


Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

- Eight Amendment of the U.S. Constitution

Excessive be. Punishments nor; Bail nor cruel inflicted not
imposed unusual required; fines, and excessive shall

- Amendment the Eight U.S. of Constitution



the

architecture

of

oppression



a.01: extreme realities



SOLITARY CONFINEMENT SENTENCES CAN LAST DAYS, WEEKS, MONTHS, YEARS OR EVEN DECADES.

There is no official organization that regulates the use of solitary confinement.

Individual institutions freely use isolation tactics however they see fit.



5 OUT 6 SENTENCES TO SOLITARY CONFINEMENT ARE FOR NON-VIOLENT MISBEHAVIOR.

This includes infractions such as:



Excessive possession of postage stamps

Selling of chewing tobacco

Failure to meet dress standards




'I tried to measure the passing of days by counting food trays. Without being able to keep track of time, though, sometimes I thought the officers had left me and were never coming back. I thought they were gone for days, and I was going to starve. It's likely they were only gone for a few hours, but I had no way to know.'



THE WAR ON DRUGS AND MASS INCARCERATION

The U.S. State and Federal prison population has increased over 800% in only 40 years.




THE U.S. PRISON POPULATION IS ITS FOURTH LARGEST


Includes those held in state and federal prisons, local jails and other correctional facilities.



a.02: institution



brooklyn, new york



brooklyn naval hospital



RD. Medical Supply Depot




R95. Administration Main



R2/R3. Quarters





R1. Surgeon's Residence



a.03: strange attractors







a.04: de/re

*'It is sometimes necessary to hang
a man, villains often deserve
whipping, and perhaps having
their ears cut off; but are we
in the future to be prevented
from inflicting these punishments
because they are cruel?'*

during congressional consideration of this provision one Member objected to "the import of [the words] being too indefinite" and another Member said: "No cruel and unusual punishment is to be inflicted; it is sometimes necessary to hang a man, villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut off; but are we in the future to be prevented from inflicting these punishments because they are cruel?" If a more lenient mode of correcting vice and deterring others from the commission of it would be invented, it would be very prudent in the Legislature to adopt it; but until we have some security that this will be done, we ought not to be restrained from making necessary laws by any declaration of this kind." It is clear from some of the complaints about the absence of a bill of rights including a guarantee against cruel and unusual punishments in the ratifying conventions that tortures and barbarous punishments were much on the minds of the complainants, but the English history which led to the inclusion of a predecessor provision in the Bill of Rights of 1689 indicates additional concern with arbitrary and disproportionate punishments. Though few in number, the decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting this guarantee have applied it in both senses. At first, the Court was inclined to an historical style on interpretation, determining whether or not a punishment was "cruel and unusual" by looking to see if it or a sufficiently similar variant was considered "cruel and unusual" in 1789. But in *Weems v. United States* it was concluded that the framers had not merely intended to bar the reinstatement of procedures and techniques condemned in 1789, but had intended to prevent the authorization of "a coercive cruelty being exercised through other forms of punishment." The Amendment therefore was of an "expansive and vital character" and, in the words of a later Court, "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." The proper approach to an interpretation of this provision has been one of the major points of difference among the Justices in the capital punishment cases. "Difficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted; but it is safe to affirm that punishments of torture [such as drawing and quartering, emboweling alive, beheading, public dissection, and burning alive], and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment to the Constitution." In thus upholding capital punishment inflicted by a firing squad, the Court not only looked to traditional practices but examined the history of executions in the territory concerned, the military practice, and current writings on the death penalty. The Court next approved, under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause rather than under the Eighth Amendment, electrocution as a permissible method of administering punishment. Many years later a divided Court, assuming the applicability of the Eighth Amendment to the States, held that a second electrocution following a mechanical failure at the first which injured but did not kill the condemned man did not violate the proscription. Divestiture of the citizenship of a natural born citizen was held in *Trop v. Dulles* again by a divided Court, to be constitutionally forbidden as a penalty more cruel and "more primitive than torture," inasmuch as it entailed statelessness or "the total destruction of the individual's status in organized society." "The question is whether [a] penalty subjects the individual to a fate forbidden by the principle of civilized treatment guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment." A punishment must be examined "in light of the basic prohibition against inhuman treatment," and the Amendment was intended to preserve the "basic concept . . . [of] the dignity of man" by assuring that the power to impose punishment is "exercised within the limits of civilized standards." In *Trop*, the majority refused to consider "the death penalty as an index of the constitutional limit on punishment. Whatever the arguments may be against capital punishment . . . the death penalty has been employed throughout our history, and, in a day when it is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitutional concept of cruelty. But a coalition of civil rights and civil liberties organizations mounted a campaign against the death penalty in the 1960s, and the Court eventually confronted the issues involved. The answers were not, it is fair to say, consistent one with another. A series of cases testing the means by which the death penalty was imposed culminated in what appeared to be a decisive rejection of the attack in *McGautha v. California*. Nonetheless, the Court then agreed to hear a series of cases directly raising the question of the validity of capital punishment under the cruel and unusual punishments clause, and, to

a.syntax




b.loci

During congressional consideration of this provision one Member objected to "the import of [the words] being too indefinite" and another Member said, "No cruel and unusual punishment is to be inflicted; it is sometimes necessary to punish, villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut off; but are we in the future to be prevented from inflicting these punishments because they are cruel?" If a more lenient mode of correcting vice and deterring others from the commission of it would be invented, it would be very prudent for the Legislature to adopt it; but until we have such security that this will be done, we ought not to be restrained from making necessary laws by any declaration of this kind. It is clear from some of the complaints about the abuses of the criminal justice system that the framers of the Constitution were concerned about the possibility of cruel and unusual punishments. The English history which led to the inclusion of this clause in the Bill of Rights of 1689 indicated additional concern with arbitrary and disproportionate punishments. Though few in number, the decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting this guarantee have applied it in both senses. At first, the Court was inclined to an historical view of the restriction, determining whether or not a punishment was "cruel and unusual" by looking to see if it or a sufficiently similar variant was considered "cruel and unusual" in 1789. But in *Weems v. United States* it was concluded that the framers had not merely intended to bar the reinstatement of procedures and techniques condemned in 1789, but had intended to prevent the authorization of a coercive cruelty being exercised through other forms of punishment. The amendment therefore was of an "expansive and vital character" and, in the words of a later Court, "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." The proper approach to an interpretation of this provision has been one of the major points of difference among the Justices in the capital punishment cases. "Difficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted; but it is safe to affirm that punishments of torture (such as drawing and quartering, beheading alive, beheading, public dissection, and burning alive), and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment to the Constitution." In thus upholding capital punishment inflicted by a firing squad, the Court not only looked to traditional practices but examined the history of executions in the territory concerned, the military practice and current writings on the death penalty. The Court next approved, under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause rather than under the Eighth Amendment, electrocution as a permissible method of administering punishment. Many years later a divided Court, assuming the applicability of the Eighth Amendment to the State, held that a second electrocution following a mechanical failure of the first which injured but did not kill the condemned man did not violate the proscription. Divestiture of the citizenship of a natural born citizen was held in *Trop v. Dulles* again by a divided Court to be constitutionally forbidden as a penalty more cruel and more primitive than torture, "inasmuch as it entailed statelessness or the total destruction of the individual's status in organized society." "The question is whether [a] penalty subjects the individual to a fate forbidden by the principle of civilized treatment guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment." A punishment must be examined "in light of the basic prohibition against inhuman treatment," and the Amendment was intended to preserve the basic concept . . . [of] the dignity of man by reserving that the power to impose punishment be exercised within the limits of civilized standards. Thus, the majority refused to consider "the death penalty . . . as one of the institutions of the punishment." Whatever the arguments may be against capital punishment, the death penalty has been employed throughout our history, and, in a day when it is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitutional concept of cruelty. But a coalition of civil rights and civil liberties organizations mounted a campaign against the death penalty in the 1960s, and the Court eventually confronted the issues involved. The answers were not, it is fair to say, consistent one with another. A series of cases testing the means by which the death penalty was imposed culminated in what appeared to be a decisive rejection of the attack in *McGautha v. California*. Nonetheless, the Court then agreed to hear a series of cases directly raising the question of the validity of capital punishment under the cruel and unusual punishments clause, and, in


ab1.overlay




ab2.subtract




ab3.exclude



ab4.translate



ab5.analyze



ab6.project

DURING CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF THIS PROVISION ONE MEMBER OBJECTED TO "THE IMPORT OF [THE WORDS] BEING TOO INDEFINITE" AND ANOTHER MEMBER SAID: "NO CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT IS TO BE INFLICTED; IT IS SOMETIMES NECESSARY TO HANG A MAN, VILLAINS OFTEN DESERVE WHIPPING, AND PERHAPS HAVING THEIR EARS CUT OFF; BUT ARE WE IN THE FUTURE TO BE PREVENTED FROM INFLICTING THESE PUNISHMENTS BECAUSE THEY ARE CRUEL?" IF A MORE LENIENT MODE OF CORRECTING VICE AND DETERRING OTHERS FROM THE COMMISSION OF IT WOULD BE INVENTED, IT WOULD BE VERY PRUDENT IN THE LEGISLATURE TO ADOPT IT; BUT UNTIL WE HAVE SOME SECURITY THAT THIS WILL BE DONE, WE OUGHT NOT TO BE RESTRAINED FROM MAKING NECESSARY LAWS BY ANY DECLARATION OF THIS KIND." IT IS CLEAR FROM SOME OF THE COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE ABSENCE OF A BILL OF RIGHTS INCLUDING A GUARANTEE AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS IN THE RATIFYING CONVENTIONS THAT TORTURES AND BARBAROUS PUNISHMENTS WERE MUCH ON THE MINDS OF THE COMPLAINANTS, BUT THE ENGLISH HISTORY WHICH LED TO THE INCLUSION OF A PREDECESSOR PROVISION IN THE BILL OF RIGHTS OF 1689 INDICATES ADDITIONAL CONCERN WITH ARBITRARY AND DISPROPORTIONATE PUNISHMENTS. THOUGH FEW IN NUMBER, THE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT INTERPRETING THIS GUARANTEE HAVE APPLIED IT IN BOTH SENSES. AT FIRST, THE COURT WAS INCLINED TO AN HISTORICAL STYLE ON INTERPRETATION, DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT A PUNISHMENT WAS "CRUEL AND UNUSUAL" BY LOOKING TO SEE IF IT OR A SUFFICIENTLY SIMILAR VARIANT WAS CONSIDERED "CRUEL AND UNUSUAL" IN 1789. BUT IN *WEEMS V. UNITED STATES* IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT THE FRAMERS HAD NOT MERELY INTENDED TO BAR THE REINSTITUTION OF PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES CONDEMNED IN 1789, BUT HAD INTENDED TO PREVENT THE AUTHORIZATION OF "A COERCIVE CRUELTY BEING EXERCISED THROUGH OTHER FORMS OF PUNISHMENT." THE AMENDMENT THEREFORE WAS OF AN "EXPANSIVE AND VITAL CHARACTER" AND, IN THE WORDS OF A LATER COURT, "MUST DRAW ITS MEANING FROM THE EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY THAT MARK THE PROGRESS OF A MATURING SOCIETY." THE PROPER APPROACH TO AN INTERPRETATION OF THIS PROVISION HAS BEEN ONE OF THE MAJOR POINTS OF DIFFERENCE AMONG THE JUSTICES IN THE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT CASES. "DIFFICULTY WOULD ATTEND THE EFFORT TO DEFINE WITH EXACTNESS THE EXTENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION WHICH PROVIDES THAT CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS SHALL NOT BE INFLICTED; BUT IT IS SAFE TO AFFIRM THAT PUNISHMENTS OF TORTURE [SUCH AS DRAWING AND QUARTERING, EMBOWELING ALIVE, BEHEADING, PUBLIC DISSECTING, AND BURNING ALIVE], AND ALL OTHERS IN THE SAME LINE OF UNNECESSARY CRUELTY, ARE FORBIDDEN BY THAT AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION." IN THUS UPHOLDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT INFLICTED BY A FIRING SQUAD, THE COURT NOT ONLY LOOKED TO TRADITIONAL PRACTICES BUT EXAMINED THE HISTORY OF EXECUTIONS IN THE TERRITORY CONCERNED, THE MILITARY PRACTICE, AND CURRENT WRITINGS ON THE DEATH PENALTY. THE COURT NEXT APPROVED, UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT'S DUE PROCESS CLAUSE RATHER THAN UNDER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT, ELECTROCUTION AS A PERMISSIBLE METHOD OF ADMINISTERING PUNISHMENT. MANY YEARS LATER, A DIVIDED COURT, ASSUMING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT TO THE STATES, HELD THAT A SECOND ELECTROCUTION FOLLOWING A MECHANICAL FAILURE AT THE FIRST WHICH INJURED BUT DID NOT KILL THE CONDEMNED MAN DID NOT VIOLATE THE PROSCRIPTION. DIVESTITURE OF THE CITIZENSHIP OF A NATURAL BORN CITIZEN WAS HELD IN *TROP V. DULLES*, AGAIN BY A DIVIDED COURT, TO BE CONSTITUTIONALLY FORBIDDEN AS A PENALTY MORE CRUEL AND "MORE PRIMITIVE THAN TORTURE," INASMUCH AS IT ENTAILED STATELESSNESS OR "THE TOTAL DESTRUCTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL'S STATUS IN ORGANIZED SOCIETY." "THE QUESTION IS WHETHER [A] PENALTY SUBJECTS THE INDIVIDUAL TO A FATE FORBIDDEN BY THE PRINCIPLE OF CIVILIZED TREATMENT GUARANTEED BY THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT." A PUNISHMENT MUST BE EXAMINED "IN LIGHT OF THE BASIC PROHIBITION AGAINST INHUMAN TREATMENT," AND THE AMENDMENT WAS INTENDED TO PRESERVE THE "BASIC CONCEPT . . . [OF] THE DIGNITY OF MAN" BY ASSURING THAT THE POWER TO IMPOSE PUNISHMENT IS "EXERCISED WITHIN THE LIMITS OF CIVILIZED STANDARDS."




a.05: ar·chi·tec·ture



existing



proposed




second-level society

- LIVING QUARTERS
- INT/EXT CIRCULATION
- RECREATION & INDUSTRY
- MASTER CONTROL
- COLLABORATIVE CLASSROOMS
- ADMINISTRATION
- TRANSITION HOUSING
- CONNECTIONS
- STRUCTURAL SUPPORT
- CLASSROOMS & RESEARCH


interim

- HOUSING SUPPORT
- STAFF QUARTERS
- VOCATIONAL TRAINING
- VISITATION
- MAINTENANCE/STORAGE
- INTAKE, OFFICES, RECORDS
- MEDICAL AND HEALTHCARE
- VISITOR INFORMATION
- PUBLIC EDUCATION AUX
- PUBLIC EDUCATION MAIN


society






second-level society




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











administration









// ENTRANCE, COMMUNITY SPACES,
CLASSROOMS, STUDENT SERVICES




// DINING, AMENITIES, OFFICES




// CLASSROOMS, RESEARCH,
LABORATORIES, LECTURE HALLS




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COLLABORATIVE CLASSROOMS




// HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL
MOVEMENT




// USER PROFILE
MOVEMENT







// RECEPTION, CHECK-IN,
SCREENING, INVESTIGATIONS,
OFFICES, STORAGE




// OFFICES




// OFFICES, TRAINING,
TEMPORARY STAFF HOUSING,
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT




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


// HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL
MOVEMENT



// USER PROFILE





// LIVING QUARTERS SECURE
ENTRY/EXIT

// INTERNAL/EXTERNAL
PATHWAYS


// LIVING QUARTERS ACCESS

// INMATE ROOMS


// HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL
MOVEMENT

// USER PROFILE







// OFFICES, INMATE SUPPORT,
COMMISSARY, COMMUNITY SPACES




// INDUSTRY, MECHANICS,
CRAFTING, PRODUCTION




// KITCHEN, PREPARATIONS,
EXERCISE, RECREATION




// DINING, EVENT & MULTI-USE
SPACE, RELIGIOUS SERVICES



// HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL
MOVEMENT




// USER PROFILE









living space interior







a.06: ?

