed and how it succeeded and, most importantly to Overy, how it failed.

In other areas of the war, the Soviets exercised particularly harsh tactics against the Germans, especially as its armies took over previously conquered German territory and began pushing into Nazi Germany itself. Due to the barbaric acts of the German army, especially of its SS units, towards its civilian population, which included mass executions and rape, Soviet commanders did not deter their soldiers from taking revenge on German soldiers and civilians in kind. Reprisal killings, looting, and rape of German women were common atrocities committed by Soviet forces that they marched towards Berlin. These atrocious acts served to put fear into many German civilians, who hoped that when Germany fell, it would be to the Americans and the British. Many fled the eastern areas of Germany in order to escape the Soviet onslaught. These were other factors that led to Germany's capitulation during the war, factors that can be more loosely applied as reprisals for German actions in both Britain and the Soviet Union. But this essay will focus on the German mistakes and errors made that helped contribute to its defeat.

1.2. German Strategy

The first category deals with German strategy, both economically and militarily, and what could have been had things gone differently for Germany. This is a controversial subject because it breeds much speculation as to predict what could have happened. Information is based on analyzing past mistakes to come to a reasonable thesis. The first book in this area is Williamson Murray's Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe, 1933-1945. While the title may suggest Luftwaffe operations before WWII,

the vast majority of the book concentrates on Luftwaffe strategy during the war. In his work, Murray's thesis is that the Luftwaffe, while a mighty force at the beginning of the war, was continually hampered by material shortages, incompetent leadership, and a dependency on quick victories to survive, which is well proven thesis these days due to the numerous other works that have been written about the Luftwaffe, but in 1986, when Murray's Strategy for Defeat was published, it was more of an exploratory area of study. At the beginning of book, Murray shows how even during German involvement in the Spanish Civil War, there were problems in the Luftwaffe, such as pilot attrition and overuse of aircraft to the point where they had to be written off. The Luftwaffe command also suffered from a belief in German invincibility after the fall of Poland and France. During this march across Europe, the Luftwaffe also helped sow the seeds of resistance in the conquered countries. The indiscriminate bombing and dive bombing of civilian centers in West and East Europe had the opposite effect on the population in that it angered the locals into forming underground resistance movements that would prove invaluable when the war turned against Germany later in the war. Hitler then committed one of his biggest mistakes with his invasion of the Soviet Union. The rate of attrition was exceptionally high among German pilots, many of whom were rarely rotated out of duty until they died. This resulted in numerous pilot and aircraft losses that the Reich could not sustain. Added to the mix of Luftwaffe problems were the constant British and American bombing campaigns. Here the Luftwaffe high command failed to move units around to the industrial centers that were being continuously bombed. Only later was this done, but it was too late to save the Luftwaffe. In the end, the inflexibility of the

Luftwaffe high command to change their strategy during the war would result in the ultimate demise of the Luftwaffe and Germany.

After reading Strategy for Defeat, it would seem that Murray's thesis is proven correct. From day one of Luftwaffe operations, it was mired in inefficiency, incompetent leadership, and inflexibility. It is interesting how he goes all the way back to the Spanish Civil War to point out problems in the Luftwaffe even as it was wreaking havoc over Spain. He even points out unusually high losses during the Polish and French campaigns to support his thesis. Even when the Luftwaffe was at its peak, it was already showing its weaknesses. It relied too heavily on imported fuel supplies and concentrated its fuel production facilities instead of decentralizing them. Luftwaffe Reichsmarshal Hermann Goering also believed, as did many in the Nazi high command, that the air force was there to support the army through tactical strikes to key infrastructure and military installations and did not believe that it would need long range heavy bombers for this purpose. This caused the country to fail to develop any real heavy bomber for the coming campaign in Russia or to be able to hit the mainland U.S. once it entered the war on the side of the Allies. The war in Russia subjected the Luftwaffe to a long war that it was not built for, which Murray points out numerous times in detailed charts on aircraft losses and write-offs, attrition rates, and aircraft availability. While the Luftwaffe experienced much success against the Soviets early in the campaign, much as in the Western front, new planes and more trained pilots would reverse the gains made by its fighters. Superior planes were coming out on the western front, while in the east, the Soviet Union was putting out massive numbers of the fighters to overwhelm the Luftwaffe. It would seem, after analyzing Murray's thesis, that the Luftwaffe had been

set up for its defeat even before WWII started. Hitler above all did nothing to help the Luftwaffe succeed. He did not push for heavy bomber production, changed strategies over Britain and the Soviet Union, and did not have German industry decentralized. The Luftwaffe high command refused to believe that their air force could be defeated even though its strategy was fatally flawed. Murray's thesis needed to concentrate on this as being the deciding factor in the defeat of the mighty Luftwaffe.

The next review is Bevin Alexander's How Hitler Could Have Won World War II: The Fatal Errors that Led to Nazi Defeat. It offers critical analysis of how Hitler failed to react to favorable circumstances or failed to change his military strategies in the face of superior forces from the east and west. His central thesis is that with victory in over Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East at his fingertips, Hitler changed his tactics and embarked on a trail that would lead to Germany's destruction.

Hitler had Europe at its knees after the fall of France in 1940. It was his greatest victory and he next wanted Britain to capitulate, but first the Royal Air Force had to be defeated. Hitler had the RAF on its knees at the start of the Battle of Britain, but here he made his first great blunder when he had the Luftwaffe switch from strategic to terror bombing in response to a British bombing raid on Berlin. If Hitler had continued to bomb key RAF industries and facilities, he could have invaded and captured Britain. His next mistake was failing to recognize a great opportunity in North Africa, where Field Marshal Erwin Rommel was pummeling the British in Libya. If Egypt fell, the oil rich Middle East was Germany's for the taking. Hitler failed to commit just a few divisions that Rommel needed for victory, instead focusing on his greatest blunder, his invasion of the Soviet Union. It also committed Germany to a two-front war, which it could not

sustain. But Hitler ignored his generals' concerns and ordered the invasion anyway. His persistence in a victory even after the debacle at Stalingrad caused such enormous loss of supplies and manpower that it prevented him from building up his forces along France and Italy to prepare for the inevitable Allied invasions to come. He failed to commit the necessary forces to beat back Allied invasions in Italy and Normandy. His obsession and hatred of communism would be his undoing. His last ditch efforts at Kursk and the Ardennes to thwart the Allies from invading Germany only sped up the process that brought about Hitler's demise and Germany's surrender.

An analysis of Alexander's thesis reveals it to be proven very correct, but yet it is a very broad reaching thesis. It does cover all of Hitler's mistakes, but it is not specific enough about what made Hitler do this. There was nothing about his hatred of communism or the Jews (who he figured were behind the rise of the Soviet Union) that often drove his many impractical decisions after his victory over France. He was driven by ego and madness, which Alexander makes all too apparent when one realizes just how Hitler failed to learn from his mistakes and refused to allow a retreat. Hitler manipulated military operations during the invasion of Russia to suit his personal goals. He wanted Stalingrad captured at all costs, mostly because it carried Stalin's name in it and it would deal a great blow to Stalin's power. His all-out attack on Stalingrad diverted troops from the Moscow campaign, whose capture might have resulted in the capitulation of the Soviet Union more so than Stalingrad's capture would have. When this battle turned against Germany, instead of saving his forces, Hitler ordered no retreat, which resulted in an entire army group being captured, an army group that could have been saved and used for other Russian campaigns. Alexander's thesis does need to be narrowed down a bit,

but it was a fascinating look at what could have been if it had not been for Hitler's incompetence and madness. He also should not have focused too much on the discredited theory that Hitler did not listen to any of military advisors, which limited the perspective of the book, as pointed out in *Publishers Weekly* that "he omits discussion of the general's consistent collaboration with their Fuhrer in military matters, or about the absence of significant dissent throughout the war."¹⁶

In his book, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy, Adam Tooze goes into great detail about how the German economy was molded to suit the Nazi's needs. Germany was in the midst of a deep economic depression when Hitler became chancellor in 1933. He sought to make Germany and independent of foreign materials, which required a remaking of the German economic structure that existed during the Weimar Republic years. In doing so, Hitler propped up the economy and gave jobs to millions of working-class Germans, though most would be in the war industries as Hitler began rebuilding Germany's military. But in doing so, Hitler set up Germany for its own demise, as military spending took up too much of the German economy from which it could not recover. Worse, once the Western Allies began bombing Germany day and night, there was no way for the economy to diversify as Hitler had made the economy one that was fed by war and not by any other means. This would be a contributing factor in Germany's defeat and subsequent division by the Americans and the Soviets.

¹⁶ Review of *How Hitler Could Have Won World War II: The Fatal Errors that Led to Nazi Defeat* by Unknown, *Publishers Weekly*, Oct. 30, 2000. <http://0-web.b.ebscohost.com.rcpl.iii.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=6&sid=d2086d33-4bb2-45be-b34a-d64025160d08%40sessionmgr112&hid=128>

An interesting theory in Tooze's book is that he sees Hitler starting the war not as a show of German strength, but more as a show of German weakness. Hitler saw the poverty of Germany in the 1930s as an example of the country's limited resources. He viewed this as evident, though, not just in Germany, but across Europe. Hitler foresaw the United States as the new power in the world and, without conquering Europe and the Soviet Union and forming a self-sufficient German-dominated state, the continent would be crushed by the coming American economic juggernaut. The only problem with this idea of Hitler starting the war because of the U.S. is that it completely ignores the Nazi ideology of *lebensraum*, as well as the idea of German racial superiority. Now Tooze does discuss Nazi persecution of the Jews and says it was a contributing factor to Hitler's decisions during the war due to his paranoia about world Jewry surrounding Germany, but Tooze does not indicate that it was the driving factor as other historians have pointed out. Tooze provides much in statistical analysis and charts to show how the Nazi economy functioned and to draw relations between Germany's economic and war output. It is this analysis, though, as well as his relating of the numbers to historical narrative of Nazi Germany that ultimately makes The Wages of Destruction an excellent example of relating a wartime economy towards one of the darkest chapters in human history. While the book gets a bit long winded and the statistical facts can be a bit overwhelming, Tooze's book is none the less a well-researched and important work on a subject not usually written about by most WWII historians. This is pointed by Frank Stilwell in his review of The Wages of Destruction, commenting that

“Tooze's book carefully analyses the strategic reasons for the failure of the fascist war economy too, following what he identifies as Hitler's 'breakneck aggression' in 1938 and Germany's surprisingly easy successes at the start of the war, including the occupation of France in

1940. Tooze argues that ‘a combination of opportunism, technocratic radicalism and ideologically inspired violence’ (p.331) held sway. The undoing was not purely a matter of military miscalculations: it also reflected the political economic tensions and weaknesses of the political economic foundations of the fascist enterprise.”¹⁷

Another book in this category is Robert Cecil’s Hitler’s Decision to Invade Russia, 1941, a work that covers the mentality and reasons for Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union. In the book, Cecil covers Hitler’s preconceived obsession with conquering the Soviet Union above all else in WWII. Hitler had not wanted a treaty with the Soviet Union in 1939, but he realized that he could not take Poland without the threat of severing Germany’s economic ties to the Soviet Union. Much of Germany’s raw materials were imported from the Soviet Union in exchange for specialized goods, especially armaments. But Hitler dreamed of *Lebensraum* in the East and wanted the oil fields in the Caucasus Mountains and the wheat fields in Ukraine. With these conquered territories, Hitler would have his critical resources and growing room for Germany. However, his ideology guided his entire campaign in Russia and he would not settle for these territories until the Bolsheviks were brought down. Here is where he ultimately lost the Eastern Front. Cecil’s central thesis is that Hitler’s fixed intention to attack the Soviet Union was based on his own ideas of racial and historical characters and he threw the military into a battle that would expose Germany’s greatest weakness and continue to fight the war, not for victory, but for his own ideological preconceptions.

After reviewing his thesis, it is hard to find how Cecil was not correct.

Germany’s generals, according to Cecil, knew that an attack on the Soviet Union needed

17 Stilwell, Frank. Review of *The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy* by Adam Tooze. *Journal of Australian Political Economy*, Jun. 1, 2011. http://0-web.b.ebscohost.com_rcpl.iii.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=5&sid=124b9a3d-3503-4b2c-9a62-b0fbbdd652c5%40sessionmgr114_&hid=112

to be won before the winter came and the Soviet military had a chance to counterattack. When victory could not happen after the winter of 1941-42, Hitler refused to listen to his generals and concentrated all of his attention on ridding the world of Bolshevism. His obsession cost Germany millions of deaths, but to the end, he believed he was right to attack. He did not fail. The German people had failed him, showing once again that his megalomania and delusion knew no bounds. Cecil's thesis shows much in terms of research and he makes the logical conclusion that Hitler lost the war in the East based on his data. His decision to invade the Soviet Union exposed Germany to its greatest peril, its lack of supplies in sustaining a long war of attrition. In the end, the vastness of the Soviet Union and its raw materials beat the Germans back, all thanks to Hitler's preconceptions of the weakness of the Slav people and his own delusional obsession. Elizabeth Bryant and Fritz Stern from the academic journal *Foreign Affairs* commented that Cecil's book was "a useful summary of Hitler's motives and Germany's planning for the invasion of Russia. The magnitude of errors on both the German and Russian sides is clearly demonstrated, as both Hitler and Stalin, prisoners of their own propaganda, underestimated each other's power and resourcefulness."¹⁸

The Holocaust cast a long shadow over Nazi Germany during the war. Hitler and other top Nazis wanted to exterminate all Jews in Europe and they used considerable resources and manpower to see their "Final Solution" to the Jewish problem solved. This has been viewed by different historians as a huge mistake of Hitler's to dedicate so much to exterminating the Jews across Europe. These resources would have served the German

¹⁸ Stern, Fritz; Bryant, Elizabeth, Review of *Hitler's Decision to Invade Russia, 1941*, by Robert Cecil, *Foreign Affairs*, Apr. 1976. <http://0-web.b.ebscohost.com.rcpl.iii.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=4&sid=d2086d33-4bb2-45be-b34a-d64025160d08%40sessionmgr112&hid=128>

military better in their battles across the continent. However, there is one author who sees the Holocaust as being more sinister in nature than is written in the history books. In his book, Hitler's Shadow War: The Holocaust and World War II, Donald McKale believes that the Nazis, Hitler in particular, started World War II in order to kill all Jews on the continent. This idea is extremely disturbing, that millions were to die just so that Hitler, Himmler, and other radicalized Nazis could murder millions of Jews and other groups that were deemed inferior to the German race. McKale's thesis is based on research on Nazi officials, conversations, and documentation of Nazi atrocities committed against the Jews. Seized Jewish businesses, bank accounts, and property helped to finance the build-up of the German war machine prior to the start of the war. Before he started the war, Hitler even had the idea to keep some Jews in Germany as hostages in order to dissuade the Western powers from going to war against Germany, an indication of the linkage he believed was between the war and the Jewish world conspiracy he believe existed.¹⁹

Throughout his book, McKale continually demonstrates how Nazi persecution related to where Hitler had the Germans invade next. He writes in a way that the reader can easily see and believe what he is saying as the absolute truth. The reader believes that Hitler invaded Poland, Eastern Europe, and Russia with the express purpose of exterminating all Jews in the conquered territories because these regions contained most of the Jewish population on the continent. However, McKale also points to the power of the human spirit to rise when things were at their worst. In Russia, the harsh treatment of Soviet POWs and execution of hundreds of the thousands of other Soviets united the

¹⁹ McKale, Donald. *Hitler's Shadow War: The Holocaust and World War II*. (New York, NY: Cooper Square Press. 2002), p. 119.

people to rise up and fight against the Nazis, who were viewed as being worse than Stalin's treatment, which was a considerable accomplishment in itself considering the millions of Soviets and Ukrainians who died under Stalin's watch prior to WWII. McKale also points out how the Western Allies did not do much to protect the Jews who were being slaughtered by the thousands in the concentration camps. He does say that while most did not know it was happening, there were some who saw that Hitler began WWII as a cover for an even bigger war against all Jews and other inferior peoples in the world.²⁰ As a result, most of the Allies fought the Germans not to save the Jews, but to defeat Nazi Germany and its occupation of Europe. This leads to many misconceptions about the war, many of which continue today in that most history books see the Holocaust as a by-product of the war, not that the war was a direct result of the Nazis' goal of total elimination of the Jewish people. This is a point that McKale wants the reader to know above all else and one that he continually points out throughout the book. As a result of his deep research on Nazi documentation on the Holocaust and an obvious passion of McKale's to disprove the widely held belief for the start of the Holocaust, his book makes for an excellent read and does a wonderful job of showing another view of the Holocaust. There is, however, an issue with the way in which McKale tries to prove his thesis as correct. That issue is that he tries almost too hard in many ways to prove it. It is obvious as one continues reading that he uses sometimes scant evidence and transforms it into some form that relates back to his thesis without necessarily proving it fully. In his review of McKale's book, Geoffrey Megargee states that "in his eagerness to show that decisions were taken early, clearly, and firmly, he tends to present the case

²⁰ Ibid, p. 405

more strongly than the evidence suggests.”²¹ Despite this shortcoming and some others pointed out in this particular review, the book is still a good read and offers another perspective on one of the darkest events in human history.

One crucial mistake not covered yet is the fact that, despite the inevitability of defeat that faced Germany in 1944, the nation and the Nazi regime refused to accept defeat and would remain defiant until the entire country was ruined. And that is exactly what would happen. Never before in the history of modern warfare had a nation refused to accept surrender with the circumstances so dire. Never before had a nation’s leaders preferred the destruction of their country to ending the war before the ruination of their country could transpire. Never before had a nation’s people, faced with utter destruction if their country did not capitulate, not risen up to their government to demand surrender. The Nazis, and the German people who refused to stand up to them, allowed their country to be left in utter ruins. The question is why? Why did Germany continue to fight the war despite its inevitable defeat from 1944 on? Why didn’t the German population demand an end to hostilities even as the Soviets, Americans, and British closed in on their country from all directions? These answers are attempted to be answered by author Ian Kershaw, who wrote his book, The End: The Defiance and Destruction of Hitler’s Germany, 1944-45, on this issue. His account begins following the events of the July 20th, 1944 assassination attempt on Hitler by Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg and his accomplices. It was the last attempt by members of the German military to remove Hitler from power and try to sue for peace with the Americans and

²¹ Megargee, Geoffrey. Review of *Hitler’s Shadow War: The Holocaust and World War II* by Donald McKale. *War in History*. Apr. 1, 2008. <http://0-web.a.ebscohost.com.rcpl.iii.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=4&sid=0ce54608-f89f-4a46-83f3-4c5bb6dc4b4a%40sessionmgr4005&hid=4104>.

British. However, its failure and the subsequent executions that followed left Hitler firmly in power and further consolidated that power with other members of Hitler's inner circle. The failed attempt to kill Hitler, according to Kershaw, meant that Germany and the regime would only surrender by a total military defeat.²²

Throughout his book, Kershaw demonstrates how Germany, despite the walls closing in all around it, continued to defy all logic and kept fighting. As the fighting worsened and the situation in Germany was getting more and more grim, Nazi leaders, both at the regional and local levels, step up the terror campaign against their own people. Anyone who was believed to be standing against the regime or opposed the continuation of the war was arrested and quickly executed. Defeatism was not permitted despite the dire circumstances. This campaign of terror kept many in the German population in line with the Nazi regime and continued to maintain the focus on defeating the Allies even though there was no way to stop them.

The creation of the *Volkssturm*, or People's Army, was the last ditch effort by the Nazi government to keep the local populations in the fight, even though it was composed mostly of boys and old men who were ill-equipped to face the Soviets or the Americans and British. Most who fought in the *Volkssturm* would be needlessly slaughtered as the Allies continued to conquer more of Germany. However, Kershaw points out that it was here as the Allies closed in on Berlin that the local population began to resist the continuation of the war. Many towns in west Germany openly showed hostility towards the *Volkssturm* and cheered as the Americans raced through their towns.²³ The "Heil

²² Kershaw, Ian. *The End: The Defiance and Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1944-45*. (New York, NY: Penguin Press. 2011), p. 53.

²³ Ibid, p. 261

Hitler” salute all but disappeared; white flags replaced swastika banners. The people, finally seeing that the Allies could not be stopped and after many local Party leaders left in the middle of the night to escape the Allied march, rose up to try and end the fight. However, the fanatical defense of Berlin and remnants of the Wehrmacht still refused to accept defeat well into April, 1945. Only after Hitler killed himself on Apr. 30th, did the remaining leaders of the Nazi regime have the sense to end the conflict. Hitler’s death ended his reign of terror and lifted his overpowering influence from the shoulders of those who succeeded him, giving them the courage to finally end the slaughter.

Kershaw’s The End is an excellent example of a writer discussing an area of Nazi Germany that no one else had written about. There are many books that discuss the reasons why Germany lost the war, as has been discussed in other books in this essay, but Kershaw’s questions of *why* and *how* Germany continued to fight despite the fact that its leaders in the military and the government knew it would lose after 1944 are what makes his book so unique. His research into how local Nazi leaders terrorized their own citizens through executions to keep them fighting is an excellent example of answering the question of why Germany kept fighting. The Nazi regime, with Hitler at the helm, refused to accept that defeat was inevitable and they made sure that local leaders were as fanatical as they were, even if it meant killing their own people to ensure that they kept fighting. The national catastrophe—the comprehensive military defeat, physical ruination, enemy occupation, and the extreme moral decline of the Germany leadership was precisely what happened to Nazi Germany and Kershaw succeeds in answering how it happened and why it happened. The Nazi leadership and ideology was so enmeshed in Germany society that its people could not or would not turn against their leaders even as

the world closed in around them. Only when it was too late, once their country was being occupied, did German society understand the folly of why they continued to fight the war. By continuing to fight the lost war, Germany would lose millions more lives than was necessary as the country refused to see itself destroyed. Instead, as Kershaw states, the nation believed it was better to be destroyed than to capitulate. In his review of Kershaw's The End, Ed Goedeken stated that "Kershaw explains in impressive detail the factors that enabled the Germans to keep fighting but assigns the most weight to Hitler's single-minded refusal to give in and the willingness of those who surrounded him to continue the war at all cost. Hitler and his henchmen knew that defeat would be their certain death or, at best, lengthy incarceration."²⁴ It is still hard for the reader to see why and how this happened in a modern nation despite Kershaw's best attempts to answer the question. And that is the hardest issue to comprehend for the reader despite Kershaw's very factual answers.

Lastly in the subcategory of "what could have been" is another book on Hitler and Germany called Hitler's Mistakes by Ronald Lewin. It is different, though, from Alexander's book, as it covers more of the psychological mistakes that Hitler made just before and during WWII, not just the strategic mistakes. At the start of the book, Levin discusses the internal problems that Hitler was causing in the Reich, making critics today, like Levin, doubt that the Reich could have survived for a thousand years, as Hitler had claimed. Levin's central thesis points out that Hitler was so possessed with victory over

²⁴ Goedeken, Ed. Review of *The End: The Defiance and Defeat of Hitler's Europe, 1944-45* by Ian Kershaw. *Library Journal*. June, 2011. <http://0-web.b.ebscohost.com.rcpl.iii.com/ehost/detail?vid=4&sid=63ab8772-d40b-40b4-a983-dcc394a2325d%40sessionmgr198&hid=113&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhtvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=f5h&AN=61428514>

the Soviet Union that he ignored all other immediate threats, both foreign and internal, and refused to accept German defeat until the very end.

Hitler made the mistake of trying to be both commander-in-chief of all German military forces and its political leader at the same time. After he declared himself commander-in-chief, his egomania seemed to drive him to commit one serious mistake after another, particularly his decision to remain in Russia and continue to lose precious supplies and manpower in a front that could not be won after 1941. His hatred of communism and his nihilistic ideals kept him from abandoning the German position. He refused to unleash two Panzer divisions on Normandy for three days and when he gave it permission to proceed, Allied aircraft bombarded it until the divisions could not perform. His egomania hit its peak at the end of the war when he ordered all of Germany to be destroyed.

A critique of Lewin's thesis shows it to be correct, as subsequent psychological profiles on Hitler have revealed. Its focus on the Soviet Union as Hitler's ultimate mistake, to me, is his most ardent and poignant stance. Hitler's invasion of Russia committed Germany to a two-front war, which it could not fight, and committed its forces to a long, bloody conflict that it could not win. Hitler's obsession with ridding the world of communism and his unwillingness to withdraw and fight at a later time cost Germany any chance of surviving the war intact. Also, Hitler did not do himself any favors by declaring war on the U.S., which he did in response to the U.S. declaring war on Axis ally Japan. By declaring war on the U.S., Hitler committed himself to fighting an enemy that could not be bombed by any aircraft at that time and had nearly unlimited resources and manpower at its disposal. Hitler would soon find this out firsthand, both in the

bombings raids over Germany and during the Normandy landings. Had Hitler committed more of his military to the Western Front, the U.S.-British invasion probably would not have happened and an invasion would have probably been driven back into the sea. Hitler refused to commit the necessary forces to do this and instead doomed Germany because of his egotistical obsession and unwillingness to change his tactics. The book does not cover all aspects of Hitler and his reign in Germany, but the book makes a great read on a narrower subject. This view is reciprocated by Raymond Puffer of the Library Journal, who commented that “the book is erudite and stimulating, and in passing, Lewin challenges many of the conventional American views of the war. Not a substitute for traditional biographies, but highly recommended for public and academic libraries.”²⁵

1.3. The German Military

The next category of reviews deals with the military itself. The German military at the start of the war was the finest in the world. It was most technologically superior and it is amazing that such a force lost the war. It was no fault of their own, though, given the state of German leadership. The first review is over Walter S. Dunn’s Heroes or Traitors: The German Replacement Army, the July Plot, and Adolf Hitler. While the title is intriguing, the content of the book would seem not to agree. In his work, Dunn’s central thesis is that after 1943, Hitler’s generals purposefully kept back certain numbers of reserves in order to have a fighting force left to join with the Allies to fight against the Soviet Union after Hitler was killed. By killing Hitler, the generals hoped to sue for peace with the U.S. and Britain and join with them to defeat the Communists. Their

²⁵ Puffer, Raymond, Review of *Hitler’s Mistakes* by Ronald Lewin, *Library Journal*, Sept. 1986. <http://0-web.b.ebscohost.com.rcpl.iui.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=4&sid=d2086d33-4bb2-45be-b34a-d64025160d08%40sessionmgr112&hid=128>.

ranks were severely depleted by the Eastern Front, which had turned into a war of attrition. The Germans, though, were not replacing their ranks as the Soviets could. Only certain, depleted units were transferred to France and Italy in preparation for the Allied invasions. The funny thing was, as Dunn points out, was that there were hundreds of new divisions in the Replacement Army that were not used. Yes, Hitler did indeed send many replacement divisions to the Eastern Front, but not the number that he needed. He was told he was using what he had, but Dunn points out at the beginning and end of the book that his generals gave him wrong numbers in order to save the military from being completely decimated. In the end, the July 20th attempt on Hitler's life saved many soldiers on both sides from dying on the fronts and actually did help to end the war even though the attempt failed to kill Hitler.

A critique of Dunn's thesis shows that the conspiracy to kill Hitler involved much more forward thinking than I realized. In his review of the book, Daniel Blewett notes that German officers involved in the plot had been "holding back troops from the front lines" as they were needed to take down the SS units guarding power centers across Germany and in doing so, negotiate a deal to end the war.²⁶ The bits of information provided to support Dunn's thesis show that it is proven correct, but more is needed. One can only find points on his thesis at the beginning and end of the book. Everything else talks about German strategy, losses, and replacements on the fronts and how desperately more replacements were needed to stop the Allied advance, which was what the officers involved wanted. He does not show the conspiracy coming together. In fact, he rarely

26 Blewett, Daniel, Review of *Heroes or Traitors: The German Replacement Army, the July Plot, and Adolf Hitler* by Walter S. Dunn, *Library Journal*, June 15, 2003. <http://O-web.b.ebscohost.com.rcpl.iui.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=5&sid=d2086d33-4bb2-45be-b34ad64025160d08%40sessionmgr112&hid=128>

mentions it throughout the middle of book. While his thesis is correct and it does show the depth that the conspirators went to ensure a continued German army, Dunn needs to use more pertinent information to support it. This is where Heroes or Traitors falls way short of its intended goal. The title and thesis grab the reader's attention, but then it gets lost throughout most of the book because he does not go into depth on the conspiracy and the hope that the U.S. and Britain would side with Germany to attack the Soviet Union. He offers no further support that this would have happened had they succeeded in killing Hitler. Dunn offers no elaboration on this point and that, along with his lack of emphasis on his thesis, is his biggest failure and disappointment in his book.

Another book that looks into the military is George H. Stein's The Waffen SS: Hitler's Elite Guard at War, 1939-1945. In this work, Stein explores the origins and applications of Hitler's most elite troops during WWII. His central thesis is that while the Waffen SS was never designed to fight in a traditional war, their devotion and fanaticism toward Hitler made them to be one of the most feared and brutal divisions in the entire Germany army. When Hitler formed a division out of Himmler's SS, he chose only the racially purest and most physically fit of the SS to join the Waffen SS. While these elite troops did not significantly take part in the conquests of Poland, the Low Countries, and France, those Allies that did meet them were astounded by their fighting ability and spirit. Hitler's greatest application of the Waffen SS came as his armies were striking into the Soviet Union in late 1941. Many divisions of the Waffen SS committed atrocious crimes against the Russians, especially toward the civilian sector, where they murdered at least half a million innocent people in the span of only about six months. They were simply following orders, as Stein believes. Fanatic defenses and a willingness

to die for their leader amazed the troops on both sides of Germany. The fanaticism of Waffen SS members, coupled with their heinous crimes committed against the civilian populations in Western Europe and across Russia, also contributed to steeling the resolve of the conquered countries to fight back against the Germans and defeat them to rid themselves of the Nazi scourge. In the end, many of their crimes were brought into the spotlight during the Nuremberg trials, where many were sentenced to death or long terms in prison.

After analyzing Stein's thesis, it almost seems to me that he was being too nice towards the Waffen SS. They did so many horrible to the civilian sector in every country that that they had a presence in. They were so brainwashed by their elite training that they blindly followed a madman into any situation he placed them in. As Stein pointed out, they were never intended to fight with the Army. They were intended to suppress rebellions in conquered territories and "cleanse" the population of the impure. This caused many thousands of deaths of innocent people, particularly those in the Soviet Union. Hitler had made sure that they hated the Slavic people before he unleashed their cruelty along with his armies. It is no wonder that many were singled out for revenge by partisans and Russian troops. And yet, despite their willingness to commit inhuman acts, they proved to be some of Germany's best troops. Retreat was rarely if ever an option for a Waffen SS member. Waffen SS panzer divisions were some of the most feared in all of Europe by both the West and East. Stein's thesis is a valid one, but he tries to play down the cruelty by which they followed Hitler's orders. They were simply following orders, orders that they were taught could not be disobeyed. These brainwashings made them commit their heinous acts. The Waffen SS was a cruel means of controlling a foreign

land and its application to Europe would result in its condemnation as being an evil force filled with murderers. It is evident today as it was then. They may have been Hitler's best troops in the Army, but they were pawns in his twisted mind to "cleanse" the peoples of Europe. And in the end, many of them, about a third of them according to Stein, paid the ultimate price for their obedience.

A third book in this category is Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich by Omer Bartov. In this work, Bartov tries to discredit the idea that the Wehrmacht was in charge of Hitler and that it ruled Nazi Germany. His central thesis that Hitler was the supreme leader of the Wehrmacht and that he instilled Nazi ideology into the army, causing them to believe in whatever he said as being ordained and causing their abandoning of all reasoning and morals. Bartov points to two factors that lead to Nazi defeat: 1) the demobilization of the German Army that caused the loss of the Primary Group and, 2) the perversion of discipline in the army that caused a distortion of reality. In the Soviet Union, the army was divided up to conquer the vast space of Russia, but this demobilization of the army did not give the Germans the necessary strength to conquer the Soviet Union. After the debacle at Stalingrad, this also caused much of their primary army groups to be chopped up piecemeal, causing a severe shortage of Germany's best and most experienced troops. The second factor happened because the Nazi government had instilled in its troops that it was ok to slaughter Soviet civilians because they were subhuman. Because they were supposed to follow Hitler above all else, many German troops abandoned all reason and believed to the very end that Hitler would save them, resulting in unnecessary losses and the prolonging of the war.

After analyzing Bartov's thesis, it is interesting that he used strategic and psychological reasoning to come to a correct conclusion. The German forces needed to be centralized in order to concentrate the full brunt of their military strength into the heartland of the Soviet Union. By spreading out their forces, they left themselves open to massive counterattacks by the Soviets, attacks that may not have been successful had Germany concentrated its forces. The destruction of its most experienced army groups caused Germany to lose its footing in the Soviet Union and replacement army groups could not stop the Soviet juggernaut. The psychological aspect of Bartov's thesis is his most intriguing point. Because Nazi ideology believed that the Slavic people were subhuman, its leaders instilled this hatred into the soldiers and it gave them permission to commit brutal acts against the Soviets. This abandoning of all morals caused the Soviets to band together in order to prevent further killings and instilled revenge on their minds, which is in itself was a powerful motivator and it gave the Soviets an excuse to do to the Germans what the Germans had done to them. Reprisal killings were all too common on the Eastern Front. This idea of ignoring all morals caused the soldiers to have very skewed views of reality. This fell in line with the next event, when they placed all of their hope in their Fuhrer to deliver them from defeat. In abandoning their reasoning, the soldiers would cause their own demise and prolong a war that they could not win. D. E. Showalter acknowledged this in his review of the book for *Armed Forces and Society*, saying that "the army increasingly internalized Nazi ideology, not because that ideology distorted reality, but because it explained reality, the specific reality of the Eastern Front, plausibly and convincingly."²⁷ This fact is by far Bartov's most interesting and

²⁷ Showalter, D.E., Review of *Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich* by Omer Bartov,

controversial point, but he does a great job of showing just how Nazi ideology affected the course of the war for Germany.

Lastly in this category is B. H. Liddell Hart's The German Generals Talk, an account of how the war was fought based on the views of many captured German generals after the war. His central thesis is that Hitler's generals were the most finely tuned in Europe, but they failed adopt new strategies and tactics soon enough and let Hitler run Germany into the ground. Many of Hitler's generals did not think that Hitler could successfully run the war and doubted his abilities. He did succeed in drawing up a plan to capture France that very few of his generals believed could work. They feared another slugfest, like in WWI. However, Hitler's plan would result in the capitulation of France in six weeks and he would dominate all of Western Europe. Despite this, his generals in the Mediterranean felt that Hitler refused to provide resources to valuable areas, especially Rommel, who could not press his attack into Egypt and drive the British out because of it. Instead, his gaze was fixed permanently on the Soviet Union, which he attacked against many of his general's advice. Leaders on the Eastern Front missed opportunities to take Moscow and Stalingrad before Russian reinforcements arrived to turn the tide. Hitler changed commanding generals on the Western Front after the D-Day landings, which he allowed by not bolstering up coastal defenses, as Rommel wanted. As Hart points out, most of Hitler's generals blamed him for all of Germany's shortcomings and its defeat.

Armed Forces and Society, Mar. 1, 1993. <http://0-web.b.ebscohost.com.rcpl.iii.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=9&sid=d2086d33-4bb2-45be-b34a-d64025160d08%40sessi%40onmgr112&hid=128>

After reading Hart's account and looking at his thesis, the generals seem to have proven him correct. If Hitler had stayed out of the equation, victory may have been Germany's. His unwillingness to fall back in Russia resulted in the annihilation of many of his armies, including Stalingrad and Kursk. He refused to listen to his generals when they advised him to throw more support to Germany's Mediterranean and North Africa campaigns, which could have taken the British out of the area and instead became obsessed with victory in the Soviet Union no matter the cost. But Hart did point out that the generals did miss opportunities as well, placing the spotlight on them for some of Germany's defeats. This becomes evident after reading many of the interviews he did with captured generals. Many of them agreed that leaders like Manstein and Rundstedt missed opportunities to finish off the Russians and British. When taking this into account, all of the blame cannot be placed on Hitler. While it is true that they failed in many ways, it is obvious that Hitler was pulling their strings. His word was final and few stood up to him. Only a few did when they attempted to kill Hitler on July 20, 1944. This resulted in a severe purge of Nazi leadership, where even Rommel committed suicide. Hitler ruled all and his will brought the end to Germany above all else. His plans worked at the beginning of the war, but his obsessions and "no retreat" statements, combined with certain generals' ineptitudes, caused Germany to lose the war.

1.4. Resistance to Hitler

The next category of reviews deals with resistance to Hitler. Germany was not the unified country that the Nazis had wished to portray to the outside world. Many people do not realize that Hitler had resistance within his own government and not just in the countries he occupied. It is important that this is made known and that works on the

subject get noticed. The first book is Hans-Adolf Jacobsen's July 20, 1944: Germans Against Hitler, which provides an account of events leading up to the failed assassination attempt on Hitler on that date. Besides the usual resistors, such as oppressed political and religious leaders, there were high-ranking generals who had called for or planned on arresting Hitler to save Germany from annihilation. But, as Jacobsen's central thesis points states, the resistance to Hitler lacked a popular uprising of German citizens and cohesion between the various conspirators during the war and all attempts failed to usurp Hitler.

Speaking of a lack of an uprising against the Nazi leadership, one of the issues that comes up frequently when talking about the German resistance to Hitler deals with the greater German population, that they knowingly put a dictator in charge of their country and approved of his messages of war and genocide towards Jews. Or the indifference the civilians of the Germany had towards the concentration camps that were near many population centers. Most claim that they did not know what was happening in the camps, a claim which is still debated among historians. Did the German people entranced with Hitler because of his promises of a restoration of German power in Europe or did they knowingly submit to Hitler and did not care what he did once there? Hitler and his messages of German power and racial purity came at a time when Germany was deep in an economic depression and its people were struggling to get by. Hitler, who was a master orator, fed on this despair and succeeded in becoming the Chancellor of Germany in 1933. This happened despite the fact that Hitler blamed the Jews for the problems of Germany and elsewhere in the world and called for their

elimination from German society, though he did not specify how this would be accomplished. Yet, the German people went along with him.

A critique of Jacobsen's July 20, 1944 reveals his work to be a statement that all was not well within the Nazi regime as is often the opposite of what most view the government. Even with its successes early in the war, resistance to Hitler continued to grow as his oppressive policies tightened. The conspirators were motivated by a love of Germany and did not want to see the country destroyed as some saw what was coming after Nazi defeats at Stalingrad and El Alamein. Jacobsen goes a long way to showing that Hitler was the one keeping Germany on the cutting block. His thesis is proven correct in that all attempts did fail and even those that were thought successful did not obtain the popular uprising that they required for success to be complete and, in fact, more Germans were killed after July 20, 1944 than in the previous four years before. However, I believe that his thesis could go a bit further or been narrowed down a bit. The book could be almost dedicated solely to military's role in the resistance and not the other movements. By not doing this, however, the book is left for further speculation and research through future books on specific areas of the resistance within Nazi Germany, including its overall message of oppression only breeding resistance.

The next work is another on German resistance during WWII. It is David Clay Large's Contending with Hitler: Varieties of German Resistance in the Third Reich. There were many other factions within Germany that were attempting to overthrow the Nazi government. Working class citizens, most involved in illegal trade unions, and Jews made up the bulk of public resistance to Hitler, but their resistance was unorganized and lacked public support as most Germans supported the regime. Resistance from religious

sectors also lacked support, although it was often easier for priests and pastors to oppose Hitler openly in the beginning, as it was not until later that the Nazis cracked down on all religious opposition with brutality, sending hundreds of church leaders to the concentration camps. He also touches on a little known group of resisters known as the Kreisau Circle, an organized group of aristocrats, socialists, various Jesuit and Protestant clergy leaders, and Foreign Office officials.²⁸ The group met in secret at different locations within Germany, planning for the eventual state of Germany once Hitler was removed. Clay indicates that the group did not favor assassination as a method of overthrowing the regime, but had links to Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg's attempted assassination attempt of Hitler on July 20, 1944. In fact, as the connection to Stauffenberg indicated, the greatest resistance to Hitler came, in fact, from within his own military ranks. There were many leaders of army who believed that Hitler would bring down the empire he had created and some who even openly opposed his brutal politics. The resistance would come down to Colonel Stauffenberg and a handful of officers to carry out the ultimate goal of all of the resisters, the assassination of Hitler and peace talks with the West. Throughout the book and its many essays, Large's central thesis points out that the resistance to Hitler shows that the Germans were not a unified people under Nazism and that many even refused to adopt Nazism.

After reading this work, it occurs to me that it is rather difficult to read a historical account of such an issue as German resistance to Hitler when it has multiple authors. Different writers have differing views on which form of resistance was best or if it even

²⁸ Large, David Clay. *Contending With Hitler: Varieties of German Resistance in the Third Reich*. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 100

succeeded. It also means reading different types of writing because each writer had a particular writing style and the book itself, while informative, did not flow well during any one part. Large's thesis is also one that seems obvious when one considers what happened within Germany. Any oppressive dictatorship, no matter how popular at first, is going to have its resistors, internal or external. His thesis is much too broad and I feel its needs to be narrowed down to a particular group of resistors that he feels was the group most responsible for the resistance, be it the military or the civilian sector. It also needs to be written in a manner that flows better, either through revisions in the other writers' essays or by Large using the other writers' research as sources for a completely new work. However, for a general overview of the resistance to Hitler, the book would be quite useful for this in spite of its lack of flow and a more centralized thesis. This fact was pointed in Agnes Peterson's review of Large's book, where she commented that "the essays have been carefully and competently edited by David C. Large, who also wrote a perceptive and well argued conclusion."²⁹

Relating specifically to a single individual who resisted Hitler and the Nazis, Eric Metaxas's work, Bonhoeffer: Pastor, Martyr, Prophet, Spy, is a story about how Dietrich Bonhoeffer, a Protestant minister who inspired those around him to be faithful in their religion and reject the dark forces of the Nazis. A scholar who took up the robes of the ministry, Bonhoeffer's speeches and sermons denouncing the tyranny of the Nazis and their brutal tactics of suppressing their own people made him a target of the Gestapo, who followed his every move. He was arrested multiple times, but continued to preach

²⁹ Peterson, Agnes, Review of *Contending with Hitler: Varieties of German Resistance in the Third Reich* by David C. Large, *Central European History*, Sept. 1, 1992. http://0-web.a.ebscohost.com.rcpl.iii.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=7&sid=f04251a3-988a-49a2-929b-43a06ca75313%40sessionmgr_4002&hid=4101

against Hitler's government. He was also a conspirator in attempts to assassinate Hitler, especially during the attempt on July 20, 1944. However, he was already in prison when Stauffenberg planted the bomb that failed to kill Hitler when it went off. He escaped from prison, but was captured and moved from Buchenwald concentration camp to Flossenburg prison where he was executed on April 8, 1945 as the Allies closed in on the prison he was in.³⁰

The book is written very well and the chronology of Bonhoeffer's life flows quite easily as Metaxas seeks to bring Bonhoeffer's resistance to the Nazis to the public eye. He sees Bonhoeffer as an unsung hero living within Germany and who did not let the Nazis silence his message, even after repeated imprisonment and the threat of death hanging over his teachings. In order to discover who the man was, Metaxas's work shows a large amount of research, not just from documents on him, but from those who knew him and the resistance that he supported up until his death. Metaxas tells just how devoted a man Bonhoeffer was to God and how he believed that Bonhoeffer was doing God's work trying to help Germany survive Hitler's reign. The detail with which he writes about this devotion and the danger Bonhoeffer faced makes the reader feel he/she is right there with Bonhoeffer as he fights for what he believes in.

One interesting section that Metaxas included in his work was the chapter on July 20 attempt on Hitler's life. It was for this reason that Bonhoeffer was executed, but Metaxas does not seem to give more credit to him for his part in the plot. It is only towards the end of the book, when he points out the discovery of an associate's diary that pointed to Bonhoeffer as a conspirator, that Metaxas explains Bonhoeffer's involvement

³⁰ Metaxas, Eric. *Bonhoeffer: Pastor, Martyr, Prophet, Spy*. (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson. 2010), p. 527-528.

and reason for his execution.³¹ He also did not explain the theological issues of Bonhoeffer's teachings and the conflicts he faced, as described by Steve Young in his review of the book, saying that "Metaxas tells a compelling story, but his portrayal of theological issues is weak and slips into caricature. Nonetheless, the book will communicate with its intended evangelical audience."³² Despite this oversight on his part, Metaxas's Bonhoeffer is an excellent, well written read and tells how one man stuck to his Christian beliefs and took on the Nazis and inspired others to do the same, even though he knew it could result in his death.

1.5. Military and Civilian Losses and the War's Result

The next category deals directly with military and civilian losses and results of the war for Germany. The Germans suffered immensely during the war and I feel that it is an area forgotten under the umbrella of victory in Europe. The first book is Martin K. Sorge's The Other Price of Hitler's War: German Military and Civilian Losses Resulting from World War II. In this account of Germany during WWII, military and civilian losses are covered in extreme detail from every angle, from combat losses to civilian losses due to Allied bombings to deaths by partisans. Sorge pulls out all the stops to show just how Germany suffered during the war. He covers the number of prisoners of war on both fronts. He also describes many of the atrocities committed on the Eastern Front by both, many of which that are too brutal in nature to list. Even more shocking in his book is the number of people who were displaced in Germany as the war turned south for their nation. His research is so extensive that one can only wonder how he got ahold

³¹ Ibid, p. 529

³² Young, Steve, Review of *Bonhoeffer: Pastor, Martyr, Prophet, Spy* by Eric Metaxas, *Library Journal*, Jun. 6, 2010. <http://0-web.b.ebscohost.com.rcpl.iii.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=4&sid=0069c871-266b-4d98-9391-eb349711e83a%40sessionmgr110&hid=127>.

of all of his sources. However, Sorge subtly points out that Germany suffered greatly and wants to convey sympathy towards the country through his work. His central thesis is that the German people suffered incredibly during the war as is evident from statistics after the war, accounting for nearly 17% of total world casualties of WWII.

After analyzing his thesis, it is apparent that Sorge's thesis is based more on statistics than on a hypothetical question that he is seeking to prove. Most would agree that Germany suffered severely, especially at the hands of the revenge-minded Soviets as they advanced into Germany. Sorge proves this through astounding research into the losses Germany incurred during the war in both the military and civilian sectors. Retribution on Germans was severe in countries that they had captured and atrocities were committed on both sides. Sorge's greatest strength is his statistical analysis of all of Germany's losses to point out just how much they suffered. At the end, he wants to convey sympathy towards Germany and its suffering, which he feels is often forgotten in annals of WWII history. His greatest weakness is that he did not formulate a thesis based off of anything else but numbers. This thought is echoed in Charles Burdick's review of the book, stating that "Sorge has read extensively, but he has not pulled his reading into a coherent, purposeful text" as well as stating that "the book poses an interesting premise and is the result of extensive research. Unfortunately, the creative thought and labor are not enough."³³ The entire book is filled with numbers and stats, but not much else. His information about certain battles or events acts as filler for his statistical evidence in order to prove his thesis, or what he calls a thesis, correct. Sorge's book shows a great

³³ Burdick, Charles, Review of *The Other Price of Hitler's War: German Military and Civilian Losses Resulting from World War II* by Martin K. Sorge, *American Historical Review*, Apr. 1, 1988. <http://0-web.a.ebscohost.com.rcpl.iii.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=8&sid=f04251a3-988a-49a2-929b-43a06ca75313%40sessionmgr4002&hid=4101>

range of statistical research, but it fails to provide enough reason to go along with numbers.

The second review is over H. R. Trevor-Roper's The Last Days of Hitler. In this work, he covers the last few days of Hitler's existence and many of his last orders, testaments, and acts of insanity that he issued before he killed himself on April 30, 1945. His central thesis is that he wanted to establish the facts surrounding Hitler's death and thereby prevent a myth that he was still alive, much as had happened when previous dictators had been killed (ex: in ancient Rome, Nero look-a-likes sprang up after he was murdered). Hitler had kept only who he perceived to be the most loyal and ardent of Nazis in his closest circle, but by April, 1945, many had left him. Himmler had achieved incredible power within the SS and during the last days of April, had deserted Hitler and left Berlin. Goering, Hitler's appointed successor, had fallen out of favor with him. Hitler issued final orders for the final attack against the Russians and called for the destruction of Germany if it failed. He declared Himmler and Goering to be traitors and to be shot on sight. His last act may have his most merciful—he married his long time partner, Eva Braun. But even his last orders were not followed, as his self-appointed leaders surrendered days later.

A critique of Trevor-Roper's thesis, interestingly enough, is correct because he accomplishes what he desired. After Hitler had died, stories circulated that he was indeed still alive. But he uses diary evidence, along with eye-witness accounts that Hitler, whose mind and body had reached the end, had indeed committed suicide and that his body, along with Eva's, had been burned to prevent a repeat of what happened to Mussolini after he was killed by partisans. It is interesting after looking at his thesis that

there would even be those who would support such a claim that he could still be alive. His closest associates had abandoned him, betraying him in his eyes. He issued their death sentences and called on all Germans to destroy their country, showing just how deep he had plunged into his psychosis. The years of stress, drugs, physical and mental ailments had finally caught up to Hitler at the end. But his subordinates realized that his power died with him and his last suicidal orders were not followed as a result. They seemed to be glad that the madman who had brought them to their current state was gone. That is why it is hard to see why many would choose to believe that he was alive. The evidence supports Trevor-Roper's thesis and it is still proven even in today's history books. Hitler did the world a favor when he ended his life and with him, ended Germany's fruitless will to continue to die in a lost war. He would not return to terrorize the world again.

The last book in this category is Percy Knauth's Germany in Defeat, an account of life in Germany weeks after V-E Day was announced. In his work, the author gives an account of his travels in Germany after his nation had surrendered to the Allies. His central thesis is that even after the war as during it, Germans were still divided between who to support and who to not support, just as many had been during Hitler's reign. According to his accounts, life in his hometown of Frankfurt changed after the first U.S. planes appeared over its skies. Its munitions plant had been bombed over and over again and its workers were continuously under pressure from SS guards to keep making more despite the dangers of beatings or death if their workload faltered. He traveled to the town of Tyrol and envisioned General Kesselring's surrender of German troops to the U.S. general only weeks before. It was the last time that an army group surrendered

before V-E Day on May 8, 1945. The author next commented on the success that the U.S. and British bombings had done to Germany's industrial output. Nearly every city that Knauth went into showed evidence of the Allied bombing campaign. Industry had suffered and war would end in part because of it. The last part of his trip ended in the ruins of Berlin, where he received a tour inside Hitler's bunker. Life was simple in the bunker, but there was still a faint wisp of death and evidence of where Hitler and Eva Braun had killed themselves. Hitler and Germany were finally finished and its people had to decide who to support—the U.S. or the Russians—and opinions divided the country once again, just as the Nazis had done for twelve years.

A critique of Knauth's thesis reveals to be based not on theory, but on experience. He lived in Germany during its worst days of WWII. His vivid accounts of life in the Third Reich give a reader the impression of being there even as the walls were starting to come down on their heads, both figuratively and literally. Hitler and the Nazis had refused to surrender and their countrymen suffered as a result of it. The country was divided before on its support of Hitler. He was a demigod to some and a failure to others. Knauth points out that those who leaned towards the failure or unsupportive side often did not make it to the end of the war, victims of the SS or Gestapo. Even this reign of terror did not silence those who did not support Hitler. The same was said after Germany had surrendered. The Allies divided up Germany, but it was obvious to Knauth that the U.S. and Russia were the major players. And just like during Hitler's days, the German people were divided as to who to support. The wrong side could punish them, as Hitler's troops had done to them for years. Both sides were courted, but Knauth says that it will never be a consensus, just like at the height of the Nazi empire. Knauth also describes

cowardess and evil of the civilian population in Hitler's Third Reich, which included the perversion of German society with Nazi ideology. In his review of the book, Albert Guerard pointed out that Knauth reported "just as strikingly on the maze of human weakness and wickedness that was Hitler's Reich" and while most of the population claimed to have not been members of the Nazi Party, the German people still demonstrated "how deeply the poison of National Socialism perverted their thoughts and feelings."³⁴ Knauth's thesis is based on observation more than actual theory, but his experiences back up his thesis. He lived out his thesis and it would hard to prove him wrong. He lived in a time when Germany was at its highest and lowest points. His personal account of it, Germany in Defeat, is clear evidence of that.

As stated, the reasons for Germany's eventual defeat at the hands of the Allies were numerous and involved many parts within the Nazi hierarchy. Most of the authors believe that Hitler was the main reason for Germany's loss in WWII, but others see members of the military at fault. The end result in any of the author's thesis is same regardless: the utter destruction of Germany and the death of millions of its people, whether they were soldiers or civilians. Should Hitler have stayed out of decision making in the military and his generals had more leeway, the war could have turned out very differently. Should Hitler have died during any of the assassination plots against him, the end for Germany could have been very different and by far less destructive. But because of luck or circumstance, the war played out as it did. Germany's mistakes would cost it dearly and the country itself would be divided up, its history during the mid to late

³⁴ Guerard, Albert, Review of *Germany in Defeat* by Percy Knauth, *Nation*, July 20, 1946. <http://0-web.a.ebscohost.com.rcpl.iii.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=12&sid=f04251a3-988a-49a2-929b-43a06ca75313%40sessionmgr4002&hid=4101>.

20th century split between the capitalism of the West and communism in the East. But, as alternative histories have shown, things could have indeed been very different for Nazi Germany had its errors during WWII not have come back to haunt it.

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II. BEGINNINGS OF THE COLD WAR AND U.S. RESPONSIBILITY FOR ITS START

Most historians will agree that the Cold War began in earnest at the end of WWII in 1945 and would continue on for almost fifty years. However, deciding which country was most at fault for starting the conflict as resulted in numerous theories, each one being different from the other. Writers from both sides of the spectrum and both countries blame the other for starting the Cold War. While each side had many writers and historians that placed blame on the other, there were still others that blamed their own countries for the events that set in motion the start of the Cold War. Historians of world history usually can agree on the causes and effects of most wars, but the Cold War is a much more complicated event due to the threat of a nuclear holocaust, by-proxy fighting, political maneuvering, and ideological superiority. The question of who started the conflict is simple enough, but the answers are complex and, as stated previously, many in number.

The U.S and the Soviet Union had emerged as the two biggest winners from the war, but they could not have been further apart in their visions of the post-war world. General mistrust of each other had prevented the two nations from effectively cooperating on any future peace deals and the world was gearing up for the conflict that many nations felt was inevitable between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The major players at the start of the conflict, including President Harry S. Truman, Secretary of State James Byrnes, and Soviet leader Josef Stalin, increasingly took harder stances towards each other, as both sides fought for position in post-war Europe and elsewhere in the world. With the transition of the U.S. Presidency from Roosevelt to Truman, the policy of the U.S. changed dramatically, as Truman and his advisors took a hardline

approach towards any dealing with the Soviets. Previously, the Roosevelt administration had favored Soviet inclusion in post-war matters, but with the end of the war, Truman initiated a complete reversal of the U.S. position towards the Soviet Union. The reasons for this could have been that Truman did not possess the familiarity with Stalin that Roosevelt had nor did he have much experience in conducting foreign policy. Aided by his mentor and Secretary of State, James Byrnes, Truman believed that the U.S. had to handle the Soviets with an iron fist more so than with an olive branch. There would be no more concessions, no more loans to the USSR unless they fell in line with U.S. policy.

One of the more important figures at the start of the Cold War was U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union George F. Kennan. His recommendations while serving in Moscow would thrust him onto the national stage in the U.S., where he would become one of the leading authorities in the U.S. government on Soviet conduct. In the late 1940s, his writings inspired the U.S. foreign policy of "containing" the Soviet Union. His "Long Telegram" from Moscow in 1946 and the subsequent 1947 article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" argued that the Soviet regime was inherently expansionist. The articles stated that Russians' communist influences had to be "contained" in areas of vital strategic importance to the United States. These messages quickly emerged as the foundation of U.S. policy at the start of the Cold War, following along with the Truman administration's new anti-Soviet policy.

Truman's heavy-handed policies may also have contributed to the start of the Cold War, but it was not based on assumptions on Stalin and his plans for the post-war world. Truman, and in fact most of the U.S., saw Stalin as an evil dictator, much the

same as the country had viewed Hitler and Nazi Germany during WWII. But in invading Russia, Hitler had created enemies on both sides of Germany and the U.S. and USSR formed a marriage of convenience as it were in order to defeat their common enemy. By no means did the U.S. want to ally itself with the Soviets, whose communist government advocated the worldwide spreading of Marxist doctrine and the downfall of capitalism. Stalin himself gave the U.S. reason to dread an alliance. The dictator's purges of his own military in the 1930s sent many of Russia's best military leaders to the gulags, or state prisons, or worse, to their deaths. This left the Soviet military dreadfully unprepared when Germany invaded in 1940. Stalin also let the Ukraine starve to death when a famine hit the country in the 1930s as well, resulting in the deaths of millions. Hundreds of thousands of Russians disappeared into the gulags under Stalin's watch or were erased from all memory. The gulag system served as a poignant example for many Americans of how distrustful Stalin was, which in kind led to the distrust of the Soviet Union as a whole.

The coming essay will compare and contrast how U.S. writers saw the United States during the Cold War and will discuss and critique their opinions and conclusions for the start of the conflict. Sections in between will also show how authors viewed the United States' foreign policy at the start of the Cold War. As stated before, there is no one simple answer to the start of the Cold War. It started as the result of many issues and problems, problems that many historians see the U.S. as having caused. Peace seemed to be the last thing that U.S. politicians and military leaders wanted after the war. The Soviet Union was now the enemy and U.S. policy and attitudes did their part to show this fact.

2.1. The Works of John Gaddis

In his book, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947, John Lewis Gaddis delves into the timeframe where most historians believe that the Cold War started, after the U.S. became involved in WWII and the U.S. and USSR became suspicious partners and he explores why the US was so suspicious of the Soviets and what the country did in response to perceived demands of the Soviet Union. He points out that even before World War II started, the U.S. and the Soviet Union were already at odds with each other, even if the public was unaware. The Non-Aggression Pact that the Soviet Union signed with Nazi Germany did much to cause many in the U.S. government to be extremely wary and distrustful of the Soviets. The U.S. believed that the Soviet Union was “cozying up” with the enemy, giving the politicians and military leaders even less reason to trust the Soviets’ intentions or believe that they wanted peace in the matter. In fact, the Kremlin’s self-proclaimed mission to advocate and work for the violent overthrow of capitalism throughout the world was by far the most obvious statement made to keep the attention of the U.S. fixed on communism rather than fascism.³⁵ To the majority of President Roosevelt’s advisors, the Soviet Union was not to be dealt with lightly and would require heavy handed diplomacy and policies to contain its influence. Even before the U.S. had become involved in the war, it seemed the leaders of the U.S. government had already set up potential roadblocks to Roosevelt’s stated goals of cooperation with the Soviets.

³⁵ Gaddis, John Lewis. *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947*. (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 32.

What could have influenced Roosevelt to try to keep supplying the Soviets?

Gaddis points out his reasoning for this in his book entitled The Cold War: A New History. This main theme of this book, which is more of an updated comprehensive account of the entirety of the Cold War, is that the US felt it needed to respond to any Soviet demand, suspicion, or territorial gain with more force and more threatening dialogue to counter the increasing threat the Soviets posed to the post-war world. According to Gaddis, the greatest fear of the Anglo-American coalition was that the Soviets would sign another pact with Germany. In such an event, the British and Americans feared nearly all of Europe and the western USSR would fall under fascist rule. This caused Roosevelt to think that U.S. Lend/Lease supplies could keep the Soviets in the war.³⁶ Worse yet, and going against what many in his cabinet wanted to avoid, Roosevelt (and Churchill) were willing to not put up any fight to Stalin's demands to gain back territories lost during the war. They did this despite the fact that much of the "territory" demanded back by Stalin was, in fact, the countries of the Baltic States (Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania), eastern Poland, parts of Finland, and Romania.³⁷ The lack of a unified response by the U.S. government to the perceived threat that the Soviet Union represented showed a weakness in confronting the communists when they were first attempting to extend their influence. Roosevelt favored appeasement to fight a common enemy, while many of his advisors and Cabinet preferred to stand up to Stalin's demands for territory.

³⁶ Gaddis, John Lewis. *The Cold War: A New History*. (New York, NY: The Penguin Press, 2005), pgs. 18-19.

³⁷ Ibid, p. 19

Specifically in The Cold War: A New History, Gaddis points out an example of this policy of Roosevelt's and its failure that was demonstrated before the war had even ended. Stalin, believing he could get what he wanted in Poland because of the agreements made at Yalta, wanted to have influence over Poland, or at least the Polish half that he and Hitler had agreed to at the time of the Non-Aggression Pact between them. However, this demand caused many Poles to resist Stalin's efforts, to which he responded by imposing a communist-friendly government upon the Poles by the end of 1945. This went against the democratic elections Stalin had agreed to with Roosevelt and Churchill at Yalta. This was soon followed in other Eastern European countries that had been "liberated" by the Soviets. As communist governments were imposed upon former German occupied territories, even Roosevelt saw his error in judgment, lamenting that "Stalin has broken every one of the promises he made at Yalta."³⁸

In The Cold War: A New History, Gaddis states that it was during this time of demands by Stalin that a unique situation arose. The situation was deemed by contemporary political scientists as one of "security dilemmas", or a situation where one nation acts to make itself more secure, but in going through this process, it diminishes the security of another nation. This causes the now less secure nation to try to repair the security damages done in order to decrease the security of the first nation.³⁹ This situation is a repetitive and reciprocal one that continues to foster distrust in the rival nations. One of the biggest problems with this cycle is that it leads to suspicions becoming self-reinforced. Gaddis believes that with victory certain in the war, there was

³⁸ Gaddis, John Lewis. *"The Cold War: A New History"*. (New York, NY: The Penguin Press, 2005), p. 22

³⁹ Ibid, p. 27

no longer as much of a need to keep the Allies' concerns under control. This was demonstrated in Stalin's wish to secure his southern border with influence and Soviet troops in Iran, Turkey, and nations in the Mediterranean.

Gaddis demonstrates what both sides did to encourage the start of the Cold War, showing how the U.S. responded to perceived Soviet aggression with aggressive moves of its own. He points out that much of the foreign policy of the U.S. that would be directed at the Soviet Union was based on George Kennan's 8,000 word telegram explaining Soviet motives. This telegram, written from the U.S. embassy in Moscow, would become the basis of U.S. foreign policy against the USSR for the next fifty years. Gaddis writes that Kennan observed the Western allies were NOT at fault for the rising tension with the Soviet Union, that Soviet leadership had to regard all foreign nations as hostile in order for it to advance its communist agenda across the world.⁴⁰ Kennan believed that the only way for the Soviets to be defeated short of all-out war was by a policy of containment of Soviet expansion. In this, Gaddis shows the beginnings of U.S.-Soviet policy for the duration of the Cold War.

Gaddis notes that when the Soviets exploded their first atomic device on Aug. 29, 1949, the stakes in the Cold War escalated dramatically. Truman's administration now had to consider upgrading its conventional fighting forces as well as stationing American troops permanently in Europe to thwart any Soviet aggression. More nuclear weapons would have to be built to maintain a superior number and quality over the Soviet Union. At this time, American scientists revealed to Truman that the U.S. was capable of

⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 29

building an even more powerful “super-bomb”, the thermonuclear or hydrogen bomb, a thousand times more powerful than the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.⁴¹ The nuclear arms race had begun and the Cold War was fully set in motion. The world would either live on with the U.S. as “the” world power or it would die in the fires of nuclear war. U.S. officials decided the end result of the Cold War at this time. This demonstrates a lack of foresight by the U.S. government and shows yet another reason why the Cold War escalated due to the U.S. policy towards the Soviets.

Gaddis demonstrates a unique knowledge of the origins of the Cold War in his updated book by offering further depth and analysis on the different aspects of the conflict. With new information and source material for him to go back on, he is able to offer a more comprehensive and definitive account of the Cold War than he was able to with his first book. The book, which covers the entire Cold War and not just the origins, seeks to show how it was fought with new insight and resources. While this essay focuses on the beginnings of the Cold War, it is easy to see how Gaddis’ thesis would be proven correct with his deep knowledge of both sides and their policies and strategies for how they fought the Cold War and how, ultimately, the United States would come out as the victor of the conflict.

A comparison of these two books by Gaddis shows how his earlier account, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947, and his newer book, The Cold War: A New History, differ between each other, not by the subject they discuss, but by how Gaddis updated his writing in between the two accounts and how new information

⁴¹ Ibid, p. 36

could be used to further the reader's understanding of what the U.S. did and continued to do at the start of the Cold War. In The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947, he demonstrated his unique understanding and knowledge of the Cold War and of the factors that led to the start of the conflict. His writing offers the reader a combination of facts to support his claims, but he gives the information presented in a way that maintains a reader's attention. This is not something that is easy to do. There is a lot of information to cover in the Cold War due to its well documented history, including its origins. Gaddis covers the information in a way that does not overwhelm the reader with too many specifics and approaches the subject from a generally neutral place, though being a U.S. historian, his views were slightly biased towards the U.S.

But in his newer book, The Cold War: A New History, Gaddis probes more deeply into events of the Cold War, from its origins to its finale and he describes the political and social climate of the countries as they continued down a path that could annihilate both sides. He tries to convey the visceral reaction to events on either side and what could have happened should things have been decided differently. In one case, he describes a particular sequence of events during which General MacArthur, acting on the authority of President Truman, dropped two atomic bombs on advancing Chinese columns after China entered the Korean War. This led to Soviet bombers dropping atomic bombs on Inchon and Pusan, which resulted in an American bomber laying waste to Vladivostok, which ended the NATO alliances. None of it was true. But Gaddis writes of this and of other events so matter-of-factly that readers would almost believe them until he reveals at the end that they were not true at all. It is hard to deny that Gaddis refined his writing techniques for this newer edition of his advancement of Cold

War teachings. The question of why events happened is what makes this book such an improvement on his previous book. One of the best modern interpretations of the entire Cold War, Gaddis' book shows how the decisions of the U.S. and Soviet Union affected each other as well as their impact on the start of the Cold War and its continuation for nearly fifty years.

One of the most famous figures at the start of the Cold War was U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, George Kennan, who was the subject of Gaddis' recent biography. Kennan is well-known for his "Sources of Soviet Conduct" telegram in 1947 that was sent to leaders in the U.S. government outlining how the U.S. should handle the Soviet Union and its threats to democracy. In this telegram was born the U.S. policy of containment of the Soviet Union wherever it showed itself around the world. Most historians and readers know this about Kennan. But what else did Kennan do to influence U.S. foreign policy at the start of the Cold War? In his biography of Kennan entitled George F. Kennan: An American Life, Gaddis discusses the life and the influence Kennan had on Cold War policy. Gaddis discusses the life of Kennan, from his start in foreign policy to his retirement, though most of the book covers his time in the Soviet Union as the U.S. ambassador and how his time there helped shape U.S. foreign policy for the next fifty years.

George Kennan got his start in learning about the Soviet Union in 1933 when he was sent to Moscow to set up a new U.S. embassy when President Roosevelt officially recognized the Soviet Union. However, in his dealings with the Soviet and the U.S. government at his new post, Kennan seemed to realize that relations between the U.S.

and USSR would chiefly depend on the U.S. The leaders in the Soviet Union were very suspicious of Western intentions. Kennan stated that the U.S. “should guard the reputation of Americans for business-like efficiency, sincerity, and straightforwardness. There is no weapon so disarming and effective with the communists than sheer honesty. They know very little about it.”⁴² In order to see what the Soviet government was like, Kennan believed that honesty was the best policy. During WWII, however, the two “allies” had a difficult time of being honest with each other, as both countries were seeking to gain the edge over the other once the war turned in the Allies’ favor. Gaddis wrote that Kennan believed a pivotal moment in Soviet-U.S. relations occurred during the Warsaw uprising, when U.S. officials were turned down by their Soviet counterparts to supply the Pole resistors by air and be allowed to land in Soviet-occupied territory to refuel. This smacked of Soviet communist policy to spread its ideology into the recaptured countries of East Europe. Kennan believed that at this point, the U.S. should have given the Soviets two options: either fall in line with agreements giving Eastern Europe its independence after the war or they would forfeit Western support for the remaining phases of the war.⁴³ However, Roosevelt ensured that none of his policies towards the Soviets was altered despite Kennan’s thoughts.

After the war, Kennan remained in Moscow, where he continued to study the Soviet government and how communist ideology influenced its decisions and policies. According to Gaddis, Kennan believed that the Soviet model of government would collapse on itself eventually, as the communist party did not inspire its people, its

⁴² Gaddis, John Lewis. *George F. Kennan: An American Life*. (New York, NY: The Penguin Group. 2011), p.

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⁴³ Ibid, p. 183

propaganda was destructive, and it did not have an orderly way of replacing its leaders.⁴⁴ If the U.S. were patient and calm, the Russians would become their own problem eventually. U.S. politicians back in the states, however, favored more direct approaches to handling the Soviet Union. While following Kennan's containment policy, U.S. government officials would get the U.S. involved in wars in Korea and Vietnam in order to thwart any other communist advances. Kennan would be proven correct, however, as the Soviet Union did eventually collapse under its own weight nearly fifty years later.

Gaddis's biography of George Kennan is another example of an excellent work by one of the foremost authorities on the Cold War. Kennan was such an influential person at the start of the Cold War that his story and his ideas on how the U.S. should have fought at the start of the Cold War needed to be told. Throughout the chapters, Gaddis describes the successes and the letdowns that Kennan experienced while he was involved in foreign relations for the U.S. Confirming what many of the other authors have hypothesized in this essay, Gaddis describes how Kennan's frustrations with his own government and its handling of the Soviet Union showed the U.S. government prolonged the conflict rather than expedited it. Kennan was one of the leading authorities of Soviet Union when the Cold War started, yet his own government did not seem to follow much of his advice, other than his tactic of using a containment policy to keep the borders of the Soviet Union from growing in other countries. The domino theory and containment went hand-in-hand. Gaddis stated that Kennan's containment strategy was not designed to be perfect, but was designed to keep lesser evils from becoming greater evils.⁴⁵ This

⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 221

⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 695

meant that stopping the spread of communism in one location could prevent communist states from linking up with Moscow and forming worldwide communist organizations, viewed as one of the greatest dangers of communism. Kennan, through Gaddis' writing, argues throughout the book on things that were done wrong, mostly from the U.S. side. Gaddis does an excellent job of pointing to issues within successive U.S. administrations that Kennan was involved with and keeps the reader interested in Kennan's life experiences and how these experiences related to the pressing issue with the Soviets at the time. George F. Kennan is an excellent addition to the works on the Cold War and Gaddis demonstrates just how vital Kennan was at the start of the Cold War and how his ideas and writings affected U.S. policy at the start of the conflict.

In another of his books, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War, Gaddis discusses the actual foreign policy of the U.S. during the Cold War, focusing on factors that kept the tension ratcheted up within the government and how those factors were answered by the Soviets and vice-versa when the Soviet Union did something. The book is Gaddis' attempt to examine a more specific issue at the heart of the Cold War in the U.S. and how the country's new national security policies shaped how the U.S. fought the Cold War. He takes a look at the National Security Act of 1947 and how the act set the U.S. down a more militaristic path which was something that the nation had traditionally not allowed itself to be. For the sake of U.S. security in the world, U.S. foreign policy and its military needed to change and be ready for action at any time. Gaddis examines how and why this came to be in Strategies of Containment.

In the beginning, he describes the climate of the uneasy alliance of the U.S. and Britain with the Soviet Union following the German invasion of Russia in Sept., 1941. He begins it with a rather Faustian-like Balkan proverb that FDR spoke, saying “My children, it is permitted you in time of grave danger to walk with the devil until you have crossed the bridge.”⁴⁶ The phrase perfectly sets up the early chapters of the book, where Gaddis examines two countries that distrusted one another and had very different ideologies and somehow formed an alliance. While questionable at best, both countries combined their forces for the perceived greater good at the time, the defeat of Nazi Germany. And Strategies of Containment demonstrates the result of this Faustian agreement—the rise of an even more powerful totalitarian state in the Soviet Union and a Cold War that would last for nearly fifty years, ten times longer than the war that the two sides had fought together to win.

Interestingly enough, Gaddis points to the fact that American strategy during WWII appeared to show that the U.S. depended too heavily on the Soviets to defeat Germany and that Roosevelt and other Western Allied leaders missed the chance to both defeat Germany while containing the Soviets. Roosevelt believed that the combination of the Lend-Lease agreements with the USSR and its being the “arsenal of democracy” could help contain Soviet expansion ambitions before U.S. troops hit mainland Europe in an eventual invasion of the continent. In the earliest chapter, Gaddis shows how Roosevelt had to balance national interests in winning on two battlefields that were thousands of miles away from the mainland U.S. while at the same time hoping the

⁴⁶ Gaddis, John Lewis. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 3

Soviets would take on much of the German Wehrmacht while the U.S. and Britain built up their forces for the D-Day invasion. And Gaddis makes a profound statement about FDR's inclusion of the Soviets in the makeup of the postwar world, where Roosevelt perceived Soviet hostility to be the result of insecurity.⁴⁷ But things would change with Roosevelt's death and Truman's rise to the Presidency.

Gaddis devotes a good portion of his analysis of early U.S. national security policy to George Kennan and the policy of containment that sprung out from his "Sources of Soviet Conduct" telegram to the American government in 1947. Kennan would become the leading expert on how to stop the expansion of communism based on his observations from within the Soviet Union. The Truman administration launched this containment policy, believing it was the best way of confronting the Soviet threat without militarily confronting them. Any fighting would be fought by-proxy in other nations and not by American and Soviet troops attacking one another. Gaddis' analysis of Kennan's policy demonstrates his understanding of just what this policy would mean for the United States for the rest of the Cold War. While he gives reasons why this policy was the best that the U.S. could come up at the time and lists the steps by which it was implemented early in its inception from 1947-50, he does point out that the policy was flawed. In particular, Gaddis points out its reliance on instilling self-confidence in both allies and especially within the U.S. However, this act of assuring the public that the U.S. was ahead of the Soviets in all facets of civilian and military endeavors also created paranoia and irrational fears on the part of U.S. politicians and the public at large. Psychology after all, he says, incorporates irrational fears and rational decisions, with the fear not

⁴⁷Ibid, p. 9

going away despite the rational decisions.⁴⁸ In Strategies of Containment, Gaddis' ties public fear, war weariness, and the administrations' policies to paint a proper picture of what the country was going through early in the Cold War. This makes the book a fine example of a specific moment early in Cold War history. Gaddis clearly shows that he has a strong grasp of the subject and is willing to show the good, and more importantly, the bad side of America's policy of containment, which will dominate U.S. foreign policy for nearly fifty years afterwards.

2.2. Writers of U.S. Foreign Policy During the Cold War

The next area of coverage features authors who looked more closely at U.S. foreign policy at the start of the Cold War and the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. In his book, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, William Appleman Williams offers a very scathing look at American foreign policy and its failures going back to 1890 and American interdiction in Cuba. Williams tracked the setbacks the U.S. experienced by examining how American interdiction in foreign countries reflected upon the U.S. The country had looked upon itself as the model of democracy as well as the model of a modern day economy. This led to many cases where the U.S. intervened to further its interests by having an economic presence in the country. However, above all, Williams shows how Americans' perceived standards of morality caused its foreign policy to fail to bring about what the U.S. government truly wanted—countries to model themselves after the U.S. form of government and allow the U.S. unbridled access to all facets of its government and economy. Williams points out this in the following statement:

⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 88

“American policy is guided by three conceptions. One is the warm, generous, humanitarian impulse to help other people solve their problems. A second is the principle of self-determination applied at the international level, which asserts the right of every society to establish its own goals or objectives, and to realize them internally through the means it decides is appropriate. These two ideas can be reconciled; indeed, they complement each other to an extensive degree. But the third idea entertained by many Americans is one which insists that other people cannot *really* solve their problems and improve their lives unless they go about it in the same way as the United States.”⁴⁹

Williams applies this analysis of American foreign policy to his sections on the U.S. and its handling of the Soviet Union at the onset of the Cold War. Rather than try to uphold its high moral standing it had for itself on its self-determination principle, the U.S. chose to keep the fires of the conflict simmering after WWII ended.

Williams points out that it was a combination of fear and the belief that the communist model in the Soviet Union would eventually collapse to explain why the government continued to try to push for the Soviets to accept Western influence in Eastern Europe and prevent the Soviet Union’s own plans for the region. The Kremlin viewed the Marshall Plan as a way for the U.S. to assert its influence in Eastern Europe, which it viewed as a threat to its plans for influence and a “buffer zone” in the region. When it refused to partake in accepting U.S. money to rebuild its infrastructure, it embarked on a campaign to place Communists in governments across Eastern Europe to ensure that these countries would not fall under U.S. economic and political influence.⁵⁰ The Soviet government, perceiving the Marshall Plan as a threat to its borders, ensured that U.S. influence would go no further. Eastern Europe would be communist and the

⁴⁹ Williams, William Appleman. *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*. (New York, NY: Dell Publishing Co., 1962), p. 9.

⁵⁰ Ibid, p. 274

nations under the Soviet sphere of influence would remain cut off from U.S. aid whether they wanted it or not.

It is interesting to note in Williams' book that while he only applies the start of the Cold War to the U.S., he offers no real evidence of what the Soviet Union did or did not do that could have prompted its involvement in the start of the conflict. He seems far too interested in showing the flaws of U.S. foreign policy while not pointing out any serious issues that kept the Soviets from finding another way to prevent the start of the Cold War. While the title and overall thesis of the book would make this seem fairly obvious, blaming the start of the Cold War solely on the U.S. would seem to be a bit presumptuous. The Soviets' attitudes towards the West also helped spark the conflict as other authors have shown. Despite the fact that Williams clearly believes that it was the U.S. alone that was responsible for the start of the Cold War, he does do a very good job of relating U.S. foreign policy to rising interest within the government of trying to influence foreign nations. This is a far cry from what the country was originally founded as a model for. And according to Williams, it is a model that was intended to be a representative of what a democracy could be, not one that needed to be duplicated by others because of American influence.

While Williams' book focuses on the negative aspects of U.S. foreign policy, another author, Walter LaFeber, focuses his work, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966, on what both parties accomplished and didn't accomplish from their alliance during WWII and how each other's foreign policy decisions affected the other. The focus of the book deals more with the U.S. and the book is actually part of a series on

American diplomacy, but from the start, it is obvious that the book would focus more on the U.S. than Russia with its opening forward statement—“The United States always wins the war, but loses the peace.”⁵¹ While a bit inaccurate as the U.S. has not always won its wars outright, it nonetheless is a very crucial statement that indicates that U.S. foreign policy is flawed, which is the general theme of the book.

Soviet propaganda at the end of WWII suggested that the USSR had conquered the Nazis with little help from the West. Communist newspapers printed nationalistic stories that Russia had “liberated” Eastern European countries from the landowning, capitalist slavery of the West.⁵² Truman’s response to this propaganda was to point out that the Soviets had not retreated from the countries that it had “freed” and was in fact placing friendly communist governments into the areas that it had retaken from Germany. He also pointed to America’s nuclear monopoly and said that the U.S. would not recognize any government that was imposed by a foreign government. The use of the atomic bomb was always in the discussion of U.S. foreign policy, has it had the only nuclear arsenal in the world at that time and believed it could use its monopoly to gain compliance from the Soviet Union. WWII had barely ended and already the U.S. and Britain could see a metaphorical iron curtain descending on Eastern Europe, cutting it off from the rest of the continent.

The lines were being drawn across Europe as both sides fought for influence over the other. LaFeber, though, points out that tension between the West and East actually started as far back as 1890, nearly twenty years before the Bolsheviks took over in

⁵¹ LaFeber, Walter. *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966*. (New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1967), p. 7

⁵² Ibid, p. 1

Russia. The Czar, Nicholas II, at the time wanted what Stalin wanted—a buffer zone to protect Russia from the foreign ambitions of Britain, France, and the U.S. He sought to gain this by expanding Russian power east towards Manchuria and China, but was repelled by the Japanese during the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905.⁵³ The U.S. did not see Russian ambition in the East as being supportive of the open door policy that it wanted to spread throughout the world. WWI reinforced this idea of distrust of the Russians. As Colonel Edward House, President Wilson’s closest advisor, said in 1914, that “if the Allies win, it means largely the domination of Russia in Europe; and if Germany wins, it means the unspeakable tyranny of militarism for generations to come.”⁵⁴ This quote seems to predict the future, even though the Communists had yet to take over control of Russia and were but a small movement in 1914. Russia wanted influence in Europe despite the crumbling of its czarist empire, which is not largely known and it adds to LaFeber’s evidence that issues between Russia and the West went back many decades before the start of WWII. How many Americans would know that, even before WWI, the U.S. government already had a deep mistrust of the Russians?

LaFeber describes how the U.S. at first tried face-to-face discussions with the Soviets to get them to back down from Eastern Europe. When that failed, U.S. officials applied economic pressure on Stalin’s government in hopes of getting him to concede by blocking or delaying loans that he was seeking to rebuild the Soviet Union’s economy and infrastructure.⁵⁵ The only way the U.S. would not delay the dictator’s requests was if the Soviet Union would join the International Monetary Fund, which would open Soviet

⁵³ Ibid, p. 3

⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 3

⁵⁵ Ibid, p. 22

records to the World Bank based in the U.S. Stalin responded to this obvious threat by creating a Five-Year Plan, in which the Soviet Union would rebuild its infrastructure and become self-sufficient from the need for Western money.⁵⁶ As a result of his plan, Stalin dropped his request for the U.S. loan. It is obvious to LaFeber that the U.S. was failing in its policy of confronting Stalin and his ambitions for his communist cause.

LaFeber does not only point to just the U.S. for the initial causes of Cold War. Stalin had a part in it as well. While the U.S. was trying to figure out how to contain communism in its present borders and keep it out of places like Greece, Turkey, and China, Stalin and Russia kept indirectly supporting various communist movements across Eastern Europe and watching events around the world unfurl. LaFeber stated that Stalin seemed to be biding his time, confident that capitalistic societies would fall as communist revolutionaries continued to enjoy success in the late 1940s.⁵⁷ In addition, independence movements in the Middle East, South, and Southeast Asia were throwing off the shackles of British and French occupation and being watched by the Soviets to expand their influences abroad. However, while he wanted more influence across the globe, Stalin's ideology also ended any hope of the U.S. that economic pressure might force Stalin to relent on his communist pursuits. The Marshall Plan, which LaFeber called the end of an era, rather than a beginning, was America's last attempt to use economic pressure to subdue the Soviets. The plan, pushed through Congress very rapidly due to communist threats in Western and Southern Europe, threw billions of dollars into Western Europe to help rebuild the infrastructure and economies of the countries ravaged by WWII.⁵⁸ What

⁵⁶ Ibid, p. 22-23

⁵⁷ Ibid, p. 42

⁵⁸ Ibid, p. 52

came out of the Marshall Plan, however, was the creation of military alliances with most West European countries, which all but guaranteed that the U.S. would go to war with the Soviet Union should it attempt to invade. LaFeber indicates that U.S. officials believed the country could break the Soviet Union by itself even as it propped up countries in West Europe. Despite the fact that the United Nations had been created, the world was broken down into two parts according to him-the Communists and the anti-Communists, with the U.S. government at the forefront of the anti-Communist portion.

LaFeber points out that along with his support of communists on the continent, Stalin, more than anything else, sought to consolidate his power grip on the Soviet Union and beef up Soviet influence across Eastern Europe. Stalin even wanted Soviet scientists to remake past scientific theories to be more Soviet friendly and conformist to the state, using Pavlov's conditioning theory to feed the public with state-controlled education and laws that made people easier to control.⁵⁹ Such was LaFeber's way of showing how the Soviet Union contributed to the rise of the Cold War. LaFeber points out different ways to show the reader how both countries began the Cold War, though the reader gets a strong sense that LaFeber shows the U.S. as being the main antagonist behind it, which some historians may not necessarily agree with. While LaFeber does not cast total blame on the U.S., America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966 does cast a long shadow upon the U.S. for its foreign policy decisions during the initial stages of the Cold War. The book is still an excellent read, with ample support for LaFeber's claims while keeping the reader interested in the bigger picture that was happening prior to the start of the Korean War.

⁵⁹ Ibid, p. 87

Daniel Yergin's Shattered Peace: the Origins of the Cold War and National Security State is another detailed work on U.S. foreign policy before, during, and after WWII and what was directed at the Soviet Union after the Bolsheviks took over in 1917. Yergin's book is directed mostly at the U.S. and what happened to cause the government to harden its stance towards the Soviets after the death of Roosevelt. And while he does discuss policies within the Soviet Union that caused much of the tension within the U.S. government, most of what the Soviets did was in response to U.S. policy directed towards them.

Yergin points out that communist doctrine and ideology, along with an innate aggressiveness towards the West because of its history of foreign invasions, shaped Soviet policy, leading to its commitment to world revolution and border expansion.⁶⁰ Stalin was not a victim of an oppressive U.S. policy directed at him, but his perceived goals caused the most concern amongst the Western powers, chiefly the U.S. Because of this, American policy makers believed that the USSR required constant vigilance. On top of vigilance, questionable acts by the Soviets at the start of WWII helped fuel public animosity towards them. One such act was its non-aggression pact with Germany and its subsequent invasion of Finland, though this ended when Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941. America and Russia had a common enemy now, though the two sides clashed regularly throughout their uneasy alliance.

Yergin devotes much of the book to discussing Roosevelt's views of the Soviet Union up until his death on Apr. 12, 1945. Roosevelt had a grand design for the postwar

⁶⁰ Yergin, Daniel. *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and National Security State*. (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1977), p. 35.

world, one which included the Soviets playing a part in as long as they cooperated with the U.S. Roosevelt's grand view called for the formation of the United Nations, composed of two branches—the General Assembly, which reflected a Wilsonian peace idea of bringing all countries together in one place, and the Security Council, composed of the world's major powers, the U.S., Britain, France, Russia, and China, who would hold the supreme power to determine world policy.⁶¹ But Yergin states that this separation of the two would be a source of great discontent between the powers and be one of the leading causes of the Cold War. The idea that the formation of the United Nations itself was a leading cause of the Cold War's beginnings is almost unheard of in other historians' writings. It is impressive that Yergin concludes this fact about the UN, but after stating this, he doesn't really mention it for the rest of the chapter. He discusses the Yalta conference and Western leaders' perceptions of Stalin and his demands, but the issue with the division of the UN into two branches doesn't seem to warrant further explanation.

Yergin states that the doctrine of national security was developed to explain America's relationship with the rest of the world, born out of politics and American experience in understanding its place in the postwar world.⁶² National security ideas would influence American relations with the Soviet Union for the next fifty years with the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. This act became America's guiding act during the Cold War and kept the U.S. in a perpetual state of preparedness for any armed Soviet aggression around the world according to Yergin.⁶³ The new national security

⁶¹ Ibid, p. 48

⁶² Ibid, p. 193

⁶³ Ibid, p. 220

policy also changed how Soviet policy was interpreted and made American interests and responsibilities global and unrestricted. This new view of international affairs would fuel the desire of the U.S. to become the policeman of the world, a view that is still held to this day, thanks to the National Security Act.

Yergin maintained that U.S. interests and continued arsenal building were a primary cause for the start of the Cold War at various points in the latter half of Shattered Peace. Yergin points to the possibility of U.S. responsibility for starting the Cold War, which was indicated when Henry Wallace, Roosevelt's Vice President until 1944 and Secretary of Commerce from 1945-46, wrote a letter to Truman, detailing how many Soviet policies were being made due to Soviet interpretations of Western actions being directed at them. These included the increasing military expenditures making it look like the U.S. was preparing for an inevitable war against Russia or that the U.S. was looking to establish a force to intimidate the rest of the world.⁶⁴ The use of this letter is an excellent example of Yergin's idea that the U.S. would seem to have been the cause of the start of the Cold War. It is also an example of how the last half of Yergin's work focuses on American foreign policy issues after WWII. From American policy at home to the countries of Europe it did or did not help in rebuilding efforts, he concludes that the combination of rising anti-communist attitudes in the U.S. government, coupled with postwar policies and shifts in the military were a significant cause of the Cold War.

Yergin's Shattered Peace is an excellent example of a Cold War historian writing about issues within the U.S. government that appear to have caused the outbreak of the

⁶⁴ Ibid, p. 249

conflict. One of his most poignant ideas was his statements about the Soviet Union responding to perceived Western threats, especially those policies coming out of the Truman administration. Truman's hardline approach to dealing with the Soviets was a complete reversal of Roosevelt's policy of inclusion and he writes about the Soviet response to these threats. While Yergin does not completely write off the Soviet Union for not helping to bring about the Cold War, especially in terms of its ideology and desire to encourage world revolution and their communist ideal, he points to policies and statements from within the American government that caused the conflict to start. It is a common theme of the book and Yergin does an excellent job of pointing out facts and statements from government leaders to back up his claims. His sources are well documented and the book, while being a bit long-winded at times, flows and keeps the reader wanting to read about some other facts that are not well known from previous studies of the Cold War.

Another writer who wrote on the creation of the national security state was Michael Hogan. In his book, Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State 1945-1954, Hogan states that America's foreign policy of isolationism following armed conflict was gone, shattered in the bombing of Pearl Harbor. Due to its new status as one of the world's superpowers, the U.S. could no longer afford to ignore the rest of the world as it had throughout much of its history. According to Hogan, however, despite victory in 1945 over the Nazis, the U.S. felt that peace was more precarious and its shores were more vulnerable than ever before.⁶⁵ The

⁶⁵ Hogan, Michael. *Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State 1945-1954*. (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1998). p. 2

oceans that previously had insulated the nation from attacks were no longer buffer zones now, thanks to the creation of long-range bombers, aircraft carriers, submarines, and nuclear weapons. American foreign policy changed dramatically, going from isolationism to one of protecting foreign “national interests”. In a sense, foreign interests acted as buffer zones for the U.S., similar to the USSR’s buffer zones in Eastern Europe, though the U.S. foreign policy did not require as much meddling in local affairs as the Soviets policy indicated. This led to a rapid expansion of American power into every corner of the world where the country deemed its national interests lay.⁶⁶ Hogan points out that this also led the U.S. to break new ground in previously overlooked areas of the world and bring them into its sphere of influence, areas that included the Middle East and Asia, notably defeated Japan and anti-communist South Korea.⁶⁷

According to Hogan, the creation of a national security state within the U.S. came about as a result of the in-fighting between the Army and Navy, as well as the lack of preparedness for war that the country had been in at the start of WWII after the bombing of Pearl Harbor.⁶⁸ Disunity and unpreparedness was America’s own worst enemy at the start of the Cold War. In order to maintain a state of readiness, Truman’s administration believed all military branches would need to be housed under one department to limit squabbling between them. The Air Force would need to be its own branch and there would need to be a security council reporting directly to the President on all matters of national security. The big problem with this plan was would the general public and conservative leaders support a security state? Hogan points out that many conservatives

⁶⁶ Ibid, p. 2

⁶⁷ Ibid, p. 3

⁶⁸ Ibid, p. 24

avored adopting the ideas of Jeffersonian republicans and the populists of the late 19th century by having power divided up and authority spread out, guaranteeing no loss of free-market forces or citizen liberties.⁶⁹ The idea of a national security state, with a large and centralized military and power in the hands of a few, frightened many conservatives. Hogan sees that these competing ideologies were responsible for a large portion of America's heightened security after the war. This also contributed to the continued resistance to any notion of negotiating with the Soviets for a diplomatic solution. Kennan's telegram still ruled American policy towards the Soviet Union. Hogan sees the proposal of national security as a way of keeping the U.S. in the fight while at the same time telling the Soviets that there would be no diplomatic resolution to the conflict. This idea would seem to support the notion that the U.S. favored militancy over stable peace with the Soviet Union, causing the nations to remain in a state of constant readiness to attack the other.

Any conservative resistance, however, would prove fruitless, as the country was made aware of what would happen should it not be ready for conflict at any time with the communists. As history and Hogan shows, the Truman administration was able to find the right mix of conservative and military support to establish the National Security Act of 1947, which established the Department of Defense, putting the Army, Navy, and Air Force under one umbrella and created the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council (NSC), and the Central Intelligence Agency.⁷⁰ The die had been cast and the

⁶⁹ Ibid, p. 28

⁷⁰ Ibid, p. 65

country descended into a state of constant preparedness and paranoia and the Cold War would not end as a result for almost fifty years. Hogan is quoted as saying,

“Everyone was ready to accept a permanent blurring of the usual distinctions between war and peace, citizen and soldier, civil and military. They seemed to agree that American security in the age of total war demanded a program of constant preparedness, that civilian and military resources had to be integrated into this program, and the new government agencies were needed meet these requirements.”⁷¹

Hogan’s Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State 1945-1954 is an excellent account of a subject that many Cold War historians only seem to briefly touch on in their accounts of the origins of the conflict. Like Yergin, Hogan believes that the creation of the national security state in the U.S. would be one of the most far-reaching consequences of the Cold War in America. For the first time in U.S. history, a large standing army would be maintained during peace time. The defense industry would become one of the most important industries in the country and led to what President Dwight Eisenhower termed as the military-industrial complex, which for better or worse, kept American workers employed and kept churning out the weapons of war should they need to be used against the Soviets. Hogan does an excellent job in his writing of showing the conflict within the Truman administration and how the act was passed after much political wrangling and showboating.

How do Williams, LaFeber, Yergin, and Hogan compare to each other? Williams tends to focus more on the negative aspects of U.S. foreign policy while not showing the flaws within the Soviet side that also contributed to the start of the Cold War. He also

⁷¹ Ibid, p. 66

sees U.S. foreign interest in propping up foreign economies as a way of showing that the U.S. wanted to influence international affairs, when it had traditionally stayed out of foreign intervention. The U.S. government was seeking to insert its model of the democracy upon the world, which Williams believes was a far cry from how the country was founded. It was a model of democracy, but not necessarily the only one that was supposed to be thrust onto the rest of the world.

LaFeber points out problems on both sides of the Cold War conflict, though he focuses more on U.S. causes for the start of the Cold War. He points to issues in the U.S. relationship with the Soviet Union starting decades earlier, when the czar was still in control of Russia. Suspicion in the nation's expansionistic goals fueled this mistrust. This was only exacerbated when the communists took over and advocated a worldwide revolution to bring down capitalist governments. This paranoia caused the U.S. government to take the steps that it did to fuel the start of the crisis. Economic pressure and military alliances in West Europe added fuel to the fire and resulted in the continuation of Cold War, a connection that Williams does not make. And unlike Williams, LaFeber does not see the U.S. as trying to enforce its government model on the rest of the world, but it did desire to keep other countries within its sphere of influence, much like the USSR did.

Yergin focuses specifically on the National Security Act of 1947, narrowing down the subject of U.S. foreign policy down to this core act of the U.S. at the start of the Cold War. In order to provide the security that its leaders deemed it needed from perceived Soviet aggression, Yergin sees the passage of the National Security Act as being the main

driving force of the Cold War. The U.S. would have a large standing army, which was unheard of since the country's founding. It would pursue a military arms race with the Soviets to be technologically superior to the Soviet Union, which had the largest army in the world. This would include nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union was to be contained at locations where it was trying to assert its influence on another country. Though the Soviets did not have the atomic bomb yet, the act guaranteed destruction should any of the policies within the act fail to thwart Soviet aggression. While Williams and LaFeber do not focus on a particular reason for the U.S. causing the start of the Cold War and focus on a combination of factors, Yergin specifically points to the National Security Act and the far reaching consequences it had on U.S. foreign policy as being the main cause for the start of the Cold War. Even though the Cold War is over, the effects of this act are still felt today in current U.S. policy.

Hogan's book, like Yergin, focuses on the National Security Act as well. However, he sees the creation of the national security state coming about due to infighting between the army and navy as well as the country's general lack of preparedness for future conflicts. Hogan believes that the National Security Act had the greatest effect on the approach of the U.S. towards the Cold War and beyond much like Yergin did. While Yergin touched on the subject of the need to create a defense industry, Hogan discussed the possible consequences of it, in what President Eisenhower dubbed the military-industrial complex. Millions of Americans would go to work for the government in defense industries across the country and cities and towns would be tied to the success of these industries. If one closed down, the entire town would shut down with it. Hogan sees this effect, for better or worse, as being tied to the National Security

Act and the U.S. government's need to be prepared for any action against the Soviets. In this aspect of his writing, Hogan points out a more negative effect of the law, whereas Yergin does not indicate this as being a major consequence of it.

Thomas Paterson wrote about both sides in the Cold War in his book, On Every Front: The Making and Unmaking of the Cold War. Paterson begins right after World War II, discussing the state of the world. Europe was in shatters. World economies were in chaos. And the United States and the Soviet Union were already quarreling with each for dominance across the postwar world. One of the chief reasons for the start of the Cold War was that each superpower jostled for influence over other nations as both the U.S. and Soviet Union aided, pressured, and built up alliances that were pitted against the other, giving the beginning of the Cold War the character of position warfare according to Paterson.⁷² As both sides sought postwar influence, the world was being carved up into spheres allied towards either the Soviets or the U.S. One of the biggest advantages that the U.S. enjoyed over the Soviet Union at the start of the Cold War was its nuclear monopoly as well as its command of the high seas. The U.S. had surpassed Britain as the world's number one navy by the end of the WWII. The country would use its new status on the seas to effect against the Soviets much as President Theodore Roosevelt had demonstrated America's newfound world status in 1907 when he sent the Great White Fleet on a globe-crossing tour that lasted until 1909. Two of the U.S. Navy's top of the line ships, the battleship *Missouri* and aircraft carrier *Franklin D. Roosevelt*, cruised through Mediterranean waters in the summer of 1946, going against Soviet requests and

⁷² Paterson, Thomas. *On Every Front: The Making and Unmaking of the Cold War*. (W.W. Norton and Company: New York, NY. 1992), p. 43

causing worry among the Soviet leadership.⁷³ The trip served to Soviets as an outline of locations that were under U.S. influence and places that were under its protection as well.

Paterson's perspective of the Cold War mostly covers the U.S. side of the conflict despite areas covering Soviet strategy and ideology. He describes the air of superiority exhibited by the U.S., describing how most Americans believed that it was the destiny of the country to police the world from communism, even if it drew the resentment of other nations. The country believed it was exceptional and let other countries know it, leading to a rising of fear, apprehension, and suspicion in other allied countries.⁷⁴ This description of how the U.S. saw itself in the world is an area that not many other historians point out. Paterson's book shows how deep American activism at the start of the Cold War ran and how right its citizens believed the country was with its new superpower status. While he discusses the U.S. mindset at the start of the Cold War, he does not devote any other sections or chapters to describing what made the Soviets believe the same in their own new status in the world. While the book seems to offer viewpoints from both sides, it is clear that Paterson discusses mainly the U.S. point of view.

Despite this limitation, Paterson discusses problems within U.S. foreign policy towards the Soviets at the start. While Roosevelt had carefully crafted a postwar peace with the Soviets, his successor upon his death, Truman did not have the experience Roosevelt had. Truman was heavily reliant on advisors from Roosevelt's Presidency, many of whom had their hawkish opinions of dealing with the Soviets silenced by

⁷³ Ibid, p. 65

⁷⁴ Ibid, p. 117

Roosevelt.⁷⁵ Under Truman, their harsher attitudes towards the Soviet Union would influence his tougher policies against them. This gave rise to Soviet suspicions of any U.S. policy move or change, as it was almost always against the communists. On this subject, Paterson devoted his one section to the Soviet Union at the start of the Cold War. However, he does not describe how the Soviet Union viewed itself in the world. Their belief that the world would eventually become a communist one was widely known, thanks in part to the Kennan telegram. Paterson, though, sees their behavior at the start of the Cold War as one driven by suspicion of the West more than anything else. Soviet leaders believed that the world would be forever divided between the greed of the West's capitalist nations and the peace and superior ideology of the socialism of the Soviet Union.⁷⁶ Peace would never exist in the world as long as capitalism drove nations to gain more wealth through conflict. While further information on Soviet views would have been a worthwhile addition to the book after this chapter, Paterson does not go into Soviet policy after this, further limiting the scope of influence he is seeking to gain from readers.

Paterson does go on to discuss other areas of the Cold War, such as the rise of the Third World and how it influenced many U.S. and Soviet views of parts of the world that most people would not think mattered much during this period of time. In this area, Paterson shows a strong grasp of scope of the Cold War and the areas that it reached and influenced. While most Cold War historians focus on Europe and Asia, Paterson discusses the African continent and its rise during the Cold War. U.S. aid was used to keep many Third World countries dependent on the U.S., which gave the U.S. influence

⁷⁵ Ibid, p. 127

⁷⁶ Ibid, p. 169

in daily affairs of other countries, a key piece in the containment policy of communism and the Soviet Union. These chapters make Paterson's book a very worthwhile addition to the collection of numerous Cold War books that are present. Despite his limited views from the Soviet Union, the book portrays the U.S. as an instigator in the Cold War and it showcases how U.S. foreign policy drove the start of the Cold War and prolonged, feeding into the belief of many writers that the U.S. was indeed the most responsible for the start of the Cold War. Perhaps more information on the Soviet Union could have made the book a more accurate representation of the Soviet Union's place at the start of the Cold War, but it lacks sufficient evidence to suggest otherwise.

2.3. Conclusions

As the authors discussed in this review have shown, there were many things that the U.S. could have done differently at the start of the Cold War to prevent it or at least have postponed its inevitability for a while. Authors Williams and Yergin believed that certain efforts and policies prevented the alliance between the Soviets and the Americans from becoming nothing more than a marriage of convenience for each other. Policy makers in the U.S. saw communism as almost equal to fascism, but fascism went to war against the world and had to be dealt with first. However, Williams, Yergin, and later Gaddis in his first book, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, demonstrate that the Allies did not try to stop Stalin's efforts to obtain a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and, in an effort to appease the dictator, effectively handed over Eastern Europe to the Soviets at Yalta. LaFeber goes back decades to show that U.S. suspicions of Russian intentions started even before WWI. Authors Messer, Byrnes, and Offner see the

lend-lease policy and failure at Yalta and Potsdam of thwarting Soviet demands as major reasons for causing the start of the Cold War. Gaddis' new book, The Cold War: A New History and Hogan's Cross of Iron, along with Yergin's Shattered Peace, demonstrate that policies that took place after the war would shape the U.S. for the next forty years and beyond. Paterson discussed the mood and the arrogance that most Americans felt after WWII and in their country's desire to police the world from communism. He also discussed the Cold War in Third World countries and how the U.S. and USSR jostled for influence in them. But all the authors demonstrate, in one form or another, that most of the blame for the start of the Cold War was placed on the U.S. and its policies towards the Soviet Union. Some blame a lack of American pressure on the Soviets during the war for the cause, leading to the government trying to come up with ways to stop the Soviets' quest for territory and influence. Others see a lack of concessions or foreign policy directed at the Soviets for being behind the start of the conflict, such as reneging on loans to the Soviet Union or policies that were made specifically to stop or contain Soviet influence, which caused the Russians to respond in kind. Either way, most of the authors in this essay view the United States as having been most responsible for starting the Cold War.

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III. THE AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT AND THE WOUNDED KNEE TAKEOVER

This essay is a historiographical review of books written on the events surrounding the occupation of Wounded Knee, SD by members of the American Indian Movement (AIM) in 1973. The essay will go over the history of AIM and how it came to be as well as go over the actual occupation itself and the fallout from it. Various works from different authors will be used and critiqued to get an overall picture of how the world viewed the occupation. Some authors, such as Rolland Dewing, a professor of history at Chadron State College, will write an overall history of the event and track how the occupation proceeded and ended in chronological order and will write about the event from the federal government perspective. A Washington, D.C. journalist will witness both sides of the occupation forty years after it occurred and record what both sides said happened. Another author was present in Wounded Knee at the time of the occupation and will offer his story of what it was being in the town as the siege continued. Still another author will describe a harrowing trip from New York to Wounded Knee to help the occupiers with aid as he sees the righteousness of what the occupiers are fighting for. I have chosen these books because the range of facts and opinions that they cover will provide readers with differing views on the occupation that will allow for opinions to develop. This will also show commonalities between the authors to form a more accurate picture of what exactly happened at Wounded Knee according to those who were there, experienced it from the outside, or wrote about it years after the occupation. The books will be analyzed based on the facts that they present, by the way the information is presented as it relates to its thesis and the prose of the book, as well as how the

information presented makes it a worthy addition to tell about the occupation. Now the prose, style, and engagement in which the books were written is subjective to the reader and what is a great read for one person may not be a good read to another, but a good general overview of the sections of a book can provide some opinion on it that can be shared by other readers of similar taste. A well written book will engage the reader with facts on top of a smooth storyline that does not jump from place to place across the timeline of the book. If a writer chooses to jump from one point to another point without having a transition to it, it will make the reader lose focus on the story or become bored with the lack of storyline flow in the book. All of the authors do not write from the point of both sides. They either viewed the occupation from the federal side or the occupier's side.

3.1. Introduction

From late February to early May, 1973, the state of South Dakota was locked in a battle. This, however, was not a large scale battle fought in a distant country. Nor was it a battle that did not have casualties on either side. For 71 days, the eyes of the region and, in fact, of the nation, were focused on a familiar and infamous spot in South Dakota—Wounded Knee. On the night of February 27th, leaders and members from AIM seized control of the small town and barricaded themselves in its boundaries and prepared for a siege. Most were willing to die for their cause, favoring martyrdom over life. Some wanted a repeat of the Massacre at Wounded Knee in 1890. The day after the takeover, local and federal agents were on the scene and quarantined the area around the town. Anyone who tried to get in without the government's permission was arrested. From all across the nation, support for the AIM members came, whether through supplies or mail.

Even a national church organization, the National Council of Churches (NCC), threw their support to the occupiers. Famous actors of the day, such as Marlon Brando, spoke publicly of the heroism of the Native Americans at Wounded Knee. Over the next 71 days, there would be numerous small gunfights between both sides, which would result in the deaths of two occupiers and several wounded on both sides. The sides would meet day after day trying to settle the matter, but new AIM requests would often prevent the meetings from achieving anything. Over 300 people would be arrested trying to get into Wounded Knee. AIM leaders made many calls to the Native Americans across America to come to aid the occupiers. In the end, most of AIM's smaller requests would be met and the occupation would end on May 9, 1973. What followed the occupation, however, would lead to AIM's downfall. Its top leadership would be arrested for crimes committed during the siege and many would be sent to jail. The organization would have a few more years of organized activity before the weight of the courts cases took it apart. Public opinion, even in the Native American community, swayed against the violence that AIM brought with it. The organization would cease to be a large, national organization and become more a regional one. Due to the negative climate that it became associated with, the 1973 occupation of Wounded Knee may have brought the plight of the Native Americans to the national spotlight and been AIM's greatest achievement, but it would result in the demise of the AIM and cause a backlash against it by other Native American groups.

This event in U.S. history is a controversial one, as it pitted a group of Native Americans against the federal government, much like it had been back in the late 1800s as white settlers and the army was trying to take over Indian territories across the Plains

states. In this case, however, there was national media coverage and both support and condemnation of the members of AIM who were occupying Wounded Knee. Because both sides tell differing stories, I believe that comparing different works can provide some common details about the occupation that will nullify other factors that each side says happened or did not happen. It is important that this event be told from a neutral point of view because the occupation itself was such an emotional roller coaster for both sides that discrepancies were bound to happen in how the story was told. Hopefully this historiographical essay will help to dispel some of the rumors of the occupation and show the commonality between both sides.

While the event pitted members of AIM against the federal government, the occupation is seen from differing points of view as stated before. On one side was that of the Native Americans involved and on the other were those who covered the occupation, from newspapers to people within the government. Some were sympathetic towards AIM's cause, while others viewed them as rebels taking over American soil and as advocates of violence. Those who viewed AIM's occupation as righteous were swayed by the extreme plight of the Native Americans in the country and saw the reservation system as being an economic burden on the tribes that lived in them, especially on the Pine Ridge Reservation, one of the poorest in the country. Others saw rampant discrimination against the tribes caused by past conflicts and broken treaties with Native Americans as being behind the hardships they faced. Some of the authors in this essay were personally involved with it in some fashion. This included being in Wounded Knee during the occupation itself or supporting it in other, more dangerous ways. Those whose opinions and evidence were more neutral tend to tell the story of the Wounded Knee

occupation from the federal government point of view while trying to portray the reasons AIM had to occupying the town the way they did. Throughout this essay, both sides will demonstrate how and why the occupation happened, but its results will show a common issue—that the occupation did not help the cause of AIM, but, in fact, led to its failure as a group movement.

3.2. AIM Beginnings and the Occupation

To set the stage for the occupation, it is necessary to see the start of the American Indian Movement and what it represented. The roots of the formation of AIM go all the way back to the original Wounded Knee massacre of 1890. Following the massacre, a series of trials were held to determine if the military had been responsible for it, most notably that of Colonel James Forsyth. He would be acquitted of all charges thanks to a witness's account of him trying to avoid shooting the women and children present at the massacre and swearing that the troops were well disciplined and well placed to disarm the Sioux.⁷⁷ This angered the Sioux, as they believed he caused the massacre to occur. It also did not help that three officers and fifteen enlisted men received Medal of Honor awards for their “heroism” in the massacre.⁷⁸

To understand the background that led to the occupation, it is also necessary to learn about the reasons for the founding of AIM and the start of the occupation. Two authors wrote comprehensive accounts of the occupation, one written by Rolland Dewing, a Professor of History at Chadron State College, entitled Wounded Knee II, where the entire event and what led to the occupation are discussed clearly and concisely into an accurate account of it. The other account by Washington, D.C. journalist Stew

⁷⁷ Dewing, Rolland. *Wounded Knee II* (Chadron, NE: Great Plains Network, 2000), p. 11

⁷⁸ Ibid, p. 11

Magnuson, entitled Wounded Knee 1973: Still Bleeding: The American Indian Movement, The FBI, and Their Fight to Bury the Sins of the Past, gives the account of the occupation from a meeting that took place in 2012 at Augustana College in South Dakota between AIM leaders from the occupation and the federal agents who were present as well. Details of the occupation were taken here and described by those involved, though the meeting did not go exactly to plan, as frequent arguments broke out between Russell Means and the former federal agents involved as each pleaded their case. Dewing's work on the occupation provides readers with an excellent example of a comprehensive work on the history of AIM, from its inception to the aftermath of Wounded Knee, which saw the organization crushed under the weight of the litigation that placed many of its leaders in jail or otherwise unable to keep the movement going. Throughout the book, Dewing describes the treatment of the Native Americans in the country as one of tragedy and mismanagement by different factions of the government. These factions ranged from the Justice Department to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) to the tribes' own tribal councils, not the least of which concerned the Oglala's council, which at the time was led by the controversial leader Richard "Dick" Wilson. It is these tragedies and perceived lack of justice for Native Americans that led to the rise of AIM.

In Magnuson's account, the AIM leaders pointed that Wounded Knee was chosen as the site for the occupation, not just because of its infamous history, but also because the Pine Ridge reservation was one that was struggling with extreme poverty and its own identity. On one side were the "traditionals", those who tried to maintain the old ways of life, and the "nontraditionals", those who favored adapting to the white ways of doing

things.⁷⁹ They were also frustrated in not being able to wrest control of the tribal council away from Wilson, long loathed on the reservation for his use of intimidation and other tactics to coerce the population into keeping him in power. Magnuson continues to write on the occupation and the resulting trials, while also writing about the conference in between and describing the tense atmosphere surrounding the interviews and those involved. What makes his book strong when compared next to Dewing's is that Magnuson has the perpetrators from both the federal government and AIM side in the same room going over the events as they saw them unfold nearly forty years earlier, giving his account first-hand experience from the occupation.

Following the massacre at Wounded Knee in 1890, nearly \$165,000 went to the Sioux for the improvement of education, \$200,000 as a result of stolen horses in 1876, and another \$100,000 in additional beef quantities along with an appropriations increase to \$1.1 million for the Sioux.⁸⁰ Still, the loss of their lands to the greedy settlers and the lack of sovereignty and civil rights among the tribes caused much resentment and distain for the government, distain that would result in the creation of the AIM organization. And one of the biggest grievances towards the U.S. government that was never discussed or negotiated was the honoring of the treaty of 1868, which was one of AIM's biggest goals to obtain, but ultimately doomed to failure.

The atmosphere of the U.S. in the 1960s was ripe with the civil rights struggle. In this era of resistance and public defiance of federal authority, it seemed the norm for change was disregarding federal policies. The American Indian Movement was founded

⁷⁹ Magnuson, Stew. *Wounded Knee 1973: Still Bleeding: The American Indian Movement, the FBI, and Their Fight to Bury the Sins of the Past*. (Arlington, VA: Court Bridge Publishing, 2013), p. 23

⁸⁰ Dewing, Rolland. *Wounded Knee II* (Chadron, NE: Great Plains Network, 2000), p. 13

during time of social upheaval in July, 1968 in Minneapolis, MN by Dennis Banks, Clyde Bellecourt, and George Mitchell.⁸¹ They were founded on the same basis as the Black Panthers, wanting immediate changes in the structure of the reservations and in Native sovereignty and they favored action, sometimes violent, to get their issues across. AIM was originally called the Concerned Indian Americans, but dropped it as its shortened letter name (CIA) matched that of the Central Intelligence Agency.⁸² Membership started out small, but soon, thanks to its message and recruitment policies, its members continued to grow. Initially, its goals were to improve on the economic and educational status of Native Americans. Their beliefs stressed that pride was the determining factor on the success or failure of the movement. Demonstration, confrontation, and occupation would be their chosen forms for getting their message out. Peaceful demonstrations had not worked in the past and AIM wanted swift changes very quickly, AIM members identified the enemies of Natives—the Christian church, the educational system, and the U.S. government.⁸³

Still, despite this opening shortcoming of the group, as membership and donations continued to grow, new chapters were started across the country. It was in Cleveland that the most well-known AIM member began his involvement. Russell Means, an Oglala from San Francisco, started the Cleveland chapter and immediately AIM leaders recognized his gift of staging organized and well-publicized demonstrations. He was involved in several occupations, from the Mayflower II capture in November, 1970 to AIM's very brief takeover of Mount Rushmore in 1971 and the unsuccessful attempt to

⁸¹ Ibid, p. 21

⁸² Ibid, p. 21

⁸³ Ibid, p. 21

capture the national BIA office in Washington D.C.⁸⁴ The occupation of Alcatraz Island in 1969 by a West Coast group called the American Indians United inspired AIM and other groups to begin occupations of their own.⁸⁵ AIM's first successful takeover happened in late July, 1970 at, of all places, a Lutheran church-Indian relations meeting at Augustana College in Sioux Falls.⁸⁶ When the college did not meet their demand for \$750,000, they locked themselves up in one of the dormitories and did not leave until the college reached a peaceful settlement. Out of this, AIM discovered that it could get favorable publicity from its occupations and was encouraged to continue their cause as more support began to come in. After its involvement in a series of trials by white men who had supposedly killed Native Americans, AIM's focus shifted to South Dakota, which was a state viewed as the ultimate struggle between the federal government and the Native Americans, particularly that of Russell Means' tribe, the Oglalas. Dennis Banks, along with Means, became involved in Native affairs following the floods in Rapid City in 1972. He came with a coalition of Indian people to help coordinate a relief effort to help the low-lying areas of the city, which were occupied by mostly Native Americans.⁸⁷ However, his support was not especially welcomed, as some saw his aid as a way of dictating policy over the local inhabitants. Because of the criticism, AIM left the area.

One of the biggest events that preceded the occupation and could have led to its idea was the murder of a Sioux named Bad Heart Bull supposedly by Darold Schmitz in January 1973 and his resulting charge of manslaughter and release on bond. This caused

⁸⁴ Ibid, p. 26

⁸⁵ Ibid, p. 26-27

⁸⁶ Ibid, p. 28

⁸⁷ Ibid, p. 34

unrest within AIM and they issued a massive protest to begin in Custer, SD on February 6th.⁸⁸ The Custer County Attorney, named Hobart Gates, who was Schmitz's attorney, was from Custer and that was why AIM called for Custer to be the site. On top of that, AIM investigators claimed that they had evidence that Schmitz was looking to kill an Indian the night of Heart Bull's death, which was ignored by the state judicial system, further infuriating the AIM members who marched to Custer.⁸⁹ The injustice done to Heart Bull through the trial of Schmitz only hardened AIM's resolve to stand up to the government with their protest. Security in Custer was beefed up in preparation for this protest, which involved putting National Guard on alert and calling up more highway patrol officers to come and help keep the peace. Strangely enough, AIM members did not show up until the afternoon, causing many to believe that they were not even coming. As it was, the 200 protesters had stopped in Hill City in the morning to burn a chuck wagon, a symbol of white settlers, in front of a restaurant.⁹⁰ When they arrived, tensions immediately rose as the protesters gathered outside of the courthouse, with Means and Banks leading the crowd. Banks felt if the roles were reversed, Bad Heart Bull would have been charged with murder, not manslaughter as Schmitz was. Once again, whites were victimizing Native Americans, as he saw it. Soon after, rocks started to be thrown through the courthouse windows. Chaos erupted immediately, as the crowd began to push through the courthouse doors. A brawl broke out, as doors, windows, and even a radiator were destroyed or ripped from their place.⁹¹ A fire truck was brought in spray

⁸⁸ Ibid, p. 41-42

⁸⁹ Magnuson, Stew. *Wounded Knee 1973: Still Bleeding: The American Indian Movement, the FBI, and Their Fight to Bury the Sins of the Past*. (Arlington, VA: Court Bridge Publishing, 2013), p. 11-12.

⁹⁰ Dewing, Rolland. *Wounded Knee II* (Chadron, NE: Great Plains Network, 2000), p. 43

⁹¹ Ibid, p. 44

down the angry mob, but its hoses were frozen and no water came out. The truck left the scene after having hundreds of rocks, sticks, and bottles thrown at it. Officers threw tear gas into the courthouse to disperse the crowd, but by then, some protesters had stolen gasoline from a nearby convenience store, poured it in the courthouse, and set it on fire.⁹² While the courthouse sustained damage, the fire was put out. The Chamber of Commerce building next to it did not fare so well, as the flames from the courthouse lit the log-covered chamber office and it burned to the ground.⁹³ Some police cars were burned and many people were injured. Some protesters even refused to take off their bloodstained clothes as they hoped to use it as evidence of police brutality.⁹⁴ Surprisingly, no one was killed in the riot. Means, Banks, and Bad Heart Bull's wife were among those arrested.

After reading about this, it would seem as no surprise why many residents in region feared AIM. It could cause trouble in even small towns, not just the cities. Others threw their support to the protest, happy to see a group not sitting back and watching one of its own die for nothing. Feelings were mixed, even among the local Native Americans. Most felt it would not help their cause and could have, in fact, hindered it even more. Violence only begets more violence and the government was not kind to groups that caused local chaos, such had been the case with the Black Panthers. Most African-Americans thought that the Black Panthers were too radical and that they were more of a hindrance than a helpful group. So was the case with AIM. Those who leaned toward its protests loved it and could not throw AIM enough support, especially local

⁹² Ibid, p. 45

⁹³ Ibid, p. 46

⁹⁴ Ibid, p. 46

members who were not present at the protest. But the majorities were indifferent and did not approve of violence to help them. This combination of government and local Native Americans would help to end AIM a few years after the Wounded Knee occupation.

However, while Dewing discusses the general fears that many feel towards AIM and its militant posturing, Magnuson never goes into what the public thought of AIM or its policies. This is one of the shortcomings of Magnuson's book despite the accounts presented to him at the conference by both who were there, both AIM and the government. While his account does not seem to take this into account due to its coverage of the conference as well as the occupation and trials that resulted from it, the book does offer readers newer bits of information than was present in Dewing's book, such as the previously stated fact that Schmitz was recorded by a witness as looking to kill a Native American that night or the fact that business owners in Wounded Knee were looking to a memorial to the Wounded Knee massacre as well as to bring in investment to build hotels and tourist-related businesses to Wounded Knee.⁹⁵ This idea was another reason for AIM to come to the town, as they viewed this plan as cashing in on the site's notoriety. These facts are not present in Dewing's, adding to the importance of Magnuson's account even without the inclusion of how the public and other Native Americans viewed AIM.

These were some of the early signs that Wounded Knee might have been the location of another AIM confrontation, but despite suspicions from local residents on the Pine Ridge Reservation and in Wounded Knee, the government watched, but did not intervene. There were thoughts that an occupation would take place when tribal

⁹⁵ Magnuson, Stew. *Wounded Knee 1973: Still Bleeding: The American Indian Movement, the FBI, and Their Fight to Bury the Sins of the Past*. (Arlington, VA: Court Bridge Publishing, 2013), p. 27

chairman Dick Wilson met with Russell Means in Wounded Knee on February 23rd, and it seemed to many that it would happen.⁹⁶ There was an AIM presence in Wounded Knee days before and there were whispers of threats to Wilson's life or kidnapping him and occupying the town until AIMs' demands were met. Wilson's family was there with him and the opportunity seemed to be so big that residents prepared for the worst. But the meeting went off without a hitch, although nothing came out of the meeting, as Means stormed out after the two got into an argument.⁹⁷ BIA police escorted a shaken Wilson and his family out of Wounded Knee. After this, most residents let down their guard despite the presence of AIM members who remained in Wounded Knee. Most thought that the danger was past and they could get on with their lives. They had no idea that AIM members and leaders were gathering in the Black Hills and preparing for their shining moment in history, the moment that AIM would finally show the world that they meant business and that the government needed to listen.

National media coverage of the occupation began almost immediately after February 28th. Papers all across the country began to print the story although not all of it was written as a positive message. The New York Times headline for March 1st screamed "Armed Indians Seize Wounded Knee, Hold Hostages".⁹⁸ Low flying planes were shot at as were cars that attempted to go past AIM controlled road blocks. Two to three hundred AIM members occupied the trading post and church of Wounded Knee.⁹⁹ Roadblocks and bunkers were built along the four roads that led into Wounded Knee.

⁹⁶ Lyman, Stanley David. *Wounded Knee: A Personal Account* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1991), p. 12

⁹⁷ Ibid, p. 13

⁹⁸ United Press International, "Armed Indians Seize Wounded Knee, Hold Hostages," *The New York Times*, March 1, 1973, 1.

⁹⁹ Ibid, p. 1

Their demands were that they wanted the Congress of the U.S. to launch a “full scale investigation” of the treatment of Native Americans in the past and that investigations begin in all South Dakota reservations for signs of corruption by tribal and BIA members.¹⁰⁰ When hostages are involved, a tense situation immediately becomes worse. The FBI, BIA, and local law enforcement responded to occupation quickly and set up their own roadblocks around the town. One of South Dakota’s senators, James Abourezk (D), said that he would follow one of the demands that asked for him to lead the negotiations with the AIM, but only if the occupiers released the hostages were released first.¹⁰¹ The stage was set for a long, drawn out occupation with far reaching effects for all involved, especially those of AIM and its leaders.

Dewing and Magnuson continue over the course of the middle third of their books to describe the occupation of Wounded Knee from the perspective of one looking at it from the outside, though Magnuson, of course, has the advantage of hearing this information from those who were involved. They describe the hardships of the inhabitants, the failures of multiple rounds of negotiations to end the occupation, the grind of the fire fights, and the deaths of the occupiers as events of tragedy and political stubbornness, tribal sovereignty mixed with the corruption of Dick Wilson, and a constant desire for the members of AIM in Wounded Knee to either have their demands met or become martyrs for their cause. However, soon national interest in the occupation began to wane, as the country’s primary attention shifted towards U.S. troops in Vietnam coming home by the thousands and the Watergate scandal heating up. Its stories began being relegated to the later sections of most national newspapers. Even after the death of

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, pg. 10

¹⁰¹ Ibid, pg. 16

U.S. Marshal Lloyd Grimm on March 26th, the story only made page 31 in the New York Times.¹⁰² Because of this waning of interest, public donations began to decrease as well. Supplies inside the town were dwindling as the federal roadblocks had cut off all traffic. Women and children in Wounded Knee began to suffer from malnutrition. Brave backpackers also brought in supplies at night, using guides to navigate past FBI agents and U.S. Marshals and through ravines and draws into Wounded Knee. There were hardships and everyone had to make due with what they had.

There were some positives, though, for those inside the town. Most of the AIM members who were there came away with a sense of pride, knowing that they had, to that point, lasted longer than any other movement occupation in U.S. history. Tribes from all across the nation came to support the Wounded Knee occupiers. Dennis Banks remarked,

“I think that the best thing that happened in Wounded Knee was that there was an immediate response from individual members of tribes all across the country. They came to Wounded Knee to help us. At one time there we had 65 various tribes represented. People from 64 different tribes came to help the Oglalas.”¹⁰³

On March 11th, the occupiers declared Wounded Knee’s sovereignty from the U.S., saying that the town and the land around it was to be called the Independent Oglala Sioux Nation.¹⁰⁴ It was the first time since the Civil War that secession from the union had taken place. It only gave more hope to Oglalas in the town that their demands could be met even as the situation grew bleaker. The days and weeks continued to pass with little happening on both sides as the stalemate continued until the intervention of other tribal

¹⁰² Martin Waldron, “U.S. Marshal Shot At Wounded Knee,” *The New York Times*, March 27, 1973, 31

¹⁰³ Zimmerman, Bill. *Airlift to Wounded Knee* (Chicago, IL: The Swallow Press Inc., 1976), 229

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, pg. 231

leaders and a compromise deal from the U.S. government came through that the occupation was finally ended on May 9th.

The last chapters of Dewing's and Magnuson's books go over the results of the Wounded Knee occupation as it affected AIM, though Magnuson covers more of the trial of Russell Means and Dennis Banks than anything else. Despite what the occupiers had worked for, much of what they accomplished for would be for naught. AIM's leadership would be decimated after the occupation, as many members would end up in jail or on trial for the next several years. Its membership would continue to decrease as the organization continued to have issues bringing in new members due to its militant ideals and the threats of having the federal government come upon them. A series of violent murders involving members of AIM also did not help its cause. However, despite the end of AIM as a massive movement in Indian country, there were some positives attained. The occupation showed the incompetence of the BIA and Interior Department towards Native Americans, which inspired massive changes within the organizations.¹⁰⁵ Sovereignty for the individual tribes was another resultant success of the occupation, although this right would not be won until later in the decade. It would be fought in the courts of the federal government and would continually be discussed, amended, and changed around before it was finally passed. But the concept of the legislation, that the tribes were sovereign bodies that had the right to determine their own memberships and laws within their reservation boundaries, held up and would remain intact.¹⁰⁶ The occupation, it seemed, though it ended AIM, was not all for nothing.

¹⁰⁵ Dewing, Rolland. *Wounded Knee II* (Chadron, NE: Great Plains Network, 2000), p. 173

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*, p. 173

3.3. Review of Comprehensive Accounts

As far as review of Dewing's book, one fact that Dewing points out is that, surprisingly enough, much of AIM's membership was made of urban Native Americans. Local reservation Native Americans, particularly in the Dakotas, were very aware of their tribal heritage and were tied to the local systems. To them, AIM was an urban threat to their established way of life and, as a result, AIM was never able to gain a foothold in a reservation, though many of their confrontations took place on them.¹⁰⁷ This is an interesting fact that the reader wishes that Dewing would elaborate on more or form more of a theory as to why this urban movement, more often than not, was fought on the very reservations that the group was seeking to help in spite of the lack of local members to the group. Dewing could have pointed out that this was a failure of AIM, especially given the group organized Survival Schools to educate other Native Americans on Native culture and racial pride. These schools could have been a great opportunity for AIM to spread their message to the poorer reservations, but they were not capitalized upon.

One of Dewing's common themes throughout Wounded Knee II is the theme of did AIM actually change much for Native Americans in the country. Many of their own people feared and despised the organization for its militant posturing. The threat of violence did not help their people in the past and many favored their local tribal systems as the best way to advance their cause. The intentions of AIM may have been good, but in their effort to advance their cause, many in the country turned away from the group. As stated before, nowhere was this more evident than on the reservations themselves, where AIM membership was generally low. Dewing comes back to this theme time and

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, p. 23

time again throughout his telling of the occupation and the reader sees that he obviously viewed the occupation as one of the main reasons why AIM membership continued to decrease after it and why its leadership could not be replaced after many of its founders were put in jail. There simply was not anyone else who wanted to fill in for them or had the desire to keep the AIM cause going. It is a sad truth to Dewing on the outcome of the occupation.

Dewing's book is an excellent example of a chronological history of the controversial event, the effects of which were still playing out as he was writing his account of the occupation. He backs up his assertions from the time period and comes to logical conclusions of what the occupation did and did not do for AIM and Native Americans in general. The book has a natural flow and is easy enough for the novice reader to follow along with. His account of the occupation contains enough factual evidence in it to keep the reader going to find out what will result from the occupation. Dewing's book is an example of a secondary account of the event and a recommended read for any who want to learn about the history of AIM and its reasons for existing.

Magnuson's book offers readers a different perspective of the occupation, that of the accounts from both the federal government and the AIM occupiers. During the conference at Augustana College, he hears the accounts of the occupation from Joseph Trimbach, FBI Special Agent in Charge at the time of the occupation, as well as AIM members who organized the occupation, including co-founders Clyde Bellecourt and Dennis Banks, as well as Russell Means. Magnuson intermixes the timeline of the occupation with the conference in 2012 and describes how each day of the conference related back to certain time periods of the occupation, including the not-mentioned-before

fact that while officially three people died during the occupation, as many as six people may have died under mysterious circumstances in Wounded Knee and were never seen again. This is evidence that this meeting yielded much more information on the occupation than was previously available to even Dewing. Magnuson's book showcases this newer knowledge and presents the conference as possibly the last chance to obtain the true information of what happened in Wounded Knee in 1973. However, while he can offer much in new information, both sides of the debate routinely blamed each other for the problems that arose while the occupation continued, giving much bias towards each side's story. This included the continual breaking of cease-fire agreements, with both sides arguing the other was responsible for the breaking of the agreements when shots were fired. And, as stated before, Magnuson does not cover the psychological impact that AIM had on the region and the country as far as how it was viewed like Dewing did. This limits the scope on how the occupation helped or did not help Native Americans in the country. However, despite these limitations, Magnuson's Wounded Knee 1973 is a necessary addition to the comprehensive history of the Wounded Knee occupation. However, given the time period and the news coverage of the event, one would think that there were other personal accounts of the occupation that existed to further substantiate Dewing and Magnuson's claims. These books do, in fact, exist and will be discussed.

3.4. Works Written By Those Who Were There

One book that describes the days of the occupation was written by an author who was actually present within Wounded Knee as the occupation started. Stanley Lyman was the Superintendent of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) on the Pine Ridge

Reservation who was present in Wounded Knee when AIM members arrived and barricaded themselves and those within the community into the town. His account of the occupation was penned in his book Wounded Knee 1973: A Personal Account. Most accounts of the occupation stem from the members of AIM who were present at Wounded Knee or from the perspective of the federal government. Lyman offers a unique view from the perspective of an employee within the BIA office. What unfolds in his book demonstrates how his opinion and insight blame not one side, but both in fact. He describes frustration, sorrow, and anger towards not just the members of AIM, but also towards the FBI, Justice Department, the Tribal Council, and the BIA. His view is unique in that he wants to help the Native Americans of the area from within the government, but he is torn between which side is right in the situation.

Throughout the book, Lyman describes day-to-day life within Wounded Knee. Some days, much is happening, from meetings with leaders of AIM to occasional fire fights with government officials on the outskirts of the town. However, many other days, not much happens as both sides dug in and kept trying to negotiate a settlement to the occupation. He describes days of extremely low supplies, a problem compounded by the inability of the occupiers to open up a steady run of supplies and the federal government's own blockade of the town. Any supplies that reached the community tended to come from individuals and groups that brought in backpacks of supplies, but the feds frequently found these trails and shut them down and arrested those who they caught on them. Severe rationing of food supplies added to the misery within Wounded Knee, which Lyman speaks of frequently during his ordeal.

Lyman does a good job of writing and describing about the lives of the people within Wounded Knee and expresses his frustrations over the negotiating process of both sides. The feds demanded that the occupiers put down their arms and surrender. AIM wanted the government to honor its treaties it had made with the tribes in the past that it had broken. Neither side appeared ready to compromise at any time during the 71-day occupation despite the loss of blood on both sides. The deaths of Frank Clearwater and Lawrence Lamont Jr. were particularly tough on the residents of Wounded Knee, which Lyman describes as causing great suffering and mourning and hardening the resolve of AIM members to see their occupation through.

Towards the end of the occupation, Lyman describes days of promise followed by days of disillusionment. Meetings between the federal government and AIM leaders in Wounded Knee failed to produce any meaningful agreements. This was even after one of AIM's leaders, Russell Means, was taken out of Wounded Knee and arrested, then bonded out and went to Washington, D.C. to plead with government negotiators to come to a solution to the occupation that met AIM's goals of the occupation.¹⁰⁸ During this time, Lyman records the arrival of Frank Clearwater and his wife from North Carolina. Clearwater, a Cherokee, was drawn to the occupation to support the efforts of AIM. However, twenty-four hours after arriving, Clearwater would be shot dead, killed while he slept in the church in Wounded Knee by stray bullet from a U.S. Marshal. His was the first death of the occupation and resulted in another demand from the occupiers. They, along with Clearwater's wife, requested that Clearwater be buried in Wounded Knee. But the government refused on the grounds that while the occupation proceeded, no one

¹⁰⁸ Lyman, Stanley. *Wounded Knee, 1973* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1991), p. 71

would be allowed to be buried there. This was a further sticking point that led to the continuation of the occupation in the weeks to come. Lyman's accounts of the final days of the confrontation were marked by on again, off again negotiations, firefights, and the continuing suffering of those in Wounded Knee, who were extremely short on food, medicine, and ammunition by the end of the occupation. It is during this time, Lyman himself becomes unpopular amongst the residents and occupiers in Wounded Knee, as he feels that the Justice Department should have been negotiating with officials of the Oglala Sioux tribe instead of with the occupiers.¹⁰⁹ To Lyman, it seemed that he surmised that if AIM had any problem with any entity in particular, it was most certainly against the Oglala council headed by Dick Wilson, a man despised by many on the reservation. It would have seemed that the federal government should have been negotiating them since the council was viewed as the main problem on the reservation. The council should have been the ones to come to a solution that worked out for both the federal government and AIM in regards to the tribal council. However, the response Lyman got when he tried to set up meetings with representatives from the Justice Department frustrated him due to the lackadaisical attitudes that the judges in the department had towards the tribe and its issues.¹¹⁰ Indian business, it seems, was none of their business.

Lyman recorded the second death in Wounded Knee very briefly as one that devastated the community more so than Frank Clearwater's due to the fact that the occupier killed was a local named Lawrence Lamont Jr.¹¹¹ Despite the fact that his death

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, p. 77

¹¹⁰ Ibid, p. 77

¹¹¹ Ibid, p. 123

was controversial (was he shot in the back by BIA officials or by a member of AIM), Lyman only briefly touches on his death before going into other facets of the day. The reader is left wondering why Lyman didn't go into more detail about Lamont's death and preceded into other issues of the day including the funeral procession of Clearwater. Where was the attention given to Lamont that was given to Clearwater? It was a little disappointing for Lyman not to cover this event more so than he did, especially given the controversial nature of Lamont's death.

In the days following the agreement between the federal government and AIM to end the occupation on May 9, Lyman discusses the cases pending against the leaders of AIM and on life returning back to the normal in Wounded Knee, though the experience had changed the town. The occupation had drawn national attention to the plight of Native Americans in the country, but the town was left to pick up the pieces on its recovery. Lyman returned to his duties as a supervisor of the BIA on the Pine Ridge Reservation and saw the recovery of Wounded Knee and the return of normal BIA operations, though Dick Wilson was still the tribal chair. Lyman was voted to stay on as a supervisor, though the memory of the occupation led to his decision to leave Wounded Knee for another position in Phoenix. He ends the book, however, saying that his staying or leaving is in the hands of the Assistant Secretary of the BIA, leaving the reader hanging a bit with such a non-conclusion of an ending to his first-hand account of being in Wounded Knee during the occupation.

All in all, Lyman's book is good read of the day-to-day activities going on from the perspective of someone who was actually in Wounded Knee at the time of the occupation. What is most interesting for the reader to see is the evolution of Lyman's

attitude from a being federal employee who believed in the system to one who questions the very federal organization he is in and is forced to re-evaluate his role and the policies of the organization. He witnessed first-hand the failure of the BIA and the Justice Department to successfully negotiate with the members of AIM and was frustrated that the department did not seem to take the occupation seriously or deem it worthy of investigating the issues that led to the occupation in the first place. And while some would think he was headed down the road to being a sympathizer with AIM and its cause, the militancy of the group and their lack of a compromising attitude opened them up to criticism by Lyman, who believed that negotiating with the tribal council was the best way for the Native Americans on reservations to obtain the rights that they had been both asking and demanding for decades. While he questions the bureaucracy of federal government in terms of its handling of the occupation, he still believes that it can help to alleviate many of the woes on the reservation.

While Lyman describes his general feelings about the occupation well enough throughout the book, he does not cover many of the daily issues of being in Wounded Knee as well as he should have. He briefly discusses the plight of those in the town here and there most days, but does not give any real emotional content that would make the reader connect with the occupiers on more of a personal level. He discusses those who favored confrontation with the government, but does not discuss the matter of those who were trapped in Wounded Knee and how they survived almost daily gunfights, severe food rationing (when it was available), and in-fighting amongst the AIM members. Throughout the ordeal, it is possible that Lyman was concerned more about surviving himself and less with the others in Wounded Knee when he was remembering his

account, but leaves the reader wondering about the innocent bystanders of Wounded Knee. And while the book gives a nice account of the day-to-day activities in Wounded Knee, he does not offer any background information or history of the area other than in the introduction of the book. He does not discuss past grievances of AIM much and at times, especially at the beginning of the occupation, points to AIM as being the main instigator in the occupation. But, despite some of its shortcomings, the book reads fairly easy and does not get very long-winded throughout its recorded days. Having an account of someone who was there in Wounded Knee is an excellent source of first-hand information on a subject that is still debated to this day.

As stated before, there were some authors who were involved with the occupation in other ways that included their unconventional support. One such person was author Bill Zimmerman, who wrote on the occupation because he actually got involved with the event, though not like Lyman was. He participated in an airdrop at Wounded Knee to deliver supplies to the occupiers, whom he sympathized with and wanted to help all the way from New York. In his account of the event, Airlift to Wounded Knee, Zimmerman tells his account of the ideas and events that led up to his participation in helping relieve the plight of the Wounded Knee occupiers. As noted before, the occupation grabbed headlines around the world. Zimmerman was a reporter from New York who followed the story closely. He sympathized with AIM and what they were trying to accomplish with the occupation. As federal government and BIA police blockaded the town and cut off all supplies, he heard of the suffering of the occupiers. After getting in touch with a friend, Zimmerman decided to help with an airdrop of supplies from two small, single-engine aircraft.

During his adventure, he and his colleagues who participated in the airdrop, he has stops in Chicago, Omaha, and small towns in South Dakota like Chamberlain and Huron. Flying in the dark most of the time with people who he'd never met during an unpredictable snow season in the Plains region made the adventure compelling, but Zimmerman is not the best story-teller for the first half of the book as his rag-tag crew try to figure out how to accomplish their stated goal of delivering supplies. He intermixes the history of the occupation and what was going on with his own story and the events that he was involved in up to the drop. The flow of the story up to that point is not smooth and the reader can sometimes find it difficult to figure out what is going on and what Zimmerman was doing as events in Wounded Knee were taking place. Up till the days before the drop, the story, while intriguing, is not being told in a way that really keeps the reader terribly interested as he describes events going on Wounded Knee in the chapters in between his discussions and meetings with other collaborators. He may have been better off telling the historical account of the occupation first and then proceeding into his experience with the airdrop to avoid the confusion the first half of his book is set up as.

There are a couple of interesting comparisons that Zimmerman points out though in the first parts of his book. First of all, he points to the fact that as the Wounded Knee occupation was beginning, the Paris Peace Accords of 1973 were underway, which was to determine how the U.S. would pull its troops out of its near ten year war in Vietnam. It was interesting to note that both of the treaties came about as U.S. military strategy had failed to achieve its goal. The U.S. was attempting to "Vietnamese" the war, turning over more duties to the South Vietnamese army to allow them to take the lead in battling the

North Vietnamese communists. This turnaround in U.S. policy is very similar to what it did during the Indian Wars in the late 1860s, using Indian scouts and trying to turn the rivaling tribes against one another, taking the military out of the equation.¹¹² It is also interesting to note that in this chapter, Zimmerman pursues more of a political agenda against the policies of the U.S. government and its military as he notes the comparisons between the two conflicts and insists that they are the same war, just one hundred years apart. The U.S. government's treatment of these invaded territories were eerily similar to Zimmerman in that the pushing of U.S. culture or religion onto the local population displaced thousands of natives and turned their lives upside down.¹¹³ So U.S. policy was, in fact, trying to impose its will on the local population, rather than trying to spread its democracy as it stated was its goal in both Vietnam and during the Indian Wars. Zimmerman sees government conspiracies and hypocrisy in the country's policies abroad, which add to the reasons why he volunteered to help out on the mission to Wounded Knee.

Once he gets past the build-up portion of his story, though, the book becomes much more interesting and informative to the reader. The actual story of the drop is filled with intrigue and suspense as he and his compatriots start their journey and fly in the dead of the night to various places across the Midwest before at last taking off for Wounded Knee and their drop. Secrecy and surprise were their allies as they flew in over Wounded early in the morning, before government forces could respond to their flight path. Upon completion of their mission, which was successful in dropping all but one of their supply containers (lost en route from Rapid City), most of them would be arrested

¹¹² Ibid, p. 68

¹¹³ Ibid, p. 70

within days of the drop. None would be formally charged with any crimes or face jail time. This is the best part of Zimmerman's book and the part that actually grabs the reader's attention and saves the book from what otherwise started out as mostly build-up and back story from Wounded Knee.

In the conclusion to Zimmerman's Airlift to Wounded Knee, he describes the progress of the white race as continually pushing westward. All American expansion after the American Revolution he sees as evidence of this land grab. Once the country was conquered, American government eyes were set across the Pacific. He states that it is the "ruthless economy that must expand or perish" that is the cause for the American need to conquer other territories, which he sees as occurring due to the islands put under American control in the first half of the 20th century.¹¹⁴ He believes that the occupiers of Wounded Knee, much like the Vietnamese, were fighting against this imperialistic expansion. After the turmoil of the 1960s, Zimmerman is gripped with a rebellious sense that the people should determine how the government operates, not the other way around. His philosophical musings at the end of the book make the reader look back on history to see if the message he is trying to convey has any factual evidence to it and, given the context of that period in U.S. history, it's hard not to see some truth in what he is saying. More than anything in his book, Zimmerman seeks to turn public opinion on the side of the Native Americans of the country and convince the reader to support their cause and protest against their past treatment. All should be united against the oppression. However, he concludes the book by saying it is only us who can determine if conditions

¹¹⁴ Ibid, p. 338

will change for Native Americans. Only confrontation with the U.S. government will change this and it is up to all of us to see it through.

It is interesting when comparing the last two authors and how their experience in Wounded Knee affected their views of the federal government and AIM in general. Lyman, as an employee of the BIA, experienced the frustration of having to deal with the Justice Department and their half-hearted negotiations with AIM while at the same time expressing frustration with AIM itself, with their unrealistic demands and their violent attitude towards achieving their desired goals. Zimmerman, on the other hand, was driven by a sense of purpose and morality towards the Native Americans of the country whom he viewed as slighted against by the federal government. He has an admiration for AIM and their occupation to help change U.S. policy towards the Native Americans and their tribal government systems imposed on them by the U.S. government. He compares it to the Vietnam War, which was winding down at the time. Zimmerman viewed the U.S. as imposing its system of government on the Vietnamese much in the same way that the U.S. government wanted Native American tribes to do the same back in the 1800s. When they did not do it willingly, it was forced on them. Zimmerman carries a certain anti-government attitude during his experience, something that makes the reader see Zimmerman as something of a product of the turmoil of the 1960s and the anti-government, anti-war atmosphere that permeated around the country in that decade. And Zimmerman indicated no regrets for his part in supplying the occupiers, even after he and his associates were arrested. He believed what he did was right. Lyman, on the other hand, is the complete opposite of Zimmerman. Lyman believed that he could help the Native Americans on the Pine Ridge reservation by working for the federal government

to try to improve their outlook on life instead of working against the government. This is where his conflict begins once the occupiers arrive. He wants to help them legally through his associations with the BIA and the Justice Department, but he sees that neither the government nor the occupiers seem to want a peaceful resolution to the crisis. Even after the crisis ends, he indicates that his faith in the government is shaken, as indicated by his trying to decide whether or not to stay on as the BIA representative in Wounded Knee.

Both authors clearly show their bias towards the opposing sides of the event, which is what makes these two books very good ones to use as they cover both sides of the spectrum, the government and the civilian side. Both see their views at the start as being the right choice. Only Lyman wavers a bit towards the end as he saw how ineffective the Justice Department was towards Wounded Knee and bringing a swift resolution to the occupation. However, both authors tell their side of the story in a way that the reader sees their frustrations and excitement, their struggles and their triumphs. What readers and historians can gain from these books is that despite their being on opposite during the occupation, it is the firsthand accounts they give that are their most valuable contributions to the literature of the crisis as they were actually there at some point during the occupation. Lyman was there for the duration and gave a first-hand account of life inside Wounded Knee during the occupation and the suffering of those who were there, while Zimmerman describes the attitude of much of the country at the time and he offers the unique perspective of not being associated with any form of the U.S. government. He brings an ideological perspective to the various accounts of the Wounded Knee occupation, where his anti-government stance places him in a unique

position to support the occupiers. In both positions, commonality is found once both sides are seen and read, making these two works very relevant accounts of the Wounded Knee occupation.

3.5. Conclusions

It would seem that the Wounded Knee occupation was AIM's last effort to gain new rights from the government. They had tried for years to accomplish this through takeovers, protests, and marches. Despite all of these attempts, they did not attain what AIM had really wanted, which was a Congressional inquiry into past Native American grievances and new tribal rights that the present system did not allow. Wounded Knee showed the government, in fact the world, that it was a force to be reckoned with and that they were capable of having their voices heard, albeit through a hostile takeover of a sacred, yet infamous site of the Sioux. The Wounded Knee Massacre of 1890 represented the end of the Native American way of life in the Midwest and it was a dark blemish on the country, a fact that AIM was quick to take advantage of. The massacre at Wounded Knee and the subsequent awards and accolades bestowed on Army soldiers who were present there left a deep wound in Native American society, a wound that had not completely healed by the time of the occupation in 1972. Another massacre would have incited further protest and anger amongst the various North American tribes across the country. Both the AIM occupiers and the federal government knew this. From my viewpoint, another "massacre" of Native Americans at Wounded Knee or even storming the town during the occupation would have been extremely unwise for the federal government to commit, especially given the media coverage of the occupation, and could have caused irreparable damage to already strained relations between the U.S.

government and the tribes of the country. During the 71-day siege, AIM succeeded in getting a Congressional inquiry to begin to look into past Native American treaties and numerous changes were made to the reservation system. Still, one of their chief issues was the removal of Dick Wilson as the tribal president on the reservation. He would remain in office and, through the use of bribery and intimidation, defeat Russell Means for the presidency seat in 1974. They also succeeded in getting the occupiers who died at Wounded Knee to be buried there. This, though, cost many of the occupiers their freedom, as many were arrested and spent years in court. In the years that followed the occupation, many would be imprisoned and AIM would begin to see a backlash against it, even from its own people, as articles in papers such as the *Amerindian* indicated. Some saw the violence it created as going against what so many had worked for. The government, which following the chaos of the 1960s had begun to crack down on so-called “subversive” groups, subdued violent groups. The combination of AIM leaders going to court or jail, the government’s attempts to undermine the group, the violence it became associated with, and the backlash that the violence and the Wounded Knee occupation created among its own people caused AIM to become weakened and cease to exist as the powerful force it had once been. It is still around today, but it does not have near the influence that it once had. AIM succeeded in getting the suffering and despair of Native Americans on reservations put into the minds of the American people and the government. However, its success at Wounded Knee would result in its ultimate downfall as an influential force. Whether or not AIM is viewed as a great movement for the Native Americans will be debated, but in the end, AIM did succeed in accomplishing much of its main goal—to help improve the daily lives of Native Americans in the U.S.

and give them more of a voice in tribal and federal affairs. It accomplished its successes in violent ways, but its message was heard, which seems is all they wanted to accomplish.

3.6. Reviewed Works and Sources

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