

UKRAINE: A NATION WITHOUT HEROES

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ABSTRACT

Ukraine's creation of national heroes reflects the challenges of nation-building after the fall of the Soviet Union. Since its independence in 1991, Ukraine has attempted to "rehabilitate" controversial political figures into national heroes in order to create a united national history. Nations have always depended on symbols and perhaps one of the most important symbols is that of a national hero. A person who fought and possibly died fighting for a national cause can unite and inspire future generations while legitimizing the necessity of the state. Along with inspiring faith and courage, the focus on national heroes manifests norms, goals, and are a medium for imposing those beliefs upon a society. While Ukraine has literary heroes, political figures are controversial. My research has focused on five figures: Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, Ivan Mazepa, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Symon Petliura, and Stepan Bandera due to their attempts to build an independent state in Ukrainian history.

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INTRODUCTION

In January 2010 outgoing Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko honored Stepan Bandera posthumously with the award “Hero of Ukraine.” The announcement of this award unleashed a wave of protest across Eastern Ukraine, as well as denunciations from the European Union and from the Russian Federation condemning Yushchenko’s decision. The protests condemning Stepan Bandera’s reception of the award linked Bandera with Nazi occupation and even presented him in altered photos wearing an SS uniform. Western Ukrainian pro-Bandera groups rallied to his defense waving banners of him (which also make their appearance at Western Ukrainian soccer games), renamed streets after him, erected monuments to him, and even issued a commemorative postage stamp of him. Incoming President Viktor Yanukovych promptly declared that in his first acts he would revoke the award¹ and in January 2011 his office announced the revocation official.²

The uproar over establishing Bandera as a hero of Ukraine is symptomatic of the divided society still trying to establish a united national conception after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Due to its division between Poland and Russia through much of its history, the division between the Habsburg and Russian Empires for almost 150 years, and its subordination in the Soviet Union, any possible political figure that could be a national hero remains highly controversial. This controversy over national heroes extends beyond simply Stepan Bandera. Ukraine is a nation without heroes. This essay will examine five case studies of potential and

¹ “Yanukovych to repeal Bandera hero decree” Kyiv Post March 10, 2010 <http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/yanukovych-to-repeal-bandera-hero-decree-62152.html> (accessed December 6, 2013).

² Pres-sluzhba Prezidenta Ukrainy Viktora Yanukovycha, “Rishennyam sudu prezydentskyi ukaz ‘Pro prisvoyennya S.Banderi zvannya Heroy Ukrainy’ skasovano” under ostanni novyny <http://www.president.gov.ua/news/19103.html> (accessed December 6, 2013).

controversial political national heroes: Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, Ivan Mazepa, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Symon Petliura, and lastly Stepan Bandera through historical memory. This essay will utilize Ukrainian and Russian primary sources including Mykhailo Hrushevsky's histories, Symon Petliura's articles, Stepan Bandera's writing, and declassified KGB documents as well as recent (since 2000) Western scholarship from leading scholars like Timothy Snyder, Paul Robert Magocsi, Serhy Yekelchuk, and Orest Subtelny. Each of these potential heroes attempted to build a unified and independent state in the Ukrainian lands yet remain controversial within Ukraine due to accusations ranging from ensnaring Ukraine under a larger power, trading away Ukrainian lands, anti-Semitism, treachery, and even genocide.

One may ask why a focus on Ukraine is necessary. Not only is Ukraine a large geographic region of Europe but it is also one of the largest states population-wise that does not have a cohesive people. Ukraine remains a state caught on the border between East and West, between Russia and Europe, between cleavages to its past and outlooks on its future. Imperial Russia developed itself based on its distinctiveness from Europe and the West and that outlook remained through the Soviet era and left an impact on Ukraine when it gained independence.³ Shortly after gaining independence, scholars like Mark von Hagen and Andrew Wilson discussed how Ukrainians had been challenging the Soviet legacy, attempting to nation build, and establish itself as part of Europe.⁴ These Ukrainian attempts to nation build and connect itself to Europe continue to be a major part of internal politics today.

³ Liah Greenfeld. *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1992), 266-7.

⁴ Mark von Hagen. "Does Ukraine Have a History?" *Slavic Review* 54 (1995):658-73. Andrew Wilson. *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation*. (New Haven: New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).

Nation building, much like a national movement, depends on symbols and mythology to further their goals and inspire unity. Symbols can include a new focus on important individuals, establishing heroes, a new flag, a new anthem, and downplaying or removing symbols of the previous regime.⁵ While it is difficult to measure something as subjective and esoteric as a “national hero” there are some suitable markers to help guide the way. If a person is important to a society, frequently there will be indicators and icons. People and politicians generally create ways of honoring new figures that are considered important and downplaying former regime symbols by renaming streets, buildings, and museums after important figures, building new monuments to national heroes, writing histories to those figures, producing television and film documentaries and movies, and inclusion in textbooks. So perhaps one of the most important symbols for a nascent nation is that of a national hero.

The problems establishing these five people as national heroes reflect the problems of nation building in Ukraine. Support for these five political figures is anemic, ranging from a high of 55% for Ivan Mazepa in Western Ukraine to a low of 6% for Symon Petliura in Eastern Ukraine. Even with the highest rate, nearly half the population does not support the concept of Mazepa as a hero even though he is on the 10 *Hryvnia* note.⁶ Ernest Renan wrote that “the essence of the nation is that all individuals have many things in common, and also that they have forgotten many things” to create “a large-scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of sacrifices

⁵ Taras Kuzio. *Ukraine: State and nation building*. (London: Routledge, 1998), 217.

⁶ According to a 1997 survey “Mazepa had a 55% positive response in western Ukraine, compared to 22% in eastern Ukraine. Petliura had 31% and 6% and Bandera 41% and 7% respectively. Contrasting those figures, Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, the last secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine received 18% and 31% respectively.” Andreas Kappeler. “From an Ethnonational to a Multiethnic to a Transnational Ukrainian History” in *A Laboratory of Transnational History: Ukraine and Recent Ukrainian Historiography*. Eds. Georgiy Kasianov and Philipp Ther (Budapest: Central European Press, 2009), 55.

that one has made in the past and of those that one is prepared to make in the future.”⁷ While Ukrainians have many things in common, they have yet to establish cohesively what constitutes a Ukrainian national hero.

One may ask what is the importance of a national hero to nation building? Scholar Joseph Campbell argued that a society needed heroes “because [a hero] has a constellating image to pull together tendencies to separation, to pull them together into some intention.”⁸ Professor Anthony D Smith argued that “every nationalism requires a touch stone of virtue and heroism, to guide and give meaning to the tasks of regeneration. Heroes provide models of virtuous conduct, their deeds of valour inspire faith and courage in their oppressed and decadent descendants.”⁹ Along with inspiring faith and courage, the focus on national heroes manifests norms, goals, and are a medium for imposing and uniting those beliefs upon a society. With such a divided interpretation of these political figures that fought for an independent Ukrainian state, it seems difficult if not impossible to establish common national heroes that create large-scale, common solidarity completing the nation building process and thus establishing a nation and national identity.

Early Modern Era and the Rise of the Cossacks

The people residing in the area now known as Ukraine have been known under a few different names. Through much of their history the people have been known as the Rus’. The other major appellations have derived from that. In the West they were called Ruthenians, and

⁷ Ernest Renan. “What is a Nation?” in *Becoming National: A Reader*. eds. Eley, Geoff, and Ronald Grigor Suny, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 45, 53.

⁸ Joseph Campbell with Bill Moyers. *The Power of Myth*. (New York: MJF Books, 1988), 163.

⁹ Quoted in Guntis Šmidchens. “National Heroic Narratives in the Baltics as a Source for Nonviolent Political Action” *Slavic Review*, Vol. 66, No. 3 (Fall, 2007), 487.

under the Russians they became known as the Malorus or Little Russians. Through this paper the people will be referred to as Rus', Ruthenians, Malorus or Little Russians depending on the context of the era and what state they resided within until the 19th and 20th centuries when they started calling themselves Ukrainians. For the sake of simplicity the territory will be referred to as Ukraine (unless certain regions are specifically named) and will correspond roughly with the current borders as represented in the Appendix. Ukrainian city names will be presented as simplified translations from Ukrainian omitting translations of soft signs, thus as examples: Kyiv rather than Kiev, Kharkiv rather than Kharkov, Odesa rather than Odessa, and Lviv rather than L'viv, Lvov, or Lwow. The name Ukraine stems from old Slavonic meaning on the border or frontier but the word remained limited in use for the region. The border, though, is an apt description because through most of its existence it has been a border region for several different cultures. Three different cultures, Poland-Lithuanian, Ottoman, and Russian, have contributed the most to its development.

In the modern world nationality is taken as matter of factly as gender or height, but for much of history that is not the case. There was no concept of nationality until the late 18th century and into the 19th century. What differentiated people from one another before that time was primarily religion and class, and only partially state loyalty. The majority of Rus' identified themselves primarily as Orthodox Christians while the noble Rus' included class along with the religious identification. Neither of these groups saw any common unity except for religious affiliation even though they would have spoken the same language. It is necessary to discuss the pre-national developments in Ukraine focusing primarily on the state, religious, and class developments since these have had long lasting consequences on future developments in the region. Successful state formation during this early modern era not only aided particular cultural

development for nationalities, but also aided future nationalist claims that certain groups were a “historical” people deserving of a state while other “non-historical” people did not.

One of the most important and most heavily contested eras of Ukrainian history is the Cossack Era because historians debate whether the situation in Ukrainian territory constituted a state or not. Ukrainian historians contend that the Cossack actions established the foundation for an independent Ukrainian state. In contrast both Polish and Russian historians largely view the Cossacks as ruffians on a rebellious border region between their respective states that brought on the downfall of one (Poland) and initiated the greatness of the other (Russia) when they integrated their Slavic brothers into the state. Two figures, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi and Ivan Mazepa, stand out in this era because they led the Ukrainian Cossacks and played the largest roles in this contested state development during the early modern period. As well since the Cossack Era and these two men play such central roles in Ukrainian culture and nationalist thinking, it is necessary to give an introduction to them and their time.

The Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania held the greatest sway over the area through the early modern period of the 14th-17th centuries. After the conquest of Galicia in 1349, Poland controlled the western part of Ukraine and desired to incorporate more of the territory. Lithuania had control over much of the rest of the Ukrainian territories from the mid 14th century until its incorporation with Poland during the Treaty of Lublin in 1569. For almost two centuries, an informal personal relationship existed where the Lithuanian nobility recognized the Polish king but the nobles maintained their independence. The Treaty of Lublin formalized and restructured the relationship into a united Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania (*Rzeczpospolita*) with one

Diet (*Sejm*) that elected its king.¹⁰ The election of the king strengthened the *Sejm* so greatly that they could not only override his decisions but required unanimous consent to make any change.¹¹ While Ruthenian nobles greatly influenced the Lithuanian state, they supported Polish incorporation because they believed that they would benefit from the union. The Ruthenian nobles believed it was a way to safeguard their Orthodox church, and maintain the use of Ruthenian as an administrative language, as the Lithuanians allowed. They also believed that they would be incorporated into the Polish *szlachta* (nobility) like the Lithuanian nobles and would have similar benefits of using public lands as private property, of deferring military service, and the elimination of most taxes.¹² This union not only expanded the nobility but also made Poland the undisputed leader in the region while bringing western ideas into the region.

The western idea that influenced the region the most during this era was the Counter Reformation which was progressing east at the time. Jesuits attempted to halt the influence of Protestantism and entered Poland to combat deviations from Catholicism in 1564. The more militant Catholicism influenced Poland greatly and caused friction between the Catholic Poles and Orthodox Ruthenians.¹³ The Jesuit education influenced the *szlachta* to oppose the Orthodox “schismatics” turning the previous general religious toleration in Poland into a virulent Catholicism. The *szlachta* denied Ruthenian nobles entry into it unless the Ruthenians would assume Polish customs, laws, language, and become Catholic. The *szlachta* even went so far to encourage the Polonization of Ruthenian nobles that laws “stipulated that a nobleman who

¹⁰ Paul Robert Magocsi. *A History of Ukraine: The Land and Its People*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 141.

¹¹ The infamous *liberum veto*, a veto of one noble, could stop all work.

¹² Magocsi, 141.

¹³ Orest Subtelny. *Ukraine: A History* 4th ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 94. Magocsi, 170.

adopted Catholicism would automatically receive the rights of a Polish nobleman.”¹⁴ These laws created an ultimatum of acquiesce or be denied entry.

This Ruthenian nobles’ desire to become part of the *szlachta* created problems for future development in the Ukrainian lands. In Poland the increased Catholic and Polish education provided a commonality between noble and peasant, but in the Ukrainian lands that education only created a greater division between noble and peasant. As the nobles became more Catholicized and Polonified, being Polish and Catholic became equated with being cultured while Orthodoxy became equivalent to being uncivilized, peasant, and backward. Since nobles frequently are a competitive group, envious of others’ status, many were concerned that Ruthenian culture was holding them back, thus many nobles quickly embraced Polish assimilation.¹⁵ With the Polish assimilation of the nobles, the Ruthenians lost the traditional elite patrons of language, religion, and customs that create high-culture and ultimately establish independent states. With the benefit of joining the *szlachta*, the nobles became more concerned with their own future development to the detriment of Orthodoxy and the peasants.

Orthodoxy, much like other religions, flourishes best when receiving support from a noble class within government. Under the previous Lithuanian rule, nobles adopted the Orthodox faith and reestablished a metropolitan to combat Muscovy’s influence. Unfortunately, this support disappeared with Polish incorporation. Orthodoxy no longer received support from the Catholic king or *szlachta*. The *szlachta* decided to undercut Orthodoxy’s legitimacy by selling bishoprics to untrained lay authorities who ended up pilfering and pillaging churches

¹⁴ Subtelny, 89.

¹⁵ Subtelny, 95-6.

selling off icons and holy relics.¹⁶ As the Ruthenian nobles assimilated and the Catholic pressure increased, Orthodox leaders believed there were few options available to maintain their religion. Some Orthodox Church leaders supported reconciliation with Catholicism so they could safeguard their practices. The attempt at reconciliation culminated in the Union of Brest in 1596 but fell short of reunifying the faiths when the Pope failed to recognize the decision. The Orthodox faithful in the Ukrainian lands condemned the Union and derisively referred to adherents as Uniates. The Union only complicated the religious situation in the Ukrainian lands even more because instead of two conflicting religions there were then three, Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and Uniate.

Other Orthodox Church leaders condemned the Galicians for their heresy in uniting with the Catholics, and felt that the only true way to preserve Orthodoxy was to find a supporter or sponsor. Ultimately, the Orthodox Church looked to three different groups as sponsors, two within the Ukrainian lands and one from without. Orthodox merchants and guilds formed Brotherhoods in the western Ukrainian lands to protect the faith and worked with nobles who remained in the faith to purchase printing presses and form schools to counter Catholicization.¹⁷ The other local sponsor and defender of the faith Orthodoxy found in the 17th century were the Cossacks but their distance from most of the population centers limited their influence. Orthodox leaders were forced to look outside of Ukraine for a strong support. Traditionally Orthodoxy would have looked to Constantinople for aid from the Patriarch, but with the fall of Constantinople in 1453, much of the Church leadership fled to Moscow and the Patriarch had more concerns maintaining the faithful within the Ottoman Empire than rescuing the faithful

¹⁶ Subtelny, 93.

¹⁷ Subtelny, 96-7.

abroad.¹⁸ Like many of the former Constantinople Church leaders, Ukrainian Church leaders began to look to Moscow for help and many went so far that they fled from the Ukrainian lands to Muscovy to maintain their religion.¹⁹

These religious refugees first from Constantinople and later from the Ukrainian lands happened to flee to Moscow as it was becoming an important power in Russia and began to portray itself as the defender of Orthodoxy. In order to explain Moscow's good fortune, the grand princes began to promote Moscow as the "Third Rome" a permanent holy and universal empire.²⁰ Along a similar line of reasoning, the metropolitans justified the flight abandoning the Ukrainian lands to the Mongols in 1326 by constructing the claim that Moscow was the last remaining dynastic Kyivian Rus state and thus entitled to be the seat of the Metropolitan. The sovereigns in Moscow encouraged this claim to explain Muscovy's rise to prominence and ultimately maintained that they were the "ruler of all Rus" effectively establishing claims to all Rus lands.²¹ This ideology was to have a great effect on the Ukrainian lands as contact with Moscow increased.

Religious development was not the only way that the nobles started to separate themselves from the Ruthenian peasants. As nobility frequently was contingent on their amount of wealth, the nobles began to also focus upon their further economic enhancement. Without merchants and large trading towns as developed in Western Europe, nobles saw agriculture as a step towards greater monetary gains and expanded status. The 15th and 16th centuries saw an

¹⁸ Magocsi, 162.

¹⁹ It was not the first time that Ukrainian Church leaders fled to Moscow. During the Mongol invasion of the 13th century, the Metropolitan of Kyiv fled north leaving Ukrainian lands without religious leadership.

²⁰ Subtelny, 76.

²¹ Subtelny, 77. Magocsi 158, 160.

influx of New World precious metals that inflated European agriculture prices. Food prices increased by 400-500% and in some locales even as high as 1000%.²² Nobles attempted to capitalize on these prices by sending greater and greater quantities of grain to the West, however, the economic structure was inefficient since peasants owned small, divided individual farms. Nobles began to reorganize the farms into plantations and estates by appropriating peasant lands and increasing peasant work obligations. Through this process, grain trade shipments increased from roughly 13,000 tons in 1491-2 to a high of 272,000 in 1618.²³

The nobles' economic restructuring did not occur all at once. Starting in the 1490s the Polish *Sejm* started restricting peasants' ability to leave noble estates legally. Peasants could appeal their noble's decisions and were allowed to leave if they had the proper authority and found a replacement for their labor. While difficult to do, it was a check on noble authority. In 1518 the *szlachta*-dominated royal court decided that they could no longer hear complaints from subjects not living on personal lands of the royal crown which greatly disadvantaged the peasants. Since nobles controlled local courts and had the legal right to judge their peasants since 1457, and without the right to appeal to a higher authority, the peasants faced greater land confiscations and increased obligations.²⁴ The Lithuanian nobles started to adopt similar practices as the *Sejm* even before the incorporation. In a 1557 agricultural reform, peasants lost all property rights to the land. Peasants could continue working the land but only nobles could own it. Without owning the fruits of their labors, most peasants could not pay to leave or afford the replacement for their labor. Serfdom came to full fruition in 1573 when laws prohibited

²² Subtelny, 88.

²³ Magocsi, 156.

²⁴ Magocsi, 151. Subtelny, 90.

peasants from leaving estates for any reason.²⁵ So not only did peasants lose rights to own the land, they also became the nobles' chattel on the land.

The increased Western agricultural prices also encouraged nobles to expand farmlands and resettle the previously abandoned steppe in what is now western and central Ukraine. Some places were so vacant that there were as few as 7 or 8 people per square mile, versus 36 in Poland.²⁶ Nobles obtained vast royal land grants with promises of future settlement and spread the practice of serfdom into the Ukrainian lands. In order to encourage settlement on the steppes, nobles frequently offered reduced periods of serfdom, *slobody*, to lure serfs from other noble holdings. The terms of *slobody* differed greatly between nobles ranging from a period of 10 to 30 years of free work on the land before being expected to work for the noble.²⁷ After the term of *slobody* ended dues and taxes would commence as normal (though frequently at dues lower than in western Poland or Galicia). While nobles were luring serfs from other nobles, the Polish government continued to enact laws limiting the rights of the peasants and strengthening the practice of serfdom to ensure continued agricultural growth. In 1588 the *Sejm* declared that any peasant who resided on a manor for ten years became "immovable" property of that manor.²⁸ That nobles continued to lure peasants from other nobles' manors questions the effectiveness of the laws.

As the nobles' estates grew, they needed people to oversee the leaseholding of their vast lands. Nobles believed that the Jews were experts at leasing and money management, so frequently they relied on Jewish leaseholders brought from the west. By the early 1600s there

²⁵ Magocsi, 151.

²⁶ Magocsi, 151. Subtelny, 83. The Mongol invasions of the 14th century caused the abandonment of the lands.

²⁷ Subtelny, 88.

²⁸ Magocsi, 151.

were already about 120,000 Jews in the Ukrainian territory.²⁹ Over the course of the 16th and 17th centuries, Jews came to manage a large proportion of the economy in the Ukrainian lands, and by 1616 more than half of the crown lands in Ukrainian territory had Jewish leaseholders.³⁰ Along with being leaseholders, they frequently operated the mills and distilleries that processed grain for the nobles. Since the nobles often had monopolies on mills and distilleries, they would regularly lease them out for limited times to their managers at a certain price. The leaseholders would then charge whatever price they wanted for the products and any fees in “excess” of the nobles’ demands went to the leaseholders’ as profits.³¹ The added “excess” demands would increase peasant labors for the noble from two to three days a week to six or seven. Some leaseholders even went so far as to establish alcohol consumption quotas forcing peasants to imbibe the overproduction and continue payments.³² Due to the fact that Jews were often middlemen for the nobles and seen as profiting from the peasants’ labor, peasants came to see the Jewish population as local symbols of noble exploitation and oppression.³³

Some peasants began to leave the nobles’ lands for the frontier to escape the taxation, exploitation, and oppression they faced, and live a freer life. Initially these peasant frontiersmen went to the border regions only to hunt, fish, and trade only for a limited time but eventually decided to settle and farm on the frontiers to escape the nobles entirely. It was a dangerous life on the frontier though, which required these frontiersmen to organize defensive groups they called Cossacks to protect themselves and others from Ottoman slave traders. The Cossacks were originally defensive in nature, frequently starting as farmers working in the fields with

²⁹ Subtelny, 108.

³⁰ Subtelny, 124.

³¹ Subtelny, 124.

³² Subtelny, 214.

³³ Magocsi 153.

rifles slung over their shoulders, but eventually they would evolve into skilled fighters and fierce raiders of Ottoman caravans acquiring the riches of Tatar traders.³⁴ The Cossacks first appeared around the 1480s and did not increase drastically until the imposition of serfdom in the region in the mid 16th century.³⁵ After a peasant's period of *slobody* ended, frequently the serf would not feel bound by the original agreement or the children would not believe serfdom applied to them and would run away. Serfs escaped from their masters in Poland, Lithuania, central Ukraine, and Russia. They would flee beyond the rapids on the Dnipro River to join and expand the groups significantly, ultimately equating Cossackdom with being free men. To strengthen the Cossack position on the Dnipro even more against possible Ottoman raids, Dmitro Vyshnevetskyi requested supplies from the Polish king and began to build a permanent fortress (*Sich*).³⁶ This place beyond the rapids (*za porozhia*) would become known as the Zaporozhian Sich and became equated with freedom. The groups ultimately grew to a size capable of providing military services for nobles and the king. The mythos of the Cossacks would become a future cornerstone of Ukrainian identity, much like the cowboy is for America.

The Cossacks came under the authority of the Commonwealth when Lithuania united with Poland in 1569. The Cossacks swore allegiance to the king and recognized the authority of Poland but only on a contractual basis contingent on whether the king respected the Cossacks' semi-democratic rights to organize themselves. Both nobles and the king used Cossacks to gain wealth and prestige fighting against the Ottomans, Muscovy, and other foreign powers. The Cossack groups would frequently try to play nobles and the king off each other to increase their

³⁴ The word Cossack possibly derives from the Turkish word "qazaq" meaning plunderer, or raider warrior. As it is believed that the first Cossacks were renegade Turkish warriors. Magocsi, 191.

³⁵ Subtelny, 108.

³⁶ Michael Hrushevsky. *A History of Ukraine*. Ed. OJ Fredriksen. (Archon Books 1970), 157.

position in the Commonwealth and occasionally even ally with foreign powers against Poland.³⁷ Nobles often saw the Cossacks as a double-edged sword, they were convenient to use for their own aggrandizement but grew concerned about their continuous demands for being ennobled, while the Polish kings frequently saw the Cossacks solely as a military asset due to the nobles' reluctance to increase taxes to pay for a Polish army.³⁸ As the Ruthenian nobles and prior elites became more Polonized and as the Cossacks became enriched from military campaigns, the Cossacks became essentially a new elite in the Ukrainian lands.

For decades the Cossacks begrudgingly followed orders from the king of Poland-Lithuania but the mixture of a semi-democratic organization within a stratified state and nobles attempting to maintain control over peasants continued to create problems. While the Cossacks were useful, they also presented a potential challenge to noble control. One of the first steps the king instituted to control the Cossacks was creating a differentiation between “registered” and “unregistered” Cossacks and limiting their numbers. The king recognized registered Cossacks as free landowners in Polish military service who were payable for their services where as the unregistered were frequently escaped serfs and not extended the same privileges.³⁹ The king attempted to keep Cossack numbers low, usually around 6,000-8,000 men, but the number frequently increased during times when Poland waged wars and needed the additional soldiers. During the “Time of Troubles” in Muscovy for example, Poland not only attempted to control

³⁷ Magocsi, 195.

³⁸ Timothy Snyder. *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus 1569-1999*. (Yale University Press, 2003), 113.

³⁹ Magocsi, 196-7.

Muscovite succession but also with the help of the increased roll of 20,000 registered Cossacks conquered Moscow in 1608.⁴⁰

This environment of stratification and social resentment fostered rebellions. Starting from 1591 on, there were several minor Cossack rebellions over the religious, economic, and political rights of their group. These rebellions frequently began because of perceived violations of Cossack privileges. Prior to 1648 most were small insurrections that collapsed soon after beginning or were quickly crushed by superior Polish forces. Cossack Hetman Petro Sahaidachnyi attempted to reconcile the Cossacks with the Poles starting in 1616 until they could become a match for Polish forces.⁴¹ To show his support for Poland, he aided the king in his missions against the Ottomans and Muscovy. Sahaidachnyi was so willing to reconcile with Poland that once the campaign against Muscovy ended and the king demanded a reduction of Cossacks from 20,000 to 3,000, he complied and kept the Cossacks from rebelling from even his own authority.⁴² He gained enough prestige through these missions that he believed he could demand restoration of the Orthodox Church and destruction of the Uniates. During his time as Hetman, he decided to make the Cossacks the protectors of the Orthodox faith to gain popular support. Cossacks then sponsored restoration of monasteries, bought printing presses, and aided in the construction of academies. The Cossacks joined the Kyiv Brotherhood to strengthen the Orthodox faith further and helped encourage a cultural revival. Sahaidachnyi's tactics were successful since the Cossacks accrued popular appeal from joining the Brotherhood along with political and military prestige that transcended long after his death.

⁴⁰ Magocsi 196.

⁴¹ Subtelny, 115. The Hetman was a recognized general and head of all Cossacks.

⁴² Hrushevsky, 237.

The Cossacks attempted to take advantage of that popular appeal upon the ascension of Władysław IV as king. The Cossacks rebelled from Poland demanding equal treatment of Orthodox bishops and demanding recognition of Cossacks as a noble estate for the first time.⁴³ In 1632 Orthodoxy finally was granted equal status in Poland-Lithuania. Metropolitan Petro Mohyla capitalized on this equal status creating an Orthodox College based on Jesuit models, resuming printing presses, expanding Brotherhoods, and building new churches.⁴⁴ While the king was willing to recognize the Cossacks as nobles (since he wanted to use their services in another war against the Ottomans), the *szlachta* was not convinced. The *szlachta* applied their *liberum veto* and denied the Cossacks recognition. This lack of recognition created further problems in the Commonwealth, especially after Poland declared all unregistered Cossacks outlaws in 1638.⁴⁵ Differences between registered and unregistered Cossacks became more pronounced since registered Cossacks saw themselves as equals to the nobility and wanted inclusion with the rights pursuant to that estate; unregistered Cossacks saw their class as equal to the registered and wanted inclusion.

⁴³ Magocsi, 203.

⁴⁴ Magocsi, 203-5.

⁴⁵ Magocsi, 206.

BOHDAN KHMELNYTSKYI

It was in this time of simmering animosity between the Polish nobles and the Cossacks that one rebellion would ultimately change the entire relationship between Poland-Lithuania and Ukraine forever. The Cossack uprising began in 1648 under the leadership of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi. Khmelnytskyi was perhaps the most unlikely character to begin a rebellion. He was a registered Cossack who was educated at a Jesuit school in Polish and Latin. He had previously distinguished himself fighting for the Commonwealth, and was even captured during a campaign against the Ottoman Turks fighting for Poland. He was even one of only four Cossacks in a delegation to the king advocating for an expansion of registered Cossacks' privileges in 1638. He was a minor noble trusted by the king who was nearly 50 years old at the time, and leading a rather subdued life.⁴⁶ His status in the Commonwealth easily suggests that he could have been content in the social structure but he began an uprising against the Commonwealth due to a Polish noble's infringement of his rights. His relatively subdued nature changed when like something out of a vigilante story happened; in 1647 a rival distiller raided his estate, captured his love interest,⁴⁷ stole and destroyed property, and flogged Khmelnytskyi's son to death.⁴⁸ Khmelnytskyi went to the local courts to seek justice for his loss, but was unsuccessful due to the rival's status. He then went to Warsaw to seek redress from the *Sejm* and even petitioned the king. The king admitted that he could not help him due to the *szlachta*'s domination of the legal and administrative system.⁴⁹ Khmelnytskyi returned home disenchanted

⁴⁶ Magocsi 210-11. Subtelny, 126.

⁴⁷ There are divided interpretations whether she was Khmelnytskyi's wife, fiancée, girlfriend, or merely a woman that he had shown interest in.

⁴⁸ Magocsi, 211.

⁴⁹ Magocsi, 211.

only to be arrested by the rival. His friends helped him escape and he fled like prior discontented Cossacks to Zaporozhia.

In Zaporozhia Khmelnytskyi influenced Cossacks to make him Hetman drawing on popular Polish discontent and gathered support for a rebellion. He understood the failures of previous Cossack rebellions and sent envoys to the Ottomans asking for their support. Polish leaders gained information of the Ottoman-Cossack alliance and prepared military forces to oppose them. The Polish force included registered Cossack units that quickly defected to Khmelnytskyi's side and turned the tide in the opening conflicts. Many peasants heard of Khmelnytskyi's victories over the Polish forces, began to revolt against Polish governors and landlords, attacked local *szlachta*, and attempted to join the Hetman's victorious forces. Frequently the peasants staged minor rebellions but this rebellion reflected the full nature of peasant resentment with the nobles. The peasants' resentment showed itself through malicious acts "wherever they found *szlachta*, royal officials or Jews, [they] killed them all, sparing neither women nor children. They pillaged the estates of Jews and nobles, burned Catholic churches and killed their priests."⁵⁰ Polish nobles fled when they could so most of the brunt of the peasant attacks focused on the Jewish population. Accurate numbers are unknown, but plausible estimates for the number of Jewish victims range from around 10,000 to 20,000 with some unlikely estimates into the hundred thousand range.⁵¹

After Khmelnytskyi's initial successes against the Polish armies and the death of the Polish king in 1648, he sent envoys to Warsaw with modest demands. He requested an increase in registered Cossacks to 12,000, remuneration for the Cossack's previous services to the state,

⁵⁰ Subtelny, 127.

⁵¹ Subtelny, 127-8. Magocsi, 216.

redress for his rival's wrongs, fair treatment for the Orthodox Church, and Polish aid in suppressing the peasant uprisings through the land.⁵² The *Sejm* responded enthusiastically to the modest demands but wished to elect a new king before accepting. While the *Sejm* deliberated, Polish forces reorganized under the leadership of Jeremi Wisniowiecki, the largest *szlachta* landowner in the Ukrainian lands. Wisniowiecki, a Polonified descendent of Zaporozhian founder Dmitro Vyshnevetskyi,⁵³ was caught on his estates stretching from Kyiv to Poltava during the peasant uprisings and forced to flee. During the flight, he gathered 230,000 of his subjects, other nobles, and Jewish leaseholders to fight their way west in order to escape into calmer Polish lands.⁵⁴ From a base in Poland, Wisniowiecki grew tired of the *Sejm*'s delay in crushing Khmelnytskyi's uprising and assembled a force of 15,000 to fight Khmelnytskyi and the peasant uprisings himself sparking the civil war anew. He responded to the peasant violence with terror tactics of his own, capturing, torturing, and killing Cossacks, peasant men, women and children through Galicia and Volhynia.⁵⁵ Wisniowiecki's successes helped reenergize Polish forces but drove a greater wedge between the peasants and the nobles.

Khmelnytskyi camped near Bila Tserkva where he awaited response to his demands and trained his increasing peasant forces in preparation of further military campaigns against the Poles. The peasant support reflected the popularity of the uprising. By the end of the summer of 1648, his army rose to roughly 80,000-100,000 men with only around 40,000 Cossacks out of that number. After hearing of Wisniowiecki's attacks in Volhynia, Khmelnytskyi left Bila

⁵² Magocsi, 214.

⁵³ Snyder, 116-7. The Wisniowiecki/Vyshnevetskyi family was one of many that reflected the change in attitude from Ruthenian noble or freedom fighting Cossack into Polish nobility that exploited the peasants.

⁵⁴ Magocsi, 153, 217. Subtelny, 108, 128-9.

⁵⁵ Subtelny, 128.

Tserkva to engage the Polish forces and defeated them with the help of his Ottoman allies. With this Polish defeat, Warsaw was defenseless but Khmelnytskyi was conciliatory rather than attacking, he sent envoys to the new king with greater demands to restore Cossack privileges, that Cossacks were dependent only to the king, a general amnesty for all participants in the rebellion, and abolition of the Uniate Church.⁵⁶ The new king (who Khmelnytskyi wanted on the throne) gave his word to do his best on the requests and requested Khmelnytskyi to end the rebellion and restore peace among the peasants.

With the king's word, Khmelnytskyi returned to Kyiv in January 1649 to popular acclaim. The Orthodox metropolitan of Kyiv and the Patriarch of Jerusalem, who happened to be travelling through Kyiv, hailed Khmelnytskyi as a "modern day Moses who had liberated the Rus' from Polish slavery."⁵⁷ The Patriarch Paisius even went so far in his laudation of Khmelnytskyi that he called him King of an independent state of Ukraine.⁵⁸ These praises and encouragements seemed to have influenced him because the tone of his next missive to Polish commissioners changed entirely. Rather than his previous modest demands from the Polish king, his next response reportedly included statements of:

I shall free the entire people of the Rus' from the Poles. Up to now I have fought because of the wrongs done to me personally; now I shall fight for our Orthodox faith... I shall drive the dukes and princes ahead of me... Not a single prince or nobleman shall I permit to set foot in Ukraine, and if anyone desires to eat our bread, he must be loyal and obedient to the Zaporozhian Host. I am a small and insignificant man, but by the will of God I have become the independent ruler of the Rus'.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Magocsi, 217.

⁵⁷ Subtelny, 129.

⁵⁸ Hrushevsky, 283.

⁵⁹ Hrushevshy, 284.

Along with that response, Khmelnytskyi began to call himself “Autocrat of the Rus’ by the Grace of God” and vowed liberation of all Rus’ in the Commonwealth.⁶⁰ It was at this point in the Khmelnytskyi uprisings that the Ukrainian lands were effectively under Ruthenian control and governance. Future Polish commissioners found the Ukrainian lands preparing for war and could not even meet with Khmelnytskyi to discuss accommodating the Cossacks within the Commonwealth. As Khmelnytskyi’s goals changed, it was becoming more evident that the civil war was inevitably going to restart.

As the Ukrainian lands were becoming autonomous, Khmelnytskyi persisted in pursuing foreign support in the fight in preparation for continued hostilities. He drew on the successes of 1648 and began to believe so strongly in the Tatar support that he addressed their leader as “my brother” and “my soul” while maintaining the alliance would be eternal.⁶¹ In the summer of 1649, Khmelnytskyi with his Tatar allies fought Wisniowiecki again and the Poles succeeded in cracking the “eternal” alliance. While Khmelnytskyi won the battle, the Poles effectively negotiated with his ally and encouraged them to end the fighting by forcing Khmelnytskyi to reopen negotiations. The negotiations resulted in the Truce of Zboriv, which took a more moderate tone than Khmelnytskyi’s earlier demands. The agreement raised registered Cossacks to 40,000, declared Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Bratslav palatinates Cossack territory thus removing Polish military and Jesuits from the territories and effectively recognize Cossack autonomy, the Orthodox metropolitan would receive a seat in the *Sejm*, and there would be an amnesty for nobles participating in the rebellion.⁶² Khmelnytskyi and other leading Cossacks agreed to Zboriv since they would be able to reclaim their lands. The agreement may have been fair for

⁶⁰ Magocsi, 218.

⁶¹ Magocsi, 218.

⁶² Magocsi, 219.

the nobles, but the peasants could not claim any success from the rebellion. Peasants would not receive amnesty and to add further insult Khmelnytskyi even encouraged them to return to their prior exploitative landlords.⁶³ Yet again, the plight of the peasants was ignored. Zboriv not only highlighted the division between registered Cossacks and peasants, but also encouraged historians to interpret Khmelnytskyi's rebellion as a noble rebellion for autonomy rather than an attempt to change the socioeconomic order of the state.

The Truce of Zboriv brought peace to the area for a brief time as Khmelnytskyi attempted to govern his newly autonomous territories and continued to look for potential allies against Poland. Khmelnytskyi redesigned local governments based on the Cossack regimental military structure, which also increased his political control. He effectively made local colonels (*starshyna*) governors and administrators of districts as they usually had greater authority than the non-military administrators Khmelnytskyi created.⁶⁴ The *starshyna* started becoming the most important component to his organization and his powerbase as the growing number of Cossacks made it difficult to continue the semi-democratic processes. While he created and tried to govern an internal military state, he continued to seek out allies. He avoided the traditional expected alliance partners of the Habsburgs or Muscovy but instead attempted to create a grand coalition of Orthodox, Islamic, and Protestant states to oppose Poland. He reached out to Moldavia, Transylvania, the Ottoman Empire, and even went so far as to ask Cromwell's England for aid to "force the Commonwealth to restructure the government into a federation of

⁶³ Hrushevsky, 286-7. Subtelny, 131.

⁶⁴ Hrushevsky, 290, 301-2.

three equal states.”⁶⁵ This showed that Khmelnytskyi did not desire complete independence for the Ukrainian lands from Poland but wanted greater autonomy for the new Cossack nobility.

The tenuous autonomous situation in the Ukrainian lands could not survive the *szlachta*'s resentment at losing their properties. Civil war reignited in 1651 with Polish forces crushing Cossack forces in Volhynia and quickly capturing Kyiv. The Treaty of Bila Tserkva was not as generous as Zboriv reducing the registered Cossacks to 20,000, reinstating Polish government in Bratslav and Chernihiv, and allowed nobles to return to their estates.⁶⁶ Khmelnytskyi and the Cossacks acceded to the treaty and attempted to enforce it even though a *liberum veto* in the *Sejm* denied its enactment (as the *szlachta* refused to accept the Cossacks as noble equals). As the Cossack state continued to develop and treaties were made and amended, many peasants grew disenchanted with the evolving system and its neglect for their plight. They felt the Cossacks were merely replacing the prior Polish *szlachta* landlords (where they were being replaced) and were concerned more with their own class than the exploitation of the peasants which helped start the rebellion. Disenchantment among the peasantry grew even greater when stories of executions as punishment for rebellion spread and that Cossacks fought peasants rising up against returning landlords (and enforcing the non-enacted Treaty of Bila Tserkva). Peasants began to move to Muscovite domains lured with tax-exempt settlements (*slobody*).⁶⁷ Many peasants settled *slobody* lands near the Kharkiv and Voronezh trying to attain the freedom they thought the rebellion would bring them.

Fighting continued through 1652 and 1653 with the Cossacks regaining victories and the terms of Zboriv. While the Cossacks and the Polish forces were able to win battlefield victories,

⁶⁵ Magocsi, 219.

⁶⁶ Magocsi, 219.

⁶⁷ Hrushevsky, 287, 291.

it was becoming obvious though that the civil war was reaching a stalemate with neither side able to deliver a knockout blow to end the conflict. Foreign alliances also proved fickle with “allies” vacillating their support between Poland and the Cossack state. The “eternal” Tatar allies fled a battlefield in mid battle and when Khmelnytskyi demanded they return to the field, rather than listening to him, they abducted him.⁶⁸ Without their general, the Cossacks subsequently lost the battle. Fortunately Khmelnytskyi was able to escape but only after the battle was already over. Still believing that he needed foreign support Khmelnytskyi continued to petition the Ottoman Empire for aid and the possibility of becoming a vassal state. There had been negotiations with Muscovy for some time with the tsar reaching no decisive action. However, when Muscovy heard of the possibility of the Cossacks becoming a vassal state, they feared the Ottomans would use the Cossacks against them, and finally considered allying with the Cossack cause.

In January 1654, Khmelnytskyi along with his Cossack soldiers met with Muscovite envoys in the town of Pereiaslav to discuss the possibility of an alliance. Unlike the ease of negotiating with the Polish nobles who would have had languages in common, Khmelnytskyi needed translators to convert the Muscovite language into comprehensible Latin.⁶⁹ Likewise the influence of Polish culture showed when the Cossacks entered the negotiation with preconceived Polish legal notions that they believed to be ubiquitous. When Muscovy decided that they would ally with the Cossack state against Poland, the negotiation almost failed when the envoys told the Cossacks that the tsar would not swear an oath to uphold their rights unlike what the Polish king would do. The envoys explained that the tsar was an absolute monarch and would not degrade

⁶⁸ Subtelny, 132.

⁶⁹ Snyder, 116.

himself swearing an oath to his subjects and limiting his powers so.⁷⁰ Khmelnytskyi and the Cossacks stormed out of the church and threatened to stop the entire proceedings but the envoys held their ground. Ultimately, necessity won out in the proceedings, in order to gain Moscow's aid, Khmelnytskyi and the Cossacks of 117 separate towns eventually did swear allegiance to Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich Romanov even without his oath.⁷¹ Khmelnytskyi knew that only a monarch willing to aid and protect the Cossacks could bring legitimacy to their autonomous state and end the stalemate with Poland that was draining both sides.

The Treaty of Pereiaslav 1654 was not just a single treaty but actually contained three separate parts: the initial oath of loyalty, Khmelnytskyi's March petition for the tsar's recognition of Cossack rights, and the tsar's response granting rights. The treaty guaranteed Cossack estates, maintained elections of Hetmans without Muscovite involvement (so long as they swore allegiance to the tsar), limited the registered Cossacks to 60,000, provided wages to the Cossacks out of taxes due to the tsar, and most importantly guaranteed Muscovite materiel aid.⁷² In return for the guarantees, the treaty reoriented foreign policy into a more Moscow centered direction by denying the right to negotiate with Poland or the Ottoman Empire. The fact that the tsar granted rights rather than taking an oath would become problematic in the future since future tsars would not feel as inclined to guarantee the granted rights. The Cossacks believed the treaty established a quasi-constitutional agreement between a ruler and their estate similar to what they had in Poland while Russia viewed the treaty through the lens of an absolute

⁷⁰ Magocsi, 227. Subtelny, 134.

⁷¹ Subtelny, 135.

⁷² Magocsi, 227.

monarch making concessions to expand territory.⁷³ In response to the successful negotiations and the increased territorial prestige of the tsar, Tsar Aleksei changed his title to “Tsar of All Great and Little Rus” fulfilling the dynastic dreams of claiming all Rus’ lands.⁷⁴

Since the time of the Treaty of Pereiaslav, the treaty and its interpretation have played a central role for Russian and Ukrainian history. Even today the debate rages on as Professor Zenon Kohut discussed the controversy, and politics of the Pereiaslav Treaty in his 2011 work. Much of the difficulty in fully interpreting the treaty stems from the fact that the original copies of the treaty were lost and that all interpretations are based off incomplete and multiple-times translated copies.⁷⁵ The Treaty of Pereiaslav interpretations hinge on a number factors. One of the largest factors is what was the status of the Ukrainian lands during essentially a civil war with Poland? Did Khmelnytskyi and the Cossacks essentially and effectively create an independent polity or was it merely a rebellion of lower nobles for expanded rights? This factor is important because it pertains to how the both sides entered the negotiations at Pereiaslav, as equally independent states or as rebellious nobles seeking merely to transfer their allegiance to a different state. Russian legal historian Vasiliï Sergeevich (d. 1910) argued one of the first interpretations that the treaty amounted to a personal union between the two; that although they shared the same sovereign they remained two separate governments. Another Russian legal historian, Nikolai Diakonov (d.1919), countered Sergeevich with another interpretation that the agreement swearing allegiance was full incorporation into the Moscovite state.⁷⁶ A third

⁷³ Peter F Sugar. “External and Domestic Roots of Eastern European Nationalism” in *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*. Eds. Peter F Sugar and Ivo J Lederer. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), 22-3, 25.

⁷⁴ Magocsi, 227.

⁷⁵ John Basarab. *Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographical Study* (Edmonton, 1982), 26-27.

⁷⁶ Subtelny, 135.

argument that both Russian historian Venedikt Miakotin and Ukrainian historian Mykhailo Hrushevsky espoused was that the agreement was a form of vassalage, the tsar agreed to protect Ukraine and not interfere with them so long as they maintained tribute.⁷⁷ Ukrainian historian Viacheslav Lypynsky proposed a fourth argument that Pereiaslav was simply a military alliance between two independent states and that this policy was nothing new since Cossack leaders frequently played Russia against Poland and vice versa.⁷⁸ Was Khmelnytskyi using Muscovy as a bargaining chip to end the war with Poland and convince them to recognize the Cossacks as equals or was he changing the political alliance? For much of the rebellion, he seemed content to remain within Polish authority and trusted the *Sejm* as long as the Cossacks would receive the rights of nobles and even after the treaty, he continued to play states against each other.

The fifth major interpretation of the Treaty of Pereiaslav arose from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union during the 300th anniversary of the agreement. Ultimately, this interpretation asks: what was Khmelnytskyi's motive during the rebellion? The party argued that Khmelnytskyi's goal from the beginning of the rebellion was reunion with the Russian people. Khmelnytskyi, in the argument, became a proto-class revolutionary⁷⁹ fighting against the *szlachta* and accepted into the Soviet pantheon of heroes who realized that "the salvation of the Ukrainian people lies only in unity with the great Russian people".⁸⁰ The party also maintained that the union was a natural conclusion of a mutual desire to be a reunited Rus' to escape "alien enslavers freeing themselves from foreign subjugation and ensuring national development."⁸¹ The Soviets after accepting him into the pantheon of heroes even went so far as to rename the

⁷⁷ Subtelny, 135.

⁷⁸ Subtelny, 135.

⁷⁹ Magocsi, 210. Wilson, 62.

⁸⁰ Subtelny, 135.

⁸¹ Quoted in John Basarab, *Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographical Study* (Edmonton, 1982), 270

western Ukrainian city Ploskyriv Khmelnytskyi to glorify him in 1954.⁸² This was not the first time the Soviet Union used Khmelnytskyi to legitimize itself. During World War II, Stalin even revived the Order of Khmelnytskyi to reward Soviet Ukrainian patriots (an order also continued in independent Ukraine). The Soviet revival of interpreting the Treaty of Pereiaslav and establishing Khmelnytskyi as a hero was a way of legitimizing the Soviet Union's control over the Ukrainian lands.

After the Treaty of Pereiaslav, Muscovy joined the Cossack struggle with Poland. Muscovy invaded and conquered Commonwealth territories (what is current Belarus) previously conquered from Muscovy during the "Time of Troubles." Through 1654-1656, Muscovy was making great inroads into Polish territory and welcomed as liberators by the peasants even as far as Vilnius and Kaunas.⁸³ Khmelnytskyi wanted to add the Belarusian Ruthenians to the Cossack-Muscovite federation in order to weaken the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth further. Even though there were military successes, the Cossack-Muscovite alliance started to show strains quickly when Tsar Aleksei sent military governors to Ukrainian cities for "protection." The largest strain occurred when Moscow reached a secret peace agreement with Poland without notifying the Cossacks. Khmelnytskyi realized yet again that his allies were fickle, but rather than abandon alliances, he instead encouraged an alliance with Protestant Sweden requesting that they invade in the north.⁸⁴ Theoretically, the alliance with Sweden should have strained relations with Moscow when Moscow became involved in a war with Sweden and demanded that the Cossacks break off relations, but due to the secret peace agreement between Moscow with

⁸² This was not the first city renamed after Khmelnytskyi. In 1943 after its liberation by Soviet forces Pereiaslav was renamed Pereiaslav-Khmelnytskyi.

⁸³ Magocsi, 232.

⁸⁴ Hrushevsky, 299-301

Poland and their attempt to subvert his territory, Khmelnytskyi considered the Treaty of Pereiaslav essentially void.⁸⁵ In 1657 Khmelnytskyi placed his hopes in one last campaign united with his Swedish and Transylvanian allies to completely break Poland and extricate the Cossacks from Moscow. The campaign failed miserably and while raging in a military tent over a Cossack regiments' mutiny Khmelnytskyi fell over and ultimately died from a stroke.

Interpretations and Problems with Khmelnytskyi

If much has been written on Bohdan Khmelnytskyi and the aftermath of his revolution, it is because he left a remarkable concept in the later national mind. The rebellion itself may have simply been a rebellion of lower nobles seeking aggrandizement with religious overtones (similar in certain respects to 1618-1620 Bohemia), but he reinvigorated the concept of a modern Rus' state and came the closest in achieving it. Prior to Khmelnytskyi the last independent Rus' state existed in the 13th century, his actions became a symbol to Ukrainian nationalists that it was possible to attain an independent Ukrainians polity. His actions also gave nationalists a greater argument that Ukrainians were not a "stateless people" they had a state but were victims of empires exploiting and dividing their territory. Thus, Khmelnytskyi became a symbol for the Ukrainian struggle to recover their state. Generally, most of the interpretations of Khmelnytskyi are positive for Ukrainians but they do have some problems with him stemming from the negotiation of Pereiaslav in mind and the aftermath of the treaty. Ukrainian historians are frequently more conflicted attempting to balance his deeds liberating the Ukrainian lands and the subsequent ensnarement with Moscow. Historian Mykhailo Hrushevsky also reflected the attempt to balance Khmelnytskyi's actions in two of his volumes of *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy* (Vol.

⁸⁵ Hrushevsky, 300.

9 part 1 and 2) and his work *Pro batka kozatskoho Bohdana Khmelntytskoho*. While Khmelnytskyi became a hero for the flowering of Ukrainian culture, independence, and became a basis for Hrushevsky's nationalist movement in the early 20th century, he could not avoid criticizing Khmelnytskyi for his reliance on foreign entanglements without being prepared for consequences when he should have relied upon the Ukrainian people.⁸⁶ Hrushevsky ultimately portrayed Khmelnytskyi not as a "gifted state-builder" but an erratic and unpredictable leader who "schemed and intrigued too freely" and was fortunate to die when he did "for the burden of his mistakes fell to his successors."⁸⁷ Of all the Ukrainian writers to discuss Khmelnytskyi, the Ukrainian poet and painter, Taras Shevchenko, is perhaps the most scathing. He saw Bohdan Khmelnytskyi as a major cause of the sufferings of his homeland. In one poem, "Katerina," he depicts Ukraine as a young maiden who gave her virtue to a Russian soldier, and once deflowered and with child was jeered and abandoned. Suffering from the shame, she committed suicide and left an orphaned child to take care of himself.⁸⁸ This poem was a somewhat xenophobic warning not only for young Ukrainian women to avoid foreigners and stay with locals but also representing what the Cossack state should have done. Countering the noble claim that Khmelnytskyi was a hero, Shevchenko drew on the ideals of Cossack freedoms and argued that it was due to Khmelnytskyi's actions Russia dominated and subjugated Ukraine. Shevchenko called him an "unknowing son" "who should look at what has happened to his disfigured mother" with the people "toiling in Jews' and Germans' hands" while the "*Moskaly*"⁸⁹

⁸⁶ Hrushevsky, 290. Mykhailo Hrushevskyi. *Pro batka kozatskoho Bohdana Khmelntytskoho*. Jersey City, NJ: Svobody, 1919), 75. Mykhailo Hrushevskyi. *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy Tom IX-2 Roky 1654-1657*. (Kyiv: Naukova Dumka, 1997), 1479-1508.

⁸⁷ Hrushevsky, 290. Basarab, 131-3.

⁸⁸ Taras Shevchenko. *Selected Works*. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), 51-71.

⁸⁹ A derogatory term for Russians.

plunder everything” and ultimately saying that he wished “Bohdan would have been strangled in his crib” to prevent what happened.⁹⁰ He lumped Russians with Germans, Poles, and Jews as foreign oppressors of his homeland and began to foment a separate exclusive identity for Ukrainians.⁹¹ Shevchenko’s writings vehemently attacked the tsars as imperialist monsters and cannibals whose focus on autocracy punished commoners. He contrasted Russian autocracy with the Cossack aspect of freedom as a way to demark cultural boundaries between Russians and Ukrainians.

Russian historians, unlike Ukrainian historians’ writings on Khmelnytskyi, are usually the most forward in praising Khmelnytskyi as he brought the “Ukrainians back into the Russian fold.” Khmelnytskyi became a symbol for eternal Russian-Little Russian unity, especially as later historians would contrast his loyalty to the tsar with Cossack Hetman Ivan Mazepa’s treachery. The Romanovs fostered this symbolism of eternal Russian-Little Russian unity in the late 19th century and was evident when they erected one of the most impressive statues to Khmelnytskyi in Kyiv near St. Sophia’s Cathedral. The statue represents Khmelnytskyi bestride a horse as a Moses for the Little Russian people leading them out of Polish servitude and into fraternal union with the Russians. Even within the statue the symbolism is evident. Khmelnytskyi’s mace, the symbol of Hetman authority and power, points to the northeast and the direction of Moscow as a way of showing where his power came from.

⁹⁰ T. H. Shevchenko. “Rozrita Mohyla” in *Kobzar*. (Kharkiv: Folio, 2001), 220-1. Wilson, 93.

⁹¹ Wilson, 91. Anna Reid. *Borderland: A Journey Through the History of Ukraine*. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 79-80. Taras Shevchenko. “Preface to an Unpublished Edition of *Kobzar*” in *Towards an Intellectual History of Ukraine: An Anthology of Ukrainian Thought from 1710 to 1995*. Eds. Ralph Lindheim and George S N Luckyj. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 102-3.

Only two groups of historians, Jewish and Polish historians, do not focus exclusively on Pereiaslav for their interpretation. Due to the peasant rebellions that sparked up in 1648 from Khmelnytskyi's revolt and the number of Jewish dead, several Jewish historians have named him "Chmel the wicked." Many argue that he sent messengers to encourage the peasant rebellions so the onus of the great loss of life falls on him. The interpretation of him is so scathing that he is held on a level similar to the perpetrators of the Holocaust. Khmelnytskyi has become a symbol for all Ukrainian-Jewish strife, and the first "pogromshchik" especially as later pogroms in the Ukrainian lands revived concepts of eternal Ukrainian anti-Semitism. Polish leaders in the 17th century despised Khmelnytskyi so greatly that once they regained control of the regions participating in 1648 uprising they began a brutal reprisal against the people that supported him and even took vengeance on Bohdan Khmelnytskyi's exhumed remains disfiguring them and casting them to the winds.⁹² Even modern Polish historians' opinions of him are not favorable. Many consider him a traitor who initiated the degradation and responsible for the ultimate destruction of the Commonwealth. The nearly hundred years following his rebellion has been named the "Ruin" and the "Deluge" due to the weakened state Poland-Lithuania was in after the constant warfare and invasion. If Poland-Lithuania could have come to some mutual agreement with the Cossacks, it is possible that it could have remained a contending power in Central-Eastern Europe and possibly could have continued checking Muscovy's expansion. The Polish *szlachta* system though was not built to respond to changes; instead it was more focused on maintaining the economic preeminence for a select group as shown in the use of the *liberum veto*.

⁹² Subtelny, 146. Hrushevsky, 323.

IVAN MAZEPA

The Cossack State Khmelnytskyi founded in the Ukrainian lands only grew more chaotic and divided after Khmelnytskyi's death. A state of Cossack civil war between Khmelnytskyi's son, Yuri, and his former advisor, Ivan Vyhovsky, divided the lands between a pro-Moscow and pro-Poland orientation. The Treaty of Andrusovo formalized the stalemated division of Ukrainian lands between Moscow and Poland in 1667. The treaty created two separate Hetmanates one pro-Polish, and one pro-Moscow who were usually in conflict with each other and frequently with their respective sponsors. Relative peace returned to the Ukrainian lands only after Moscow and Poland formalized the "Eternal Peace" in 1686 nearly 30 years after Khmelnytskyi's death. Each side swore to respect the other's control over one half of the territory and Poland gave up claims to Kyiv and the Zaporozhian Cossacks in exchange for a campaign against the Ottomans.⁹³

Ivan Mazepa was able to exploit the political instability in the Ukrainian lands to become Hetman of the pro-Russian Cossacks during this period of great divisiveness and was perhaps the most influential Hetman after Khmelnytskyi. Ivan Mazepa was a shining example of how certain Cossacks learned how to expand their powers through snaking and zigzagging alliances. Even starting in his early life, he learned how to navigate disparate positions. He was born in 1639 in Bila Tserkva to a Cossack father who would support Khmelnytskyi's rebellion and ultimately educated in the Jesuit College in Warsaw during the height of the rebellion. He quickly garnered the king's attention and eventually became a diplomat for the Polish king to the Cossacks.⁹⁴ After his career for the Polish king ended in scandal, he fled to the Ukrainian lands

⁹³ Subtelny, 151.

⁹⁴ Magocsi, 255.

only to swiftly rise to prominence in Hetman Petro Doroshenko's staff. While on a diplomatic mission for Doroshenko to Crimea, Zaporozhian Cossacks captured him, and subsequently shipped him off to Moscow for further imprisonment but rather than facing imprisonment and execution, Mazepa was able to charm his way into the favor of Muscovite leaders by revealing Doroshenko's plans and returned to the Ukrainian lands in the service of Ivan Samoilovych. When Moscow blamed Samoilovych for the military blunders during a campaign against the Ottomans and exiled him to Siberia in 1687, Ivan Mazepa, a former ambassador for Petro Doroshenko and counselor for Ivan Samoilovych, exploited his close ties with Moscow to become Hetman. While the Treaty of Pereiaslav still provided the election of Hetmans, their service began to depend more and more on the Muscovite monarch's favor and selection. Moscow leaders supported him after the removal of Samoilovych due to his charm and the influence of 10,000 rubles. Prince Golitsyn made sure that Mazepa was the only candidate for Hetman after the monetary donation.⁹⁵

Through most of his Hetmanate Mazepa maintained close ties with Moscow gaining privileges and balancing the loyalty of the Cossacks. Mazepa's zigzagging alliances helped him gain his position but it also left him without a local power base. Eastern and Zaporozhian Cossacks distrusted him and believed him to be an upstart Polish noble.⁹⁶ His close ties with Moscow could have become a potential problem because when visiting his patron, Regent Sophia, her young half-brother Peter deposed her in a palace revolution. Mazepa yet again showed his impressive ability to navigate political intrigue by turning the liability of being Sophia's advisor into an asset for the young new tsar. He was also able to navigate the political

⁹⁵ Clarence A Manning. *The Story of the Ukraine*. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1947), 94.

⁹⁶ Hrushevsky, 352.

intrigue after his previous sponsor Prince Golitsyn fell out of favor with Peter, rather than fall out of favor also, the Hetman actually received Golitsyn's estates as a gift along with his previous bribe of 10,000 rubles.⁹⁷ Peter developed a strong affection for Mazepa due to his intelligence, his advice about the Poles, and his loyalty during Peter's expansion against the Ottomans.⁹⁸ Peter showed his favor for Mazepa and his importance in the imperial court with a coveted acceptance into the Order of St. Andrew (Mazepa was among the first few to receive the award).⁹⁹ This Muscovite favor was extremely useful when Zaporozhian Cossacks allied with the Ottomans and revolted against Mazepa declaring their intentions of liberating all the Ukrainian lands from Moscow and the increasingly elitist *starshyna*. The Zaporozhians became progressively more disgruntled at the elitism of the *starshyna*, their growing contempt for lower orders of Cossacks, their semblance to the *szlachta*, and the Hetman's increasing reliance on them.¹⁰⁰ After Khmelnytskyi expanded the Cossack Order so greatly during his rebellion, the system was too large to remain semi-democratic and the *starshyna* became essential to the Hetman's government. Much like previous Hetmans, Mazepa attempted to consolidate his power in the Cossack order by giving land and special privileges to the *starshyna* in order to gain their support. Peter supported Mazepa in subduing the Zaporozhian revolts and used it as a stepping-stone to a campaign against the Ottomans.

Mazepa used the support from Moscow effectively during his Hetmanate to become a patron to many projects. Mazepa obtained nearly 20,000 estates to become one of the richest

⁹⁷ Manning, 95.

⁹⁸ Subtelny, 161. Magocsi, 257.

⁹⁹ Robert K Massie. *Peter the Great: His Life and World*. (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1980), 458-9.

¹⁰⁰ Magocsi, 257. Massie, 459.

men in Europe at the time.¹⁰¹ But he did not use the resources only to aggrandize himself though. He gave over 1000 land grants to the *starshyna* to maintain their support and expand their individual estates. Mazepa was also a dedicated patron of education due to his own higher education. He supported the Kyiv Academy donating new buildings and furthering enrollment to 2000. Other schools received printing presses so that “youths might be able to indulge in any aptitude they had for learning.”¹⁰² Mazepa also became a major patron for the Orthodox Church during his Hetmanate helping build and repair many churches.

Moscow’s favor for Mazepa only grew with the success against the Ottomans. Muscovite nobles even began to praise Mazepa saying “there has never been a Hetman so helpful and beneficial to the tsar” and “the tsar would sooner disbelieve an angel than Mazepa”.¹⁰³ Through the first thirteen years of his Hetmanate, Mazepa maintained and nurtured the close relations with Peter. In 1700 the situation began to shift. Sweden was becoming a stronger power in the region and defeated Moscow at the Battle of Narva with only 8,000 versus the Muscovite 40,000.¹⁰⁴ That success diminished Moscow’s influence in the region, and the Swedish king, Charles XII, utilized his increasing influence by invading Poland and taking control of Polish leadership. The Cossack Hetmanate under Poland rebelled in 1702 engulfing the area with political turmoil. Mazepa saw this rebellion as a way to reunite the Ukrainian lands under Poland-Lithuania with his and Peter consented. This allowed Mazepa to take advantage of the rebellion in Polish territory to augment Cossack territory. To finalize his influence over the former Polish lands, Mazepa influenced Peter to exile the rebel Cossack leader

¹⁰¹ Subtelny, 160.

¹⁰² Subtelny, 161.

¹⁰³ Subtelny, 161. Reid, 50.

¹⁰⁴ Doroshenko, 358.

to Siberia.¹⁰⁵ As the conflict continued to expand, Peter ordered Mazepa to defend the western Ukrainian lands so they would not support Charles XII. Mazepa entered the region in 1704 and united most of the regions controlled by Khmelnytskyi fifty years earlier. The local Cossacks welcomed Mazepa and his support in driving out Polish forces. Peter saw this as a temporary situation though, and thought that his loyal Hetman would return the newly won territories to his Polish ally in 1707, but rather than return the territory Mazepa offered various excuses in order to delay.¹⁰⁶

In the early 18th century, there was growing widespread popular discontent through the Ukrainian lands for the Muscovites. Moscow military governors and their garrisons began abusing their power and punishing peasants for minor offenses. The governors increased taxes to provide for the war efforts. Mazepa also received reports from multiple locations of Muscovite garrisons arbitrarily mistreating people, requisitioning food, stealing property, raping Cossack wives and daughters, and even received reports about the possibility of the tsar replacing him with another favorite foreign general.¹⁰⁷ The Muscovites furthered enflamed Ukrainian discontent through increased demands for military service from the Cossacks and pressing villagers into military service while neglecting defense of the Ukrainian lands.¹⁰⁸ Moscow's war against Sweden called up more than 40,000 Cossacks without equipping them with modern weapons or training and marched them north to fight Sweden. Essentially the Cossacks were used as shock troops and cannon fodder and suffered casualty rates as high as

¹⁰⁵ Hrushevsky, 362.

¹⁰⁶ Hrushevsky, 363

¹⁰⁷ Massie, 459. Subtelny, 163. According to Doroshenko, Peter considered giving the Ukrainian lands to the English Duke of Marlborough (365).

¹⁰⁸ Massie, 459.

70%.¹⁰⁹ Along with the high casualty rates, Mazepa requested Moscow aid after receiving reports that the Swedish armies under Charles XII were advancing on Ukrainian lands and was rebuffed. Peter reportedly responded “I cannot even spare ten men; defend yourself as best you can”¹¹⁰ much to Mazepa’s dismay. This rebuff became the final straw and Mazepa believed the Treaty of Pereiaslav was invalidated since Moscow was no longer abided its part in the treaty for the defense of Ukraine while it continued to infringe on the rights and privileges of the Cossacks.¹¹¹ Some historians have argued that Mazepa entered into negotiations with Charles XII around 1704 or 1705 but the only confirmed negotiations occurred after the tsar’s snub. Mazepa negotiated with Charles XII in 1708 for a possible alliance and wanted the guarantee of autonomy under Swedish protection if they would be victorious.

In 1708 Ivan Mazepa and about 4000 Cossacks journeyed north to meet with Charles. Before the journey, Mazepa informed his men of his intentions and allowed 2000 Cossacks who disagreed to depart. Mazepa ultimately joined with Charles XII’s army guaranteeing aid, provisions, and shelter within the Ukrainian lands for Charles’ weary men. Initially Peter did not believe the reports brought to him since throughout most of Mazepa’s Hetmanate he had received false accusations from Cossacks seeking to aggrandize themselves with his downfall, so he ordered the informants tortured to “verify” their testimony.¹¹² By the time the informants recanted their accusation and were executed, Peter learned that Mazepa had moved his troops into the Swedish camp and found the accusations were true. To say that Peter was shocked that his nearly 70-year-old advisor betrayed him is an understatement. Peter was determined to

¹⁰⁹ Magocsi, 259. Subtelny, 161.

¹¹⁰ Subtelny, 164.

¹¹¹ Sugar, 25, 27.

¹¹² Dmytro Doroshenko. *A Survey of Ukrainian History*. Ed. Oleh W Gerus (Winnipeg: Trident Press Limited, 1975), 371.

punish “the deed of the new Judas, Mazepa, who after twenty-one years of loyalty to me and with one foot already in the grave, has turned traitor and betrayer of his own people.”¹¹³ Within days of learning of Mazepa’s treachery, he sent his army to the Hetman’s capital, Baturin, and massacred the entire population of 13,000-15,000 men, women, and children.¹¹⁴ A wave of terror swept the Ukrainian lands as the Muscovite troops imprisoned and executed anyone remotely suspected of supporting Mazepa, who were called *Mazeptsi* or Mazepists. Peter installed a special court of justice that accused 900 Cossacks loyal to Mazepa of treason, tortured, and executed them.¹¹⁵ Most of the peasants and the *starshyna* did not join the rebellion unlike in Khmelnytskyi’s rebellion because they feared for their lives. Peter not only declared Mazepa a traitor but also hung an effigy of him and had the Orthodox Church excommunicate him and declare him an anathema (even after all the patronage Mazepa gave the Church).¹¹⁶ Peter then demanded that the Cossacks elect the docile Ivan Skoropadsky as their new Hetman. The Church declared the annual anathema for over 210 years until a descendent of Skoropadsky finally had the Ukrainian Orthodox Church lift the decree in 1918.¹¹⁷

Through the winter of 1708 and spring of 1709, Hetman Ivan Mazepa with his Swedish allies faced only some minor battles against Peter, as the two sides maneuvered into strategic positions for the final confrontation and attempted to rally the popular support. One surprising group decided to support Mazepa and Charles, the Zaporozhian Cossacks, because they saw Mazepa as a lesser evil than Moscow. Muscovite forces punished the Zaporozhian defiance by attacking and destroying several of their fortresses torturing and executing any Cossacks they

¹¹³ Subtelny, 164. Reid, 51.

¹¹⁴ Subtelny, 164. Magocsi, 260.

¹¹⁵ Doroshenko, 377.

¹¹⁶ Magocsi, 260.

¹¹⁷ Reid, 51. The Russian Orthodox church continues to issue the anathema to this very day.

captured. Even though Charles' forces were fatigued and ill from combat through the winter and early spring, he decided to march on Moscow going through the Ukrainian lands. On July 8, 1709, Charles with his Cossack allies fought Peter and his Cossacks who remained loyal at Poltava. Similar to the Battle of Narva, the Muscovite forces substantially outnumbered the Swedish forces 40,000 to 18,000 but unlike at Narva the battle was a defeat for Charles and Mazepa. Mazepa's skill of picking political winners and being able to play intrigue had run out. The success was even greater for Peter who led his forces in person and captured most of the leading Swedish generals and officers striking a harsh blow for the Swedish forces. Charles and Mazepa escaped though to Ottoman controlled territory to attempt to reorganize their forces. Mazepa attempted to regain his former position under Peter though by scheming to deliver Charles into his hands in exchange for a pardon.¹¹⁸ While Peter responded favorably to Mazepa's offer, the victorious monarch never received a response. Only two months after the disastrous Battle of Poltava, Mazepa died after passing his Hetmanate to his subordinate Pylyp Orlyk.¹¹⁹

Pylyp Orlyk continued Mazepa's fight and was also the first to justify Mazepa's actions against Moscow during his exile in the Ottoman territories for over thirty years starting in 1710. Orlyk argued that Mazepa rebelled from Peter to "defend the laws and liberties of the Cossacks and entered negotiations with Charles XII following in the footsteps of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi to liberate his fatherland from servitude."¹²⁰ The 4000 Zaporozhians who fled with Mazepa supported Orlyk's Hetmanate especially after Orlyk drafted a Cossack constitution which called

¹¹⁸ Massie, 466.

¹¹⁹ Magocsi, 262.

¹²⁰ "Bendery Constitution" in *Towards an Intellectual History of Ukraine: An Anthology of Ukrainian Thought From 1710 to 1995*. Eds. Ralph Lindheim and George S N Luckyj. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 55.

for limited powers for the Hetman, limited economic exploitation of the peasants, preserved Zaporozhia's status, and declared that the Ukrainian lands separate from Moscow's should he gain power.¹²¹ Orlyk was recognized as leader of Zaporozhia and the western Ukrainian lands and launched several successful campaigns against Muscovite forces but could not attain a general popular support against Moscow.¹²² After his final campaign ended in defeat in 1714, Orlyk and several of his followers travelled from European capital to capital seeking an alliance for the liberation of his lands only to be denied audience and was finally incarcerated in the Ottoman Empire.¹²³

The Battle of Poltava strengthened Muscovite prestige in Eastern Europe and resulted in a closer inclusion of the Ukrainian lands under Moscow. It was only after 1721 that Muscovy became known as the Russian Empire with the incorporation of Ukrainian lands. Peter I's feelings of betrayal by a man he once called friend led him to impose a greater centralizing control over the Cossacks and establish the policy of Muscovite monarchs selecting loyal people for the position of Hetman. Hetmans could no longer grant or seize estates, or raise or dismiss Cossack officers without the tsar's approval.¹²⁴ In the beginning any Cossack that did not support the tsar or that followed Mazepa when he fled were called "Mazepists" or traitors. Peter only granted amnesty a decade afterwards and only to some Cossacks in order to enhance the number of troops for further campaigns against the Ottoman Empire. Along with selecting a loyal Hetman, Peter forced the Hetman to move his capital closer to Hlukiv so that the tsar and his minister could keep a watchful eye over him. With the closer watch over the Hetman, Peter

¹²¹ "Bendery Constitution", 56-64.

¹²² Magocsi, 262.

¹²³ Subtelny, 165.

¹²⁴ Doroshenko, 391.

began to cause dissention in the Cossack ranks by threatening to support peasants over the *starshyna* and divisions between the Hetman and *starshyna*. The “conflicts” and problems among the Malorus became so great that Peter created the Little Russian Collegium in 1722 comprising of six Russian officers in a parallel government function. With the death of Skoropadskyi, the Collegium was the sole authority because Peter would not recognize a Hetman and arrested the candidate the Cossacks put forward.¹²⁵ He believed the Ukrainian lands were now finally effectively administered and forbade any petitions to install a new Hetman saying “from the period of the first Hetman, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, to Skoropadskyi all the Hetmans have proven themselves traitors.”¹²⁶ The injury of the betrayal of Mazepa struck deep.

Interpretations and Problems with Mazepa

While Mazepa did many things to further Ukrainian learning, culture, and the position of the Cossacks, his betrayal of Peter seems to forever tarnish him both in Russia and in Ukraine. As the Russian state continued to centralize, ironically many of the intellectuals the state came to rely on were from the Ukrainian lands and educated in the academies Ivan Mazepa promoted. Mazepa’s Kyiv Mohyla Academy trained many of the leading ministers including Peter I’s chief ideologue, Teofan Prokopovych, and Catherine II’s chancellor Aleksander Bezborodko.¹²⁷ The tsars ultimately recruited hundreds of graduates and teachers from the Academy to fill government, educational, and church posts due to the high standards of education.¹²⁸ Some

¹²⁵ Magocsi, 287.

¹²⁶ Hrushevsky, 380.

¹²⁷ Serhii Plokhy. *Unmaking Imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Writing of Ukrainian History*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 18. Magocsi, 301.

¹²⁸ This was not a new situation because even as early as 1687 one graduate of Mohyla Academy, Simeon Polozki, founded an Academy in Moscow. Greenfeld, 236.

historians have argued that perhaps as high as 50% of the first Russian nationalists were actually Ukrainian and educated in Mazepa's schools.¹²⁹

Catherine II, like Peter, also distrusted the Cossacks and believed any independent leadership would follow Mazepa's treacherous footsteps. She began the most intensive centralization process of the Ukrainian lands since Peter I's reign with Ukrainian educated nobles. She eliminated the position of Hetman entirely in 1764, destroyed the fortress in Zaporozhia ending the Zaporozhian Cossacks and any last vestiges of their independent power in 1775,¹³⁰ and consolidated the previous ten Cossack regimental districts into three Russian provinces (Kiev, Chernigov, and Novgorod-Siversk) in 1783. She then absorbed the Cossack *starshyna* into the Russian nobility by 1785 through her "Charter of Nobility" making them equal.¹³¹ With the growing opportunities for the nobility in St. Petersburg as chancellors and ministers, most of the Cossack elites welcomed the mobility and advantages of inclusion while typically only traditionalists bemoaned the loss of the past structures.¹³²

While Catherine II's "Charter of Nobility" declared Cossack nobles as equal with Russian nobles, it did not define who deserved to be a noble. Initially the Russian governor-general accepted all *starshyna* as nobles but grew suspicious when the large number of over 30,000 signed up in 1790. The governor-general struck over 20,000 from the rolls of nobility sparking massive petitions to the monarchs. As Russian monarchs attempted to gentrify the Cossacks into Russified nobility by giving them special privileges to land and increasing their

¹²⁹ Greenfeld, 238.

¹³⁰ Magocsi, 284.

¹³¹ Subtelny, 173.

¹³² Subtelny, 182.

serf holdings during the late 18th and early 19th centuries, they required proof to accept them into the nobility. As

descendants of the Cossack officers were admitted to the ranks of the Russian imperial nobility[,] mobilized Ukrainian gentry turned into *volens nolens* archeographers and historians, collecting and producing family genealogies, documents, and chronicles to prove their descent from noble families of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This mass archeography resulted in the nineteenth century in several histories of Ukraine.¹³³

These nobles poured through Polish-Lithuanian charters, treaties between Moscow and Hetmans, family journals, and local traditions to prove their status. The histories that the nobles produced glorified Hetmans loyal to Russia and continued to vilify the traitor Mazepa in order to gain acceptance. However, searching for their own justification of status, the nobility unwittingly provided and published sources fanning the dying embers glorifying the Cossack past and their rights that would become tools for future rebels.

However, Mazepa's influence on education for state and class building did not matter since from the Battle of Poltava into the twentieth century, Mazepa and a Mazepist was another term for a traitor in the Russian Empire and ultimately became a term of scorn for early Ukrainian nationalists. The Russian Orthodox Church annually declared him an Easter Anathema for over two centuries.¹³⁴ The Russian censors prohibited any objective study of him, and would only allow a work if it portrayed Mazepa as one of the greatest criminals against the state. Russian authors like Alexander Pushkin referred to Mazepa as a traitor and used him largely as a foil to aggrandize Peter in his poem *Poltava*.¹³⁵ Even Ukrainophile Russian historian Nikolai Kostomarov imbibed the influence of a tarnished Mazepa and it influenced the first

¹³³ Taras Koznarsky. "Izmail Sreznevsky's "Zaporozhian Antiquity" as a Memory Project" *Eighteenth-Century Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Fall, 2001), 92.

¹³⁴ Wilson, 76.

¹³⁵ W.E.D. Allen. *The Ukraine: A History*. (New York: Russell & Russell Inc., 1963), 204.

serious historical study of Mazepa in the late 19th century. In Kostomarov's work *Mazepa i Mazepintsy (Mazepa and Mazepists)* he accused Mazepa of nearly any crime possible describing him as "not a representative of the national idea, but an egoist in the full sense of the word. He lied to, cheated, and was ready to do evil to everyone while looking only to benefit himself."¹³⁶ On top of those descriptions, Kostomarov accused him of being "a Polish agent who wanted to return the Ukrainian lands to Polish power and re-enslave them."¹³⁷ Even once the Russian Empire fell, Soviet authorities prohibited any studies about Mazepa and equated his name with "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" which became yet another form of traitor to the state. Discussion of Mazepa in anything other than a traitorous method only started to occur during Glasnost. This kind of thinking over such a long period leaves an ingrained belief that is difficult to alter.¹³⁸

The Romantic Movement starting in the 19th century largely redeemed Mazepa's image. Authors like Lord Byron, composers like Liszt, and novelists like Victor Hugo romanticized the notion of him as a tragic, failed hero. The Decembrist Movement in 1825 as well invoked his image as a source of inspiration to rebel against the tsars. One of the leading members, Kondratii Ryleev, went so far as to write a poem entitled "Mazepa" which shows the influence.¹³⁹ Ukrainian poet and painter, Taras Shevchenko, also attempted to revive and revitalize his image through his art and his poetry. Tsar Peter and his successors hunted down

¹³⁶ N.I. Kostomarov. *Mazepa i Mazepintsy*. (St. Petersburg: MM Stasyulevich, 1885), 585.

¹³⁷ Kostomarov, 585.

¹³⁸ Consider a comparison in American history with Benedict Arnold. His name is synonymous with traitor as well, and slightly more recent in history, yet any attempt at restoring his name would receive great backlash.

¹³⁹ Roman Szporluk. "The Making of Modern Ukraine" in *A Laboratory of Transnational History: Ukraine and Recent Ukrainian Historiography*. Eds. Georgiy Kasianov and Philipp Ther (Budapest: Central European Press, 2009), 266.

and destroyed most of the images of Mazepa and the ones that survived showed him as an unkempt ruffian because of the anathema. Shevchenko created a more heroic portrait of the Hetman. Shevchenko also wrote poems commemorating his vision wanting to liberate Ukraine and “regretted that the Zaporozhians did not support him unanimously in the battle with the dog, Peter”.¹⁴⁰ Shevchenko also countered Pushkin’s praise for the tsars by blaming them for the state Ukraine was in “it was the First [Peter I] who crucified our Ukraine, and the Second [Catherine II] finished off the widowed orphan”.¹⁴¹ Ukrainian nationalists used him to inspire movements. Mazepa became a symbol of Ukrainian nationalism largely not because of what he did but because of what he represented, a restoration of lost liberties, a rebellion against Russia and the “last” independent leader of a Ukrainian state. Some authors, like Hrihori Poletika in his *History of the Rus*, appealed for a return of Cossack liberties drawing on journals of Mazepa’s successor Pylyp Orlyk and other Cossack elites after the Russian consolidation of the Hetmanate lands. One nobleman, Vasyl Kapnist, went so far as to secretly petition Berlin in the 1790s to support a Cossack rebellion as a response to his criticisms of Russian centralization and violations of Cossack rights.¹⁴² The personal aspects of Mazepa’s history became superfluous but the great idea of David taking on Goliath is what drew nationalist appeal to him. Although Mazepa’s stone missed in his attempt to take out the Goliath of Peter, Ukrainian nationalists believed they would ultimately succeed in felling the giant of Russia and be independent.

Nationalist historians like Hrushevsky and Doroshenko continued Shevchenko’s attempt to redeem Mazepa’s name and actions and others are continuing to do so but there is still much ground to cover. The 1997 survey referenced at the beginning of this work shows part of the

¹⁴⁰ T H Shevchenko. “Irzhavets” in *Kobzar*. (Kharkiv: Folio, 2001), 392-395.

¹⁴¹ T H Shevchenko. “Son” in *Kobzar*. (Kharkiv: Folio, 2001), 244. And quoted in Subtelny, 235.

¹⁴² Magocsi, 332.

story, but those kinds of feelings persist even today after two decades of attempting to nation-build. In a 2009 study 30% of Ukrainians view Ivan Mazepa as a national hero where as 28% view him as a traitor.¹⁴³ Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko was one of the leading politicians trying to repair Mazepa's image during the 300th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava saying that "Ivan Mazepa was not a traitor since he did not betray the Ukrainian people... He had only one goal: to preserve the independence of the Ukrainian state."¹⁴⁴ These words though did not convince the people of Poltava to support a monument to the Cossack leader; instead they erected a monument to Peter the Great.

¹⁴³"Swedish king feted in Ukraine 300 years after landmark battle." The Local June 26, 2009 <http://www.thelocal.se/20302/20090626/#.UQiIs2c0-NM> [accessed January 29, 2013].

(Unfortunately it does not say what the other 42% believe about Mazepa.)

¹⁴⁴ "Swedish king feted in Ukraine 300 years after landmark battle."

MYKHAILO HRUSHEVSKY

The Ukrainian efforts at state building hit a large roadblock after Mazepa's failure, the consolidation of the Ukrainian lands into the Russian Empire, and the Cossack *starshyna's* assimilation into Russian nobility. The effects of having no leadership or noble sponsorship were so large that 200 years would pass from Mazepa's failure before there was another attempt at building a state in the Ukrainian lands. In fact without leadership or sponsorship, Ukrainian culture nearly died out had not three developments happened when they did in the 19th century, the Romantic Movement which inspired Ukrainophilism, Polish nationalism, and the promotion of Ruthenians in the Habsburg Empire. Starting in the 1790s and early turn of the 19th century, the Romantic Movement started to spread into the Russian Empire from Germany. Drawing influence from the ideas of the German author Johann Gottfried Herder, the movement encouraged greater concentration on folk stories and songs inspiring writers to make works in the local tongue. Herder argued that "the speech is the dearest thing to a people. Therein resides its whole intellectual wealth, tradition, history, religion and principle of life- its very heart and soul. To deprive a people of its speech is to deprive it of its one eternal good."¹⁴⁵ In the largely illiterate society, oral folk tales could easily have blinked out of existence with the premature death of a prior generation. The life expectancy was an exceptionally low 40, so waiting a couple generations easily would have destroyed the memories of the Cossacks and knowledge of the Little Russian dialect.¹⁴⁶ To prevent it from happening, scholars began to collect folk stories and create dictionaries of the Little Russian dialect. It was out of this Ukrainophile atmosphere that authors like the Russified Little Russian writer Nikolai Gogol wrote collections of Little

¹⁴⁵ Johann Gottfried Herder. *Letters Addressed to Humanity* quoted in Magocsi, 376.

¹⁴⁶ Subtelny, 214. Koznarsky, 93.

Russian short stories, and historical epics like *Taras Bulba* glorifying the days of Cossacks fighting Poland in the 17th century.

While the scholars did not have political goals in mind with their studies, nobles and the Russian government are another story. The Ukrainian lands were not only instrumental in developing Russian and eventually Ukrainian nationalism but were a hotbed of Polish nationalism. In November 1830 Polish nobles followed the example of the revolutions in France and Belgium, rebelled in western Ukraine and Poland, and attempted to overthrow Russian rule.¹⁴⁷ In the aftermath of the Polish rebellion, Tsar Nicholas wanted to reduce Polish influence and saw education as a way to counter Polish nationalism. This is why Russian ministers founded the university in Kyiv in 1834 “to disseminate Russian education and Russian nationality” and to aid the preservation of Little Russian (Ukrainian) folk stories and language to counterweigh the Poles.¹⁴⁸

One of the most important cultural developments to come out of Kyiv in the 1840s was the Brotherhood of Sts. Cyril and Methodius. Kyiv University history professor Nikolai Kostomarov founded the secret society to further literary undertakings in the Ukrainian lands but while it started as a literary group, it soon evolved into political discussions. The group began to formulate political goals like education for all, an abolition of serfdom, and called for a democratic federation of Slavic nations. Soon the society attracted the attention of two figures who would become the most prominent members of the group, the writer-translator Panteleimon Kulish and the writer-poet-artist Taras Shevchenko. Kulish published two editions of Ukrainian primers. Although the primers did not enjoy widespread use, they became the basis of modern

¹⁴⁷ Hugh Seton-Watson. *The Russian Empire: 1801-1917*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 283.

¹⁴⁸ Subtelny, 210-11.

Ukrainian orthography.¹⁴⁹ Shevchenko not only interpreted Ukrainian history in a way that countered the nobles' conceptions but also promoted the Ukrainian language as a language emotive and nuanced enough that it could be used by more than just serfs and scholars.¹⁵⁰ Shevchenko's importance in Ukrainian literature could be compared to Shakespeare's importance in English.

A political intelligentsia is not what the Russian monarchy wanted though. After the arrest and punishment of the Brotherhood, the imperial ministers' suspicions of separatist movements abounded from the 1850s on and they became more reactionary towards non-Russians. They punished the Poles in 1864 by confiscating Catholic properties, closed nearly all monasteries, and centralized Church administration under the Ministry of the Interior.¹⁵¹ All educational and religious books in Ukrainian were banned in 1863, brotherhoods were limited, and anyone suspected of being a Ukrainian populist was arrested. There were brief respites in the 1870s and early 1900s of these policies toward Ukrainians and Poles but largely the stringent policies continued until the end of the Russian Empire.

Soon after the Russian Empire began its promotion of Little Russian language and folk tales to counter Polish nationalism in the 1830s, the Habsburg Empire likewise began to promote Ruthenian political development as a Polish counterweight in 1848. This Ruthenian promotion, though, did not last long as Polish leadership eventually established a Polish monopoly over Galician government, education, and even replaced German with Polish as the language of

¹⁴⁹ Magocsi, 391.

¹⁵⁰ Subtelny, 233. Magocsi, 385.

¹⁵¹ Seton-Watson, 409.

administration.¹⁵² As the Poles began persecuting the Ruthenians in Galicia in the 1860s and 1870s, the Russian Empire began its total denial of the Little Russians' language and culture. Facing this persecution in Russia, many Little Russian scholars like Kyiv professor Mykhailo Drahomanov and former member of the Brotherhood of Sts. Cyril and Methodius Panteleimon Kulish came west to publish and encourage Ruthenians in Galicia where the laws were less stringent than in Russia. In Galicia, they gave the strongest case for the use of Ruthenian vernacular in the form of the writings of Taras Shevchenko.¹⁵³ They sponsored the creation of the Enlightenment Society in 1868 and the Shevchenko Society in 1873. These societies promoted adult Ruthenian education and reached out to a broad population of peasants that was largely "anational" due to the limited education and that rather than identifying as Polish or Ruthenian merely called themselves "from here" even into the 20th century.¹⁵⁴ The strongest divider of the peasantry was religion.¹⁵⁵ The societies promoted political and social work along with literature and culture. The prestige of the Little Russian scholars greatly influenced Galician feelings that the Ruthenians were part of a larger group. The Supreme Ruthenian Council reflected this unity when they stated in their petition to the Habsburg emperor "we Galician Ruthenians belong to the great Ruthenian people who speak one language and number

¹⁵² Magocsi, 445. Piotr S Wandycz. *The Lands of Partitioned Poland: 1795-1918*. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996), 151.

¹⁵³ Magocsi, 471.

¹⁵⁴ Daniel L Unowsky. *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism: Imperial Celebrations in Habsburg Austria, 1848-1916*. (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2005), 35.

¹⁵⁵ CA Macartney. *The Habsburg Empire: 1790-1918*. (New York: Macmillian Co., 1969), 94. Robert A Kann. *A History of the Habsburg Empire: 1526-1918*. (Berkley: University of California Press, 1974), 165.

15 million, of which 2 1/3 million live in the Galician land.”¹⁵⁶ At this same time, the intelligentsia also began referring to Ruthenians and Little Russians as Ukrainians to further differentiate the people from Russians.

It was out of this confrontational intellectual and political environment that Mykhailo Hrushevsky grew to prominence. Galician populist parties were finally successful in expanding educational efforts through cooperation with Poles and won a very important victory in 1894 with the creation of a department of Ukrainian history at Lviv University. The appointed professor, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, was an unknown 28-year-old Russian citizen who studied in Kyiv under a Polish professor. When he arrived in Lviv, Hrushevsky was shocked that the Galician Poles were so antagonistic towards the Ukrainian cause and became the strongest voice for Ukrainian cultural and intellectual life.¹⁵⁷ He lectured in Ukrainian to show it was a credible language for scholarship and succeeded in drawing scholars from all parts of Ukraine.¹⁵⁸ Along with his scholarly activities, he reorganized the Shevchenko Society into an unofficial academy of arts and sciences that had published 300 volumes in history, ethnography, and folklore by 1914.¹⁵⁹ The Shevchenko Society provided a training ground for future Ukrainian scholars. Ultimately, this little known professor would have an immense effect on not only the interpretation of Ukrainian history but also the future political developments.

Mykhailo Hrushevsky created perhaps one of the most important reinterpretations of Ukrainian history with his ten-volume magnum opus *History of the Ukraine-Rus'*. Beginning in

¹⁵⁶ “Odozva do ruskoho narodu” *Zoria halytska*, I, 1 (Lviv, 1848), p. 1. Quoted in Paul Robert Magocsi, *The Roots of Ukrainian Nationalism: Galicia as Ukraine's Piedmont*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 107.

¹⁵⁷ Snyder, 128. Magocsi, 481.

¹⁵⁸ Snyder, 128. Doroshenko, 583.

¹⁵⁹ Doroshenko, 583.

1898 with his first volume, his history argued against the standard Polish and Russian “historical nations” interpretation, which centered primarily on the elites and their involvement in state traditions as comprising the nation. Instead, he focused on the common Ukrainian people as comprising the nation and by including the continuity of the common people and their culture, Hrushevsky undercut the basis of political state legitimization based on noble assimilation.¹⁶⁰ Hrushevsky’s use of the long-history of the people back to the Kyivian Rus’ refuted Moscow’s imperial claims as an inheritor and a continuation of the Kyivian Rus’ since he argued the people were socially and culturally different.¹⁶¹ As well, his long-history allowed for an argument against “historic” Polish control over Galicia. Through the inclusion of the common people, Hrushevsky expanded the basis of legitimization for a future Ukrainian state to include the ancient Kyivian states rather than just the brief Cossack state.¹⁶² While not all historians agreed with his argument, he brought the Ukrainian people into history and established a compelling populist argument for the necessity of Ukrainian statehood while also presenting the history in a fairly nuanced and balanced fashion.

It was not only in his historical works that Hrushevsky brought the Ukrainian people forward; he also brought them forward with his political activities. Hrushevsky maintained contact through the Shevchenko Society with underground intelligentsia and political leaders in Kyiv and in the eastern Ukrainian lands. It was through these underground contacts, that he knew that the intelligentsia in both the Russian and Habsburg Empires were in favor of

¹⁶⁰ Snyder, 128.

¹⁶¹ Zenon E Kohut. *Making Ukraine: Studies on Political Culture, Historical Narrative, and Identity*. (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2011), 209, 220.

¹⁶² Wilson, 109.

uniting.¹⁶³ Hrushevsky was one of the leading figures that founded the Ukrainian National Democratic Party in Galicia in 1899 that advocated further political activity “to achieve the ultimate unification of the whole Ukrainian nation into one single national organism.”¹⁶⁴ The National Democratic Party gained popularity quickly, overtook the Radical Party along with others, and even won the most famous Western Ukrainian poet Ivan Franko to the cause while continuing to declare their support for the Habsburg Empire. Other parties like the Social Democrats and the Radicals altered their platforms in order to mimic the National Democrats, which reflected the mood of Ukrainian unity and ultimately national independence.

The Galician Ukrainian parties and newspaper publications inspired Ukrainians in the Russian Empire to attempt political organization. Following the Revolution of 1905 and the October Manifesto, Ukrainian publishers began to organize and publish while political parties came into the open. The Russian government during the first parliament even went so far as to declare that Ukrainian was not a dialect of Russian but in fact a separate language and reversed their decision allowing cultural activities in Ukrainian.¹⁶⁵ The ministers believed that the actions of the Ukrainian intelligentsia did not threaten Russian unity but that the increased education could make Ukrainians into Russian nationals. Literacy at this time was a dismally low 13% for Ukrainians with only a slight improvement to 36% for Russians.¹⁶⁶ Encouraged by the liberalization in 1905, Hrushevsky returned to Kyiv and organized a branch of the Enlightenment Society to establish closer ties between the groups of Ukrainians and centralize Ukrainian

¹⁶³ Manning, 206-9.

¹⁶⁴ Seton-Watson, 492. Doroshenko, 581.

¹⁶⁵ Seton-Watson, 608.

¹⁶⁶ John A Reshetar Jr. *The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920: A Study in Nationalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), 40. This low literacy rate actually worked against the last two tsars who finally tried to nationalize the Russian state and create Russian nationalists, since nationalists are matriculated and not born.

cultural development.¹⁶⁷ The Enlightenment Society published numerous books, opened libraries and bookshops, and encouraged scholarship in the eastern Ukrainian regions.

Hrushevsky feared that two separate Ukrainian literatures and cultures would develop unless activities were centralized.¹⁶⁸ He then began to divide his time between Kyiv and Lviv while he continued to write his long-history and write profusely on Ukrainian social and political themes.

This period of Russian liberalization towards the Ukrainians was short-lived. Following the dismissal of two different parliamentary sessions in 1906 and 1907 for being too radical, Nicholas II reasserted his authority over the parliament. For the third parliament, Tsar Nicholas changed the election rules to minimize peasant votes, which resulted in fewer Ukrainian deputies and a more conservative parliament. This conservative atmosphere was less conciliatory towards the Ukrainians. Ukrainian deputies' request in 1908 to teach elementary schools in Ukrainian met a rejection.¹⁶⁹ There was a fear in parliament and the monarchy that educating the peasants would only radicalize them. Russian ministers then began to close all branches of the Enlightenment Society (closing the last one in 1910) because they feared that the "Mazepists" were fostering a sense of separatism or working as agents of the Austrians or Poles.¹⁷⁰

While Ukrainian nationalism may have been growing among the populace in the Russian Empire as well as in Galicia, there was little sign of it during the outbreak of World War I. Shortly after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in June 1914, Ukrainian political parties in Galicia formed into the Supreme Ukrainian Council, which declared its loyalty to the

¹⁶⁷ Seton-Watson, 608.

¹⁶⁸ Reshetar, 31.

¹⁶⁹ Wilson, 79.

¹⁷⁰ Seton-Watson, 667. Doroshenko, 588.

Habsburgs, and professed a unified front against Russia.¹⁷¹ They drafted 2,500 men to serve in the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen to fight alongside Habsburg armies against the Russians. In total, a quarter-of-a-million Ukrainians would serve in the Habsburg armies and frequently fight the three and a half million Ukrainians that served in the Tsarist armies.¹⁷² While the armies fought, most of the Ukrainian intelligentsia continued to declare their loyalty for their respective monarchs.

Tsar Nicholas II saw World War I as an opportunity to “reunite” all of the Rus’ lands. In August 1914 Russian armies defeated Habsburg armies and conquered Galicia. Galician Polish administrators retreated with the armies and accused the Ukrainian populace of treason or collusion with the Russians. These accusations brought a backlash that killed several thousand Ukrainians and deported even more to internment camps deep in Austria.¹⁷³ The Ukrainians did not fare any better with the new Russian military administration. The new governor attempted “to end all seditious Ukrainian activities directed against the Russian Empire in Lviv” by closing down all newspapers, disbanding all cultural organizations, instituting Russian to replace Ukrainian as the administrative and educational language, and attempting to close the Greek Catholic Churches.¹⁷⁴ Russian administrators arrested many Galician Ukrainian leaders like the Greek Catholic Metropolitan, Andrei Sheptytskyi, and deported them deep into Russia and parts of Siberia. Administrators even arrested Professor Mykhailo Hrushevsky upon his return to Kyiv late in 1914 and deported him to Moscow.¹⁷⁵ To signify the importance of the acquisition of

¹⁷¹ Doroshenko, 589.

¹⁷² Subtelny, 540.

¹⁷³ Doroshekno, 590. Magocsi, 495.

¹⁷⁴ Seton-Watson, 688. Serhy Yekelchuk. *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 65.

¹⁷⁵ Magocsi, 495.

Galicia, Tsar Nicholas II visited Lviv in early 1915 and declared that the “‘Russian’ population would never be returned to ‘foreign’ rule.”¹⁷⁶ These decisions were an attempt to incorporate the last outlying “Russian” lands into the motherland but in the end only solidified Galician Ukrainians against the Russians.

In total, the Russian control would be short-lived as the Habsburg armies defeated the Russian armies and returned to Galicia in the spring of 1915. The Russian armies attempted an impossible task of deporting the entire Ukrainian population of Galicia to Russia while retreating but only succeeded in bringing 25,000 with them.¹⁷⁷ Following the army successes, Habsburg authorities again punished Ukrainians suspected of collaborating with the Russians. The Habsburg authorities sent many Ukrainians to internment camps and placed them on trial for treason. In 1916 Russian forces successfully reacquired sections Galicia and had learned from their mistakes during their previous administration of Galicia. Unlike the previous time, the Russian administrators were more lenient to Ukrainians, especially when Ukrainian historian Dmytro Doroshenko became governor-general in 1917.¹⁷⁸

Galicia was a heavily contested region on the Eastern Front between the Habsburgs and Russia. The region became even more contested when Germany and Austria created an independent Poland from Russian territory in 1916. Polish leadership requested the inclusion of Galicia to restore their historic kingdom. The Habsburgs did not consent to that request but promised that the region would receive greater autonomy. Ukrainian politicians in Vienna became incensed at the promise because it would mean greater Polish domination over the province. The Ukrainian politicians renewed their demands for a partition of Galicia into Polish

¹⁷⁶ Doroshenko, 590.

¹⁷⁷ Magocsi, 495. Doroshenko, 591.

¹⁷⁸ Magocsi, 496. Doroshenko, 592.

and Ukrainian halves and greater Ukrainian autonomy. Franz Joseph made promises that once the war was over the Galician situation would “be settled favorably.”¹⁷⁹ Shortly after making these promises in 1916, Franz Joseph died, and his successor, Karl I, made similar promises. The promises though did not assuage Ukrainian grievances.

While the Habsburgs continued to make promises of autonomy to the Ukrainians in 1917, the situation in Russia gave an actual chance for autonomy. In March 1917 a general strike spread through St. Petersburg (named Petrograd at the time) over food shortages. The strikes happened to correspond with 30,000 Ukrainians celebrating of the anniversary of Taras Shevchenko’s birth.¹⁸⁰ The Ukrainian population in Petrograd was familiar with the troops’ repressive actions but in 1917 they were even more severe.¹⁸¹ Tsarist troops were given orders to fire on the protesters but instead joined the strike along with most of the population of the city. The Ukrainian community was one of the most active groups during the protests. Ukrainian soldiers and workers encouraged the Volhynian Regiment to join the protests rather than the police and were involved in forming workers’ councils.¹⁸² Seeing that he no longer had any popular support, Tsar Nicholas II abdicated and went into hiding along with several ministers. The political vacuum allowed a provisional democratic government to form.¹⁸³ The newly formed Russian republic promised “freedom of speech, association, and press” and abolished “all

¹⁷⁹ Magocsi, 497.

¹⁸⁰ Wolodymyr Stojko. “Ukrainian National Aspirations and the Russian Provisional Government” in *The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution*. Ed. Taras Hunczak. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 4-5.

¹⁸¹ Hrushevsky, 521.

¹⁸² Hrushevsky, 521. Doroshenko, 595.

¹⁸³ Seton-Watson, 724-726.

restrictions based on class, religion, and nationality.”¹⁸⁴ This liberalized atmosphere encouraged Ukrainian political activities to resume.

Within days of the monarchy’s collapse, three different groups competed for popular support in Kyiv. Representatives of the Russian bureaucracy organized an Executive Committee and acted as an extension of the Russian Provisional Government. Representing a more leftist ideology, workers and soldiers organized a Kyiv Soviet.¹⁸⁵ As these groups competed, moderate liberal Ukrainian politicians Dmytro Doroshenko, Evhen Chykalenko, and Serhii Efremov joined with social democrats Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Symon Petliura to form the Central Rada. Other parties began to join the Central Rada and membership grew to 600 delegates. With the increasing membership, it became the largest group and effectively displaced the Executive Committee as a form of governance during the political vacuum. Nominally, the Rada was an acting regional administrative unit of the Provisional Government until the government could organize a formal one, but largely the Provisional Government was too involved in its own affairs to influence the Rada.¹⁸⁶ The delegates seized on the Provisional Government’s disregard and attempted to nationalize Ukraine. From the time the Central Rada became the leading group until the eventual Bolshevik conquest, the revolution in Ukraine gained more national overtones. The Central Rada delegates elected Mykhailo Hrushevsky president upon his return from exile because of his efforts championing Ukrainian rights and his broad nationalist appeal.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁴ Seton-Watson, 726.

¹⁸⁵ Soviet meaning a council in this sense and not necessarily reflecting support of Bolshevism or a Soviet Union.

¹⁸⁶ Magocsi, 501-2.

¹⁸⁷ Doroshenko, 597.

Under Hrushevsky's leadership, the Central Rada attempted to become a legitimate representative body for all Ukrainians while "awakening" the nationalist sentiment of the common people. In April 1917 the Rada expanded to 900 delegates representing all regions of Ukraine and passed resolutions declaring that only an autonomous Ukraine could fully represent the people.¹⁸⁸ The Ukrainians in the Habsburg Empire supported the Rada's efforts and declared that "they would not give up the struggle repudiating any connection between the Kingdom of Galicia with Poland until the great Ukrainian nation was in enjoyment of its full rights on its entire national territory."¹⁸⁹ The Rada's resolutions of autonomy met with silence from the Provisional Government though. They interpreted the silence as tacit approval, so the Rada also passed resolutions promoting the use of Ukrainian in primary schools, courts, political institutions, churches, newspapers, as well as creating Ukrainian military units.¹⁹⁰

In July 1917, deserters and mutineers from the Russian army converged on Kyiv, organized themselves into two all-Ukrainian regiments, the Bohdan Khmelnytskyi and Polubotok Regiments, and swore their allegiance to the Central Rada.¹⁹¹ Along with the soldiers, nationalism seemed to be reaching the upper military echelons as well. Russified General Pavlo Skoropadsky "rediscovered" his Ukrainian heritage and offered to swear allegiance with his personal 40,000 well-trained, equipped and disciplined soldiers to the Central Rada. Socialistic idealism influenced much of the Rada's ideology so Prime Minister¹⁹² Volodymyr Vynnychenko rejected the offer because the standing army would be "unnecessary" since the success of the

¹⁸⁸ Magocsi, 502.

¹⁸⁹ Macartney, 822.

¹⁹⁰ Reshetar, 50-1.

¹⁹¹ Subtelny, 347. Allen, 279.

¹⁹² For the role of Prime Minister, intellectuals revived the title Hetman to show continuity with the Cossack era.

socialist revolution would “wither away its necessity” and because Skoropadsky was a rich bourgeois landowner who could not be trusted.¹⁹³ Less than a year would pass before this policy towards landowners would backfire on the Rada.

The nationalizing effort seemed to garner support as groups of soldiers, teachers, workers, and peasants numbered in the hundreds of thousands and demonstrated in Kyiv voicing their support for the Central Rada.¹⁹⁴ These protests may or may not have been direct support for the nationalizing effort of the Central Rada but a belief that a closer government would be more responsive than the Russian government to end the war and help attain more land. The great majority of Ukrainians were indifferent to the national movement as they were more concerned with ending the war and land distribution.¹⁹⁵ This support though encouraged the politicians to believe that they were not just representatives of the intelligentsia but were a legitimate parliamentary body representing Ukraine.¹⁹⁶

The question of support would remain a source of weakness internally and externally during the Rada’s entire existence. General elections could have removed this internal weakness but they were scheduled too late to be of use.¹⁹⁷ While the demonstrations may or may not have reflected the general public opinion, there were some groups greatly mistrustful of the Central Rada’s development. Socialists in Russia and within Ukraine were generally mistrustful because they believed the Rada would distract the working classes from the class struggle and focus them on the less important national struggle (even though largely the Rada was primarily a leftist

¹⁹³ Subtelny, 347-8. Yekelchuk, 71.

¹⁹⁴ Yekelchuk, 69.

¹⁹⁵ Allen, 276.

¹⁹⁶ Subtelny, 346.

¹⁹⁷ The Bolshevik assault on Kyiv postponed the elections in January 1918.

organization).¹⁹⁸ Russian and Jewish populations living in Ukraine still supported Russian culture and government and were concerned what the Central Rada would mean for the future of Russia. These Russian and Jewish groups were largely urban, while the nationalist Ukrainian population was primarily rural with only small urban political-intelligentsia segments. Nationalist Ukrainians continued to debate how to attract the Russian and Jewish groups and focused primarily on nationalizing the urban population. Along with the urban focus, petty political squabbles distracted and distanced them from the rural land issues that would have given greater political support and legitimization.¹⁹⁹ The peasants would become so disgruntled with the Central Rada's inactivity over land issues that by the fall of 1917 they started mass seizures of noble and crown lands.²⁰⁰ This urban-rural divide would be a further challenge to the Central Rada's support and, ultimately, its existence.

If internal support was a source of weakness, external support was an even greater source of weakness. The Central Rada requested the Provisional Government to recognize their internal autonomy to no avail. The Provisional Russian Government argued that the ability to grant autonomy in a federal structure superseded their temporary authorities and did not wish to be held accountable for such a change before a permanent government was in place.²⁰¹ Along with that argument, there was a general belief that the Rada was taking steps towards Ukrainian separatism and dismemberment of Russia. Volodymyr Vynnychenko later conceded in his work *Vidrodzhennia Natsii* (Rebirth of a Nation) in 1920 that it was “the root of separatism. We all

¹⁹⁸ Subtelny, 346.

¹⁹⁹ Subtelny, 347.

²⁰⁰ Yekelchuk, 70.

²⁰¹ Magocsi, 505.

desired to separate from oppression.”²⁰² Due to the lack of response, in June 1917 the Central Rada declared in its First Universal “Ukraine is free. Without separating themselves entirely from Russia, without severing connections with the Russian state, let the Ukrainian people... have the right to order their own lives.”²⁰³ This declaration of a legitimate local government was a first step toward an independent Ukrainian state.

The Central Rada was attempting a tightrope-walk balancing considerations of autonomy with loyalty to a federated Russian republic. Conservative Russians in the Provisional Government saw the Universal as an attempt to dissolve the Great Russian unity and believed the Central Rada was a “hotbed of treason”²⁰⁴ that was guilty of “stabbing the Russian revolution in the back.”²⁰⁵ Shortly after the declaration of the Universal, the Central Rada created an executive branch called the General Secretariat with Volodymyr Vynnychenko at its head. These actions did nothing to relieve the Russian fears of Ukrainian secession, but instead only furthered them. The feelings were so pervasive that the Provisional Government sent Minister of War and future Prime Minister Aleksander Kerensky with a delegation to Kyiv to negotiate with Hrushevsky and Vynnychenko to maintain Ukrainian loyalty to Russia.²⁰⁶ Hrushevsky and Vynnychenko gave assurances that their actions were not attempts to separate from Russia but only to establish federal authority. Kerensky and the Russian delegation believed the assertions that “nothing decisive” was happening in Ukraine.²⁰⁷ To further the cooperative spirit, the Central Rada joined with the Russian delegation and issued its Second Universal. The Russians

²⁰² Quoted in Reshetar, 53.

²⁰³ Reshetar, 61. Magocsi, 505. Universal was a revived Cossack term used by Khmelnytskyi and Mazepa for a declaration and an attempt at presenting a continuity with the Cossack state.

²⁰⁴ Reshetar, 57.

²⁰⁵ Stojko, 16.

²⁰⁶ Allen, 277-8. Subtelny, 347.

²⁰⁷ Allen, 277.

recognized the Rada's authority (but not its autonomy) and the Ukrainians gave concessions to maintain unity with Russia.²⁰⁸ The Universals and the establishment of the General Secretariat tied the Provisional Government's hands, as it forced them to recognize the Central Rada's control over five predominantly Ukrainian provinces in order to receive continued support during World War I. This debate over autonomy versus centralism would continue to dominate the relationship and negotiations of the Central Rada with the Russian Provisional Government.

The debate over Ukrainian autonomy was not the only issue weighing on the Provisional Government from June through October 1917. As the Central Rada pressed for greater local authority, the Provisional Government was facing a greater threat to its very existence. In April 1917 a little known socialist political organizer Vladimir Ulyanov (better known as Lenin) returned from exile in Switzerland and immediately called on the Bolsheviks to overthrow the Provisional Government. While the general popular opinion trended to supporting socialist groups, that did not necessarily translate into support for the Bolsheviks. Frequently the Bolsheviks targeted their message to the urban industrial proletariat and this message did not translate well to peasants.²⁰⁹ Lenin's Bolshevik party was not the largest socialist group at this time, numbering less than 24,000, but they were a centralized, well disciplined, and organized group compared to other socialist parties.²¹⁰ The Bolshevik activities came to a head in July when a Russian military disaster on the Eastern Front provided them with popular support for their slogan of "peace, land and bread."²¹¹ Workers joined with the Bolshevik attempt to overthrow the government but the Provisional Government was able to respond and drive Lenin

²⁰⁸ Hrushevsky, 527. Stojko, 19.

²⁰⁹ Evan Mawdsley. *The Russian Civil War*. (New York: Pegasus Books, 2005), 7-8.

²¹⁰ Subtelny, 348. Mawdsley, 7.

²¹¹ Magocsi, 508.

back into exile. This time, though, Lenin merely escaped to Finland and continued advocating overthrow of the Provisional Government.

While Lenin was in exile, the Bolshevik party continued to gain adherents. Lenin's grand strategy was to place as many Bolsheviks in positions of power in workers' and soldiers' councils (each with its own militia) around Russia as his Red Guard.²¹² This strategy was successful since by October the party had grown to 350,000 members and the Bolsheviks had majorities in several councils in Moscow and Petrograd.²¹³ While the strategy was successful in the more urbanized Russia, in the more rural Ukraine the Bolsheviks met with only limited success. By August 1917 there were only around 22,000 members divided in four groups, which largely competed with one another, rather than cooperating.²¹⁴ The divided front left the Bolsheviks unable to compete with the Central Rada so they cooperated with the local Ukrainian government (as much as they ideologically could) and sent representatives as members of the Rada.²¹⁵

Repelling Lenin and the Bolsheviks in July 1917 was only a temporary reprieve for the Provisional Government. The Provisional Government could not stop Lenin from advocating further overthrow from Finland nor could they stem possible further Bolshevik attempts. Two months later in early September, another challenge came when a rightist coup possibly attempted to overthrow the Provisional Government. Many in the military grew disgruntled with the Provisional Government and the increasing influence of the councils. Supreme Commander-in-Chief General Lavr Kornilov believed the Provisional Government was impotent to do anything

²¹² Magocsi, 508.

²¹³ Magocsi, 508. Mawdsley, 6.

²¹⁴ Magocsi, 508.

²¹⁵ Magocsi, 509. Subtelny, 349.

to the councils and decided to take the law into his own hands and marched on Petrograd²¹⁶ either to curb the workers' councils or to initiate a military dictatorship.²¹⁷ When the Provisional Government discovered this, they ordered Kornilov to relinquish control of his troops but he disregarded the order and continued his army's march on the capital. The rebellion only ended due to the general's lack of preparation and the unity of the railroad workers' soviets stopping the trains carrying the troops rather than a coordinated effort by the Provisional Government. The local soviets disarmed and arrested Kornilov with the other mutineers and only increased the threat to the state since the soviets still remained and were now armed with Kornilov's weapons.²¹⁸ The Bolsheviks used Kornilov's coup as a further indictment against Kerensky's inept and ineffective Provisional Government and gained traction with their propaganda.²¹⁹ Whatever Kornilov's motives were, the result was yet another weakening of the Provisional Government's position and a strengthening of the soviets which were to become pivotal for the Bolsheviks.

As the Bolsheviks continued to gain power in the Russian Republic, the Provisional Government grew concerned over any threats to its power. It viewed the Ukrainian efforts and Bolshevism as linked threats. The Provisional Government started to withdraw from previous agreements with the Central Rada and attempted to centralize Russian control of the General Secretariat.²²⁰ The Rada refused to participate in the State Conference because they were

²¹⁶ Peter Kenez. *A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End*. (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 21

²¹⁷ Mawdsley, 11. Kornilov's motives are still debated today whether he merely wanted to limit the soviets' influence or actually overthrow the government.

²¹⁸ Kenez, 21-22.

²¹⁹ Mawdsley, 11.

²²⁰ Doroshenko, 607-8.

allowed only five delegates and felt underrepresented.²²¹ Kerensky's government grew concerned that the Ukrainians were becoming "Judases" and instructed a Russian special prosecutor to investigate both the Central Rada and the General Secretariat while also withdrawing financial support for them.²²² Kerensky demanded that the General Secretariat come to Petrograd to explain the necessity of their Congress in October 1917 while he considered using the military to disperse the Rada.²²³ As the Ukrainians were facing a more belligerent Provisional Government and just as the delegates arrived in Petrograd, the Bolsheviks launched another attack to overthrow the government and finally succeeded. The militarized Bolsheviks took over public buildings, railroad stations, and newspapers. After ultimately taking over the entire government, the Bolsheviks legitimized their power by passing resolutions supporting their actions through the soviets (organizations that they dominated).²²⁴ The Ukrainian delegates saw the turmoil in the capital and quickly returned to Kyiv. The Provisional Government's prior antagonism towards the Central Rada did not encourage Ukrainians to support the Provisional Government's fight against the Bolsheviks.

The two issues of land redistribution and ending the war were the largest factors that weakened support for the Provisional Government. Lenin and his Bolsheviks exploited these issues to great effect to garner support so he knew that they were the most important issues to deal with first. With Lenin's first two proclamations the day after his victory, he addressed both those issues. His first proclamation called for all countries at war to begin peace negotiations and while his second proclamation declared all land to be state property it made allowances for

²²¹ Stojko, 27.

²²² Stojko, 28.

²²³ Reshetar, 80.

²²⁴ Kenez, 28.

peasants to cultivate it as their own.²²⁵ The Bolsheviks opposed private ownership of land but wanted the peasantry to feel that the Bolsheviks supported them.

The Bolsheviks held similar views as other socialist groups in Russia concerning national minorities. They straddled claims supporting self-determination yet not wanting them to separate. Both Lenin and the Bolshevik Minister of Nationalities, Joseph Stalin, wrote before World War I about Marxism and the issue of self-determination. Stalin wrote that “Social-Democracy in all countries proclaims the right of nations to self-determination. [...] The right of self-determination means that a nation may arrange its life in the way it wishes. [...] It has the right to complete secession. Nations are sovereign and all nations have equal rights.”²²⁶ Lenin reflected a similar ideology stating that “‘self-determination of nations’ in the Marxists’ Programme *cannot* have any other meaning than political self-determination, state independence, and the formation of a national state.”²²⁷ While both seemed in agreement with self-determination, their writings in the end castigated national self-autonomy and determination as bourgeois ploys to “poison the atmosphere, spread mutual distrust” and “fragment proletarian organizations into national exclusiveness.”²²⁸ Ultimately, the Bolshevik ideology was that national feelings could wait due to the greater importance of class struggle. This ideology tempered Bolshevik relations with the Ukrainian nationalists and the Central Rada.

As Civil War between the Bolsheviks and the forces of the Provisional Government was beginning in the Russian lands, the conflagration threatened to spread to Ukraine. Russian

²²⁵ Kenez, 28.

²²⁶ JV Stalin, “Marxism and National Question” *Marxist.org*. January, 1913, <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1913/03a.htm> (accessed June 12, 2012).

²²⁷ Vladimir Lenin. *The Lenin Anthology*. Ed. Robert C. Tucker. (New York: WW Norton and Company, 1975), 157.

²²⁸ Stalin. Lenin, 180.

garrisons in Kyiv, which supported the Provisional Government, attempted to defend the Russian Republic, denounced the Central Rada of being in alliance with the Bolsheviks and organized an attack on it.²²⁹ To respond to the threat, the Central Rada briefly allied with the Bolsheviks due to the Rada's military weakness to "defend the revolution" and expel the Russian garrisons.²³⁰ This alliance was short-lived though as the Bolsheviks soon after denounced the Central Rada as a "bourgeois agent of international capitalism" and demanded its submission.²³¹ The Central Rada attempted to keep a neutral approach not declaring its support for either side in order to maintain its autonomy. While the Rada did not recognize the Bolshevik government as legitimate in Ukraine, it did acknowledge its *de facto* existence in Russia proper to stave off a conflict with the Bolsheviks and to effect at least a neutral stance from Russian military units fighting the Bolsheviks.²³²

The Central Rada took steps to clarify its neutral position when it declared its Third Universal on November 20, 1917. The Rada stated that "the Central Government of the north has collapsed and anarchy, lawlessness, and ruin are spreading through the state. Our land is also in danger. Without a single, strong, national authority Ukraine may also fall into the abyss of civil war, slaughter and ruin."²³³ The Third Universal attempted to expand the Central Rada's influence in the region as the only remaining established order and created the Ukrainian National Republic (*Ukrainska Narodna Respublika*) or UNR to legitimize that government.

²²⁹ Hrushevsky, 531.

²³⁰ Doroshenko, 609.

²³¹ Doroshenko, 609, Hrushevsky, 531.

²³² Ihor Kamenetsky. "Hrushevskyi and the Central Rada: Internal Politics and Foreign Interventions" in *The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 38.

²³³ Third Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada. Quoted in *The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution*. Ed. Taras Hunczak. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 387.

Even though they were declaring Ukraine a republic, this Universal did not take the final step and declare independence. The Central Rada explicitly stated that the Ukrainians were not “separating from the Russian Republic” but were “maintaining its unity [...] standing firmly on their territory so that [their] strength may aid all of Russia, so that the whole Russian Republic may become a federation of equal and free peoples.”²³⁴ With the establishment of the Ukrainian Republic, the Central Rada also attempted to take advantage of the chaos and expand its territory from the previously recognized five to nine dominantly Ukrainian provinces. The declaration again attempted to maintain Ukrainian aspirations of national autonomy within a federalized Russian republican state.

The Rada continued its delicate equilibrium between autonomy and placating the Bolsheviks. Even in the declaration of the Ukrainian Republic, the balancing act is apparent. In Ukrainian the word *narodna* can either mean national or people’s. This double meaning was a way of reconciling socialist groups and nationalists internally and a way of appeasing the Bolsheviks externally since each group interpreted *narodna* through their own ideology. The Third Universal as well incorporated some of Lenin’s initial proclamations attempting to settle land issues and echoed the call for peace. Through the fall, many peasants had already started to seize church and royal lands, and large estates, the leaders in the Rada were aware that they were too weak politically and in numbers of police to reverse the illegal seizures. Rather than trying to regain influence through rational and legal land reform that could have further legitimized their government, the Central Rada compromised by “asserting these [seized] lands are the property of the entire working people, and that they be recognized as such without compensation

²³⁴ Third Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada, 388. Kamenetsky, 40-1.

to former proprietors.”²³⁵ This declaration followed Lenin’s example earlier that month. The Rada also called upon all belligerents to begin peace negotiations and asserted it would defend Ukrainian rights from infringement during the negotiations.

While the stated goals of the Bolsheviks and the Central Rada seemed compatible with one another, the two groups quickly antagonized each other, which led to an expansion of the Civil War into Ukrainian lands. The Bolsheviks remained amicable while they still believed they could possibly take power in Ukraine through peaceful and “democratic” means. Starting in early December 1917, Minister of War, Symon Petliura, correctly interpreted the threat to the Ukrainian Republic. He called for a cessation of foreign (Russian) troops moving through Ukrainian lands. To enforce it, Petliura ordered Ukrainian troops not to obey orders from the Bolsheviks and to disarm any Russian soldier passing through Ukrainian territory.²³⁶ The Bolsheviks issued an ultimatum to the Central Rada to return the weapons within 48 hours or there would be a state of war.²³⁷ Simultaneously with the ultimatum, the Ukrainian Bolsheviks attempted to organize soviets in Kyiv in order to seize greater power in the government. The soviets overwhelmingly supported the Rada over the Bolsheviks (53% to 10% respectively).²³⁸ Following these unsuccessful attempts, the Rada was able to force the Ukrainian Bolsheviks out of Kyiv. After the Ukrainian Bolsheviks fled, they established a rival government, the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic²³⁹, in Kharkiv on December 17 and appealed to the Russian Bolsheviks for support. Lenin used the excuse of civil war in Ukraine to send the Russian Red Guard to invade Ukraine on December 25 and support the Ukrainian Bolsheviks. To lend credibility to

²³⁵ Yekelchik, 70. Third Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada, 389.

²³⁶ Reshetar, 93.

²³⁷ Reshetar, 93.

²³⁸ Kamenetsky, 40. Mawdsley, 25.

²³⁹ Later, in 1936, it changed to Soviet Socialist upon orders from Moscow. Yekelchik, 85.

the Ukrainian Bolsheviks' cause, Lenin placed Vladimir Antonov-Ovseenko in charge of the Red Guard because of his Ukrainian sounding name.²⁴⁰

As the Russian Civil War spread into Ukraine, both the Bolsheviks and the Central Rada attempted to extricate themselves from World War I. The Bolsheviks were able to negotiate a cease-fire on December 22 while the peace conference met in Brest-Litovsk. The Central Rada leaders became concerned when they learned the Bolshevik government would be negotiating on their behalf so they sent delegates to protect Ukrainian interests on January 1, 1918. The Central Rada abandoned the idea of a federal structure since the Bolsheviks declared of war and started their invasion. German and Austrian diplomats grew concerned that the Ukrainian delegates would complicate a desired quick peace settlement, but relented to the Ukrainian delegates on the condition the Russian delegates allowed and recognized them. The head of the Russian delegates, Leon Trotsky²⁴¹, did not object to the Ukrainian presence and maintained Lenin's argument that they had the right to secede.²⁴² The Russian recognition along with *de facto* recognition and entreaties from France and Great Britain to remain involved in the war were the beginnings of acknowledgment of an independent Ukrainian state.²⁴³ On January 6, 1918, the Germans began formal negotiations with the Ukrainians.

It was soon apparent that the German delegation would not be able to get the quick peace treaty they wanted from the ideologically driven Trotsky and Russian Soviet delegates. Trotsky would frequently begin to harangue the Germans as though he was prosecuting western

²⁴⁰ Lenin ordered that the battalions be known as the Ovseenko to get Ukrainian support.

²⁴¹ While famous for being a Russian Marxist, he was born in what is now central Ukraine.

²⁴² Reshetar, 105.

²⁴³ Kamenetsky, 48. Hrushevsky, 536.

capitalism and attempted to spread revolution to the Habsburg and German armies.²⁴⁴ There were reports of discontent in the West due to the war and the Bolsheviks believed that that would be the beginning of a worldwide proletariat revolution. Trotsky hoped that he could stall the negotiations long enough for either a proletariat uprising or that the Bolsheviks could achieve a victorious peace.²⁴⁵ The negotiations began with the Russian delegates pressing for national self-determination and no annexations and the delegates were completely unfamiliar and unprepared for the *realpolitik* style of the German negotiators. The German delegates finally grew tired of Trotsky's lectures and stall tactics by January 18 and German General Hoffmann produced a map showing that the German armies would not withdraw from the territories of Poland, Lithuania, or Belarus and refused further negotiation on the creation of these "buffer states."²⁴⁶ Trotsky requested and received time to bring this proposal to the capital for instructions. One of the reasons why the Germans opened negotiations with Ukraine was due to the difficulty dealing with Trotsky.

The Germans met with the Ukrainian National Republic delegates for nearly a month, and were having greater success at attaining a peace treaty. The Ukrainian delegates argued for expanded territory including the Ukrainian regions of Galicia and Volynia under Habsburg control. While unsuccessful at receiving the territories into the UNR, secret protocols assured the delegates that the Ukrainian regions would become a special crownland in the Habsburg Empire.²⁴⁷ Unlike Trotsky though, the UNR delegates were not as ideologically driven due to their circumstances. The delegates were aware that Bolshevik armies were closing in on Kyiv

²⁴⁴ Edward H Carr. *The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923 Volume 3*. (London: Penguin Books, 1966), 42.

²⁴⁵ Carr, 42-3.

²⁴⁶ Carr, 42-3.

²⁴⁷ Doroshenko, 620.

and they needed a deal to end the war and gain the support of the Central Powers. The Ukrainian military's previous show of support in July 1917 seemed to be for naught as most of the 300,000 soldiers melted away back to their farms or were effectively disenchanted with the Central Rada due to continuous Bolshevik propaganda. By January 1918, Minister of War, Symon Petliura, could only effectively muster 15,000 soldiers for his Free Cossack brigades and was also relying on Galician volunteers under the command of Yevhen Konovalts.²⁴⁸ The Red Guard had already gained control of many eastern and southern provinces through a rail war including Kharkiv, Poltava, Katerynoslav, and Odesa in the month long fight and it was uncertain whether the Central Rada could hold out much longer near Kyiv.

The negotiations at Brest-Litovsk and the Bolshevik invasion were instrumental for the Central Rada to take the final step towards Ukrainian independence. Hrushevsky and the Central Rada leadership knew that the treaty could only happen with sovereign states. As well, they knew that the Bolsheviks would not agree to Ukrainian autonomy or shared governmental powers in a Russian federation since the Bolsheviks had recently dispersed the popularly elected Assembly for expressing anti-Bolshevik sentiments.²⁴⁹ So on January 25, 1918²⁵⁰, the Central Rada released its Fourth Universal which declared Ukraine "a free, subject to no one, sovereign state of the Ukrainian People" in order to finalize the treaty.²⁵¹ As the Central Rada debated and finally decided on the course of independence, the Ukrainian military defenses around Kyiv were failing as the Red Guard continued its rail war attack along the Kursk-Kyiv rail line. The

²⁴⁸ Yekelchik, 71. Doroshenko, 616.

²⁴⁹ Kenez, 32-3.

²⁵⁰ When released, it was backdated to January 22 when the negotiations began. Many Ukrainians celebrated January 22 as Independence Day until 1991 when Ukraine again gained independence.

²⁵¹ Fourth Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada. Quoted in *The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution*. Ed. Taras Hunczak. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 392.

military attempted a hasty and desperate defense to fend off the Red Guard at the town of Kruty but the inexperienced student army failed and left Kyiv open for assault on January 30.²⁵²

The Central Rada in Kyiv attempted to pass as much legislation as possible before the Bolsheviks reached the capital. Commissions began to enact the land policies passed with the Third Universal and eliminated private land ownership. The Rada passed laws for an eight-hour workday, public control of industries, and curtailed capital punishment.²⁵³ Along with these laws, the Central Rada established symbols of a Ukrainian state: a new currency (the Hryvnia), a coat of arms for the republic (the trident of the Kyivian Rus' King Volodymyr), Ukrainian citizenship, and created laws guarding national minorities.²⁵⁴ All of the legislative activities were an attempt to reach out to the peasants and workers in order to fortify the concept of a Ukrainian state in the popular consciousness. The attempts though seemed too late as politicians and workers sympathetic to the Bolsheviks staged rebellions in several Ukrainian cities and challenged the Rada's authority internally. Members of the Social Revolutionary Party conspired to overthrow the Rada, establish a soviet form of government, and make peace with the Bolsheviks.²⁵⁵ Meanwhile in the rest of Kyiv, workers seized the arsenal, began to fight soldiers supporting the Ukrainian government in the streets, and reported to the Red Guard that the city had fallen.²⁵⁶ The army responded quickly but within a week the Red Guard was within range to bombard Kyiv.

The Bolshevik twelve-day bombardment of Kyiv threw the entire city into chaos. Fires broke out from the bombs and striking water plant workers only exacerbated the problems with a

²⁵² Doroshenko, 616. Reshetar, 114.

²⁵³ Hrushevsky, 537. Reshetar, 115.

²⁵⁴ Doroshenko, 617.

²⁵⁵ Reshetar, 113.

²⁵⁶ Yekelchuk, 72.

lack of water.²⁵⁷ Where the city did not have fires, it was in darkness from striking power plant workers. The Bolshevik bombardment also ended up ruining Hrushevsky's apartment building and destroying his personal library (as well as many documents he accumulated for the ninth volume of *Istoria Ukrainy-Rus'* and for a work about Bohdan Khmelnytskyi separating myth from fact).²⁵⁸ Many Central Rada and cabinet members fled to avoid the chaos in the city, and those that stayed found themselves in such danger that they needed pistols to defend themselves.²⁵⁹ The entire UNR government finally fled on February 7 to Zhitomir.

Only when the success of the UNR delegates at Brest-Litovsk seemed imminent did Trotsky demand recognition of the Ukrainian Soviet delegates as the legitimate Ukrainian government. The Central Powers ignored Trotsky's demand, recognized Ukraine as a separate sovereign nation, and signed a peace treaty in order to support their dwindling food supplies with Ukrainian grain on February 9, 1918.²⁶⁰ The Central Powers were not aware of the UNR's dire circumstances. Within ten hours of the recognition and signing the peace treaty, word of Kyiv falling to the Bolshevik army reached Brest-Litovsk. When the Bolsheviks captured Kyiv, they captured and executed between 2,000-5,000 "class enemies" and alienated many of the people they were "liberating."²⁶¹ The Brest-Litovsk agreement would have forced the Russian government to recognize Ukraine as a fully independent state and to discontinue their war with them. Trotsky and the Russian delegates continued to debate the German delegates until finally

²⁵⁷ Reshetar, 114.

²⁵⁸ Reshetar, 114. Frank E Sysyn. "Grappling with the Hero: Hrushevskyi Confronts Khmelnytskyi," in *Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: Essays in Honor of Roman Szporluk*. Eds. Zvi Gitelman, Lubomyr Hajda, John-Paul Himka, Roman Solchanyk. 589-609. (Harvard University, 2000), 597.

²⁵⁹ Reshetar, 114-5.

²⁶⁰ Kann, 479. Macartney, 825.

²⁶¹ Yekelchuk, 73.

Trotsky announced “Russia, while refusing to sign an annexationist peace, for her part declares the state of war with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria at an end.”²⁶² After this statement, Trotsky and the Russian delegates left believing that without fighting there was no war.

While German civilian diplomats were willing to accept the unorthodox peace agreement, the German military interpreted it differently and announced the Russian withdrawal from negotiations as an end to the armistice. On February 18, the German army accepted the Central Rada’s appeal for help and resumed hostilities with the Bolsheviks.²⁶³ The Germans quickly adapted to the Bolshevik rail war tactics and overwhelmed them with an army of 450,000 soldiers.²⁶⁴ The German forces took control of all rail lines in Ukraine. The resumed war forced the Bolsheviks to come back to Brest-Litovsk, agree to the German demands, and recognize an independent Ukraine. By the end of April 1918, Bolshevik forces were retreating and the Central Powers’ armies had liberated all of the Ukrainian lands that the Central Rada claimed to represent and even added Crimea to their territory.

In March 1918 with the German armies’ aid, the Central Rada reentered Kyiv to govern again. The German liberation of Ukraine was not without problems. It was not an altruistic exercise; they expected Ukraine to provide the agreed upon grain and wanted it promptly. The Rada’s socialistic tendencies tended to worry the German Central Command so the Germans countermanded many of the Rada’s decisions.²⁶⁵ The Germans demanded farmers to sow all arable land and attempted to force the land committees to supply large estates with labor. The

²⁶² Carr, 48-9.

²⁶³ Doroshenko, 621.

²⁶⁴ Yekelchik,, 73.

²⁶⁵ Doroshenko, 621.

Ukrainian people grew upset because of the German export expectations.²⁶⁶ The Central Rada could have attempted to strengthen their tenuous link to the peasants but failed but instead both large landowners and peasant farmers became hostile to the Rada. President Mykhailo Hrushevsky attempted to portray himself above the political fray but by this time though, he could not maintain a unified government. German leadership began to describe Hrushevsky as “a frightened old man all of a tremble; his old bones are supposed to give the Rada a noble patina worthy of so august an assembly. [He] Holds on for all he is worth to the German Command.”²⁶⁷ When the Central Rada still could not present an effective form of government to provide German food supplies, the Germans replaced the government on April 29, 1918 with one they believed could be more effective under Pavlo Skoropadsky.

Hrushevsky’s role in the Ukrainian National Republic became very limited after the Germans removed his government from Kyiv. He was a figurehead for a brief time but began to quarrel with the leaders of the UNR Directory, Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Symon Petliura, who subsequently completely displaced him from the government in 1919. Since he no longer had a role in government, Hrushevsky left Ukraine to continue his historical studies in exile in Vienna. Hrushevsky only returned to Ukraine in 1924 after the Soviets consolidated their control. The early stages of Soviet control in Ukraine were more conciliatory to national issues allowing scholars to promote the history and print in Ukrainian as a stepping-stone to further socialization. This policy of allowing nationalities to develop in their own language was known as *korenizatsiya* (taking root). According to Soviet ideology, *korenizatsiya* was necessary to instruct various nationalities how to become good socialists and allow *rastsvet* (a flowering) to

²⁶⁶ Doroshenko, 621-2. Reshetar, 120.

²⁶⁷ Allen, 290.

occur. Essentially the ideology was an attempt at fostering nationalist sentiment and then reshaping that national sentiment into Soviet patriotism. Even allowing the name Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was a begrudging recognition of the national issue. During this period of relative openness, Hrushevsky established and led the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences effectively recreating his previous role when the tsarist government was in place.

The Soviet policies towards nationalities did not remain conciliatory for very long. Hrushevsky was one of many Ukrainians caught in Stalin's first purges. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the Soviet policy of *korenizatsiya* ended with denunciations of it claiming that it fostered "cultural counter-revolution," "national enmity," and "isolated Ukrainian workers from the positive influence of Russian culture."²⁶⁸ By the end of the 1930s, Soviet leaders turned away from the prior *korenizatsiya* language policies and demanded that Ukrainian students be fluent in Russian.²⁶⁹ With the policy change, secret police began to search for underground Ukrainian nationalists. The secret police believed they had discovered an underground organization called the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine in July 1929 and arrested 5,000 "members."²⁷⁰ The next spring Soviet authorities conducted show trials to deal with the underground nationalists. During the show trials, the secret police "discovered" Hrushevsky's role as a leading nationalist conspirator and arrested him. Unlike many of the other nationalists who were shot or deported to Siberia, Hrushevsky escaped with a somewhat more lenient sentence of being deported to Moscow in 1931 and ultimately to the Caucasus where he died in

²⁶⁸ Reid, 120.

²⁶⁹ Paul Robert Magocsi. *The Roots of Ukrainian Nationalism: Galicia as Ukraine's Piedmont*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 62.

²⁷⁰ Reid, 120. The Union for the Liberation of Ukraine was believed to be a fictitious group created for the purpose of removing challenges to Soviet authority.

1934 under somewhat mysterious circumstances.²⁷¹ Those around Hrushevsky were also arrested as collaborators. In contrast, Hrushevsky's right hand man in the Academy, Fedir Savchenko, was arrested and disappeared without a trace. Savchenko's name was virtually erased from history, his ultimate fate unknown, and most of his works were confiscated to be destroyed.²⁷² The Soviet government attempted to give Hrushevsky the same fate as Savchenko. When he was exiled in 1931, anyone purchasing a work by Hrushevsky could be arrested and ultimately by 1937 no work by Hrushevsky was even published in the Soviet Union.²⁷³ Even though Hrushevsky's works survived destruction in the Soviet Union, leaders censored Hrushevsky's history as "bourgeois nationalism" or "Ukrainian fascism" and it remained taboo even to discuss his works until Perestroika while most of the West gave it short shrift due to it being a history from a small power nation.²⁷⁴

Interpretation and Problems with Hrushevsky

There are two ways that Hrushevsky was important to a Ukrainian state, one as revolutionary and politician, and the other as a historian. Hrushevsky was a better revolutionary figurehead and organizer than a politician. His organizational abilities helped educate a segment of society of nationalists and helped Ukrainians view the Galicians under Habsburg rule as part of the larger group under Russian rule. However these organizational abilities did not work when Hrushevsky led the Central Rada. The Rada remained politically divided over its course of

²⁷¹ Reid, 120.

²⁷² Omeljan Pritsak. Introduction to *Zaborona Ukrainstva 1876 r.* Savchenko, Fedir. Ed. The Harvard Committee on Ukrainian Studies. (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1970), ix.

²⁷³ Roman Szporluk. *Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union.* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2000), 209.

²⁷⁴ Basarab, 129. Szporluk, 209-10.

action whether to declare independence or remain an autonomous region of Russia until the Bolsheviks were invading. This political indecision ultimately placed Ukraine in a crisis that had no alternative except to accept German and Austrian intervention or fall to the Bolsheviks. The criticism Hrushevsky leveled at Khmelnytskyi over foreign entanglements in Volume 9 of his history may have in fact been self-criticism over the entangling relationship Hrushevsky himself made with Germany during that crisis and that ultimately forced him from power. The Germans would only become more unpopular in Ukraine due to their demands under Hrushevsky's usurper and successor. This anti-German attitude tainted Hrushevsky since he invited their support and was one of the reasons why Vynnychenko and Petliura did not restore Hrushevsky to power when they overthrew Skoropadsky.

Hrushevsky's greatest importance, however, remained his historical influence. His *History of the Ukrainy-Rus'* provided one of the most important arguments against both the Polish and the Russian traditional interpretations. He delinked the aristocratic view that the nobility comprised the nation and established Ukrainian nationalism firmly in populism where the common people comprised the nation.²⁷⁵ Thus even though the Ukrainian lands lost their nobility to Poland and Russia the people still had a history, language, culture, and right to a state.²⁷⁶ These ideas were dangerous and a reason why the Soviets attempted to ban and destroy his works. It was only late during Perestroika in 1989 that both Western and Ukrainian scholars began to reinvestigate his works and he became a "rehabilitated" figure. His histories provided a readymade nationalist interpretation of Ukrainian history as the Soviet Union started to break apart and provided a new teleology; instead of the eventual victory of communism and withering

²⁷⁵ Sugar, 52-3.

²⁷⁶ Plokhy, 90.

away of the state, it provided for the success of a nation-state after its centuries of struggle. With Hrushevsky's rehabilitation, one can see the collective act of forgetting French scholar Ernest Renan discussed for a nation. Hrushevsky became figure for the new Ukrainian state to emulate. To show the "continuity" with the Ukrainian National Republic, the new Ukrainian state adopted the same flag, the trident, national anthem, and currency. As an ultimate show of continuity and legitimacy for the new government, the last president of the UNR in exile resigned his symbols of authority to the Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk in 1992.

SYMON PETLIURA AND AN ATTEMPT AT AN INDEPENDENT UKRAINE

With the removal of Hrushevsky as President of Ukraine on April 29, 1918, a bloodless coup established General Pavlo Skoropadsky as leader of Ukraine. The Germans conspired with General Pavlo Skoropadsky to overthrow the Central Rada and establish a new government that would be more conservative and reliable. For a month before the coup, German military leaders grew concerned with the Rada's socialistic tendencies and saw it as an ineffective regime.²⁷⁷ In the middle of April 1918, the Germans met with General Skoropadsky, who was one of the most outspoken critics of the Rada's radicalism, and agreed to remain neutral in a coup so long as a Skoropadsky regime fulfilled the secret clauses of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. On April 29, industrialists, large landowners, bankers, and former tsarist ministers met as the League of Landowners to protest the Central Rada's attacks on private property, and the 6,000 gathered members proclaimed Skoropadsky Hetman in order to stop the socialist experimentation.²⁷⁸ After the proclamation of the assembly, Skoropadsky told the audience to gather in St. Sophia's Square to have the Kyiv Metropolitan anoint his position (an act not done in 154 years).²⁷⁹ With the acclamation and anointment, Skoropadsky revived the semi-monarchical nature of the Hetmanate in Ukraine.

The Central Rada was still in session as Skoropadsky was becoming Hetman and possibly could have maintained its position had it acted in time. Hrushevsky received reports that there was a potential coup but he also received German intelligence that informed him the

²⁷⁷ Doroshenko, 621-23

²⁷⁸ V.A Savchenko. *Pavlo Skoropadskyi: Ostanyi Hetman Ukrainy*. (Kharkiv: Folio, 2008), 136-7

²⁷⁹ Savchenko, 138. Reshetar, 132. The Metropolitan supported Skoropadsky because the Rada distributed church lands

Central Rada “had no reason to be concerned.”²⁸⁰ The German involvement in the coup has remained debated and problematic since it happened. While the Germans claimed they had no participation in the coup, they were quick to capitalize on the coup by recognizing the new Skoropadsky government. Former tsarist Russian soldiers supported Skoropadsky’s ascension and seized key ministries under his orders while the Rada’s troops offered minimal resistance.²⁸¹ The Central Rada was caught unaware while Skoropadsky’s soldiers disarmed those soldiers that supported the Rada and dissolved the Central Rada. In his first decrees, Skoropadsky nullified all of the Central Rada’s policies and established himself as the sole dictatorial authority in a provisional government and commander-in-chief of the army and navy until elections would create a parliament.²⁸² The elections would never occur and the Ukrainian National Republic became the Ukrainian State (or frequently referred to as the Hetmanate or the Second Hetmanate to claim a continuance with the Cossack Hetmanate).

Skoropadsky did attempt to reach out to many Ukrainian nationalists from the Central Rada though and offered them cabinet positions in order to foster Ukrainian unity. Almost unanimously all members of the Central Rada rejected Skoropadsky’s offer and refused to participate with his government. Only one leading nationalist and socialist from the Central Rada accepted a position in Skoropadsky’s cabinet as Foreign Minister, Dmytro Doroshenko,²⁸³ and only after he broke with his party to do so. Doroshenko attempted to convince other nationalists to participate in order to further the Ukrainian national cause but was unsuccessful.

²⁸⁰ Savchenko, 138-9.

²⁸¹ Savchenko, 139-40.

²⁸² Taras Hunczak. “The Ukraine Under Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi” in *The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution*. Ed. Taras Hunczak. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 68-9.

²⁸³ Doroshenko was one of the few apologists for Skoropadsky’s government, whereas most historians of the era were vehemently opposed to him.

The nationalist and socialist boycott of his government would prove to be a problem through his entire reign. Without their support, he was forced to rely more heavily on the Germans and derived what he could get of his internal political support from landowners, capitalists, and former bureaucrats of the tsarist regime. He responded to that internal support by establishing a special propertied class for them, and called them “Cossacks.”²⁸⁴

Many of the Ukrainian nationalists attacked Skoropadsky for his reliance on “foreigners” to keep him in power. He hired many former tsarist bureaucrats due to their expertise and based recruitment on skills rather than language qualifications.²⁸⁵ These bureaucrats proved to be effective administrators due to their experience but because of his dependence on Russian bureaucrats, nationalists decried Skoropadsky as not being nationalist enough while many of the socialists attacked him for being reactionary and for essentially restoring the monarchy. Former members of the Central Rada called him a Russified sell-out of his people, and cited his ancestor Ivan Skoropadsky’s refusal to ally with Ivan Mazepa as a reason why he could not be trusted.²⁸⁶ He even responded to the charge when he requested that the Kyiv Metropolitan lift the anathema against Ivan Mazepa to make him a more acceptable hero to the Ukrainian public. However, during the Hetmanate of Pavlo Skoropadsky though, there were some of the most effective nationalizing attempts. He enacted a law codifying Ukrainian citizenship based on loyalty to the state, established Ukrainian universities, ordered the creation of Ukrainian history, culture, and literature departments in all previously established universities, founded over 150 schools, created funds to educate professors and teachers and to print Ukrainian textbooks.²⁸⁷

²⁸⁴ Yekelchuk, 74.

²⁸⁵ Reshetar, 158-9, 167-8.

²⁸⁶ Reshetar, 145-6.

²⁸⁷ Reshetar, 163-7.

Skoropadsky organized Ukrainian cultural edifices including: the Ukrainian State Theater, the State Archives, a National Gallery and Museum, and attempted to organize the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (and even offered former Rada President Hrushevsky a leading role in it) but was forced out of office before it was actualized.²⁸⁸

As Skoropadsky attempted to Ukrainianize the state and his cabinet, he could not appease either side. His attempts did not satisfy the nationalists (who failed in their own similar attempts under the Central Rada, but yet saw the measures as not going far enough), and enraged many of the anti-Bolshevik Russians who found the concept of Ukrainian citizenship and loyalty repugnant.²⁸⁹ Some of the anti-Bolshevik Russians, who fled south to Ukraine to continue their fight, thought the Ukrainianization was a “farce” or just “paying lip service” to the “*Mazepintsi*” while others were so enraged they left for the Don and Kuban regions to support other anti-Bolshevik “White Russian” forces under General Kornilov and then Anton Denikin.²⁹⁰ Nationalists on the other hand remained in Ukraine but planned and worked to displace Skoropadsky’s regime with a popular republic. In July 1918, Skoropadsky gave orders to watch and if necessary arrest the leaders of the UNR. The orders placed Hrushevsky under house arrest. The Hetman’s Minister of the Interior accused former Prime Minister, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, of conspiracy to overthrow the Hetman and arrested him on July 12 (they released him shortly after on lack of evidence but by September Vynnychenko was active in protests against the Hetman).²⁹¹ Former Minister of War Symon Petliura had become leader of the All-Ukrainian Union of Zemstvos, organized it as a center of opposition to Skoropadsky, protested

²⁸⁸ Doroshenko, 631. Reshetar, 165-6. Many of the cultural edifices that Skoropadsky organized are still in existence today.

²⁸⁹ Reshetar, 164, 167.

²⁹⁰ Reshetar, 159, 167.

²⁹¹ Savchenko, 226. Reshetar, 160-2.

the increased grain requisitions, the increased censorship and limited civil liberties, and called for a return to local self-government.²⁹² The government accused him of being an instigator of anti-German actions and arrested him on July 27. Petliura attained release only because of Doroshenko's advocacy and upon the condition that he "refrain from conspiratorial activity."²⁹³

Nationalists were not the only groups attacking Skoropadsky's regime. Peasants and laborers blamed Skoropadsky for the excessive German crop demands, the brutal German reprisals when the demands were not met, and for not solving the land issues. Landowners used the occupying German forces to punish peasants who stole or damaged lands in the prior year. Since the German forces at first prohibited the Ukrainian State from establishing a large internal military (there were German fears that those troops would be used against the Germans), the German troops became the law of the land.²⁹⁴ To impede any organized resistance of intellectuals, workers, or peasants, the German army instituted new censorships, prohibited public gatherings, and attempted to halt the increasing number of agricultural and railroad strikes.²⁹⁵ The German efforts to control Ukraine only created greater animosity to the occupiers and that animosity was reflected in the increasing terroristic activities. Peasants began to attack Germans posted to protect rail stations, and bridges.²⁹⁶ In early June Kyiv munitions stores exploded killing two hundred and injuring many more; a similar munitions explosion followed in late July in Odesa. Eight days after the explosion in Kyiv, fire swept through the city leaving several thousand homeless.²⁹⁷ When the culprits of these terrorist acts were caught, frequently

²⁹² Reshetar, 153.

²⁹³ Savchenko, 227. Reshetar, 161.

²⁹⁴ Hunczak, "The Ukraine Under Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi," 71-2.

²⁹⁵ Hunczak, "The Ukraine Under Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi," 71.

²⁹⁶ Allen, 298.

²⁹⁷ Reshetar, 170-1.

the soldiers would shoot them on the spot, occasionally in the event that the culprits were arrested instead, they faced German military tribunals.²⁹⁸ Terrorist activities culminated with the assassination of German Field Marshal von Eichhorn on July 30.

While the Ukrainian domestic situation remained unstable and problematic, the Hetman's Foreign Minister, Doroshenko, secured many diplomatic victories. Doroshenko was able to retain German support after the assassination of Eichhorn and effectively persuaded German leaders to consent to the creation of an independent Ukrainian army to help maintain order.²⁹⁹ He also was able to maintain friendly relations with Austria-Hungary even though there were some minor frictions over the independent crown land for Galicia and the belief that Wilhelm von Habsburg wanted to be king of Ukraine. Doroshenko finally attained an armistice with the Soviet Union on June 12, 1918, and received recognition that Ukraine was an independent state (three months after the Soviets signed and agreed to do so at the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk).³⁰⁰ The negotiations with the Bolsheviks broke down by October though and an uneasy situation remained. One of the greatest successes was Doroshenko's reopening diplomatic relations with Western Europe. After the Ukrainian National Republic signed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the Entente broke off relations because they saw the UNR as supporting the continuation of the war. As defeat of the Central Powers became more apparent and imminent, Doroshenko was convinced that Entente recognition and support was necessary for a continued independent

²⁹⁸ Allen, 298.

²⁹⁹ Doroshenko, 629, 634. Unfortunately due to poor popular support for the government, recruiting volunteers for that army was very slow, but by the end of the Hetmanate there were around 60,000 Ukrainian soldiers.

³⁰⁰ Doroshenko, 629. Lenin feared that the Soviet stall tactics with Ukraine might irritate the Germans, but persisted in withholding a formal peace treaty since they foresaw the Central Powers' eventual defeat.

Ukraine.³⁰¹ As World War I was winding down, Doroshenko travelled to Switzerland to meet French representatives, seeking Entente support and occupation forces until a strong Ukrainian military could form.³⁰² French and English representatives would not make a commitment until the pro-German elements left the cabinet and Ukraine ended its alliance with Germany.

The Hetmanate attempted to balance the Entente's demands while maintaining Ukrainian security from the potential Bolshevik threat. Many members of Skoropadsky's cabinet did not agree with Doroshenko's nationalistic cause for an independent Ukraine. Most of the cabinet were still heavily pro-Russian and saw Ukraine only as a base of operations for the continued war against the Bolsheviks.³⁰³ This internal strife led to a cabinet crisis in mid-October 1918. In an attempt to appease the Entente and receive their support, Skoropadsky made a clean sweep of his entire cabinet in late October and reached out to Ukrainian nationalists like Vynnychenko to no avail. Eventually Skoropadsky believed that the only way to attain Entente support was through working with the "White Russians" and promoted a policy change in mid-November where the Ukrainian State would return to a non-Bolshevik Russian Federation.³⁰⁴ He issued an edict calling on all citizens and Cossacks of Ukraine to support a Russian Federation.

The edict did not have the effect that Skoropadsky hoped; the Entente continued to delay support while Ukrainian nationalist leaders galvanized a resistance movement to Skoropadsky's regime using the edict as "proof" of his Russian sympathies. The movement began slowly in October 1918 with Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Symon Petliura uniting with three others (who

³⁰¹ Hunczak, "The Ukraine Under Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi," 77.

³⁰² Reshetar, 195-6.

³⁰³ Hunczak, "The Ukraine Under Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi," 77.

³⁰⁴ Reshetar, 197. Hunczak, "The Ukraine Under Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi," 78-9.

were virtually political non-entities) to form the Directory.³⁰⁵ The leaders knew that it was essential to win over the Ukrainian army so Petliura petitioned the army's aid in Bila Tserkva. Petliura won influence with the Galician Sich Sharpshooters and the newly formed regiment, the Zaporizhian Riflemen, who were displeased with Skoropadsky's policy calling for a return to Russia. The Directory excluded Hrushevsky from the organization because there was widespread anti-German sentiment and they felt that Hrushevsky damaged his reputation accepting German aid against the Bolsheviks and felt that including him would hurt the movement.³⁰⁶ After the edict, thousands of peasants went to Bila Tserkva wanting to join the Directory's struggle against Skoropadsky.

The Directory did not succeed in overthrowing the Hetman until the German forces were withdrawing after signing the armistice on the Western Front. The Directory's armies marched on Kyiv to overthrow Skoropadsky in late November and called on the German forces not to fight to support his failed regime. For nearly a month, there was a standoff between the Germans and the Directory's forces near Kyiv. The Directory used this time to consolidate their influence on other areas south of Kyiv until Skoropadsky's power was limited to just the area around Kyiv. By mid-December, the German soldiers were already war weary and wished to return home so the Directory offered them safe passage home and took Kyiv relatively peacefully. Skoropadsky fled with the retreating German armies and renounced the position of Hetman, but he remained an outspoken supporter of Ukrainian independence until his death during an Allied bombing raid in Germany in 1945.

³⁰⁵ The five leaders named it the Directory as an homage to the French Directory of 1795-1799.

³⁰⁶ Reshetar, 218.

As central Ukraine was changing regimes, a new Ukrainian government also was forming in the west. The Ukrainians in the Habsburg Empire were still *kaisertreu* (loyal to the emperor) to the end of the empire but could see that the Habsburg rule in Galicia was soon going to end. On October 16, 1918, Emperor Karl issued a manifesto transforming the Habsburg Empire into a federation. Polish leaders in Galicia were already moving steadily towards independence and unification with Congress Poland (which the Central Powers established in 1916) which caused some concern for Ukrainians.³⁰⁷ Galician Poles were considering themselves already citizens of a Polish state comprised of the “historical borders” prior to the 1772 partitions. In order to preempt the Polish independence, Galician Ukrainian leaders declared the formation of a Western Ukrainian Republic on October 19 and seized key government buildings in Lviv by November 1. This seizure of government buildings was an attempt to portray a peaceful relinquishment of power to the Ukrainians. The Ukrainians were among the last nationalities to see an independence movement from the Habsburgs, and only did so reluctantly as the Poles were declaring Galicia part of their state. While their involvement in World War I was ending, they quickly entered a new war with Poland in November 1918.³⁰⁸

The people of Lviv awoke November 1, 1918 to the sight of Ukrainian flags hanging from government buildings and announcements that Lviv was the capital of a new Ukrainian state encompassing Eastern Galicia and Bukovina.³⁰⁹ Other towns throughout Eastern Galicia had similar occurrences with most of the Ukrainian population greeting the news enthusiastically. The overwhelmingly Polish population of Lviv though did not receive the news as favorably. Largely the Polish population, once the shock had dissipated, turned to active

³⁰⁷ Wandycz, 365. Kann, 507.

³⁰⁸ Macartney, 832.

³⁰⁹ Subtelny, 367-8.

resistance against the new government and bitter house-to-house fighting broke out between the Poles and the Ukrainians.³¹⁰ The more organized Polish forces captured key railroad centers that could have supported the Ukrainian forces in Lviv. In the south, Romanians seized most of the Bukovina territory while the Hungarians retained control over its Ukrainian population the Western Republic attempted to claim. By November 5, the Galician Ukrainians began to appeal to Skoropadsky for military aid primarily against the Poles. Skoropadsky was afraid to offend the Polish leaders but allowed the Galician Sich Sharpshooters to cross the border covertly to support the Galicians while disavowing any knowledge of their actions.³¹¹ Most of the Galician Sharpshooters remained in central Ukraine though in order to support the Directory's overthrow of Skropadsky. Without the Sharpshooters' support, the Western Ukrainian Republic lost control of Lviv on November 22 and were forced to flee to Stanyslaviv (modern Ivano-Frankivsk).

In Stanyslaviv the Western Ukrainian Republic made its greatest efforts to form a functioning government. Even though the Western Ukrainian leaders faced military difficulties and defeats, they pressed forward to form a capable civil administration and even held elections for a legislative body.³¹² The republic guaranteed full voting rights to all citizens and granted minority rights. Like the UNR in the east, the Western Republic faced issues concerning peasants' rights to land. Unlike the UNR though, the Western Republic was able to maintain stability and its authority while appropriating land for the peasantry.³¹³ Also unlike the UNR, the Western Republic quickly realized the effectiveness and necessity of a fully trained regular army for its defense and was able to muster 100,000 troops.

³¹⁰ Subtelny, 368.

³¹¹ Subtelny, 368. Reshetar, 214.

³¹² Subtelny, 368.

³¹³ Subtelny, 368-9.

The Directory of the UNR stood in stark contrast to the organizational ability of the Western Republic. From the beginning of the revolt against Skoropadsky, there were political and personal animosities between Vynnychenko and Petliura that divided the orientation of the future government and confused loyalties. After Vynnychenko and Petliura entered Kyiv on December 14, Vynnychenko became President of the Directory while Petliura became Otaman (a Cossack term for general) of the military. The more idealistic Vynnychenko believed that uniting with the Bolsheviks was essential to overthrow Skoropadsky and further a socialist revolution, whereas the more pragmatic Petliura maintained that Ukraine needed Western support to retain independence.³¹⁴ Vynnychenko's idealism versus Petliura's pragmatism also influenced their stances on the use of Skoropadsky's regular armies (perhaps the best and most important legacy of the former Hetman's rule). Vynnychenko believed that rhetoric and people's councils would influence popular support, establish peace, and make regular armies unnecessary.³¹⁵ Petliura knew that more than just rhetoric would be needed for Ukrainian independence. The Galician Sich Sharpshooters were unsure initially which leader to support but eventually threw their support behind Petliura.

The first two months of the Directory's existence showed the greatest promise of success. The Directory had most of the Ukrainian armies under their direction (about 127,000 soldiers by the end of December) and influenced a large portion of the Ukrainian lands.³¹⁶ On December 1,

³¹⁴ Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak. "The Directory of the Ukrainian National Republic" in *The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution*. Ed. Taras Hunczak. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 89. Taras Hunczak. *Symon Petliura and the Jews a Reappraisal*. New York: Ukrainian Historical Association, 2008), 22-3.

³¹⁵ Bohachevsky-Chomiak, 91-3.

³¹⁶ Yaroslav Bilinsky. "The Communist Take-over of the Ukraine" in *The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution*. Ed. Taras Hunczak. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 116.

the Directory showed this great promise and declared its support for the Western Republic announcing its ultimate intention of unifying all Ukrainians under one state. They reestablished several of the laws that the Central Rada passed to protect laborers and peasants and attempted to settle the peasant land issues finally (which already caused problems for the two prior governments' relations to the peasants).³¹⁷ By January 22, 1919, the leaders of the Directory were able to meet with the Galician leaders and declare a unified Ukrainian state (this declaration was largely more symbolic than actual though). The Western Republic was to become a province but retained a great amount of autonomy. The new western province still had its own capital, administrative structures, laws, armies, and even maintained separate foreign ministers and diplomatic missions.³¹⁸

There was another group that worked to overthrow Skoropadsky and unify the Ukrainian territory as German soldiers were withdrawing from Ukraine, the Bolsheviks. The German forces effectively removed most of the Bolshevik activities in Ukraine but the Bolsheviks were able to maintain propaganda activities in most major cities and even in Kyiv during the final months of Skoropadsky's rule even though their numbers had dwindled to nearly 4300 members.³¹⁹ The Bolsheviks saw an opportunity to return to Ukraine as the Germans were leaving. While the Directory was working to establish itself in the Ukrainian lands, Bolshevik military leaders pressed Lenin to agree to another invasion before the Directory consolidated its power.³²⁰ Lenin consented to the operation to support a provisional Soviet Ukrainian government and allowed Antonov-Ovseenko to command the Red Army. The Red Army

³¹⁷ Reshetar, 216. Bilinsky, 116.

³¹⁸ Yekelchuk, 77. Subtelny, 362. Reshetar, 230.

³¹⁹ Subtelny, 364. Magocsi, 527.

³²⁰ Magocsi, 527. Subtelny, 364. Bilinsky, 117.

progressed from Kursk in mid-December and quickly reestablished Soviet authority in Ukraine. On January 3, 1919 the Red Army conquered Kharkiv and reestablished a Ukrainian Soviet government there. The Red Army caused the Directory to flee to Vynnytsia by February 2 and retook Kyiv on February 5.

This Red Army occupation of Kyiv lasted longer than the first occupation in 1918 and forced the Directory into becoming a mobile government. For about seven months, the Directory was operating from various cities and from constantly moving railcars in Western Ukraine in order to avoid Red Army or Polish capture.³²¹ The Directory cabinet blamed Vynnychenko for failing to make peace with the Bolsheviks, his policies attempting to “out Bolshevik” the Bolsheviks, and for the loss of Kyiv. He resigned from the presidency on February 10 and Petliura became president.³²² The frequent movement of the governing officials to avoid capture created an emergency atmosphere that limited Petliura’s state-building attempts. Without a stable government and governing location for the Directory, the generals gained greater authority to act on their own accord without much concern of Directory oversight or repercussions. The generals received Directory funding to supply and inculcate Ukrainian nationalism in their soldiers but since the Directory lacked effective oversight, those funds frequently were wasted or were stolen by the generals for their own private aggrandizement.³²³ During 1919 the generals alternated their allegiance to the Directory, the Bolsheviks, or the White Russian forces as another way to expand personal gains and became virtual warlords.³²⁴

³²¹ Doroshenko, 639, 644-5. Bohachevsky-Chomiak, 96. Reshetar, 267-8. Hunczak, *Symon Petliura*, 30.

³²² Bohachevsky-Chomiak, 93-4.

³²³ Reshetar, 252-3.

³²⁴ Bilinsky, 117. Yekelchuk, 80.

The generals nominally under the Directory and Petliura's control saw and took full advantage of opportunities in the chaos of multiple invading armies. The Bolsheviks were not the only foreign force that entered Ukrainian territory during the withdrawal of German forces in December 1918. The French led a 60,000 strong Entente force to occupy Odesa in order to support anti-Bolshevik Russians who wanted to flee west. As well the anti-Bolshevik White Russian forces under Anton Denikin entered the eastern Ukrainian lands to fight the Bolsheviks in the area around the Donets River. There was still popular simmering resentment among the peasants over the previous German and Bolshevik invasions that allowed two generals to lead peasant uprisings effectively against the French, then the Directory, then the Bolsheviks, then the White Russians, and finally against the Bolsheviks again. Generals Matvii Hryhoriiv (Grigoriev) and Nestor Makhno led strong peasant rebellions 40,000 strong against all invaders while their allegiances altered quickly.

In this extremely chaotic environment, the generals nominally under the Directory and Petliura's control as well as under Bolshevik and White control further alienated the populace from supporting any government with their actions. Through much of the Ukrainian lands, rule existed only by bayonet. Many of the general-warlords began raiding and terrorizing villages in their regions and plundering anything they desired. The general-warlords looted money, jewelry, and even the women of villages and cities.³²⁵ The general-warlords tapped into much of the popular peasant resentment and directed their attacks primarily against the Jewish populations. A few reasons why the general-warlords targeted Jewish populations was due to the history of Jewish exploitation as stewards of noble lands and taverns, the general Jewish pro-Russian or

³²⁵ Hunczak, *Symon Petliura*, 26-7.

Bolshevik leanings, and widespread belief that Jews used Christian blood in matzoth.³²⁶ While these excuses may have remained in the *zeitgeist*, there is also a more contemporary explanation. During the German occupation, many peasants believed that the Jewish populations profited inordinately from their products forcibly removed to feed Germany.³²⁷ So similar to the peasant anti-Jewish activities during the Khmelnytskyi uprising, the peasants transferred their animosity from the group that was truly exploiting them to a group that was closer and perceived to be exploiting them. In this environment of anti-Semitism, the Jewish population faced around 927 pogroms and “excesses” between February and September 1919 that claimed between 30,000 and 60,000 people and was the largest modern attack on the Jews before Hitler.³²⁸

Whether pogroms or “excess” attacks came from the White Russians, Bolsheviks, the general-warlords, or the Directory forces, a number of writings have laid most of the blame on Symon Petliura, the UNR, and armies under their control. These authors implicate the Directory of being culpable for a plurality of around 40% of the total pogroms in the Ukrainian lands.³²⁹ Those authors do not deny that other forces operating in Ukraine also committed pogroms but have found them less culpable. A former UNR minister under Petliura, Arnold Margolin, disputed the claim that other forces were less culpable. Margolin claimed that open pogroms existed in Kyiv during Denikin’s army occupation yet the Jewish population still largely supported him more than the Directory. Margolin also claimed that Denikin had “more

³²⁶ Reshetar, 252-3. Yekelchik, 80-1. While the Christian blood-matzoth myth has existed since the Medieval Ages, it gained new traction near the end of the Tsarist regime when *The Elders of the Protocol of Zion* was published. The work spread west with fleeing White Russians and became a tool describing Bolshevism as a new Jewish plot.

³²⁷ Elias Heifetz. *The Slaughter of the Jews in the Ukraine 1919*. (New York: T. Seltzer, 1921), 7-8.

³²⁸ Magocsi, 537. Yekelchik, 81. Subtelny, 363. An “excess” was a less violent attack where no life was lost.

³²⁹ Yekelchik, 81.

numerous and terrible” pogroms than the Directory but due to Russian propaganda Petliura’s were better known in the West.³³⁰ The authors that defend Petliura generally insist that it was a lack of control over the forces rather than a coordinated, ordered attack.³³¹ Reports leaked from Margolin and others around Petliura that Petliura was “depressed by the pogroms and implored his men not to commit them with tears in his eyes but found it difficult to persuade his Haidamaky to moderation.”³³² Petliura even wrote articles to his army leaders reminding them that “the Jewish population has helped the UNR during the war [and that] Bolsheviks have not executed only Ukrainians but also Jews during the struggle.”³³³ The largest anti-Jewish attacks arose only after the Directory lost Kyiv, which led some scholars to argue that the soldiers were demoralized and that the attacks occurred only after the soldiers were drunk and often against superiors’ orders.³³⁴

The Directory attempted to respond to the pogroms and convince the Jewish population that they should continue to trust and work with the UNR against the Bolsheviks. In April 1919 the Directory issued a declaration stating:

The Ukrainian Government will fight with all its power against violations of public order, will strike the brigands and pogrom instigators with the severest punishment and expose them publicly. Above all the Government will not tolerate any pogroms against the Jewish population in the Ukraine, and will employ every available means for the purpose of combating these abject criminals.³³⁵

³³⁰ A.D Margolin. *The Jews of Eastern Europe*. (New York: T. Seltzer, 1926), 130-1.

³³¹ Reshetar, 252-5, Bilinsky, 120. Subtelny, 363.

³³² Allen, 310.

³³³ Symon Petliura. *Statti*. Ed. M N Moskalenko. (Kyiv: Dnypro, 1993), 184-5.

³³⁴ Subtelny, 363. Yekelchuk, 81.

³³⁵ Hunczak, *Symon Petliura*, 33.

The Directory court-martialed and ultimately executed General Semesenko for the pogrom he instituted in Proskuriv.³³⁶ Likewise junior officers and Cossack found guilty of pogrom activities were also executed.³³⁷ The declaration and threat of punishment did little to discourage further pogroms though since Directory forces usually were too preoccupied fighting the Bolsheviks to enforce declarations. In August Petliura renewed his call for soldiers to respect Jewish property and lives as they had suffered against the Bolsheviks as well.³³⁸ Along with the declarations to punish offenders and respect Jewish lives, the Directory appropriated over 11 million *Hryven* for pogrom victims in July and doubled the amount in October.³³⁹ Petliura also called on Jewish settlements to organize their own self-defense units that would be included as part of the armies.³⁴⁰ Through these measures, Petliura was able to attract prominent Jewish citizens and founded a Ministry of Jewish Affairs.³⁴¹ Jewish settlements in western Ukraine began to rally to the Ukrainian cause. It is ironic that only after Jewish leaders began to trust Petliura and the UNR that the West began to receive reports of his pogroms and anti-Semitic activity.

Symon Petliura realized quickly that Ukraine needed foreign support for any hope of maintaining an independent state. While Vynnychenko was still president, Petliura believed the best hope of support came from the Entente and the French occupying Odesa. The Entente was strongly anti-Bolshevik and Petliura believed that this shared ideology would garner Entente

³³⁶ Hunczak, *Symon Petliura*, 32. Subtelny, 364. The Directory could not (or would not) institute this punishment until over a year later though so its effect was minimal. That there is such a gap in declaration and enforcement has led scholars like Saul Friedman to claim that it was a publicity campaign for foreign support and too little and too late to help.

³³⁷ Hunczak, *Symon Petliura*, 36-7.

³³⁸ Magocsi, 538.

³³⁹ Reshetar, 255.

³⁴⁰ Hunczak, *Symon Petliura*, 27. Subtelny, 364.

³⁴¹ Reshetar, 256. Subtelny, 364. Hunczak, *Symon Petliura*, 31-4.

support for Ukraine.³⁴² From the beginning though, the French had a strained relationship with the Directory because they thought Vynnychenko and the UNR's socialist leadership were as radical as the Bolsheviks, especially after the UNR sanctioned the peasant land seizures. After Vynnychenko resigned, Petliura had renewed hopes that a new non-socialist cabinet and president would encourage Entente to support an independent Ukraine. During the peace talks in Versailles, Ukrainian diplomats continued petitioning for recognition of independence and aid from the West. The Entente though continued to place demands on the Directory in order to receive support, including the resignation of Petliura and subordinating the Directory's forces to General Denikin.³⁴³

The issue of subordinating the Ukrainian forces to Denikin was one of the initial cracks in the relationship between the Western Ukrainian Republic and the Ukrainian National Republic. The leaders of the Western Republic believed that support for Denikin would encourage the Entente to send aid to Ukraine similar to the aid that the Entente was already providing Poland. The Western Republic believed that Entente aid along with Denikin's support would be enough to expel Poland from Galicia (which the Ukrainian and Galician forces lost in July 1919). The UNR was more hesitant to support since Denikin's stated goals were to restore the Russian Empire. In the Ukrainian locales where Denikin's army operated, he was hostile to the Ukrainian national aspirations; he closed Ukrainian schools, forbade the use of the Ukrainian language, and would not recognize the Directory government. Denikin influenced Western thoughts about Ukraine by calling the Directory a "separatist movement worse than the

³⁴² Bohachevsky-Chomiak, 94-5.

³⁴³ Bohachevsky-Chomiak, 95, 98.

Bolshevik threat” that was a “result of Austrian and German propaganda to disrupt Russia.”³⁴⁴

Because of the White Russian influence, the Entente was not ready to “Balkanize” the former Russian Empire, especially for a “bandit” leading a German created state.³⁴⁵

On August 30 1919, the Galician Ukrainian forces liberated Kyiv from the Bolsheviks but were forced to surrender the city shortly after to Denikin’s forces. The Directory attempted to work with Denikin but to no avail. After months of negotiations, the Directory leadership realized that the Entente did not wish to support an independent Ukraine even if their forces were subordinate to Denikin. The Directory finally declared war on the White Russians on September 24, 1919 and believed that they could mobilize the peasantry against him to regain Kyiv.³⁴⁶ The attempt did not mobilize the peasants and only created another front in the conflict. The armies were exhausted because of the continuous fighting, the lack of food and supplies and a typhoid epidemic broke out which nearly eliminated them. This exhausted environment did nothing to foster continued cooperation between the Western Republic and the UNR. The relationship crack became more pronounced between the UNR and Western Republic when the Galician army unilaterally negotiated a separate alliance with Denikin on November 15, 1919 because they believed they could win Entente support or at least leash the Polish armies if they supported the Entente backed general.³⁴⁷ The Directory considered this negotiation as a “stab in the back” for the republic. An even larger crisis arose though when peasants attacked the Directory’s

³⁴⁴ Doroshenko, 645. Reshetar, 287.

³⁴⁵ Doroshenko, 643. Bohachevsky-Chomiak, 94.

³⁴⁶ Bohachevsky-Chomiak, 99.

³⁴⁷ Bilinsky, 119-20.

railcars and stole the state treasury.³⁴⁸ Facing these crises Petliura fled to Warsaw and began negotiations with Poland.

The Directory negotiations with Poland corresponded with a renewed resurgence of Bolshevik forces attacking Ukraine. Through November and December 1919, the Bolsheviks virtually eliminated Denikin's forces and pushed him back to southern Russia. The Bolsheviks had learned from their prior failures though, and returned to Ukraine insisting on the right of national minorities to govern themselves and instituted new policies to assuage the nationalistic fervor and the peasant demands for land. Lenin and the Bolshevik Party realized that a formal independent Ukraine entering a Soviet federation would diminish the friction. Military Commissar Trotsky demonstrated this policy when he explicitly told the Red Army "your task is not to conquer the Ukraine but to liberate it."³⁴⁹ The Ukrainian Soviet Republic allowed official education in the Ukrainian language and attempted to build up Ukrainian culture. Rather than reinstitute the state farms and communes that angered so many, there was a massive distribution of land to the peasantry finally fulfilling that wish.³⁵⁰

The Red Army was also successful against the Directory and pushed most of Petliura's forces into Poland. In December 1919 the Bolsheviks took Kyiv for the third time in less than two years. While in Poland, Petliura came to an agreement in April 1920 with Marshal Josef Pilsudski where the UNR recognized Polish control over Galicia in return for Polish recognition of the UNR and aid against the Bolsheviks. The Western Republic leaders, who had already fled to Vienna and had formed a government in exile there, denounced Petliura's alliance with the oppressive Poles as a betrayal, and the "unity" that existed between the UNR and the Western

³⁴⁸ Yekelchuk, 82. Reshetar, 298.

³⁴⁹ Mawdsley, 248.

³⁵⁰ Yekelchuk, 83.

Republic ended with this agreement. Not only the Galician Ukrainians accused him of selling out his people; Mykhailo Hrushevsky and Volodymyr Vynnychenko added their voices in protest to the treaty.³⁵¹

In exchange for Petliura's recognition of Polish control in Galicia, which had been a fact for months, the Polish leadership agreed to enter the war against the Bolsheviks and that they would not conclude any agreements that were opposed to Ukrainian interests. In April 1920 the Polish forces successfully drove the Bolsheviks from the western Ukrainian lands. The Poles liberated Kyiv on May 7, 1920 with limited aid from the Directory's forces and issued declarations that the Polish forces would remain only until the regular government assumed authority.³⁵² Petliura believed that the peasantry would rally to the Directory's defense but was unaware how exhausted the people were of war and that they still retained ill will against the Poles. The peasantry largely did not rally to the Directory's defense. The political parties also largely did not rally to the Directory's cause. Petliura organized a cabinet in Kyiv on May 25 and could only get support from two parties. The cabinet did not meet long in Kyiv though; with word that the Bolsheviks launched a counterattack, the cabinet fled on June 8 and Kyiv fell once again to the Bolshevik armies on June 11.³⁵³

The Bolsheviks did not halt at the Polish border during their successful repulsion of the Polish and Ukrainian forces. Within two months the Red Army was on the outskirts of Warsaw. Galician Sich Sharpshooters suggested to Petliura that the forces could withdraw from fighting and attempt to hide in the Carpathian Mountains until the Bolsheviks were threatening Western

³⁵¹ Reshetar, 306.

³⁵² Reshetar, 308.

³⁵³ Yekelchuk, 83. Reshetar, 309-10. It was the 16th and final time Kyiv changed hands in the war. Mawdsley, 252.

Europe, then when the anti-Bolshevik campaign began the Ukrainians could support the Western Powers and gain recognition.³⁵⁴ Petliura dismissed the idea because he did not wish to betray his ally Pilsudski. Ultimately though Pilsudski betrayed the alliance. After Pilsudski was able to counter the Red Army's advance on Warsaw and push the Bolsheviks back to Minsk, they opened negotiations for an armistice in September and finalized it in October. The armistice eventually became the Treaty of Riga in March 1921, and it formalized the division of the Ukrainian lands between Poland and the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.³⁵⁵ The Treaty of Riga essentially accepted the status quo for borders between Poland and the "independent" Soviet Republics of Ukraine and Belarus, which would remain fixed until 1939. It recognized Polish control over Galicia and Volynia without Ukrainian consent. The treaty effectively symbolized Polish abandonment of support for Petliura.

When Poland signed a peace treaty with the Soviet Union, it essentially nullified Petliura's hope of liberating Ukraine. Petliura continued to fight as the treaty was being negotiated but was forced to retreat in the face of the larger Red Army. Limited Ukrainian forces continued to launch guerilla attacks against Bolshevik forces but that mostly amounted to a minor nuisance. The Soviets finally eliminated the guerilla forces in 1924. Petliura lived in exile in Tarnow, Poland for a short time and maintained contacts with Pilsudski. Under Petliura's orders Directory officers set up a Ukrainian National Republic archive in a Tarnow hotel using government documents they were able to escape with. Petliura faced threats to his life from the Bolsheviks, and began to feel pressure from laws limiting Ukrainian activities while living in Poland, so he ultimately left to live in Paris, France in 1924. There he continued to

³⁵⁴ Reshetar, 311.

³⁵⁵ Mawdsley, 256.

petition Western governments for support. It was in Paris that Sholem Schwarzbard assassinated Symon Petliura in the middle of the street in broad daylight on May 25, 1926, and claimed that it was retaliation for the pogroms. Schwarzbard's attorney claimed that Schwarzbard was seeking vengeance for 14 family members killed during the pogroms for which he held Petliura responsible. There are still debates over Schwarzbard's motives as Schwarzbard had ties to the Red Brigades in Odesa during the revolution and had links to a Soviet secret agent. This information though did not come out during his trial since the lawyer was able to make it a trial of Petliura during his time as president of the UNR.³⁵⁶ Another argument that it may have been a Soviet inspired assassination is since also in May 1926, Marshal Pilsudski launched a coup d'état and became dictator in Poland and there were concerns that there may be a renewed Polish-Ukrainian fight against Soviet Ukraine.³⁵⁷ The trial acquitted Schwarzbard of any wrongdoing and further damaged Petliura's name in Western eyes equating him with the pogroms but elevated him a martyr for many Ukrainian nationalists.

Ukrainian nationalists set up another Petliura Library in Paris with UNR government documents in an attempt to galvanize nationalistic sentiment. The library had a tangled history though as ultimately both National Socialist Germany and the Soviet Union attempted to seize the materials from the library and use it for their own ideological purposes. The National Socialists declared the library "under their protection" shortly after the invasion of France in 1940 and confiscated over 100,000 books.³⁵⁸ There were claims that Adolf Hitler was a "student

³⁵⁶ Patricia Kennedy Grimsted. "The Odyssey of the Petliura Library and the Records of the Ukrainian National Republic during World War II" in *Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: Essays in Honor of Roman Szporluk*. Eds. Zvi Gitelman, Lubomyr Hajda, John-Paul Himka, Roman Solchanyk. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 183-4.

³⁵⁷ Grimsted, 184.

³⁵⁸ Grimsted, 186.

of the first great nationalist, Petliura” and that the symbol of Petliura would be used to lure Ukrainian nationalists into anti-Semitic activities for the possibility of Ukrainian independence.³⁵⁹ The National Socialists also used Petliura’s name during anti-Jewish atrocities during the occupation in Lviv.³⁶⁰ The Soviets also attempted to control the sensitive documents during the UNR’s brief rule of Ukraine. Many of the earlier documents had already ended up in Soviet archives and were closely watched. After World War II documents the National Socialists were not able to evacuate also ended up in various Soviet archives.³⁶¹ The Soviets seized these documents to find Nazi collaborators, anti-Soviet or “bourgeois-nationalist” elements, and other enemies of the USSR³⁶² as well as cover up the struggle for Ukrainian independence in order to maintain the fraternal union of republics.

Interpretations and Problems with Petliura

Ultimately there are three critiques that need to be overcome in order to accept Symon Petliura as a Ukrainian hero. The first and most damning critique against him is the Directory’s actions during the pogroms in 1919. Since he was Head Otaman of the Ukrainian forces and President during most of the anti-Jewish activities, several authors have blamed him almost exclusively for the actions. Even his former partner in the Directory, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, accused Petliura of being an anti-Semite and that he encouraged the pogroms. The National Socialist use of his name to encourage Ukrainian nationalists to commit anti-Jewish activities also does not do credence to his name. If Petliura was an anti-Semite, why did he take such

³⁵⁹ Grimsted, 186, 189.

³⁶⁰ Grimsted, 189.

³⁶¹ Grimsted, 189, 196-7.

³⁶² Grimsted, 197.

pains to encourage Jewish participation in the UNR and to punish pogrom perpetrators? In the multiple cities the Directory fled to, there were no pogroms, but instead there were outreaches to the Jewish populations, the establishment of Jewish protection units, and large capital outlays to pogrom victims. Petliura attempted to do all he could to protect Jewish populations during the chaos of 1919 but with his limited resources overstretched and each general a virtual dictator unto himself law and order could not be reestablished in time. One can see the UNR's executions as an extreme attempt to restore law and order on a chaotic land.

The second critique that needs to be overcome is his "apparent lack of patriotism" acknowledging Polish control over Galicia in late 1919 and early 1920. Western Ukrainian nationalists and Hetman supporters have accused Petliura of being a traitor to Ukraine because of those negotiations relinquishing Galicia. From the beginning until his death, Petliura believed that nationalists needed to focus on the possible and that central Ukraine needed to serve as the basis of statehood. In August 1919, Petliura believed that Kyiv was more important to the nationalist movement than liberating Odesa (Kyiv's symbolic status is one of the reasons why it traded hands so many times during the war). Petliura could have realized that the war against the Bolsheviks was effectively over in late 1919 when the Bolsheviks reconquered Ukraine but he believed that with possibly one local ally (even if it meant trading Ukrainian territory) he could gain Entente recognition, support, and win an independent Ukraine. If Petliura would have received Entente support like Poland did, it is possible that the UNR would have retained control of Ukraine and effectively nationalized the population as a buffer for Bolshevism. That he did not receive support led him into the treaty with Poland for a last attempt.

The third critique authors have leveled at him was his "lack of leadership" in organizing a Ukrainian state. The population of Ukraine at this time was not prepared for nationalistic or

socialist activities. Petliura had a more capable cabinet with a clearer goal of independence than Hrushevsky did but also faced greater challenges from external invasions and uncontrolled armies internally. The popular cry was to own more land rather than socializing it, and assuaging the peasantry's concerns proved difficult for all the groups that operated in Ukraine. The peasants would organize in their regions to fight invading armies but saw no reason to fight armies distant from their villages since the peasants did not recognize the other villages as part of their larger community. Only the overwhelming size of the Red Army finally controlled the chaos in Ukraine. While Doroshenko cites a lack of "ruthlessness" in his leadership that is necessary during a "revolutionary situation,"³⁶³ Petliura remained committed to a democratic and independent Ukraine and did almost everything in his power to fight for it even though the odds were greatly stacked against him and support was elusive.

³⁶³ Doroshenko, 650.

STEPAN BANDERA AND THE OUN

By the end of 1923, Poland had completed its control over the western regions of Ukraine in Galicia and Volhynia. In order to influence popular foreign opinion and appease the League of Nations, Poland made claims of respecting Ukrainian national rights and even claimed to proffer autonomy in eastern Galicia. Through these claims along with fatigue over the “Galicia problem,” the League of Nations recognized Poland’s governance of the region rather than just military occupation. With control established over the region they called Eastern Little Poland (Galicia), Polish politicians like Stanislaw and Wladyslaw Grabski passed laws attempting to assimilate the 5-7 million Ukrainian population into Polish nationals within the next generation. The *Lex Grabski* of 1924 transformed Ukrainian language schools into functionally Polish language ones in Galicia.³⁶⁴ Along with Polish being the de facto language of primary school, the *Lex Grabski* also excluded Ukrainians from Lviv University on the premise that a separate but equal Ukrainian institution would be founded in the future but which never was.³⁶⁵ The Polish views on the Ukrainian provinces influenced their assimilation policies. Poland believed Galicia was a hotbed of Ukrainian nationalistic agitation while they viewed Volhynia as loyal since it had no previous episodes of Ukrainian national movements.³⁶⁶ Polish settlers began to colonize regions of Volhynia attempting to civilize the under-populated region while keeping the Ukrainians there pacified and isolated from the Galician agitators. The Polish assimilation policy underwent some modifications once Josef Pilsudski overthrew the state and became leader

³⁶⁴ Snyder, 144.

³⁶⁵ Subtelny, 429.

³⁶⁶ Snyder, 145-6.

in 1926. Rather than national assimilation, Pilsudski instituted state assimilation where loyalty to the state instead of nationality of the individual became the focus.

There were essentially three ways that Ukrainians reacted to the Polish assimilation policies. Some groups acquiesced to Polish rule since they believed that they could continue culturally and economically as a minority group in Poland. Other Ukrainians advocated for expanded political and social action within the Polish state in order to receive schools, churches, halt Polish settlements and eventually gain autonomy. The Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance (*Ukrainske Natsionalne Demokratychnе Obiednannia*) or UNDO was the most organized party working in the Polish state. They opposed Polish settlements in Volhynia, attempted to found private Ukrainian schools to counter assimilation, promoted the use of Ukrainian for state purposes, and defended the rights of Uniate and Orthodox churches.³⁶⁷ The third way that Ukrainians reacted was based on the belief that Polish rule was illegitimate and the only way to counter it was through armed paramilitary insurrection to destabilize the state and establish an independent Ukrainian state. Many of these paramilitary groups, like the Ukrainian Military Organization, originated from disbanded military units that served during the Ukrainian-Polish war. They became disgruntled that Ukrainians, like the UNDO members, joined the politics of the state since that lent legitimacy to the Polish rule and compromised Ukrainian demands for statehood.

Due to the political and military failings of successive weak Ukrainian governments and continued feelings of persecution and assimilation in the 1920s, many Ukrainian nationalists had a rightward quasi-fascist bend in their political beliefs. The interaction and reaction between Ukrainian nationalists and the Polish officials produced a “spiral of radicalization” in the state

³⁶⁷ Magocsi, 635-7

over perceptions of betrayal and persecution.³⁶⁸ These beliefs sprang from not only former military personnel but also from disgruntled educated Ukrainians. Groups of students from underground Ukrainian universities organized in the Union of Ukrainian Nationalistic Youth against Polish “occupiers” and communists.³⁶⁹ The Polish discrimination policies promoted radical anti-Polish attitudes in these groups.³⁷⁰ Even such leaders as former Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky and Ukrainian nationalist fighter Vasyl Vyshyvanyi³⁷¹ began to endorse more integral nationalist ideals. These groups blamed democracy and socialist leanings for the weakness and failings of the Ukrainian states, especially after the Ukrainian National Republic traded the Western Ukrainian National Republic to Poland for military aid and ultimately fell to Bolshevik Russia. Author and journalist, Dmytro Dontsov, provided them with a foundation of their ideology with his call for a “will to nation” through constant nationalist struggle.³⁷² The success of western fascist ideologies inspired Dontsov and these groups into believing that a similar integral nationalist ideology could be useful in Eastern Europe.

Integral nationalism was already starting to spread into Eastern Europe in the extreme nationalist parties of Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia in the 1920s. While the other nations may have influenced Ukraine, much of the ideology seems much more homegrown due

³⁶⁸ Jasna Dragovic-Soso. *Saviours of the Nation: Serbia's Intellectual Opposition and the Revival of Nationalism*. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), 257.

³⁶⁹ John A Armstrong. *Ukrainian Nationalism 2nd ed.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 21.

³⁷⁰ Subtelny, 439. Joseph Rothschild. *East Central Europe between the Two World Wars*. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974), 43.

³⁷¹ He is better known as Wilhelm von Habsburg. He fought for an autonomous western Ukrainian state and eventually for a monarchial Ukraine possibly led by him. He fought for an independent Ukraine until his arrest for spying and death in a Soviet prison in 1948.

³⁷² Dmytro Dontsov. “Nationalism” In *Towards an Intellectual History of Ukraine: An Anthology of Ukrainian Thought from 1710 to 1995*. Eds. Ralph Lindheim and George S N Luckyj. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 262-5.

to the disillusionment with failures of their own governments, the failures of Western support, along with belief that only radical actions could change the status quo. Historian John Armstrong describes a number of characteristics that define what integral nationalism is, especially as it pertains to Ukraine:

1) a belief in the nation as the supreme value 2) mystical ideas of solidarity of all individuals making up a nation [e.g.] biological characteristics or irreversible common historical development 3) subordination of rational thought to “intuitively correct” emotions 4) expression of the “national will” through a charismatic leader and an elite of nationalist enthusiasts organized in a single party 5) glorification of action, war, and violence as an expression of the superior biological vitality of the nation.³⁷³

The Ukrainian Military Organization provided military and nationalist political ideology training for young Ukrainians.³⁷⁴ The training encouraged nationalists to undertake several terrorist-like actions against Polish officials including an attempted assassination of Josef Pilsudski in 1921 and a sabotage campaign through 1922. When the Allies recognized Polish control over Galicia in 1923, many Ukrainians doubted the efficacy of continuing armed resistance causing many veteran members to leave the organization.³⁷⁵ The Ukrainian Military Organization continued its tactics unmodified, though and ended up alienating many. Ultimately, it was forced to flee abroad from a Polish police crackdown.

There was a change in popular opinion of the extreme nationalist actions, though, after the 1926 assassination of Symon Petliura and acquittal of his assassin. It galvanized even greater ideological support for paramilitary Ukrainian nationalists. While in Vienna, Austria, the Ukrainian Military Organization, the Union of Ukrainian Nationalistic Youth and other student groups joined in a council to strategize and unite their tactics. The council eventually coalesced

³⁷³ Armstrong, 20.

³⁷⁴ David R Marples. *Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine*. (Budapest: CEU Press, 2007), 93-4.

³⁷⁵ Subtelny, 443.

into one organization the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in 1929 with Yevhen Konovalts as its head. Konovalts rose as a colonel in the Ukrainian National Army Sich Sharpshooters and distinguished himself as the leader of the brigade that entered Kyiv first and liberated it from the Bolsheviks. He became the head of the Ukrainian Military Organization after the Sharpshooters disbanded and began synchronizing paramilitary attacks against Poland including the attempt on Marshal Pilsudski's life. Through most of the 1920s and into the 1930s, Konovalts was able to find support and receive money from a fund in Weimar Germany for stateless nations sponsored by other nationalists.³⁷⁶ He became the glorified leader for the struggle of Ukrainian independence and was an important rallying figure for nationalists largely because of his distinguished past and his organizational abilities founding the OUN.

Along with glorifying their leader, Ukrainian nationalists made the concept of nation a central object of their ideology and believed that glorifying it came at all costs even. During the formation of the OUN in Vienna in 1929, the group created a "Ten Commandments" or Decalogue for their cause. True nationalists were expected to memorize and act according to all ten of the Commandments.³⁷⁷ One can see after reading the Commandments that individuals are

³⁷⁶ Marples, 91.

³⁷⁷ The Commandments are worth quoting in full: 1. You will attain a Ukrainian State, or die in battle for it. 2. You will not permit anyone to defame the glory or honor of Your Nation. 3. Remember the Great Days of our struggles. 4. Be proud that you are the inheritor of the struggle for the glory of Volodymyr's Trident. 5. Avenge the death of the Great Knights. 6. Do not speak about matters with whom you can, but only with whom you must. 7. Do not hesitate to carry out the [greatest crime] most dangerous deeds, should this be demanded by the good of the Cause. 8. Treat the enemies of Your Nation with hatred and ruthlessness. 9. Neither pleading, nor threats, nor torture, nor death shall compel You to betray a secret. 10. Aspire to expand the power, wealth, and glory of the Ukrainian State [even by means of enslaving foreigners]. Quoted in Tadeusz Piotrowski. Ed. *Genocide and Rescue in Wolyn*. (McFarlan and Company Inc. Publishers, London, 2000), 176. and Yuri Boshyk, Roman Waschuk, Andriy Wynnnyckyj Eds. *Ukraine During World War II: History and its Aftermath*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,

a means to an end for the national cause and that struggle is manifestly valued. While Dontsov was the inspiration for the OUN's ideology, he did not fully condone the actions of the group and never officially joined the group. With the formation of the OUN, it is apparent that nationalistic zeal began to spread from primarily intellectuals as it was during the UNR, the Hetmanate, and the Directory to a wider and less educated group due to feelings of oppression.

Through the 1930s the OUN continued their wave of violence in an attempt to destabilize the Polish government. The OUN successfully assassinated a Soviet diplomatic consul in Lviv to protest the famine in Soviet Ukraine in 1932-33.³⁷⁸ In 1934 a Lviv University student continued the history of student violence. Following the "tradition" inaugurated in 1907 when a Ukrainian nationalist student murdered a Polish professor, Stepan Bandera and a group of students in the OUN organized a plot to assassinate a Polish minister. The student OUN group assassinated the Polish Minister of the Interior, Bronislaw Pieracki and was the highest official successfully targeted. After the assassination, Bandera and his group of students attempted to go into hiding but were arrested, convicted, and jailed in 1935. The court initially sentenced Bandera to death but revised the sentence to life in prison.³⁷⁹ While number of prominent Ukrainians and the UNDO denounced the OUN's tactics, the OUN began to gain some support when Polish soldiers began arbitrary beatings and arrests in villages of suspected nationalists.³⁸⁰ The support spread wide enough that the Polish government established a detention center, *Bereza Kartuzka*, to contain the nationalists. The excessive Polish responses further encouraged

1986) 173-4. The parts in parentheses are alterations from different editions. It is unknown which version was official first.

³⁷⁸ Magocsi, 640.

³⁷⁹ Volodymyr Serhiychuk Ed. *Stepan Bandera u dokumentakh radianskykh orhaniv derzhavnoyi bezpeky (1939-1959) Tom I.* (Kyiv: PP Serhiychuk M.I., 2009), 88-9.

³⁸⁰ Emil Revyuk. *Polish Atrocities in Ukraine.* (Jersey City, NJ: Svoboda Press, 1931), 9-10. Doroshenko, 722-3.

peasants to support extreme groups on the right and left, the OUN or communist elements, and provoked greater violent outbreaks. Bandera would remain in a Polish prison until his 1939 release during the Soviet Red Army invasion.

Many Ukrainian nationalist groups fled to Germany during the Polish persecutions and Germany was frequently the choice for Ukrainian nationalists through the 1920s and 1930s as a safe haven. Skoropadsky and the Hetmanate supporters along with leaders of the UNR in exile and OUN maintained close contact with the German government. The aggrieved settlement terms of World War I found both Germans and Ukrainians sympathetic partners to the other's plight.³⁸¹ Although neither the UNR officials nor the Hetmanate were in any position to further National Socialist goals, they believed the German government was dedicated to restoring an independent Ukraine.³⁸² The German intelligence service, the *Abwehr*, and its leader, Admiral Canaris, also maintained these contacts with the governments in exile as well as with the OUN. In the 1930s German policy changed towards Poland and the OUN contacts became an "ace in the hole." The *Abwehr* provided the OUN with training and arms that the OUN used to further their terrorist activities against Poland. The *Abwehr* used the Ukrainian nationalists to destabilize Poland in the late 1930s and maintained these contacts with a motive to possibility undermine Soviet forces and influence popular sentiment in a future conflict with the Soviet Union.³⁸³

The OUN attempted to capitalize on its relationship with Germany shortly after the German seizure of the Sudetenland and breakup of Czechoslovakia in late 1938 and early 1939 respectively. Czechoslovakia received the predominately Ukrainian population of Sub-

³⁸¹ Doroshenko, 720.

³⁸² Armstrong, 42.

³⁸³ Armstrong, 48. Snyder, 156-7.

Carpathian Ruthenia as part the peace settlements of 1919. In March 1939, once Slovakia proclaimed its independence from Czechoslovakia under German influence, the Ruthenian autonomous region was cut off from Prague. The OUN had been active in the region and advocated independence believing that the German government would recognize them as they recognized Slovakia. The Carpathian Sich Sharpshooters along with the OUN and the Regional Council declared an independent Republic of Carpatho-Ukraine in Khust on March 15, 1939.³⁸⁴ Germany publically supported Ukrainian nationalism in Carpatho-Ukraine and that inspired the Council leaders and OUN to believe that this small state could be the nucleus for a greater Ukrainian state.³⁸⁵ The next day though, Hungary declared war on the new state (with Hitler's consent) and quickly succeeded in capturing and arresting many officials while invading. The Sich Sharpshooters continued to fight in the mountains with OUN support but suffered major losses.³⁸⁶ This republic was perhaps one of the shortest-lived governments in world history as Hungary crushed the state by March 17. Ultimately, the nationalists active in the brief government fled to Germany and began to concentrate their activities on liberating Galicia. While the nationalists lost German support for Carpatho-Ukraine, they still maintained hope that Germany would upend the balance of post-Versailles Europe that would allow for the creation of an independent Ukraine.

The next hope for establishing an independent state came during World War II.

Ukrainian nationalists saw Poland fall in 1939 though not from their terrorist activities but in the beginning of a new world war. In September 1939 the Soviet Union joined with Nazi Germany

³⁸⁴ Norman Davies. *Vanished Kingdoms: The Rise and Fall of States and Nations*. (New York: Penguin Publishing, 2011), 625-7.

³⁸⁵ Doroshenko, 737.

³⁸⁶ Davies, 631. Doroshenko, 737.

in partitioning Poland. Shortly after the Soviet invasion of eastern Poland, the head of Soviet security, Lavrenti Beria, issued orders to all NKVD agents to control national archives, close down all radio transmitters and receivers, telegraph and telephone lines, post offices, and any other ways that people could organize a counter-revolution.³⁸⁷ Along with these orders Beria listed several nationalist political parties and groups to find and arrest with all due haste including the OUN. The OUN though still found ways to organize in several villages early during the Soviet invasion. Soviet authorities received warnings of OUN organized public demonstrations where people flew UNR flags, and sang national songs.³⁸⁸ In an attempt to counter the nationalistic feelings, the Soviet authorities placed a Ukrainian in charge of the Red Army, Marshal Tymoshenko, and portrayed themselves as liberators rather than conquerors. Under the guidance of the head of Soviet Ukraine, Nikita Khrushchev, Western Ukraine convened a People's Convention which voted to join Soviet Ukraine. With great pomp on November 1, 1939, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic accepted Western Ukraine into the republic "in order to unite Ukrainian people into one state and thus end the centuries-old division of the Ukrainian people."³⁸⁹

Initially Soviet governance seemed very beneficial to Western Ukrainian aspirations. There was a policy of "Ukrainianization," which encouraged the development of the Ukrainian language and brought artists, writers, and singers from Eastern Ukraine to encourage the arts in the west. Polish cultural institutions became targets. Formerly Polish bilingual schools and gymnasia became fully Ukrainian schools.³⁹⁰ This trend continued even into higher education as

³⁸⁷ Serhiychuk, 24.

³⁸⁸ Serhiychuk, 31.

³⁸⁹ Doroshenko, 742.

³⁹⁰ Magocsi, 663-4.

the Soviets finally gave the Galicians a Ukrainian university in Lviv and named it after Ivan Franko.³⁹¹ The Soviet leaders believed that “Ukrainianization” would help combat the “bourgeois-feudal Polish rule” and influence the population to support the Soviet government. However, along with these conspicuous policies, the Soviet security forces, the NKVD, began discreetly removing political and national leaders. Simmering resentment and animosity over prior Polish actions along with the new Soviet Ukrainianization policies helped win over many villagers and inspired them to collaborate with the Soviet authorities denouncing social elites and anyone suspected of harboring anti-Soviet attitudes. Starting in late 1939 the first wave of arrests of professors, journalists, clergy, intellectual and popular leaders began and was followed by two more waves arresting other anti-Soviets in April 1940 and June 1941.³⁹² The Soviets deported approximately half a million Ukrainians and another half a million Poles from Galicia and Volhynia to Siberian and Kazakhstani labor camps.³⁹³

Even though the OUN was able to organize small-scale symbols of resistance to the Soviets, the organization remained divided with internal squabbling after the assassination of Konovalts. In 1938 an NKVD agent, Pavel Sudoplatov, assassinated Konovalts with a package bomb in Rotterdam, Holland.³⁹⁴ There was not a clear line of succession but former Galician Sharpshooter Captain Andrii Melnyk assumed the leadership role. Members of the OUN generally supported his leadership in the beginning and supported him during the Rome Conference in 1939, but there was a division forming in the OUN. The division began largely over age differences in the group as younger members tended to advocate for more violent and

³⁹¹ Doroshenko, 743. Magocsi, 663.

³⁹² Magocsi, 663. Manning, 290.

³⁹³ Magocsi, 663-4.

³⁹⁴ Marples, 94-5. Sudoplatov is more well known for his active role in the assassination of Leon Trotsky in 1940.

revolutionary actions while the older members sought to moderate the group enough to encourage more Galician Ukrainians to join the OUN. While Konovalts was alive, he was able to reconcile the generation gap in the OUN, after his death though, the reconciliation fell to Melnyk and, generally, the youth were the largest group disenchanted with Melnyk's leadership.³⁹⁵ The younger members felt alienated from group decisions since the older members had earned ranks and respect during the Polish-Ukrainian War (which they could not receive), and due to his ties to the Greek Catholic Church since they believed that Melnyk held his religion as more important than a Ukrainian state.³⁹⁶

In an attempt to ameliorate the forming division, Melnyk made an effort to create a more revolutionary action branch of the OUN, so the youth could have a voice and participate. Melnyk asked Stepan Bandera, after his release from prison, to work together according to Bandera's talents in a revolutionary branch of the OUN.³⁹⁷ Melnyk did not know that before he asked Bandera, Bandera was already organizing a revolutionary group comprised of former nationalist inmates like himself that had been locked up in the Polish detention camp Bereza Kartuzka.³⁹⁸ Bandera declined Melnyk's offer, instead his actions show that he wanted the leadership of the whole OUN.³⁹⁹ The challenge to Andrii Melnyk's leadership finally came to a head in 1940. Bandera's organization began to spread out from the 16 former prison friends to the youth to a larger following of OUN members and undermined Melnyk's powerbase. In August 1940 the OUN divided into two separate groups that rarely even talked to each other. Andrii Melnyk led one group (OUN-M), while Stepan Bandera led the other (OUN-B). During

³⁹⁵ Armstrong, 41.

³⁹⁶ Armstrong, 41.

³⁹⁷ Serhiychuk, 92.

³⁹⁸ Serhiychuk, 89. Magocsi, 641.

³⁹⁹ Serhiychuk, 92

an OUN conference in Cracow in March 1941, the younger members ratified Bandera as the sole leader and solidified the division in the OUN.⁴⁰⁰ Rather than a division of ideology, largely the split was due to tactics since many members believed Bandera was a more dynamic and revolutionary leader than Melnyk.

Both sections of the OUN had groups that remained in the Soviet controlled areas and maintained underground resistance while continuing to negotiate with the German intelligence service, the *Abwehr*. German leadership was hesitant though to support either faction of the OUN for their nationalistic activities in Galicia due to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.⁴⁰¹ Internally, the Germans fostered Ukrainian collaboration similar to the Soviet method by exploiting animosities in order to disrupt any potential Polish resistance movements in the General Government lands. Unlike in the Soviet Union though, most of the Ukrainians collaborating with the Nazis were members of the OUN. Frequently the *Abwehr* believed that they could gain greater support from the Melnyk faction since they were more ardently German supporting and believed to be less revolutionary. However, Melnyk fell out of favor with the Nazi leadership, so the Bandera faction began to receive greater support. When Germany was beginning to prepare for their confrontation with the Soviet Union, the *Abwehr* started training and arming 600 members of the OUN-B to comprise two support units for the German army.⁴⁰² Named Roland and Nachtigall these Ukrainian support units were to be both a force for rallying the oppressed Ukrainian populace to and guides for the Germans.

The Bandera faction though started to view Roland and Nachtigall as a nascent Ukrainian army for the future nation they would form with German support. Through 1941 the Bandera

⁴⁰⁰ Armstrong, 62.

⁴⁰¹ Armstrong, 48.

⁴⁰² Armstrong, 74-5.

faction attempted to motivate the public with propaganda pieces. They tied their fight with the historical “struggles of Taras Shevchenko, the revolutionary course of Konovalts, the course of Khmelnytskyi and Petliura, for the glory and greatness of the Golden Trident.”⁴⁰³ When the Germans launched Operation Barbarossa on June 22, 1941, Ukrainian nationalist believed that their time for liberation and state building had begun. Many Ukrainians welcomed the German forces as liberators from the Soviet Union especially in Galicia.⁴⁰⁴ Only a few days after the war began, on June 30, 1941, Yaroslav Stetsko (a lieutenant representing Stepan Bandera since Bandera remained in German territory) declared an independent Ukrainian state in Lviv. The leaders in the Bandera faction believed that Germany would have no other option than to recognize the *fait accompli* state or they would lose the support of the Ukrainian populace.⁴⁰⁵ Shortly after this declaration though, Nazi officials ordered a rescission of the declaration and when the Banderites would not rescind it, the Germans arrested the leadership. Stepan Bandera and his lieutenant Yaroslav Stetsko spent most of World War II in a concentration camp near Berlin.

While the German leadership would not recognize an independent Ukrainian state, they continued to encourage Ukrainian collaboration. In fact, the Germans named one of their initial pogroms in Lviv “Operation Petliura” to rouse Ukrainian nationalist anger over the acquittal of his Jewish assailant and encourage their participation.⁴⁰⁶ The Germans also granted Ukrainians nominal authority in Galicia through a Central Committee while they also continued to

⁴⁰³ Serhiychuk, 87. The trident was the symbol of Kyivian Rus’ King Volodymyr the Great.

⁴⁰⁴ Subtelny, 461.

⁴⁰⁵ Armstrong, 80-82

⁴⁰⁶ Reid, 153.

encourage Polish collaboration with administrations in Volhynia.⁴⁰⁷ The German attempt to play faction off faction also shows with their policies with the OUN. After drawing the German ire over declaring an independent state, the Bandera faction fell from German favor and the Melnyk faction rose once more. So that the Roland and Nachtigall support units (full of Bandera faction nationalists) could not undertake similar actions, the Germans sent one unit to secure the Romanian border, and sent the other to fight Soviet partisans and maintain order in Belarus. Within a year, the Germans would disband both units, arrest most of the officers and send them to concentration camps along with many other OUN-B members. The Melnyk faction appreciated the newfound German support, especially as remaining members of the Bandera faction began targeting Melnykites with terrorism and assassination. The Germans helped virtually wipe out most of the Bandera faction in order to support the Melnyk faction.⁴⁰⁸ The Germans though did not realize that the Melnyk faction was planning a similar tactic of declaring an independent state once their expedition group reached Kyiv. As OUN-M groups moved east independent of the German armies, they began to organize local political governments and attempted to gain local support. Both groups of the OUN were surprised though at the “lack of national feeling” and disappointed when the populations largely did not rally to the OUN cause.⁴⁰⁹ The greatest sources of support for both OUN factions in Eastern Ukraine were generally Soviet educated rural and urban intelligentsia who frequently had positions in local government.⁴¹⁰ OUN-M members organized a city council in Kyiv and believed that it could become the beginning of an independent state. However, even the Kyiv city council was too

⁴⁰⁷ Snyder, 157.

⁴⁰⁸ The Germans eliminated perhaps as high as 80% of the OUN-B members. Snyder, 164.

⁴⁰⁹ Kate Brown. *A Biography of No Place: From Ethnic Borderland to Soviet Heartland*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 214.

⁴¹⁰ Brown, 215.

much for the Germans, because the German officials began to arrest and execute hundreds of OUN-M leaders and members, when they learned of the OUN-M's ultimate motives with the city council.

Ukrainian support for the Nazi "liberators" began to change as Ukrainians learned of the German racial policies. Ukrainian nationalists held out hope longer than the general public and cooperated and collaborated with the Nazi regime's persecution of Jews to gain Nazi support against the Poles until they discovered the Nazi views on Slavs were virtually identical. The Germans not only viewed Jews as subhuman but also considered Slavs as *Untermenschen* that would become slaves for the German master race. Under the governance of Erich Koch, the Germans began to exploit Ukraine as a colony. They diminished food shipments to the cities to drive people into the countryside, lowered peasant income, forced workers to work from dawn to dusk, and met any resistance to their rule with corporal punishment and brutal reprisals.⁴¹¹ Largely though, two Nazi policies were the main cause of Ukrainian resistance. The Nazis retained the much-despised Soviet collective farms to ensure Ukrainian agricultural production and cheap labor. Since the peasants were unable to attain land, many began to view the Nazi regime as a continuation of the Soviet. The second policy that influenced resistance was when Nazis also began to deport Ukrainians West in order to deal with worker shortages. The *Ostarbeiter* (eastern worker) program deported 2.3 million Ukrainians to deplorable farming and factory conditions in the West to support the war.⁴¹²

By 1942 the anti-Nazi sentiment fomented to such an extent that a nationalist veteran of Petliura's UNR government-in-exile, Taras "Bulba" Borovets, formed the Polissian Sich.

⁴¹¹ Subtelny, 469. Yekelchuk, 140.

⁴¹² Yekelchuk, 140.

Initially it was formed to fight alongside the Nazis against the Soviet partisans near Volhynia, but it soon began fighting against the Nazis as well. When the objectives changed to removing all foreign influence, Borovets renamed the unit the *Ukrainska Povstanska Armiya* (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) or UPA in spring 1942.⁴¹³ Several veterans of the Roland and Nachtigal units joined with the discouraged populace in the insurrectionary force to disrupt the Nazis. The UPA began attacking both Nazi forces and Soviet partisan groups in the marshy northwestern region of Volhynia, which was more conducive to guerilla actions. Both factions of the OUN saw the popular support for the insurgent actions and formed their own groups of UPA. Ultimately the Bandera faction eventually co-opted Borovets' UPA and overwhelmed it with members from the inside while intimidating other nationalists in 1943. The OUN-B formed a security and intelligence bureau based on both the Nazi Gestapo and the Soviet NKVD to weed out internal threats like informants, traitors, and political opponents. The intelligence bureau forced opponents of Bandera out of the UPA with a policy of "join or die" and was instrumental in the Banderite takeover of the UPA.⁴¹⁴

As the Banderites were taking over the UPA, the Melnyk faction again tried to encourage closer cooperation with Germany. After the Nazi defeat at the Battle of Stalingrad, Melnykites saw increased German support as a way to stave off Soviet invasion and show the Germans that Ukraine deserved to be a state. The Germans finally acquiesced and began to arm Ukrainians in a new *Waffen SS* division, *Galizien* (the German for Galicia since Reichsführer SS Heinrich

⁴¹³ Subtelny, 473.

⁴¹⁴ Piotrowski, 13.

Himmler feared naming it Ukraine would encourage Ukrainian nationalism).⁴¹⁵ Melnykites maintained nationalistic beliefs about the new division of 11,000 Ukrainians and viewed *Galizien* as the nucleus of a future Ukrainian national army.⁴¹⁶ Initially the Germans did not fully trust the unit and utilized it primarily to counter Soviet and Polish nationalist partisans. Through the winter and spring of 1944, the unit burned and destroyed several Polish villages and killed many villagers. The unit saw its first major action in July 1944 when it attempted to protect Galicia from Soviet invasion, confronted the Red Army at Brody, and was virtually annihilated.⁴¹⁷ The Germans attempted to reconstitute the unit in order to use it to against Slovakia and Hungary, but many of the 3,000 survivors either fled to join the UPA or fled to Allied control territories.⁴¹⁸ Andrii Melnyk continued to seek German support even as collaboration with Germany began to lose credibility until he was arrested by the Gestapo.

After facing nearly total annihilation, the Banderite faction became more extremist towards Germans, Poles, and even other Ukrainians as part of their goals to national liberation. It was a gradual change towards the Germans since following the Nazi crackdown in 1941 and 1942, the Banderites still did not fight back against the Nazis because they saw that “any actions against the Nazis would mean help to Stalin.”⁴¹⁹ Only in 1943, the OUN-B along with its arm of UPA began to see Nazi weakness, especially after the German defeat at Stalingrad. The Bandera faction’s ideology changed from a belief that the Nazis would win against the Soviet Union but

⁴¹⁵ Heinz Höhne. *The Order of the Death’s Head: The Story of Hitler’s SS*. (New York: Penguin Books, 1969), 504-5. John Keegan. *Waffen SS: The Asphalt Soldiers*. (New York: Ballantine Books, 1978), 107.

⁴¹⁶ Snyder, 164.

⁴¹⁷ Snyder, 166.

⁴¹⁸ Subtelny, 477. Magocsi, 683. Snyder, 166. Armstrong, 174-5.

⁴¹⁹ Alexander Statiev. *The Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Western Borderlands*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 80

would be too weak to enforce any administration in Ukraine thus an independent Ukraine may be possible to the Soviets would win and be too weak.⁴²⁰ With this changed ideology, the OUN-B believed that it was the right time to strike the Nazis and succeeded in removing most of the German presence in Volhynia. Bands of OUN and UPA frequently attacked and killed German settlers in Ukraine to force them from the land. The tactics drove 43,000 German settlers to seek German SS protection in safe zones and provoked renewed retaliations on the Ukrainian people.⁴²¹ The German reprisals frequently destroyed entire villages but worked against the Germans by adding more displaced people to partisan movements against them.

After they largely isolated and removed the German threat, leaders of the OUN-B and UPA turned their attention to a possible future Polish threat. A number of Ukrainian nationalists believed that there would be a repeat of the aftermath of World War I, where both Germany and Russia were exhausted and a resurgent Poland would emerge and establish control over Ukrainian lands.⁴²² To prevent the Polish claims to Ukrainian lands, especially the lands in Volhynia where Poland focused its settlement in the 1920s and 30s, nationalists engaged in ethnic cleansing. The Nazis and Soviets reinforced Ukrainian beliefs that the Poles could not be trusted when both effectively exploited those animosities in order to rule the region. With fear of a resurgent Poland and the great distrust in place, the UPA began to apply genocidal methods they had learned from the Nazis.⁴²³ The UPA also began targeting Ukrainians who hesitated to join the OUN, or who had ties to Melnyk or Borovets. Through these tactics the UPA may have

⁴²⁰ Statiev, 80

⁴²¹ Brown, 220.

⁴²² Snyder, 167.

⁴²³ Snyder, 165.

killed as many Ukrainians as Poles in 1943.⁴²⁴ The success of the driving the German populations out of Ukraine with extreme tactics against only reinforced the use of these same tactics against the Polish population and with Soviets “collaborators”.⁴²⁵

As a response to World War II and the realization that Germany would not support an independent Ukraine, the OUN’s ideology began to shift. After the German invasion, both factions of the OUN sent expeditionary groups throughout 1941 and 1942 to organize movements in the East. When the groups arrived in the East, they found Ukrainians that did not understand the OUN’s hatred and extremism towards Poles, the Soviets, and Jews. The Eastern Ukrainians generally favored a more egalitarian society with economic and political opportunities due to Soviet education.⁴²⁶ Both factions began to alter their messages in order to gain wider support beyond Galicia. The ideology shifted so much that Jewish doctors frequently were found travelling with UPA units.⁴²⁷ By August 1943 the Eastern influences became more apparent and moved the OUN away from solely the concepts of Dontsov’s integral nationalist ideology of force and terrorism to essentially a political party with a military force. Ultimately these changes influenced the OUN to ignore most of Dontsov’s political guidelines by declaring the OUN’s opposition to the imperial regimes of Germany and the Soviet Union while advocating a free society with protection of minority and religious rights in the Extraordinary Grand Assembly in August 1943.⁴²⁸ The OUN found away to fuse the disparate concepts of Dontsov’s exultation of heroism and leadership with more socially egalitarian ideology.

⁴²⁴ Snyder, 164.

⁴²⁵ Brown, 221-2. Yekelchuk, 146.

⁴²⁶ Armstrong, 109, 159-60.

⁴²⁷ Armstrong, 156.

⁴²⁸ Marples, 284.

With the Gestapo arrest of Melnyk and the removal of Borovets from the UPA, Bandera's faction consolidated its position and became the primary center of the nationalist struggle. After their Grand Assembly though the Bandera faction began to reach out to other nationalist groups in order to unite and focus the struggle against both the Nazis and the Soviets and liberate Ukraine rather than divide the nationalist front. The OUN-B and UPA reached out to members of the Ukrainian National Republic abroad, the Hetmanate supporters, and other groups to form the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council and place the UPA under the council. Melnykites and nationalists allied with Borovets did not join the council because they distrusted the Banderites and felt that the Banderites would monopolize power in the group while nominally arguing that it was democratic. Those arguments were ultimately correct since the OUN-B was the most important and dominant group in the council and did dictate most of the decisions of the council and the actions of the UPA. While the OUN-B was the leading group of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, Stepan Bandera had little involvement in it due to his incarceration and primarily local Banderite members made the decisions.

The UPA became the one of the most important parts of the Ukrainian nationalist struggle. After the Allied landings in France in June 1944 and with the continued pressure from the Soviet Red Army, the Nazi government changed its policy towards Ukraine in order to gain support against the Soviet Union. They supplied the UPA with weapons and even released Bandera, Melnyk, and other nationalists from political prisons in order to secure a withdrawal of German troops.⁴²⁹ Even though the Germans released Bandera and Stetsko in September 1944, neither Bandera nor Stetsko returned to Soviet occupied Ukraine, nor were they in active

⁴²⁹ Doroshenko, 757.

communication with the OUN-B local leadership nor UPA forces.⁴³⁰ Bandera had become more of a nominal leader or figurehead for the nationalist movement.

As the Red Army and the Eastern Front of World War II passed through Ukraine towards Germany, the Soviets found Western Ukraine and Eastern Poland in complete disarray. Not only had the Ukrainian-Polish ethnic strife stirred up during the war continued unabated, but also the Ukrainian Insurgent Army was prepared to fight the Red Army for every inch of Ukrainian territory. Conservative estimates suggest around 40,000-50,000 Polish civilians were killed in Volhynia with another 20,000-30,000 in Galicia.⁴³¹ In an effort to counter the UPA attacks and threat to Polish people, Polish nationalists created defensive units under the control of the *Armia Krajowa* (AK) (Polish Home Army) in January 1944. The AK carried out reprisals against Ukrainians but to a much more limited death toll of around 20,000 since their goal was not extermination.⁴³² The AK's focus was more divided than the UPA's since they were simultaneously defending Polish citizens from the UPA, fighting the Nazis to liberate Poland, and contending with the politics of working with the Soviet Union. The UPA on the other hand was able to focus solely on the advancing Red Army and fought numerous battles. UPA commanders organized sizable battalions to fight the Red Army head on through early 1944. These UPA units believed that their dedication could repulse the Soviets and even attempted to capture Kyiv to block the Red Army's advance across the Dniipro.⁴³³ The UPA's dedication did not stop casualties though, as Soviet forces reported killing over 91,000 nationalist guerillas and

⁴³⁰ Statiev, 107.

⁴³¹ Keith Lowe. *Savage Continent: Europe in the Aftermath of World War II*. (New York: St Martin's Press, 2012), 219.

⁴³² Piotrowski, 26-8. Snyder 173-5. Lowe, 219.

⁴³³ Statiev, 108.

detaining more than another 96,000 during 1944 and 1945.⁴³⁴ The Red Army was forced to contend with both insurgent groups while continuing their advance against Germany.

To counter this bloody civil war, the Soviets offered nationalists amnesty in three large waves from 1944 through 1946 if they would come forward and stop fighting each other and the Soviet forces. Initially the Ukrainian nationalists ignored the amnesty offer, continued to confront the Red Army head on in conventional combat through 1944, and sustained heavy losses.⁴³⁵ Ukrainians did start to seek the amnesty but many nationalists used the prospect of amnesty to blend into the population largely and continue actions against Poles, the Soviets, and any Soviet collaborators as an underground organization.⁴³⁶ UPA strategists realized that guerilla forces could be more effective than conventional confrontation and began to divide into smaller groups that merged and blended into village life. These smaller village level UPA forces continued to fight the Soviets for nearly a decade after the World War II ended.

Along with the attempts to mollify members of the OUN and UPA with amnesty so they would no longer be a hassle, Soviet forces also attempted to discredit the Ukrainian nationalists in order to alienate them from the populace. The head of Soviet Ukraine, Nikita Khrushchev, began the attempts to discredit the OUN and UPA in February 1944, even before the Red Army had entered Ukrainian territory. Khrushchev defamed the OUN and UPA as “Ukraino-German nationalists,” “Quislings begging Hitler for statehood,” and “dunces among the populace who did not realize what the Soviets had done for the Ukrainians.”⁴³⁷ The Red Army finally pushed the Germans out of Ukraine, and the NKVD returned with the intention to pacify the formerly

⁴³⁴ Yekelchuk, 146.

⁴³⁵ Statiev, 108

⁴³⁶ Yaroslav Bilinsky. *The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine after World War II*. (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1964), 130.

⁴³⁷ Bilinsky, 127-9.

occupied areas and eliminate the nationalist movements. When the slanderous propaganda did not work to stop the influx of nationalists to the movement, the NKVD promoted further ethnic strife between Ukrainian and Polish nationalists and even went so far as to create falsified UPA units to attack and ethnically clean areas of Poles to further the fighting in order to divide and conquer the region.⁴³⁸ The NKVD also openly enlisted local Ukrainians into its spy network in order to both spy on the UPA and provoke them into unpopular actions. When members of the OUN-UPA could not discover which of the locals were active or inactive spies, frequently they would retaliate and execute innocent individuals.⁴³⁹

The ethnic conflict between the Ukrainians and Polish continued for at least two years after World War II because neither the UPA nor the Polish defense forces would stand down. Soviet authorities realized the danger of having mixed nationalities with such animosities on the Polish-Soviet border so Stalin devised a solution. Stalin believed “*net naroda, net problem*” (no nation, no problems) where the Ukrainian nationalists could be appeased with the acquisition and incorporation of Galicia, the Poles appeased with a nation-state of their own, and both nationalities would be beholden to Stalin.⁴⁴⁰ The policy that arose from this belief was the “repatriation” of all Poles in the newly established Ukrainian borders to Poland while Polish communists launched a similar policy “repatriating” Ukrainians in Poland to Ukraine. The Soviets expelled 782,582 Poles from Soviet Ukraine to be resettled in Poland while the Polish government responded with expelling 482,000 Ukrainians to Soviet Ukraine by 1947.⁴⁴¹ Unlike

⁴³⁸ Snyder, 188. Bilinsky, 134. The OUN and UPA veterans later would use this information to argue that the 1943 ethnic cleansings of Poles in Volhynia were Soviet NKVD units as well attempting to discredit the UPA.

⁴³⁹ Bilinsky, 133.

⁴⁴⁰ Magocsi, 691.

⁴⁴¹ Lowe, 222.

the Soviet Union's expulsion of the Poles though, the Polish government was unable to expel all the Ukrainians from its territory before the Soviet Union closed its border. This left around 200,000 Ukrainians in Polish territory. Many of those Ukrainians were active UPA members. The Polish government launched "Operation Vistula" to break up Ukrainian nationalists, internally displace the Ukrainian populations, and forcibly assimilate them into Polish life.⁴⁴²

The UPA continued fighting using guerilla tactics and terrorist actions like assassinating Soviet officials in Ukraine into the beginning of the 1950s. Even though the UPA was still trying to motivate the populace to not accept Soviet government and resist the Soviet occupation, the public started to cooperate with the government. The message of struggle with the Soviet Union also lost much of its importance after the death of the last UPA commander Roman Shukhevych in 1950. People realized that the UPA guerilla tactics could not bring independence but instead only bring punishment since the West was unwilling to aid or fight for Ukrainian independence.⁴⁴³ The Soviet policies were effectively incorporating Western Ukraine into the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. To discourage Galician nationalists, the Soviet government outlawed the Ukrainian national flag, proscribed national heroes, and prohibited use of the national anthem and Galician self-identity.⁴⁴⁴ The people who violated these laws were branded "bourgeois national" criminals. First-Secretary of Soviet Ukraine, Nikita Khrushchev, in the post-war years, initiated mass arrests and deportations against Ukrainian nationalists in such numbers that exceeded the nationalists' figures, indicating many common citizens also were punished.⁴⁴⁵ Between the years 1944 and 1946 alone, 182,543 Ukrainians were sent to the

⁴⁴² Lowe, 223-5.

⁴⁴³ Statiev, 127-8. Reid, 159-60.

⁴⁴⁴ Magocsi. *The Roots of Ukrainian Nationalism*, 61-2.

⁴⁴⁵ Marples, 251.

Gulags.⁴⁴⁶ Russian writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in *The Gulag Archipelago* briefly discussed the large numbers of Ukrainians in the Siberian camps and he, much like, the Soviet authorities lumped all Ukrainian nationalists as “Banderists” while explaining that they were “the most dangerous rebels in the camp.”⁴⁴⁷ Soviet leadership purged many Ukrainians in civil and party administrations throughout the Soviet Republic and monitored intellectuals for any signs of nationalistic sentiment.⁴⁴⁸

By the late 1950s the OUN and UPA had lost most of their influence among Ukrainians except for some in the diaspora which had limited influence internationally. The “repatriation” of Poles to Poland and Ukrainians to Ukraine greatly diminished the OUN’s ideology of struggle with Poland and the new struggle with the Soviets was not gaining support. The OUN continued to petition for foreign support but the Western powers largely ignored them. American and British intelligence services encouraged the UPA’s actions against the Soviets to destabilize the regime and utilized Soviet information the UPA gave.⁴⁴⁹ This continued contact encouraged Ukrainian nationalists to believe that the West could be influenced to support the plea and struggle for independence.⁴⁵⁰ The Americans and British though did not extend their interest much beyond intelligence gathering actions. There was one power though that did not ignore the

⁴⁴⁶ Timothy Snyder. *Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin*. (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 328.

⁴⁴⁷ Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. *The Gulag Archipelago: An Experiment in Literary Investigation. Abridged*. (New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2007), 394.

⁴⁴⁸ Hugh Seton-Watson. *From Lenin to Khrushchev: The History of World Communism*. (New York: Frederick A Praeger Inc., 1960), 242-3.

⁴⁴⁹ There are theories that the West’s relationship with the OUN and UPA for intelligence activities helped cool the Allies’ relationship in the beginning of the Cold War.

⁴⁵⁰ Stepan A Bandera. *Slovo do Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv Revolyutsioneriv za kordonom*. 1948. <http://diasporiana.org.ua/ideologiya/940-bandera-s-slovo-do-ukrayinskih-natsionalistiv-revolutsioneriv-za-kordonom/> (accessed June 11, 2012), 30.

OUN, the Soviet Union. Under both Stalin and Khrushchev, the Soviet leaders took the threat of the OUN and UPA seriously. Soviet NKVD and KGB agents attempted to infiltrate the organizations to undermine them and target nationalist leadership.

Stepan Bandera continued to advocate to the Ukrainian diaspora from Munich, Germany to motivate the Western Powers against the “communist imperialism” and support an independent Ukrainian bulwark against the communists.⁴⁵¹ However, similar to Symon Petliura, and Yevhen Konovalets the Soviets began to target Bandera. A Soviet agent shot Stepan Bandera in Munich while he was returning home for lunch on October 15, 1959. His wife found his crumpled and bleeding body in the stairwell of their apartment building and quickly called for medical help.⁴⁵² German doctors, however, could not save him and he died the same day. His lieutenant Yaroslav Stetsko took over the leadership of the group and continued to advocate for an independent Ukraine until his own death in 1988.

Interpretations and Problems with Bandera

Shortly after independence, Ukrainian historians began to reinterpret the activities of the OUN and the UPA but lost funding in 1993. The Canadian Diaspora views of the OUN and UPA are still the leading challengers to the former Soviet interpretations of the organizations. Both Soviet and Diaspora interpretations are not without their biases though. The post-war Ukrainian émigrés frequently were former OUN, UPA, and other nationalists, or relatives persecuted for their beliefs and this of course colors their interpretation that the OUN and UPA were freedom fighters from two of the most malevolent dictators of the 20th century. They

⁴⁵¹ Bandera, 67-8.

⁴⁵² Danilo Chaykovskiy. *Moskovski vbiivtsi Bandery pered sudom*. (Munich, Germany: Ukrainske Vydavnytstvo, 1965), 24-5.

“sanitize” the history of their organizations glossing over the initial anti-Semitism in order to gain Nazi German aid and support. The Soviet interpretation took the other extreme and accused all nationalists of being fascists while glossing over their own extreme policies. With such extremes to contend with, it becomes understandable that there is little to no room in the center for compromise or dispassionate discussion.

In 1997 then President, Leonid Kuchma, appropriated funds for twenty leading historians to continue the work started after independence. After seven years of archival research, in 2004, the historians released a nuanced fourteen point historical conclusion that attempted to contextualize and explain the OUN and UPA actions without idealizing, whitewashing, or blackening anyone to counter both preconceived diaspora and Soviet interpretations. They stressed the need for greater examination into the era and the escape from the myopic one-dimensional narratives.⁴⁵³ The era requires a great amount of nuance and finesse to recognize and address the ambiguity and controversy for all sides of the issues. That ambiguity is what makes black and white beliefs so controversial. Further research and its dissemination are necessary for reconciliation. As a further attempt at reconciliation a year later in 2005, President Viktor Yushchenko invited UPA veterans to celebrate the 60th Anniversary of the end of World War II with former Red Army soldiers. Many individuals did make their peace with each other but only a few months later in October 2005 groups of UPA and Red Army soldiers protested the other group’s receipt of veteran’s benefits.⁴⁵⁴ In 2009, fifty years after his assassination, and one hundred years after his birth, Western Ukraine celebrated the efforts of Bandera’s faction of the OUN and the UPA. The preparations for the anniversaries and celebrations inspired new

⁴⁵³ Marples, 288-99.

⁴⁵⁴ Marples, 300.

research and documentaries about Bandera that amounted to more than 20% of all research conducted into Bandera.

One may question why independent Ukrainian leadership has focused so much research on redeeming a quasi-terrorist organization like the OUN. There are a few reasons why Ukraine has tried to “rehabilitate” the OUN and its leadership through three different presidencies. The myth that Ukraine has been in a continual struggle for independence makes the OUN and UPA a necessary component for that myth. That the OUN and UPA were able to fight, even briefly, against both the Nazis and the Soviet Union independent of outside help plays an important psychological stimulus for nationalist feeling and a justification for independence. The OUN and UPA can be considered one of the first national armies of Ukraine that espoused the concept of an independent state and fought for it while there was no state. Their entire reason for being and fighting was an independent Ukraine, free from outside influence. The OUN also presented the argument that due to Ukraine’s oppression and victimization under Russia and communism they deserved a state of their own. Although the OUN and UPA ultimately failed concerning their ideological goals of an independent Ukrainian state, they succeeded in politicizing the diaspora abroad, which in turn helped politicize Ukrainians in Ukraine during *Glasnost*. The OUN and UPA provided a justification for independence and helped foment a stronger nationalism than had existed previously among Ukrainians.

This strong and determined focus on independence is what made the OUN problematic for the Soviets during World War II and in the immediate aftermath. Nationalism in Ukraine following World War I was one of the strongest forces that could counter and potentially undermine communism and continued to be so after World War II. Both movements depended on and attempted to motivate urban workers and intellectuals for their causes making the groups

naturally inimical to each other. During World War II the OUN found its greatest support in Eastern Ukraine among Soviet educated apparatchiks and intellectuals rather than among rural peoples. Without the intellectuals' support the Soviet state would not be able to exist, so from the outset of the OUN-Soviet conflict, the Soviets derided the nationalists in their propaganda by calling them Mazepists, "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists," and Banderites regardless of what organization they actually belonged to.⁴⁵⁵ The blanket name-calling also helped the Soviets to stifle any debates. The Soviets focused on linking all nationalists to fascism and Nazism and continually claimed that the OUN was merely a puppet of fascist intentions in order to blacken the OUN, stigmatize any nationalist group, and confound any potentially nationalist debate.

However, even discounting the Soviet denigrations in any evaluation of the OUN and Stepan Bandera, some major problems exist. The largest problem with the OUN and especially the OUN-B is its extreme fanaticism. While the stated goal of Bandera to liberate Ukraine may have been justified, the extreme and uncompromising methods the group used does not encourage one to overlook the numerous reports of extreme violence. Apologists may argue that the numerous reports derive from Soviet NKVD invention or the fake squads the NKVD used to discredit them, but the history of the group necessitates investigation. Through the 1920s and 1930s even Ukrainians wrote about and disagreed with the OUN's terror tactics, and it is unlikely that those tactics changed greatly from those decades into the chaos that swept through Ukraine in the 1940s. The OUN methods of assassinating and terrorizing enemies and people deemed collaborators with those enemies does not lend to any definition of heroism. The most impartial and dispassionate analyses of the OUN and UPA must include discussion of their brutality instituted against "outsiders" and their own people. It is difficult though to find those

⁴⁵⁵ Marples, 79-80.

impartial and dispassionate discussions of Bandera. Most of the sources favorable to the OUN remained conspicuously silent about the OUN and UPA's actions during 1943 and if they mention anything, it is usually only organizational issues while numerous sources opposed to the OUN and UPA report the brutality to non-combatants. Even with more research, it can most likely be concluded that the OUN was involved in excessive actions against the populace in western Ukraine, and even though the symbolism of the OUN continuing the Ukrainian struggle for statehood is important to independent Ukraine, it is because of those excesses of the OUN that Bandera should not be a hero.

CONCLUSION

Facetiously, personalities as diverse as rocker Frank Zappa⁴⁵⁶ and comedian Eddie Izzard⁴⁵⁷ have discussed what the requirement threshold is for a state to exist. Using those thresholds Ukraine qualifies as a state, since they have a beer, an airline, a football team, and a flag, and even though they conscientiously gave up the nuclear weapons stored in the country during the USSR. More seriously though, Ukraine has laws, a constitution, police, military, education, and maintains the trappings of what is necessary for statehood. The fact that Ukraine is a state is not what is in question, since it has been a state since the “independent” Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic joined the USSR in 1922. Ultimately it was the Soviet structural system that gave Ukrainians the essence of a state, named it, and why independent Ukraine broke away following the arbitrarily designed Soviet administrative district rather than determining new borders. It is establishing the Ukrainian nation that is a more difficult problem.

While the state became independent through referendum and essentially granted independence by an apathetic Russia, there is a sense that independence came only from the generosity or apathy of Russia. Even though the “Orange Revolution” of 2004 was not a nationalist revolution, it was an attempt to integrate all Ukrainians in a democratic government under the rule of law and complete the “revolution” that began in 1991. As one protester

⁴⁵⁶ “You can’t be a real country unless you have a beer and an airline – it helps if you have some kind of football team, or some nuclear weapons, but at the very least you need a beer.” Quoted in Andrew Wilson *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation* 223.

⁴⁵⁷ “No flag, no country. You can't have one! Those are the rules... that I just made up!” Eddie Izzard, *Dress to Kill*, DVD. (San Francisco CA: Ella Communications Ltd., 1998).

reported “in 1991 we became independent, now we want to be free.”⁴⁵⁸ Many Ukrainians were seeking freedom from Russia’s continued influence in the country which remained strong following independence (in fact the influence was so great that Russian President Vladimir Putin openly campaigned for two months in 2004 for pro-Russia candidate Viktor Yanukovich).⁴⁵⁹ Yanukovich’s campaign became a campaign against not only Yushchenko but against Western Europe and America. Yushchenko faced a Russian inspired smear campaign that attempted to present him as an American spy subjugating Ukraine to the will of America due to his American wife. Yanukovich’s negative posters presented images of US President George W Bush revealed behind a torn picture of Yushchenko with a slogan of “Yes! For Bushchenko” (a combination of their names).⁴⁶⁰ This mixed image of Bushchenko also appeared as a cowboy in another poster riding across a map of Ukraine threatening the outbreak of a civil war like in “Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, Iraq” and saying that “[Ukraine is] next.”⁴⁶¹ When the smear campaign did not succeed, Yushchenko was poisoned with dioxin in September 2004.⁴⁶² Allegations spread quickly that the Russian FSB (successor to the KGB) was involved in the poisoning and Ukrainian nationalists linked the attempt on Yushchenko’s life with the previous successful Russian assassinations of Bandera, Konovalts, and Petliura.

⁴⁵⁸ Roman Szporluk. “The Making of Modern Ukraine” in *A Laboratory of Transnational History: Ukraine and Recent Ukrainian Historiography*. Eds. Georgiy Kasianov and Philipp Ther (Budapest: Central European Press, 2009), 279.

⁴⁵⁹ Nikolai Petrov, and Andrei Ryabov. “Russia’s Role in the Orange Revolution” in *Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough*. Eds. Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul. 145-164 Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006, 148-9

⁴⁶⁰ Andrew Wilson. *Ukraine’s Orange Revolution*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005, 95.

⁴⁶¹ Wilson, *Ukraine’s Orange Revolution*, 95.

⁴⁶² Wilson, *Ukraine’s Orange Revolution*, 99.

Yushchenko survived the poisoning and came in first in the first round of elections in October 2004. Although he came in first he did not have the 50% to avoid a second round of elections against Yanukovych. During the second round, there were many voting irregularities and Yanukovych won even though exit polls showed stronger support for Yushchenko.⁴⁶³ Again Russian influence was suspected. Ultimately with the help of millions of Ukrainians marching on Kyiv another election round was held, Yushchenko won, and received the presidency but he still could not escape Russian influence. In 2006 and 2009 Russia doubled the cost of natural gas shipments to Ukraine⁴⁶⁴ (both times closely corresponding with upcoming elections) which harmed Yushchenko's popularity and ultimately led to his 2009 defeat to Yanukovych.

Due to Yushchenko's ordeals involving Russia, one can understand why his administration promoted these five individuals as potential heroes in an attempt to legitimize and justify the nation being congruent with the state. The Ukrainian nation is still seeking justification to govern that state through the attempts to delegitimize the Pereiaslav myth, which brought them under Russian influence, and by promoting these five individuals, it showed that the struggle to make a state congruent with the nation has been constant since Khmelnytskyi. While the definition of who the nation is has changed, the goal of an independent state has not. National heroes become symbols to legitimize a nation-state by showing that someone was fighting for independence and that is why there is such a struggle to establish these five people as heroes. These five individuals are a few among all the figures and symbols representing that continual national struggle to be a state independent of Poland and Russia.

⁴⁶³ Petrov and Ryabov, 158-60. Wilson. *Ukraine's Orange Revolution*, 109.

⁴⁶⁴ Adam Taylor, "Why Ukraine Isn't 'The Ukraine,' and Why That Matters Now. Business Insider, December 9, 2013, <http://www.businessinsider.com/why-ukraine-isnt-the-ukraine-and-why-that-matters-now-2013-12> (accessed December 13, 2013).

While Yanukovich has backed away from Yushchenko's nation building efforts, he continues to face similar problems of how to unify the Ukrainian people. In late November 2013, his decision to back out of trade negotiations with the European Union unleashed the largest protests in Kyiv since the "Orange Revolution." Protesters viewed Russian influence as the reason why Yanukovich backed out of the nearly completed deal at the last minute. The protesters have not only targeted Yanukovich with their invectives; they have also blamed Russia for interfering once again in Ukrainian affairs. Many of the people gathered in *Maidan Nezalezhnosti* (Independence Square) hold signs full of invective saying "if you're not jumping, you're a *Moskal!*"⁴⁶⁵ Some protesters have even torn down a 70-year-old statue of Lenin in Kyiv as a sign of their frustration over Russia's meddling.⁴⁶⁶ Yanukovich is still attempting to assuage the protesters who call for his ouster from power.

Independent Ukraine is a young state and still figuring out how to build and consolidate their nation. While they define a citizen as someone who supports the Ukrainian state, they are still debating what a hero is. Part of this debate over the establishment of heroes stems from groups wanting to delegitimize the former Soviet regime and arguing that it is due to Ukraine's long suffering under oppressive regimes that they deserve a state of their own, while some segments of society continue to idealize and legitimize the prior Soviet government. As the Ukrainian state is attempting to build the nation, they have been removing the symbols of former Soviet authority; many statues and portraits of Lenin, Stalin, and Marx have been coming down

⁴⁶⁵ Kathleen Moore and Pavel Butorin. "From Maidan to Berkut: A Ukraine Protest Glossary," Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, December 4, 2013 http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-protest-glossary-euromaydan/25190085.html?utm_medium=email (accessed December 4, 2013)

⁴⁶⁶ Uri Friedman. "The Remarkable History Behind Ukraine's Toppled Lenin Statue" The Atlantic, December 8, 2013, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/12/the-remarkable-history-behind-ukraines-toppled-lenin-statue/282141/> (accessed December 11, 2013).

and have been replaced with statues and portraits of Shevchenko and Hrushevsky in order to show the new values of a Ukrainian state. However, one can still find many lingering statues of Lenin in southern and eastern Ukrainian towns. Western Ukrainian towns have removed the Soviet symbols more quickly. According to surveys conducted from 1994 through 1996 through Ukraine, Lviv in the west was the most nationalistically Ukrainian region while Donetsk in the east was the lowest. Frequently these two places are treated as representatives of the extremes on a continuum of “Ukrainian-ness.” Residents of Lviv consistently identified themselves as Ukrainian for their primary identity (73.1%-78.5%) where as Donetsk residents’ identities ranged from Ukrainian (25.9%-39.3%), to Russian (22.9%-30%), to Soviet (40%-45.4%) as their primary.⁴⁶⁷ When there are still sizable segments identifying themselves as Soviet, it is difficult to completely remove the previous regime and legitimize the new. That difference in self-identification as “Ukrainian” can explain why western Ukraine has been more accepting of these five individuals as national heroes versus the east.

Many academics have argued that these differences between Lviv and Donetsk and thus the legitimization problems in Ukraine *in toto* stem largely from the differences of language in the two cities and regions. Lviv residents speak primarily Ukrainian while Donetsk residents speak primarily Russian. However, concerning that “language issue,” it did not change their beliefs pertaining to patriotism since both residents in Lviv and Donetsk had a consensus that “the language people speak does not matter, as long as they supported Ukraine.”⁴⁶⁸ As well several residents of Donetsk responded that “they were ready to accept the establishment of

⁴⁶⁷ Yaroslav Hrytsak. “National Identities in Post-Soviet Ukraine: The Case of Lviv and Donetsk,” in *Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: Essays in Honor of Roman Szporluk*. Eds. Zvi Gitelman, Lubomyr Hajda, John-Paul Himka, Roman Solchanyk. 263-281. Harvard University, 2000. 266-7.

⁴⁶⁸ Hrytsak, 269-70.

Ukrainian as the official public language so long as they were given time to prepare for the change and if Ukrainian will be the language of a ‘strong master’ who will bring the situation in Ukraine under control.”⁴⁶⁹ These responses do not reflect the traditional interpretations that the eastern regions of Ukraine are less nationalistic but merely that they desire a stronger state that is responsive and can guide its people.

It seems rather than language being one of the largest problems hindering nation building it was historical education. Again, the primary self-identifications are indicators of the disparate views on Ukrainian history and challenges Ukraine faces in its legitimization. Both Lvivites and Donetskites view the Kyivian Rus’ era as important for Ukrainian history (72.7% and 77.2% respectively) but then have very different views of the rest of Ukraine’s history. Lviv residents view Cossack history (74.1%), the Ukrainian National Republic (67.5%), and the Ukrainian Proclamation of Independence in 1991 as the most important events (90.4%)⁴⁷⁰ whereas Donetsk residents viewed the Treaty of Pereiaslav (77.7%) and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (59.7%) as the most important events.⁴⁷¹ That is why one of the ways that independent Ukraine has been attempting to legitimize itself is through the nationalization of history and showing that there has been a constant struggle for statehood. Ukraine has attempted to “reclaim” Kyivian Rus’ history and the interpretation of Khmelnytskyi from Russian appropriation. Ukraine has also attempted to establish an argument that the current state is a continuation of the Cossacks values. The importance of the Cossacks in national thinking shows why even after Ukrainian

⁴⁶⁹ Hrytsak, 270. During the time of the surveys in Ukraine, there was a hyperinflation of 17,000% that destroyed most people’s savings and greatly weakened people’s opinions of the government.

⁴⁷⁰ Hrytsak, 271. Donetsk residents responded 45.9%, 23.3% and 28% respectively for these events.

⁴⁷¹ Hrytsak, 271. Lviv residents responded 33.4% and 19.8% respectively for these events.

independence there were movements during both Kravchuk and Kuchma's presidencies for the title of President to be renamed Hetman to reinforce the continuity with the Cossacks.⁴⁷² The Ukrainian state is attempting to justify itself as a continuation of the Orthodoxy of the Kyivian Rus' while also being a continuation of the freedom and democratic inclusiveness of the Cossacks.

The state needs to be created before one can create nations and/or nationalists since it is the state that establishes the educational system. When the Soviet Union incorporated the Ukrainian Soviet Republic in 1922, illiteracy was rampant and most of the Ukrainians were largely still agrarian. The Soviet regime industrialized, and effectively urbanized the Ukrainians but in order to industrialize, the regime needed to educate the people. With the Soviet education, literacy rates soared and Ukrainians came into greater contact with Russians in the urban environments. This contact with Russians and the governmental policies that disadvantaged native Ukrainian speakers helped crystallize their identity.⁴⁷³ Ukraine start controlling its own educational system only in the last days of *Glasnost* and that is why reinterpretation and rehabilitation of these maligned figures began. Ukraine is still contending with the lingering after effects of Soviet education while developing its national mythos and its identity since gaining independence. Education is the key component to delegitimizing the prior regime, matriculating national sentiment, and coalescing various factions on national heroes.

The Ukrainians are still justifying their role in the world and the debate over national heroes reflects the division of what role it will ultimately take. While most of the world recognizes Ukraine as a legitimate and justified state, there are Russians who still deny that there

⁴⁷² Kuzio, 223-4.

⁴⁷³ John Breuilly. *Nationalism and the State*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 348. Ernest Gellner. *Nations and Nationalism*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 33.

are Ukrainians⁴⁷⁴ as well there are some who claim that the creation of a Ukrainian state is like East and West Germany (an artificial division that will one day be reunited).⁴⁷⁵ While the pro-Russian groups in Ukraine may not advocate reunification with Russia (since there has not been a large movement since 1991), they do weaken the process of legitimizing Ukrainian independence since they maintain positive views of the prior regime. In the eastern and southern parts of Ukraine, Soviet nostalgia remains. It is in many ways similar to feelings in eastern Germany (*Ostalgie*) that “things were better” under the prior regime. The groups that still identify themselves as “Soviet” or “Russian” within Ukraine disagree with these figures as heroes and generally want closer relations with the Russian Federation. In contrast, the groups who self-identify as “Ukrainian” are more accepting of these figures as heroes and generally favor closer relations with Western Europe and the USA.

The Ukrainians find themselves in a quandary over proving their identity similar to how Austria found itself with the breakup of another 20th century empire, the Habsburg Empire. Both states have had a late start in building a nation-state while escaping the specter of more populous “big brothers” (Russia and Germany) that overshadowed and have attempted to incorporate them. Austria reinterpreted its history to highlight its differences and distinctiveness, similar to what Mykhailo Hrushevsky did with his *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, but a “separate Austrian national identity only came decades after independence in the 1960s.”⁴⁷⁶ Hrushevsky’s influence has only returned since the early 1990s so there is still time for growing pains. The Soviet self-

⁴⁷⁴ Wilson. *The Ukrainians*, 298. In a 1997 survey, 56% of Russians saw Ukrainians and Russians as one people.

⁴⁷⁵ Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2004. Mark von Hagen, “Revisiting the Histories of Ukraine,” in *A Laboratory of Transnational History: Ukraine and Recent Ukrainian Historiography*. Eds. Georgiy Kasianov and Philipp Ther (Budapest: Central European Press, 2009), 27.

⁴⁷⁶ Kuzio, 16.

identity will decline in time, but what will replace it? Further research could focus on whether Soviet self-identification actually is declining and if there is a decline what is its impact on nation-building and the establishment of national heroes. If there is not a decline in Soviet self-identification, would that mean that protests would continue until the Ukrainian state fractured into two separate states each responsive to the popular demands, a pro-Western state and a pro-Russian state? Whether other former Soviet republics have had, or are experiencing, similar struggles establishing national unity and what courses of actions those states have or have not taken. Ultimately nationalism is what is necessary for a state to remain independent but it is only with education and time that Ukraine will build its nation, decide who its heroes are, and decide the role and orientation their state will have in the world.

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APPENDIX: MAP OF UKRAINE



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