

LOCAL NONPROFIT AND GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION CONCEPTUALIZATIONS
OF DISASTER RESPONSE EFFECTIVENESS

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ABSTRACT

This study attempted to explore how nonprofit and government organizations conceptualize disaster response effectiveness using an internet survey. Unfortunately, the data collected through this method was insufficient for meaningful data analysis, and, therefore this study was unable to generate significant findings with respect to its research question. Thus, rather than focusing on a presentation of results from data collection and interpreting the significance of those results, this thesis focuses on justification of the need for research on this topic, review of the literature that suggests it is likely that nonprofits and government perceive disaster response effectiveness differently, recounting of the initial data collection efforts undertaken and the problems encountered, offering of hypotheses for future testing based on analysis of the flawed data, and recommendation of an alternate data collection method that should be used in the future.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DHS.....	Department of Homeland Security
DRC	Disaster Research Center
FEMA.	Federal Emergency Management Agency
IRB.....	Institutional Review Board
NIMS.....	National Incident Management System
NRF.....	National Response Framework
NRP.....	National Response Plan
PDD.....	Presidential Disaster Declaration
VOAD.....	Voluntary Organization Active in Disasters

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

This study attempted to explore how local nonprofits and emergency management relevant government organizations conceptualize “disaster response effectiveness”. Specifically, the study addressed the following research question:

How do nonprofits and emergency management relevant government organizations conceptualize the terms disaster, response, and effectiveness?

Background

This background section establishes that dealing with the aftermath of disasters is complex. Nonprofits have been a consistent provider of relief after disasters from early in American history while government’s role in disasters has evolved, slowly expanding over time. As government’s role has expanded, it has sought to increase the effectiveness of how disasters are managed and actively sought improvement in the coordination among the entities involved. Yet, government has not, until very recently, actively engaged with nonprofits. The section also shows that there is now interest in learning about these groups and exploring what is needed to coordinate among them. The discussion suggests that a helpful basis for figuring out a coordination system that includes nonprofits is based on an understanding of how both groups—nonprofits and government—conceptualize the events and activities in which they engage. Specifically, knowledge of what nonprofits and government think a disaster is, what each thinks responding to a disaster means, and how each understands when it has been effective would provide an empirical basis upon which to build an effective coordination system.

Complexity of Dealing with Disasters

There exists no agreed upon definition for what constitutes a disaster among scholars or practitioners (see for example: Dombrowsky, 1995; Gilbert, 1995; Hewitt, 1995; Kroll-Smith & Couch, 1991; National Research Council, 2006; Perry, 2007; Porfiriev, 1995; Quarantelli, 2005). Scholars differ as to whether the events under discussion must be intended or unintended or planned or unplanned events (Dombrowsky, 2005); whether qualitative or quantitative factors matter more (Perry, 2005; Quarantelli, 2005); the terms used to describe the event (e.g., disaster, crisis, hazard etc.) (Alexander, 2005; Barton, 2005; Britton, 2005); whether the systems that are impacted by the event include social, political and/or natural (see for example; Cutter, 2005; Stallings, 2005; Smith, 2005); and, more. The debate still rages on despite recognition within disaster scholarship that a shared understanding of the concept of “disaster” is critical (Buckle, 2005). Currently, no consensus-backed operational definition of disaster exists. There are, however, some common characteristics that are associated with descriptions of disaster events. These characteristics are not related to numbers of things (e.g., deaths, injuries, properties lost, businesses impacted, infrastructure damaged or destroyed); rather, they are related to qualitative features of the post-disaster environment such as who is involved in these kinds of events and how they are handled.

Dealing with the consequences of disasters is complicated. The characteristics of a hazard, hazard event, and pre-existing vulnerabilities interact to produce any variety of impacts (National Research Council, 2006). The impacts lead to any number and combination of needs on the part of individuals and households, businesses, government, and nonprofits, the built environment, the natural environment, etcetera (National Research Council, 2006). Depending

on the nature of the disaster's impacts, a variety of entities become involved in addressing the needs (Auf der Heide, 1989; Drabek et al., 1981; Lewis, 1988). From the local level, these entities can include individuals and households in the impacted area, businesses (e.g., contractors, emergency medical services), nonprofit organizations, government agencies (e.g., fire department, law enforcement, public works, elected officials), and government agencies from jurisdictions surrounding the impacted jurisdiction.

Some impacted communities may have had previous experience with disasters and some may not have (Auf der Heide, 1989). Some of the impacted communities may have planned to engage in the aftermath of disasters and some may not have (at least not to the degree necessary) (Auf der Heide, 1989; Drabek et al., 1981). Regardless, all find that despite any preparedness efforts the needs related to a disaster exceeds their capacity (Auf der Heide, 1989).

Depending on disaster related-needs and the capacity and capability of local communities to adequately address them, additional entities from outside the impacted community may also assist (Auf der Heide, 1989; Drabek et al., 1981). These entities can include individuals and households from outside the area who volunteer spontaneously, national level businesses and nonprofits, and any number of government agencies from the state and federal level. Each of the entities may have individual perspectives and goals, resources, organizational structures, and preferred methods of assisting impacted communities (Auf der Heide, 1989; Drabek et al., 1981). Further complicating matters, each of the entities may become involved in helping communities at various points in time after disasters (e.g., immediately before, during, and after the event when lifesaving activities and activities to preserve property and the environment are carried out, in the initial weeks and months following the event when basic services are restored, roadways are cleared, temporary housing is devised, etcetera, or in the period when the social, built,

physical environments are reshaped, restored, and/or rebuilt) (Lewis, 1988; Smith, 2011). Moreover, these entities once involved may stay so for various lengths of time (Lewis, 1988; Smith, 2011).

Due to the urgency of the situation, sheer number of needs to be met, and entities involved (with their varying ways of viewing and doing things), some shared manner of coordination (e.g., structures, processes) among them is desirable (Auf der Heide, 1989). Also desirable is clarity and shared understanding among the entities involved about goals and priorities in the aftermath of disasters, which entities will fulfill which roles, under what conditions, at what times and for what length of time, to/for whom, toward what end, with what, and how the effectiveness of their participation will be determined much less the effectiveness of the overall effort to meet disaster-related needs (Auf der Heide, 1989). Pursuit of such coordination in the United States has been slow in coming (Schroeder, Wamsley, & Ward, 2001) and efforts have met with varying levels of success at various times and in various places (Comfort, 1988; Drabek, 1985).

A Brief History of How Disasters Have Been Dealt within the United States

Disasters have occurred throughout United States history. In fact, even prior to the nineteenth century the United States experienced a significant number of major disasters (Rubin, 2007). Yet, developing a coordinated way of dealing with disasters that synchronized the efforts of involved entities was not only not attempted it was not even considered. Explanations for why coordination efforts have been slow in coming in the United States include how disasters were perceived, who was thought to be responsible for dealing with them, and how disaster-related needs were addressed early in the country's history.

Early in the history of the United States, disasters were perceived as unavoidable “acts of God” (Fischer, 1998) that transcended the power of government to prevent (Rubin, 2007, p.12). Responsibility for dealing with disasters was considered a local concern; thus, the federal government only stepped in after the event in the most extreme cases (Miller, 2009). State governments assisted local governments when and where they could (Rubin, 2007). Disaster assistance for individuals and households was viewed as the moral responsibility of churches, neighbors, and charities but not the government (Platt, 1999). Any efforts by the government to provide relief to communities impacted by disasters were reactive, ad hoc, uncoordinated, provided well after disasters occurred, and often focused primarily on the needs of government (e.g., rebuilding public facilities) (Platt, 1999; Rubin, 2007). The degree to which government was involved was determined case-by-case and often on the basis of precedent (Rubin, 2007). Thus, local communities were typically left to their own devices in dealing with disasters and kin and neighbors did what they could to address the needs of those impacted while local governments attempted to address needs related to infrastructure, public facilities, and the economy.

Nonprofits such as the American Red Cross, the Salvation Army and other organizations were the earliest providers of formal relief that assisted impacted communities (see for example: Fischer, 1998; Popkin, 1978; Rubin, 2007; Ott, 2001). From the outset of their involvement, they attempted to fill the gaps left by survivors, kin, neighbors, churches, and government and address the needs of individuals and households to the degree they could (Kreps, 1990; Pipa, 2006). They have provided a range of vital services (De Vita & Cramer, 2008) and acted as advocates for victims (Boris & Steuerle, 2006b). Yet, despite their early involvement in disasters, significant attempts to coordinate among the nonprofits involved were not made much

less efforts to coordinate across all of the entities that became involved in the aftermath of disasters at various times (Rubin, 2007).

As the nineteenth century gave way to the twentieth, the number of disasters occurring, their magnitude, and the number of people and communities impacted increased (Rubin, 2007). The public's expectations of government also began to expand (Rubin, 2007). And, government's involvement in disasters gradually grew, particularly the involvement of the federal government which began providing assistance to state and local governments for an increasing number of disasters (Miller, 2009). Yet, even though government was increasingly involved in providing relief after disasters along with survivors, neighbors, churches, and nonprofits, there was no effort to develop a formal system to coordinate their efforts.

In the late 1940s, the federal government began to see the costs associated with a lack of coordination both in the assistance offered by the federal government and its interactions with the entities involved in the aftermath of disasters at all levels. Thus, the federal government began a series of attempts to coordinate disaster assistance. For instance, the Federal Disaster Assistance Act of 1950 was passed in an attempt to formalize and standardize provision of federal disaster relief (Rubin, 2007). This legislation also articulated that the primary responsibility for natural and human-caused disasters lay with local and state government and that the federal government's role was only supplemental (Rubin, 2007). Following this legislation, there was an increase in government involvement in disasters and more government assistance was available to impacted communities. And, the Civil Defense Act of 1950 was passed to support the development of state and local civil defense offices and plans to deal with the consequences of a potential domestic (possibly nuclear) attack (Quarantelli, 2000). Yet, this evolution of the government's role in disasters addressed the provision of aid and coordination

issues related to government and overlooked the role of all of the entities that had historically been the primary providers of relief—survivors, neighbors, kin, churches, and, the most formal of relief providers—nonprofits.

As the twentieth century progressed, the federal government continued its efforts to coordinate how disaster needs were addressed. A number of grant programs were created and funded to support state and local preparedness in addition to the funding that was already being provided after disasters through the Federal Disaster Assistance Act. In 1979, at the urging of state and local leaders and following several major disasters, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was created (Miller, 2009). FEMA was intended to advance disaster management by addressing tasks related to response, recovery, mitigation, and preparedness as well as coordinating the activities among federal, state, and local governments (Kreps, 1990; Miller, 2009; Rubin, 2007). Federal leadership (and the provision of accompanying resources) resulted in increased attention to preparedness for disasters at the state and local government levels (Rubin, 2007). Still, entities outside of government were largely overlooked despite their continuing involvement in the aftermath of disasters (Rubin, 2007).

The federal government has continued its attempts to formalize and standardize a system of coordination for managing disasters. For instance, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Department of Homeland Security was created to address terrorist threats and consolidate and coordinate federal efforts related to disasters (Miller, 2009); and, the National Response Plan (NRP) and National Incident Management System (NIMS) were developed to bring about a standardized nationwide system for addressing disaster needs at the local, state, and federal levels (Rubin, 2007). However, the new system caused significant complications at the state and local levels by establishing barriers between formal response system and the informal

network that had historically formed at the local level to respond to disaster (Rubin, 2007). The federal government's attempt to standardize how disasters were managed was tested in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005.

A significant body of literature has suggested that government's reaction to Hurricane Katrina was uncoordinated, slow, inadequate, and did not successfully integrate nonprofits and businesses into government efforts (see for example: Boris & Steuerle, 2006b; Canclini et al., 2009; De Vita & Kramer, 2008; Pipa, 2006; Rubin, 2007; Simo & Bies, 2007). In stark contrast, the involvement of nonprofits has been lauded and highly publicized (see for example: Boris & Steuerle, 2006b; Brennan et al., 2007; De Vita & Kramer, 2008; Kapucu, 2007; Pipa, 2006; Simo & Bies, 2007; Torrey et al., 2007). Most of the problems that have been noted regarding nonprofit involvement in Katrina revolve around coordination issues—related to structures and processes to coordinate efforts among nonprofits themselves as well as with government and the basic issues of shared understandings of who does what, when, where, why, under what conditions, for what length of time, etcetera (De Vita & Cramer, 2008; Fagnoni, 2006; Gajewski et al., 2010; Pipa, 2006; Schneider, 2005). As Boris and Steuerle (2006a) emphasized, it took a large-scale disaster such as Hurricane Katrina to reveal the weakness of how disasters are managed in the United States for all to see. And, it would appear from scholarly discussion (e.g., Comfort, 2006; Howitt and Leonard, 2006; Waugh & Streib, 2006), government reports (e.g., Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 2006; Townsend, 2006), and popular books (e.g., Brinkley, 2006; Cooper & Block, 2006; McQuaid & Schleifstein, 2006; van Heerden & Bryan, 2006) that one of the primary problems in meeting the needs from Hurricane Katrina was a lack of coordination.

The federal, state, and local governments are now paying increasing attention to coordination issues—not just within government but also across all of the entities involved after disasters. A number of changes have been made to federal policy and law (Bea et al., 2006) and the federal government has made multiple revisions to plans and various coordination mechanisms to include a wider range of the entities involved in response (e.g., FEMA, 2008a, b; FEMA, 2011). These efforts have not been easy. As stated by Waugh and Tierney (2007), “Integrating volunteer organizations, faith-based organizations, for-profit organizations and others into one unified effort can be a monumental task. Poor cultural interoperability complicates multi-organizational, intergovernmental, and inter-sector operations” (p. 329). It would seem, however, that these efforts were undertaken without a critical first step—an exploration and acknowledgement of how the different entities engaged in disaster management—in this case nonprofits and government—view the events, tasks, and success associated with their involvement. As will be demonstrated in the literature review chapter to follow, there are many differences among government and nonprofits in general and specific to their involvement in disasters that suggest they may conceptualize disasters, the response to them, and response effectiveness differently.

Significance

The aftermath of disasters has been researched for decades. We know a lot about what needs are commonly seen and what seems to help things work better or worse after disasters. We know a lot about who is involved and what they do. What we do not know, and what has not been explored through research are three simple issues: a) What is it that characterizes the events in which nonprofits and government are involved? b) To what extent are each involved at

different times in the life of an event? and c) How is it that each knows if it has been successful, or effective, in helping to meet the needs of the event?

This study hoped to contribute to emergency management practice by identifying the extent to which nonprofits and government view these issues similarly, articulating where differences exist, and suggesting the possible implications of their views for efforts to develop coordination systems for the aftermath of disasters. Waugh and Tierney (2007) would agree that a study of this nature would be of value since "...tools [are needed] to facilitate coordination and collaboration with organizations and entities whose structures and decision-making processes differ from their own" (p. 328).

This study also stood to contribute to the emergency management discipline. As the discipline that studies "how human beings create, interact, and cope with hazards, vulnerabilities, and associated events particularly through activities related to preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation" (Jensen, 2010, p. 19), the issue of how disaster response effectiveness is defined is of inherent interest. By beginning to fill a gap in the literature on this topic this study was designed to provide important data that could be used for the development of emergency management theory and future research as well as in the education of students studying the aftermath of disasters.

Unfortunately, this study did not result in the potential contributions identified. Data collection efforts to explore this topic met with little success; and, the data that resulted from these efforts was insufficient for the type of analysis the researcher intended. Although this study was not able to contribute in as significant a way as she might have hoped, it makes the following contributions. First, the present study provides a thorough review of the literature highlighting the many and key differences between nonprofits and government organizations.

These differences are so significant they may very well influence the way each type of organization views basic concepts such as disaster, response, and response effectiveness in different ways. The full nature and extent of the anticipated differences in understandings of these concepts awaits the data the present study had hoped to collect, but this study's literature review clearly highlights the potential for these differences, and, given the coordination problem in disaster response, resolution of these differences is critical. Second, the present study's data collection challenges are detailed for the benefit of future researchers along with suggested solutions. Third, the results of a superficial analysis of the data collected are shared and hypotheses of what future research exploring the topic may find are provided. Thus, this thesis offers both substantive and methodological insights pertinent to a key concern—disaster response effectiveness.

Conclusion

Chapter Two reviews the literature suggesting that nonprofits and government may very well conceptualize disaster, response, and effectiveness differently. After Chapter Two, this document departs from the typical thesis format where results are presented and implications of those results are discussed. Instead, the remainder of the document revolves around the attempt made to study this topic, what went wrong, and what can be done to study this topic in the future. Thus, Chapter Three presents what the researcher did to collect data related to her research question. Chapter Four describes the intended data analysis technique the researcher was going to use to analyze her data and why she was unable to do so; and, the Fifth Chapter makes suggestions for future research on this topic. Chapter Six presents a superficial analysis of the data and hypotheses for future testing. Chapter Seven provides a summary and conclusion for this project.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review discusses the differences between nonprofits and government organizations and suggests that these differences may impact their conceptualizations of disaster response effectiveness. Review of the organizational literature reveals differences in the day-to-day orientation, power structure, financial stability, and organizational culture of these two types of organizations. And, the disaster literature shows that these differences also appear in the involvement of these types of organizations in disaster. Based on a review of these two bodies of literature, it is reasonable to think that the differences between nonprofit and government agencies may have consequences for their conceptualization of disaster response effectiveness.

Differences between Nonprofits and Government in Organizational Literature

The nonprofit sector in the United States is dynamic and has grown significantly in recent decades (Boris & Steuerle, 2006a; Rubin, 2007; Salamon, 1999; Tierney et al., 2001; Ott, 2001; Wolf, 1999). However, differences within the sector make it difficult to define and describe it as a whole (Boris & Steuerle, 2006a; Eisner, 2010; Wolf, 1999). Nonprofits vary from one to the next in their mission, organizational structure and staffing, size, sources of revenue, and financial status (see for example: Boris & Steuerle, 2006a; Block, 2001; Eisner, 2010; Ott, 2001; Wolf, 1999). In fact, they vary so much that some observers question whether it is appropriate to lump nonprofits together and speak of them together as a “sector” (Salamon, 1999).

Despite the complexity and diversity of the “sector”, there are a few characteristics that unify nonprofits. For instance, to be considered a nonprofit the organization must be self-governing, incorporated under federal and state law as a charitable or not-for-profit corporation, and have a mission that is dedicated to serving the public good in some way (see for example, Boris & Steuerle, 2006a; Eisner, 2010; Ott, 2001; Popkin, 1978; Rubin, 2007; Salamon, 1999;

Smith, 1978; Spillan, 2003; Tierney et al., 2001; Wolf, 1999). Ott (2001) would argue that there are additional characteristics common to nonprofits such as the fact that they receive significant support from voluntary contributions of time, effort, and money and have organizational cultures that are based on beliefs, values, and basic assumptions associated with voluntary participation.

Nonprofits are not the only sector actively involved in the provision of various services to the public and addressing societal problems – government does too (Boris & Steuerle, 2006a; Salamon, 1999; Wolf, 1999). For instance, nonprofits and government are involved in the arts, culture, education and research, environment and recreation, as well as promoting health, preventing diseases, providing clothing, food and shelter, and providing spiritual care among many other services (see for example: Boris & Steuerle, 2006a; Salamon, 1999; Ott, 2001; Pipa, 2006; Wolf, 1999). Despite the fact that nonprofits and government agencies perform similar activities in serving the public, they are dissimilar in many other ways (Boris & Steuerle, 2006a; Ott, 2001; Popkin, 1978; Wolf, 1999). There are several key characteristics that distinguish nonprofits and government, including their day-to-day orientations, power structure, financial stability, and organizational culture.

The day-to-day orientation of nonprofits and government organizations is different. Meeting the needs of the constituencies associated with the organization is more important for nonprofits than meeting other organizational goals (Boris & Steuerle, 2006a; Wolf, 1999). Ott (2001) noted that nonprofits exist as long as they satisfy constituencies and the constituencies perceive that they are benefitting from the organization's activities. Their goals (insofar as they have them) fluctuate with the needs (Smith, 1978) and interest (Ott, 2001) of the constituencies associated with the organization. In contrast, government has been described as comprised of bureaucratic, goal-oriented, and instrumental organizations whose primary purpose is to

accomplish their goals and objectives regardless of the degree to which the goals and objectives meet public needs (Ott, 2001). Thus, nonprofits are naturally less interested in issues of performance, efficiency, budget, and accountability than government. The different day-to-day orientations of nonprofits and government may lead them to conceptualize the notion of effectiveness of disaster response differently.

The authority relationship within nonprofit and government organizations is also dissimilar. For instance, government agencies are organized hierarchically and employees are under the control of higher administrative or political authority (Ott, 2001). The government is relatively centralized (at each level) and decisions made by top administrative and/or elected officials determine what is done. How decisions are implemented within government is often determined by law, regulation, policy and/or ordinance (Sylves, 2009). Unlike government, the “business” of nonprofits is not determined or carried out in accordance with a hierarchical structure and the power structure between nonprofit boards, other outside stakeholders, clients, staff, and volunteers is not hierarchically organized (Ott, 2001). While nonprofits typically have a board of directors, its main function is developing strategic plans and identifying goals. The board typically does not speak for the organization or compel action within the organization (Ott, 2001). This difference in power structure between nonprofits and government may also influence how each approaches their involvement in disaster, how each thinks about disaster response effectiveness, and how effectiveness is achieved.

Another critical difference between nonprofits and government that may influence disaster engagement is the financial stability of each type of organization. The financial foundation of nonprofits tends to be unstable and insecure (see for example: Boris & Steuerle, 2006a; Ott, 2001; Salamon, 1999; Wolf, 1999). Nonprofits typically cobble together a financial

foundation for the organization that includes grants, fees for services, contracts, and/or donations. Yet, the amount of donations received is not constant and fluctuates with publicity received by the organization, public interest in the mission of the organization, and the state of the economy (Block, 2001). Grants are unreliable in that, regardless of source (e.g., government grant, foundation grant, etc.), they tend to be time-bound with funds supplied for only a limited period of time (Block, 2001). As the amount of funds and source of funding coming into a nonprofit ebb and flow, the nonprofit is forced to constantly negotiate its financial survival. Nonprofits spend considerable time on related efforts (Coppola, 2011). As Coppola, (2011) stated, “because NGOs depend on outside funding for their operations, they must spend a significant amount of effort on public relations, fundraising, and outreach” (p.390). Securing funding sources is a competitive endeavor often pitting one nonprofit against another for a contract or grant (Coppola, 2011). Because of these issues, the financial foundation of two nonprofits is never the same and changes over time (Coppola, 2011, p.392).

On the other hand, government agencies have long-term programs, in large part, due to their financial stability. Once government bureaucracies are created, it is rare that they are eliminated entirely (Sylves, 2009). The funding for government organizations is allocated through a pre-determined periodic process. Changes to funding levels are the result of discussion, and there is typically significant forewarning if there are to be budget cuts that impact any one government entity or entities. Thus, government and nonprofits have quite different financial foundations, and those foundations may very well impact the way they view disaster response effectiveness.

Organizational culture is yet another important distinction between nonprofits and government that may influence the way each views the topic of this study. The organizational

culture of nonprofits is based on beliefs, values, and basic assumptions associated with voluntary participation (Ott, 2001). The culture is also based on like-minded individuals who are associated with the organization (Coppola, 2007). This “like-mindedness” stems from the fact that nonprofits attract individuals who are motivated to work for the organization because of belief in the organization’s mission and the activities in which it engages (Coppola, 2007; Kelly, 1988; Ott, 2001). Government agencies do not have “like-mindedness” similar to nonprofit organizations. But, the cultural differences between nonprofits and government only begin here – there are many others. Listing a few additional differences, Ott (2001) stated,

... [nonprofits] seldom operate, feel, or act like government agencies. Key actors do not relate to each other or to the organization in the same ways... things usually do not get done in the same ways, people and groups do not fill similar roles, possess similar power, or share the same service – or bureaucracy related values (p. 288).

Thus, the organizational literature suggests that cultural differences in addition to those associated with financial stability, power structure, and day-to-day orientations may each influence how government and nonprofits conceptualize disaster response effectiveness.

Similar to the organizational literature, the disaster literature also suggests that there are critical differences between nonprofits and government including their structure and functions during disaster, their missions and goals, and their human and physical capacity. And, this literature provides reason to believe these differences may impact their perceptions related to the topic of research for this study.

Differences between Nonprofits and Government Articulated in the Disaster Literature

The aftermath of disaster involves individuals and various organizations that span the public and private sectors including fire services, emergency medical services, public works departments, law enforcement, nonprofits, businesses, religious congregations, communities,

volunteers, and many other small groups who provide vital services to disaster victims (see for example: Auf der Heide, 1989; Boris & Steuerle, 2006a, 2006b; De Vita & Kramer, 2008; Drabek, 1983; Popkin, 1978; Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977; Rubin, 2007; Tierney et al., 2001). The Disaster Research Center (DRC) developed a typology that helps us to better understand the various organizations that provide relief. The typology separates all of the organizations and entities involved with disaster into one of four categories of groups including established, expanding, extending, or emerging groups (Dynes, 1970; Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977; Scanlon, 1999).

All four of these groups are actively engaged in disaster relief activities (see for example: Dynes, 1970; Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977; Scanlon, 1999; Tierney et al., 2001). Yet, the typology suggests that these categories of groups differ in the specific tasks in which they engage and their human and physical capacities (Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977). Government tends to fit in what the DRC typology would call the category of established groups. Nonprofits tend to fit in the categories of extending or expanding groups. The following discussion will focus on the categories of groups to which government and nonprofits tend to belong.

According to Quarantelli and Dynes (1977), established groups are complex organizations such as police and fire departments, general hospitals, and public utility companies. The established groups have manifest emergency functions and are expected to be involved in emergencies and disasters. They tend to carry out their day-to-day tasks with relatively small changes—even during disasters (see for example: Kennedy et al., 1969; Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977; Quarantelli et al., 1966; Wenger et al., 1989). For instance, police and fire departments might be forced to engage in search and rescue but revert back as quickly as possible to their regular work (Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977). They usually function the same way

in both the pre-disaster and emergency period (Auf der Heide, 1989; Kennedy et al., 1969; Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977).

On the other hand, expanding groups tend to be nonprofits such as Red Cross chapters, Salvation Army units, and other community and faith-based or secular organizations (see for example: Dynes, 1970; Scanlon, 1999; Smith, 1978). Expanding groups have what is described as a “latent emergency function” meaning that while they have no disaster related day-to-day mission these types of groups are expected to be active during disasters and provide critical services to survivors (Dynes, 1970). These kinds of organizations and the jurisdictions in which they are located intend for the organizations to be involved despite the fact that their disaster function is different from their day-to-day activities, often bearing no resemblance (Quarantelli et al., 1966). For instance, an organization like the Salvation Army that offers a variety of programs serving youth, the homeless, the elderly expands its services beyond these day-to-day programs to assist victims through collecting and distributing essential needs, opening shelters, and providing spiritual counseling as well as many other health and human services after a disaster (see for example: Boris & Steuerle, 2006a, 2006b; De Vita & Kramer, 2008; Eisner, 2010; Smith, 1978; Kapucu, 2003; Pipa, 2006).

Unlike expanding groups, extending groups have no manifest or latent function related to disasters. Extending groups include churches, social groups, and recreational groups that have no regular tasks associated with disasters in routine or disaster times but find themselves extending beyond their normal mission to assist. Members of both expanding and extending groups often lack skills and experience to carry out emergency functions.

In addition to organizational functions, the groups involved in the aftermath of disasters are dissimilar in their organizational structures. The structure of each group dictates to a large

extent how their members will act in their position in the organization (Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977). Established groups are highly bureaucratic in structure and tend to have a clear-cut line of authority and explicit decision-making processes even at the times of disaster (see for example: Auf der Heide, 1989; Dynes, 1970; Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977; Scanlon, 1999; Ott, 2001). Nevertheless, internal structural rearrangements such as decision-making at lower levels of the hierarchy may occur during hazard events (Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977).

Unlike established groups, the internal structure and external relations of expanding groups change extensively at the time of disaster (Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977; Scanlon, 1999). Their size expands as volunteers and/or new members join the organization to help fulfill their latent disaster functions (Quarantelli et al., 1966). Similarly, the extending groups often have no clear organizational structures and the structures that do exist do not mirror those of established or expanding groups or even those of other extending groups (Scanlon, 1999). Expanding groups tend to have relationships with established groups and other expanding groups; however, extending groups do not tend to have such established relationships outside of the group instead evidencing strong ties and connections among members of the individual extending organizations (Quarantelli et al., 1966). The structure of these groups is strongly influenced by their physical and human capacities.

The established and expanding/extending groups vary in their physical and human resources. Established groups tend to have stable budgets and material resources such as facilities, equipment, transportation, and communication devices that they can utilize when carrying out disaster-related tasks (Kennedy et al., 1969; Wenger et al., 1989). They also have experience, knowledge, and trained staff with special skills to carry out response-related tasks and activities (see for example: Auf der Heide, 1989; Kennedy et al., 1969; Quarantelli et al.,

1966; Wenger et al., 1989). They tend to depend exclusively on their full-time staff and/or borrow personnel from the same organizations in surrounding jurisdictions (Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977).

In contrast, expanding/extending groups tend to have limited physical and human resources as they largely rely on donation, grants, and volunteers (Boris & Steuerle, 2006a; Smith, 2006). During disasters they are extremely dependent on volunteers (see for example: Smith, 1978; Brennan et al., 2007; Hamilton, 2008), who often lack knowledge, skills, and/or experience with disasters (Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977). They use non-routine resources and activities for non-routine domains and tasks, using non-routine organizational arrangements (Majchrzak et al., 2007; Drabek, 1983). The overall changes in structure and functions of these types of groups along with their physical and human capacities may have a significant influence on their disaster involvement and how they perceive the events and tasks with which they are engaged. In addition to these factors, their missions and goals may influence how they perceive effective response.

The mission and goals of the nonprofits and government determine their overall role and involvement in disasters. Government's mission during disasters is described as a population-based approach due to its mandate to serve the general population (Egan & Tischler, 2010). They attempt to assist disaster victims in a manner that helps the greatest number (all, if possible) in an environment of scarce resources (Egan & Tischler, 2010; Boris & Steuerle, 2006b). Thus, government tends to focus on tasks that benefit communities as a whole (Egan & Tischler, 2010). Examples of these tasks include removing debris and cleaning up major roads and bridges, restoring infrastructure and utilities, reestablishing public services (e.g., education, permitting, assessing), and reopening public facilities. Hence, the government's primary goals

are not to directly help each individual and household cope with disaster. Egan and Tischler (2010) stated:

The populations-based governance approach to disaster management is the right approach for a government to take, but it misses the essential human face of the disaster- the location of tragedy – an area which the nonprofit sector is uniquely positioned to provide a helping hand (p.75).

In contrast to government's population-based approach, the mission of nonprofits in disasters is known as the "helping hand" approach (Egan and Tischler, 2010). The nonprofits are individual-focused and seek to help individuals and families in need (De Vita & Cramer, 2008). The "helping hand" approach of nonprofits focuses on providing relief and assistance to disaster victims to help them return to self-sufficiency and, if possible, help them become more resilient than they were before the disaster (Egan & Tischler, 2010).

To the extent they are involved during events, nonprofits tend to run shelters to provide safe harbor (see for example: Dalal et al., 2007; Davis, 1977; Dombroski et al., 2006; Hyer et al., 2007; Nigg et al., 2006; Quarantelli, 1982). Later, they tend to assist in the provision of food and basic supplies, repair and rebuild homes, coordinate volunteers and donations, provide child care, legal assistance, and mental and spiritual counseling, among a range of other tasks (Egan & Tischler, 2010; Fagnoni, 2006; Goldman, 2006; Pipa, 2006). The mission of nonprofits is also described as intended to "fill the gaps" left by the government (Boris & Steuerle, 2006b; Egan & Tischler, 2010; Kapucu, 2003; Pipa, 2006). To the extent they are successful in doing so, it is because they are not bound by the same bureaucratic rules as government; do not have the same political constraints; and, have day-to-day missions that are already oriented to individuals and households (Boris & Steuerle, 2006b; Egan & Tischler, 2010). Nonprofits also tend to be already in touch with community members and know their needs well (Gazley & Brudney, 2005;

Eisner, 2010). Therefore, the diversity of missions and goals in addition to difference in nonprofit and governments approaches may have significant influence on how they think of the events in which they are involved and the effectiveness of their related tasks.

Conclusion

This chapter discussed the organizational and disaster-specific differences between nonprofits and public agencies. The literature revealed that nonprofits and public agencies vary in regard to their organizational, functional, and cultural structures as well as financial, human, and physical capacities generally and during disasters. Based on an understanding of this literature, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the significant differences between these types of organizations will lead to differences in how each perceives disasters, their activities related to them, and the effectiveness of their activities. Yet, the literature did not suggest how each of these types of organizations might actually conceptualize disaster response effectiveness. Thus, on the basis of this review, a study to explore this topic is justified and the results from such a study stand to contribute significantly to the literature.

While the study recounted in the following chapters was unable to contribute to the literature on the topic, exploration of the topic was certainly warranted as is further exploration on the topic in the future. From this point on, the document transitions from providing a justification for a study on disaster response effectiveness and a discussion of its potential significance to a report of the initial effort undertaken to explore this topic through research. Next, Chapter Three describes the data collection approach and method used.

CHAPTER THREE: AN INITIAL DATA COLLECTION EFFORT

This study intended to explore how local nonprofits and public agencies conceptualize the key concepts of disaster, response, and effectiveness and attempted to use an internet survey for collecting data for this study. Yet, the initial data collection effort was not successful in gathering rich data related to the research topic; and, as a result, the researcher was unable to analyze what nonprofit and government agencies thought or how the meanings they gave these concepts was different. To set the stage for the discussion of the data issues that manifested in this study and how they might be avoided in the future in the coming chapters, this chapter describes the methodological approach that was applied to this study in section one, the sampling process used in section two; and, the procedures used to gathering data in section three.

Methodological Approach

Since the goal of this study was to explore what the concept of disaster response effectiveness means to nonprofits and public agencies, there were several reasons the qualitative approach was thought to be best suited for this study. First, as noted by Taylor & Bogdan (1998) a qualitative methodology refers in the broadest sense to research that produces descriptive data – people’s own written or spoken words and observable behavior (p.7). Qualitative research seeks to understand the particular context within which the participants act and the influence that this context has on their actions (Maxwell, 2005, p.22). Moreover, it enables researchers to develop concepts, insights and understanding from patterns in the data rather than collecting and assessing from predetermined theories (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998). Therefore, the researcher assumed that qualitative methods would allow her to stay close to the empirical world and collect firsthand knowledge about how nonprofits and government conceptualize disaster response

effectiveness as well as to ensure a close fit between the findings and what organizations actually say and do (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998).

The researcher also believed interpretive constructionist theory was particularly applicable to this study since researchers adopting this approach seek to understand how people view an object or event and the meaning that they attribute to it (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). According to the interpretive constructionist perspective, all societies and organizations/groups consist of actors who are involved in a constant process of interpreting the world around them on the basis of the meanings the things have for them; and, these actors often develop shared collective meanings (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998). Constructionists also expect people to interpret and define things differently as they have different experiences and have learned different social meanings (Rubin & Rubin, 2005; Taylor & Bogdan, 1998). Thus, a qualitative study informed by an interpretive constructionist approach was assumed to be the best foundation from which to build a research design that would gather data from different nonprofits and public agencies involved in disaster relief and explore their perception of effectiveness in disaster response.

Population and Sampling

The population for this study included all the nonprofits and public agencies who were involved in the aftermath of disaster in the United States. To narrow the population to a reasonable sample for this study, a purposive sampling process was used. In purposive sampling units are chosen because they have particular features or characteristics which will enable detailed exploration and understanding of the central themes (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). The most important selection criteria in purposive sampling is individuals who can provide information related to a study's research question (Maxwell, 2005, p.89). For this research project, the individuals in the best position to speak to their agency's views were thought to be those working

for nonprofits or government agencies that were involved in the aftermath of disasters in recent years. Thus, the researcher used a four-step sampling process to develop a sample of these individuals for this study. See Appendix A for the complete description of the four-step sampling process that was utilized. See Appendix B for the counties in the sample and the years in which they received PDDs that included individual assistance. The sampling process resulted in 156 individuals in six states including Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, and Indiana that were invited for participation in this study—78 representing nonprofits and 78 representing government agencies.

Data Collection

The researcher attempted to collect data through an internet survey hosted by SurveyMonkey.com for the initial data collection effort. Internet surveys can pose a number of data collection issues for some respondents including a lack of access to the internet, poor internet connection speed, and varying ability to use the internet (Dillman et al., 2009). The researcher believed that the advantages of this means of data collection outweighed the potential disadvantages. The specific advantage that drove the researcher's decision was that internet surveys allow electronic questionnaires to be sent to an entire sample inexpensively and quickly (Dillman et al., 2009). Moreover, the researcher assumed that by virtue of their employment potential participants for the study would both be familiar with using the internet and have reliable access to it. Hence, the researcher used an internet survey to attempt to collect information related to the topic of this study from 156 potential participants for no cost and in a limited timeframe. Based on this rationale, data collection proceeded between November and December 2012.

The researcher followed the procedures for distributing and designing internet surveys suggested by Dillman et al. (2009). The participants were contacted via email and invited to participate in the study. Within the invitation email, the researcher provided a link to the internet survey. See the invitation email in Appendix C. When participants followed the link provided, the first page they encountered included the title of the survey, a description of the study, and why their participation was important (Dillman et al., 2009). See Appendix D for the information sheet and a screenshot of the initial survey. It was believed that sending information to potential respondents about the survey and how the results would benefit others would encourage survey participation (Dillman et al., 2009). The invitation email and information sheets also included positive regards such as “Thank you in advance for your participation” to encourage them to respond.

The researcher monitored the survey completions in real time; and, as representatives from nonprofits and public agencies completed the survey, the organization was crossed off the list. Respondents need to be given adequate time to respond before reminders begin arriving, and waiting to send reminders will give a researcher time to identify and address problems if they occur (Dillman et al., 2009, p.278). However, it was assumed that e-mails as opposed to letters by mail are more likely to be quickly dismissed, forgotten, or sent to “junk mail”. In an effort to balance these concerns, a reminder /thank you email was sent one week after the initial invitation email. The timing of this contact was thought to be reasonable and was consistent with Dillman et al. (2009). See Appendix E for the reminder email and Appendix F for the “thank you” email that was used.

A second invitation email was sent to those who had not completed the survey the week after the reminder email. The second follow-up invitation was different in tone, focusing, in a

friendly way, on the short amount of time that is left to complete the survey and the importance of responding. See Appendix G for the second invitation letter that was sent to the remaining individuals in the sample. And, seven days following the second invitation email, a final reminder was sent. See Appendix H for the final follow-up e-mail. These multiple contacts were undertaken because Dillman et al. (2009) suggest that sending multiple contacts to potential web survey respondents is the most effective way to increase response rates (p. 275). Thus, the researcher contacted potential respondents five times. The researcher closed the survey one week after the second reminder email was sent.

Survey questions were developed in accordance with Dillman et al., (2009). The goal of survey development was to have questions that every potential respondent would interpret in the same way, be able to respond to accurately, and be willing to answer (Dillman et al., 2009). The survey was comprised of both open-ended and closed-ended questions. Open-ended questions are flexible, intended to obtain descriptive response to a specific topic, and allow respondents to freely answer the question as they want without limiting their response (Dillman et al., 2009). This was done so that neither the researcher nor the survey instrument would overwhelm respondents or constrain their answers.

The original survey included the following questions with ample space following each for participants to respond:

1. How would you describe the day-to-day, overall mission of your organization?
2. What makes a disaster a “disaster”?
3. How does your organization respond after a disaster occurs in your community?
4. In the context of disaster, what does the term “response” mean to you?

5. How do you assess the effectiveness of your organization's response?
6. Please use this space to address anything related to disasters that you think I should know.

The first question was asked to learn about the activities and tasks that organizations carry out daily in non-emergency periods. The government's day-to-day mission is clear as they were expected to respond to local emergencies. Nonprofits are very diverse and their daily missions were not necessarily expected to be oriented around disasters. Thus, learning about their day-to-day mission helps to obtain a general understanding on what nonprofits do on a daily basis; what kind of capacities or resources they possess; and how they may be incorporated during the disasters. The other survey questions are directly linked to the research question for this study and ask participants to describe their understanding of the key concepts of disaster, response, and effectiveness. The last question provided an opportunity for participants to share any information they think would be valuable for this study.

The closed-ended questions in the survey were intended to obtain demographic information. They were asked at the end of the survey because open-ended questions require some time for thinking and reflecting (Dillman et al., 2009). The following closed-ended questions were asked in the survey:

1. In what city, county, and state is your organization located?
2. What is the name of your organization?
3. Please identify the category to which your organization belongs?
 - Government agency
 - Nonprofit organization
 - Other (please specify)

Prior to sending the initial invitation to participate in this study, the researcher sent a copy of the survey to several nonprofit and government agency representatives in the Fargo-Moorhead area for their review. In her email request to review the survey, the researcher asked the representatives to provide feedback as to the survey's clarity and wording. In total four individuals reviewed the survey (2 nonprofit, 2 government agency). Only minor revisions were recommended; and, these recommendations were followed. See Appendix D for a screenshot of the final, original survey.

As the researcher monitored the survey responses in real time, she noticed issues with data collection. Specifically, the response rate from the initial invitation email was incredibly low and there were issues with the data provided by those who responded. While the initial invitation to participate in the study was sent to 150 potential participants, only 11 individuals followed the survey link; and, of those 11 only six of them completed the survey (i.e., 3 nonprofit and 3 government representatives). And, the responses to the initial survey questions were brief, vague, incomplete, and needed further clarification to be understood. Some answers were not related to the topic and were missing the points of the question.

It was thought that perhaps one of the explanations for participant failure to complete the survey, or complete it without much detail, was the open and broad nature of the questions. It was thought that perhaps the questions were so open and broad that participant's did not know where to start in constructing a response. After meeting with her advisor, the researcher modified the question format in an attempt to make the survey easier to answer. With the exception of the first question related to the organization's mission, all of the open-ended questions were modified to ask participants for two characteristics or two examples. A specific

space, small in appearance, was provided for participants to answer. An additional space was labeled “other characteristics” in case participants had more they wanted to communicate with respect to the question. Figure 1 is presented below as an example; and, the full, revised survey can be viewed in Appendix I. These alterations to the questionnaire were consistent with Dillman et al. (2009).

Figure 1. Screenshot of modified questionnaire.

How would your organization define a disaster?

Please provide two characteristics of disaster that distinguish it from other types of events.

***Characteristic one:**

***Characteristic two:**

Other characteristics?

A week after the initial invitation the researcher sent out a follow-up email with the link to the modified survey. Eight participants started the survey and seven of them completed it. The nature of the responses changed due to the alterations made to the survey. Now, the answers directly addressed the survey question for the most part. A few participants provided detailed

information by giving examples from their organization's experience; yet, the majority still provided short and vague answers.

Because the response rate was still very low relative to the sample (N= 19 with only 13 completed out of a possible N of 150), the researcher decided, in cooperation with her advisor, to change the content of the second invitation and follow-up emails. The second invitation email was rewritten to make the survey seem less threatening. For instance, it informed respondents that the survey does not require special training or expertise to answer the questions. Please see Appendix J for a copy of the revised second invitation email. In total, 22 additional participants followed the link to the survey after the second invitation and follow-up email. Of these, 17 answered all the questions; yet, their answers continued to be both short and vague.

Overall, the researcher contacted potential participants five times between November and December of 2012. These contacts resulted in a total of 41 participants out of 150 potential participants following the link to the survey. Of these, only 30 completed the survey, including 16 from public sector and 14 from nonprofits. The vast majority of participants from the public sector were local emergency managers (N=9); the remaining participants represented police departments (N=4) and fire departments (N=3). As for nonprofit participants, the majority represented local churches such as the Lutheran Church, First Baptist Church, and United Methodist Church.

Conclusion

This chapter discussed the qualitative research methods that were used in an initial data collection effort to explore nonprofit and public agency conceptualizations of disaster response effectiveness as well as a rationale for the use of those methods. The researcher followed the survey design and data collection recommendations of Dillman et al. (2009) and made an attempt

to adjust the survey when she found that participants were not providing responses of any great length or detail. Ultimately, despite these efforts, the data that was provided by participants was not conducive to the kind of data analysis that the researcher had planned to use. The next chapter reviews the data analysis technique that the researcher had hoped to use for this study. It also provides examples from the data to demonstrate why the technique could not be used.

CHAPTER FOUR: DATA ISSUES

This chapter is comprised of two main sections. The following section describes the data analysis technique that the researcher intended to use to explore the data collected through this study. The next section discusses the data collected and why the data was not conducive to analysis with the intended technique. Ample examples from the data are provided to highlight the issues encountered.

Intended Data Analysis Technique

As discussed in Chapter Three, qualitative data collection methods were used for this study. To complement the qualitative approach to data collection, the researcher intended to use a qualitative analytical technique known as “The Analytic Hierarchy” described in Ritchie and Lewis (2003). The “Analytic Hierarchy” refers to a process through which qualitative “findings” are built from the original raw data (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). The technique entails three stages of analysis including data management, descriptive accounts, and explanatory accounts.

Data Management

Data management initially involves deciding upon the themes or concepts under which the data will be labeled, sorted, and compared (Ritchie et al., 2003). The background information presented in Chapter One of this proposal suggested that there have been past attempts to create organizing systems for emergency management; that nonprofits have been largely ignored in the development of these systems; that there is growing recognition of the need to work with nonprofits if we are to have a system that works; and, to have such a system, it must be based on an understanding of what constitutes effective disaster response. As revealed in the literature review, nonprofits and government are involved in the aftermath of disasters;

and, there is reason to believe they may have different views about the events, activities, and goals of their efforts. Thus, questions were developed to explore what nonprofits and government representatives think with respect to each of these areas.

Because the researcher conducted a survey with questions that explore thematic areas, the steps in the Ritchie & Lewis (2003) Analytical Hierarchy related to data management were, from the study's inception, not necessary to use. For instance, sorting, identification of initial themes, and indexing was not required because material with similar content or properties was already located together by survey question design. Thus, the researcher's analysis would have revolved around the next two stages of the Analytical Hierarchy – the development of descriptive and explanatory accounts—if the data had been favorable to such analysis.

Descriptive Accounts

Developing a descriptive account involves detection, categorization, and classification of the substantive content and dimensions of phenomena. Detection involves looking within the data related to one of the survey questions across individual surveys and noting the perceptions, views, and experience or behavior related to the question. Categorization and classification then transition data analysis from individual survey data to the survey data collectively. In this stage, the collective data are categorized and refined separately, in this case for the nonprofit organization and public organization survey data related to each of the concepts embedded within this study's research question (e.g., disaster, response and effectiveness). The extent to which the categories and classifications derived are different between the two groups is explored and described. Phrases and expressions are retained in the participant's own language; interpretations are kept to a minimum so there is an opportunity to revisit participant's original expressions (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003).

Explanatory Accounts

The development of explanatory accounts is the last stage of analysis in the Hierarchy. At this stage, the researcher seeks to find patterns of association within the data related to each question and across questions and then attempts to explain why those patterns occur (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p. 261). The process is undertaken to account for differences that may be observed, in this case 1) in the nonprofit data; 2) in the public organization data; 3) between nonprofit data and public organization data. Variation in what the concepts of disaster, response, and effectiveness mean to these two groups would have been explained using common sense, seeking explanatory concepts within the data, and drawing on the literature review presented for this study (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003).

Should the survey have resulted in rich data, the researcher would have the Analytical Hierarchy for data analysis. Assuming the researcher appropriately and carefully carried out her analysis, she would have been able to 1) explain the meaning of the concepts of disaster, response, and effectiveness from both nonprofit and public perspectives; 2) explain major patterns related to the data; 3) offer explanations of the similarities and differences between the data from the two types of organizations; and, 4) on the basis of the analysis, discuss implications for emergency management coordination systems and emergency management theory. The Hierarchy is a powerful analytic technique and as a result of using it the researcher may have been able to make significant contributions to practice and theory. Yet, the researcher could not use the Hierarchy and the section to follow describes why that is the case.

Data Issues

As previously stated, the responses to the survey generally lacked depth and detail. The answers to the questions asked were short and incomplete. Most of the responses consisted of

one word or a phrase that would require further explanation or clarification to be understood in relation to this study's research question. The following paragraphs are intended to provide the reader with a sense of the issues that the researcher encountered when attempting to analyze the data from the surveys and the difficulties these issues posed for utilizing the Analytic Hierarchy.

The survey asked participants to answer a question about what makes a disaster a disaster, how their organization responds to disaster, what response means to them, and how they assess the effectiveness of their organization's response. The researcher discovered issues related to the length and/or depth of participant responses to all of these questions.

When participants were asked to define the concept of disaster by identifying two characteristics that distinguish it from other types of events, participants tended to offer short answers in reply—some even limited to a single word or phrase. For instance, one participant wrote the word “unplanned” and “disrupting” in the spaces provide; another just the phrases “displaces individuals”, “damages or destroys public or private property”, and “creates a gap in basic human needs being met”; and, another “anything that affects our area” and “all disasters starts and ends local”. On the other hand, some respondents provided a more comprehensive response. As one participant put it,

A minor disaster is an adverse event that may have impacted more than one jurisdiction, or may pose a threat of additional danger to public safety across several jurisdictions. Mutual aid is required from adjacent jurisdictions. A major disaster is an adverse event that impacts numerous county jurisdictions. Resources organic to jurisdictions of the county are insufficient and direct mutual aid is immediately required from either adjacent counties or state agencies. A catastrophic disaster is an event that has impacted severely on a major segment of the county involving many jurisdictions. Mutual aid is necessary from adjacent counties, state, federal and private sector resources for a prolonged period to meet both human response and recovery needs and reestablish the infrastructure.

These examples demonstrate the variation of answers by their length and depth.

The quality of the data did not improve when the researcher examined the data related to the next survey question, “how does your organization respond after a disaster occurs”. Few participants provided specific examples of how their organization is involved in response efforts despite the prompt to do so in the survey question. For instance, one participant responded “assistance” and “coordination”; another “working together every day” and “within 30 min”; and, another simply wrote “mass care” and “individual and household recovery”. Just what these organizations are doing in the aftermath of the disaster is unclear from the participant responses. Other participants provided answers that were difficult to interpret despite using more words. For instance, the following statement exemplifies the vagueness of many of the responses,

This agency coordinates with local emergency response agencies to meet their needs to effectively respond to the disaster. This agency coordinates with state and federal agencies to meet the needs of those affected by the disaster.

In this example, it is unclear what coordination means to the participant, the extent to which the organization actually coordinates with other agencies at the local, state, and federal levels, why this is desirable, how coordination is related to needs, which agencies they work with, what specific tasks or services they coordinate with others, whether the tasks and activities they undertake are intended to meet the needs of the community at-large or segments of the community, and how this participant’s statement relates to the concept of response and its meaning. It should be clear from these examples that analysis of what each individual organization was doing in response was difficult to analyze much less how the response activities of nonprofits might differ from government agencies.

When asked what the term response meant to them, the same issues were evidenced. Some participants provided a one word or short phrase reply, e.g., response is “open EOC”, “everyone working together”. Some participants provided longer but equally vague answers.

For example, one participant stated, “Response term means fire and rescue, police, medical, power restoration, safe roads from debris and feeding and shelter”; another “response would be things that we do that are directly related to the event”; and, another “response for most disaster situations we have 2 hour window of time for our staff to arrive at the scene of the emergency that is what our response is”. Another participant wrote,

Response is an active approach to attack the effects of the disaster by putting boots on the ground; additionally, response is actually making contact with those directly affected by the disaster. This agency's response is passive because the agency's personnel play a more active role behind the scenes and do not initially make direct contact with those affected by the disaster.

The example above led to more questions than it did revelations of what response meant to the participant. What was meant by active approach and what boots on the ground means is unknown as is how putting boots on the ground addresses disaster effects. Moreover, how the agency is playing a passive role while personnel are active is unclear as well as what role personnel are playing behind the scenes and how that role relates to the participant’s conceptualization of the term response. From these responses the researcher was unable to tell what exactly the concept of response meant to the participant.

The data issues did not improve with respect to participant responses to the final open-ended question requesting participants to identify two ways they assess the effectiveness of their organizations response. Examples of responses to this question include “fire rescue relationship” and “client surveys”, “responder coordination” and “relief”, and “people are safe” and “people in need are being served”. These responses were not enough to reveal what effectiveness may mean to these organizations or how they assess it. For instance, “client surveys” as a measure of effectiveness is too vague to be meaningful in analysis since who the clients are that are being surveyed, when/how they are being surveyed, what they are asked, how what they are asked

relates to the organization's assessment of its effectiveness, the threshold at which the organization would deem itself effective as a result of the data collected, and what would be done within the organization if the surveys were to show the organization ineffective remain unanswered. The same participant also identified "fire rescue relationship" as a measure of organizational effectiveness but what "relationship" means, what about the relationship would connote an effective response versus an ineffective one, and how they assess the relationship is unclear. Had more of these issues been addressed in the participant's response—and others—analysis might have been possible. There are many other examples of problematic data such as the following:

Our agency utilizes an action report that we utilize to evaluate our effectiveness. We work with our EMA to gauge our effectiveness. We document the resources that are utilized during the event and measure our results. We work with the state and federal agencies that assist with measuring our effectiveness.

What an action report is and how it is actually used cannot be discerned from this participant's response. Additionally, how the organization works with the EMA to determine effectiveness is left unstated. In this example the link between resources and effectiveness is also clear enough but the participant did not explain whether resource use is the only organization that matters for their organization's effectiveness, what results are being measured, or how they measure those results. Another example of a poor response to this question is the following:

All individuals in need of meals as a result of the disaster have meals provided for them. All individuals seeking shelter in response to the disaster have a temporary place to stay. Individuals impacted begin transitioning into the recovery process.

Whether effectiveness is in meeting the needs of individuals or in the completion of the tasks to meet those needs is uncertain from what was written as is how the organization tracks individual

need and whether individuals have shelter and meals and whether they consider themselves effective if less than *all* individuals have shelter/meals. Moreover, how the organization identifies that an individual is transitioning into recovery and how they assess their organization's role relative to it is left out of the participant's response. Participant responses left the research with many questions and unable to tell what effectiveness mean to participants or how it would be assessed.

The brevity, vagueness, and lack of depth of participant responses to the survey questions made it inappropriate to utilize the Analytic Hierarchy for data analysis. Use of the Hierarchy challenges researchers to first generate descriptive accounts beginning with the process of detection and ending with categorization and classification; yet, the researcher was unable to detect the perceptions, views, experience, and/or behavior of participants individually much less nonprofit and government agencies as distinct groups. Since the initial stage of generating descriptive accounts could not be completed, it was inappropriate to continue on to the next stage in the Hierarchy—generating explanatory accounts.

Conclusion

This study was unable to generate meaningful findings with respect to the study's research question. The study's failure was not due to the research question, its qualitative approach, the populations sampled, or the analytic technique intended for use—all of these elements of the research design were appropriately conceived and implemented. The failure of this study was due to the data collection method. The chapter to follow connects the data issues experienced in this study to problems associated with survey research. The chapter also recommends an alternate data collection method that should be used in the future to gather the type of data needed to holistically analyze this study's research question.

CHAPTER FIVE: APPROACH TO FUTURE RESEARCH

This study intended to explore how nonprofits and government perceive disaster response effectiveness by collecting data through an online survey and analyzing it with the Analytic Hierarchy posited in Ritchie and Lewis (2003). As has been described in Chapters Three and Four, the researcher's initial data collection and analysis efforts did not proceed as planned due to issues with the data collected. This chapter discusses the relationship between the weaknesses in the data collected and the methods employed to collect the data in its first section. And, the second section analyzes the weaknesses in the data collected in conjunction with an alternate data collection method that will minimize, if not eliminate, those weaknesses in future studies on this topic.

The Data Issues-Data Collection Connection

As frustrating as the researcher found the responses provided by study participants, the researcher was not entirely surprised that these issues manifested in this study. The risks associated with survey research—particularly internet surveys—are known. In fact, the data issues that were evidenced in this study were nothing the literature on survey research had not already noted as potential weaknesses of the data collection approach.

The literature on survey research suggests that close-ended questions are more useful in survey research than open-ended. It has been noted numerous times that open-ended questions do not often result in lengthy, detailed responses (see for example: Babbie, 2010; Dillman et al., 2009; Hakim, 1987; Rubin & Rubin, 2005). As Fowler (2002) put it,

Generally speaking, if one is going to have a self-administered questionnaire one must reconcile oneself to closed questions, that is, questions that can be answered simply by checking a box or circling the proper response from a set provided by the researcher...self-administered open answers often do not produce useful data...(p. 62).

One reason useful data does not often result from open-ended questions is, as Babbie (2010) stated, "...respondents will read items quickly and give quick answers" to survey questions (p. 260). As a result, participant answers tend to be unclear and sometimes irrelevant to the objective associated with the question (Fowler, 2002). And, in survey research, there is not an opportunity for the researcher to attempt to guide participant responses back to the topic of the question or explore more fully what a participant meant in a given response (Dillman et al., 2009; Fowler, 2002). Due to these issues, open-ended question data from surveys is often difficult to analyze and not comparable across surveys even with respect to data from the same question (Fowler, 2002). Dillman et al. (2009) suggest that it is wise to use open-ended questions "sparingly and only for important topics about which descriptive information is necessary" (p. 114). Perhaps it is due to the weaknesses associated with open-ended survey questions that surveys, as a data collection approach, are rarely described as a qualitative data collection technique (see for example: Babbie, 2010; Creswell, 2007; Fowler, 2002; Lune, Pumar, & Koppel, 2010).

Given these comments from the literature, it would appear that this study's reliance almost entirely on open-ended, broad questions using a survey data collection method was flawed from the start. The open-ended, broad nature of the questions was consistent with qualitative research (Babbie, 2010; Creswell, 2007) and the research question for this study; yet, the data from participant responses evidenced the problems associated with survey-based data collection. The responses provided by participants to the questions tended to be quite short and vague, often limited to a single word or phrase—the opposite of the rich, dense, comprehensive, and detailed responses exploring the research question for this study would have required. Even when the researcher made the questions and space provided for responses more structured in an

effort to bring about more developed responses from participants, nothing changed. Ultimately, the data provided proved insufficient to analyze because the researcher was unable to interpret what participants actually meant by their responses.

There also may have been an issue with survey question design from the start. Questions in survey research ought to be carefully crafted according to the literature. Among other considerations, questions should be developed, to the extent possible, to ensure that all study participants find the questions relevant (Babbie, 2010) or “highly salient” (Dillman et al., 2009). This is particularly important for open-ended questions since, as Dillman et al., (2009), stated “descriptive open-ended questions are... ‘expensive’ for respondents in the sense that answering them requires a significant investment of time and effort on their part” (p. 113).

With respect to this study, there may have been a question design issue in this area. The researcher attempted to identify potential study participants that would be in a position to provide the data required for this study through a purposive process involving multiple steps as reviewed in Chapter Three. Given the research question for the study and the significant role that nonprofit and government organization play in disasters, there was no better sample frame to draw from. It is possible, however, that while the potential respondents were in a position to provide the required data, they were not interested in providing it much less spending time to respond at any length or to any detail. If more time and attention had been devoted to wording the questions in a way that made them relevant for all participants, then perhaps more developed responses to survey questions would have been provided.

Another limitation of survey research that manifested in this data collection effort was a low response rate. Only 41 participants out of 150 followed the link to the survey and of these

only 30 of them completed the survey. The researcher modified the content of the invitation and follow-up email to encourage increased participation, but the response rate remained low.

The low response rate associated with this study is not a problem in and of itself. Issues of nonresponse bias are not central in qualitative work as they are in quantitative work. In qualitative research, numbers of responses are not the focus of the researcher so much as the ability of those sampled to provide the data needed to explore the research question posed and the quality of the data collected (Creswell, 2007). Nevertheless, if participation were higher, it is possible that there would have been more, and perhaps better, data. Because of this possibility, it is worth further exploring the issue of why the response rate was low.

Enlisting sufficient participation is a well-known challenge associated with internet surveys (Fowler, 2002). There is a widespread cultural trend of suspicion of research and a lack of interest/willingness to participate in survey research in the United States that can negatively impact response rates (Dillman et al., 2009). Moreover, there is a trend of distrust in internet communications and interactions that can also negatively influence response rates (Dillman, et al., 2009, p. 9). Potential participants may avoid even opening an unsolicited, email invitation to participate in the research due to these trends (Dillman et al., 2009, p. 9). Given these issues, Fowler's (2002) comment that "the response rate for mail or e-mail surveys depends critically on the population and the survey's purpose" makes sense (p. 65) as does his suggestion that these factors play a critical role in "the overall success of the [survey] effort" (p. 50).

To overcome the aforementioned cultural trends surrounding survey research, the population sampled must be motivated to respond by the survey's purpose. In this case, the populations sampled were individuals representing nonprofit and government organizations that had been involved in several disasters in the past decade. The conceptualizations of these

individuals matters particularly with respect to the study's research question. Yet, as the literature review in Chapter Two established, nonprofits are different one to the next and disaster-related activities are not central to the mission of the vast majority of nonprofits. Furthermore, even while government organizations are similar one to the next in critical ways, the literature review demonstrated that most government organizations (e.g., fire, law enforcement, public works) revert to their pre-disaster tasks and activities as quickly as possible following such an event. The literature suggests that disasters are just not that much of a day-to-day focus for the populations sampled for this survey; and, thus, getting a good response rate from these populations on a disaster-related topic was going to be challenge before data collection began. The use of a survey to collect data from these populations particularly a survey with a purpose that was most likely not interesting enough to elicit the interest, much less their time and attention, was probably not the best choice.

The researcher chose a qualitative approach for her initial data collection effort because it was most appropriate given her research question. A qualitative approach remains the most suitable for exploration of nonprofit and government organization views of disaster response effectiveness despite the fact that the particular data collection method used in this attempt to study the topic did result in data suitable for analysis. The data issues experienced in this study were simply manifestations of weaknesses already associated with survey research. Should this topic be explored through research in the future a different qualitative data collection method—one known for producing rich, thick data and one wholly divorced from issues related to numbers of responses—must be used.

An Alternate Method

The length and depth/detail of participant responses hindered this study. These issues were experienced because there was a mismatch between the research question and the nature of the data needed to explore that question and the data collection method used. Had another qualitative data collection method been utilized, the data issues would likely have not been seen. The following paragraphs suggest that use of in-depth, semi-structured interviews to collect data on this topic would have minimized, if not, eliminated entirely the data issues observed in this study.

The length and depth/detail of participant responses presented a problem in this study. Participants seemed to provide quick, “off the cuff” answer to the survey questions. They wrote very little even though ample space was provided for extended responses to the questions posed. This issue of short, thin responses is not normally associated with in-depth, semi-structured interviews because of social norms, the availability of techniques to elicit greater depth, and the flexibility of questioning.

While this study found that participants did not seem to want to write, most people like to talk. As Rubin and Rubin (2005) stated, “...most people like to talk ... and are pleased that somebody is interested in what they have to say” (p. 90). Interviews also can capitalize on the social norms of talking and reciprocity that demand an answer be provided when a question is asked (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). Of course, there is no guarantee that people will speak to the question asked at length or to any detail. After all, “in normal conversations people often answer formalistically, providing little detail” (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p. 113). Yet, in interviews the interviewer has many opportunities to signal their interest in depth. For instance, an interviewer can choose not to interrupt a participant’s response to a question, ask a double-barreled question,

ask about specific words or terms that the researcher does not understand, and “indicate [their] familiarity with the interviewee’s world so that the person knows that superficial answers won’t teach [the interviewer] all that much” (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p. 112-114). Using these techniques interviewers can elicit greater depth in participant responses in interviews. No equivalent techniques were available for the researcher to elicit greater depth in the survey responses.

Follow-up questions and probes are additional means of getting more detailed responses from participants that are not available in an internet survey. Generally, interviews are structured around a series of main questions that cover the main parts of the research question (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p. 129). These main questions are complemented by follow-up questions “to obtain depth, detail, and subtlety, while clarifying answers that are vague or superficial” and probes that “help manage the conversation by keeping it on topic, signaling the desired level of depth, and asking for examples or clarification” initiated by the interviewer in real time (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p. 112). The questions asked in the survey for this study are what Rubin & Rubin (2005) would describe as main questions and what was missing and would have helped bring about the needed depth in participant responses were follow-up questions and probes.

Examining the data from this study that were used as examples in Chapter Four, it is obvious that follow-ups and probes would have been of great benefit. For instance, the researcher would have had the opportunity to ask “what is it about these tasks that makes them response” if a participant had said “Response term means fire and rescue, police, medical, power restoration, safe roads from debris and feeding and shelter” in response to an interview question about what response meant to them. And, if a participant had said “responder coordination” in reply to a question about how his/her organization assessed its response effectiveness, the

researcher would have been able to ask questions such as “What do you mean by the term responder?; “Who do you consider responders?”; “What does coordination mean?”; and, “How do you know when coordination has been achieved?” Without the ability to ask these follow-up questions and probes, the researcher was left with no more or less than the reply written by the participant.

Another advantage associated with in-depth interviews that is not with internet surveys is the flexibility of the design throughout the process. While the researcher did alter the structure of the survey questions after data collection had ensued, the basic questions being asked remained the same. It would have been inappropriate to have dramatically changed the survey even though it was clear that participants were not providing the kind of data needed because all participants would not have had the chance to answer the same questions. Ideally, the researcher would have been able to change questions by breaking the question topic into several questions and changing wording significantly when it was clear the questions being asked were not understood or were not generating the data needed. In interviews, it is expected that questioning remains flexible throughout the interview process to accommodate new information, adapt to the actual experiences that people have had, and adjust to unexpected situations (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p.35). As Rubin & Rubin (2005) noted,

Unlike survey research, in which the exactly same question is asked to each individual, in qualitative interviews each conversation is unique, as researchers match their question to what each interviewee knows and willing to share (p.4).

The use of a survey prevented the researcher from being flexible in her questioning when it was clear that participants were not responding as she would have hoped whereas use of semi-structured interviews as a data collection method would have allowed her to adapt to the situation.

Conclusion

While the researcher's initial data collection efforts did not result in the kind of contribution to the research literature the researcher had hoped, this study and the analysis of its execution has nevertheless made an important contribution. By discussing the issues that hampered data collection and thwarted analysis, this study ought to help future researchers avoid similar issues. Moreover, through suggesting an alternate method to study this topic, the researcher has provided a path forward for future research.

Exploration of the topic of how disaster response effectiveness is conceptualized and the implications of that conceptualization for coordination systems is important for practice and also for the emerging academic discipline of emergency management. Research on the topic is sorely needed. Because research on the topic is in such short supply, the researcher decided to informally examine the data that she collected for a) what, if any, patterns existed in the data (however poor); b) if patterns were discovered, any evidence of differences in government and nonprofit views; and, c) if patterns were discovered, any hypotheses that might be tested through future research. The potential to suggest hypotheses for future testing stood to make another contribution to the research literature in addition to the aforementioned methodological contributions. The researcher's analysis of the data is reported in the following chapter.

CHAPTER SIX: INITIAL ANALYSIS OF DATA

While the researcher was unable to analyze the data formally through the use of the Hierarchy, she attempted to informally review the data to see if examination of it might leave her with some initial thoughts as to what disaster response effectiveness means to nonprofits and government organizations and whether there was any evidence that nonprofits and government organizations perceive disaster response effectiveness differently. Two steps were taken to examine the data. First, the researcher looked at the data from nonprofit and government participants related to each survey question for any patterns that might exist. Of note, all of the data analyzed is available for review in Appendixes K-N. Following this step, the researcher evaluated the extent to which the patterns that emerged from each group's data were different. The results of this analysis are related in the following pages as are hypotheses of what future research might find based on this analysis.

Analysis of Data on Definition of Disaster

No consensus was evident in the nonprofit data regarding how participants conceptualize the concept of disaster although two patterns were found with respect to what disaster meant to these participants. The first pattern that emerged was that approximately half of the nonprofit participants define disaster in terms of impact to individuals and households (e.g., disaster is an event that “results in people’s lives being turned upside down”, “forces a person to be unexpectedly homeless and potentially without documents, medicine, clothes or food”, “displaces individuals”). The second pattern contrasts with the first. Approximately half of the nonprofit participants (not the same as those referred to with respect to the previous pattern) define disasters predominately in terms of the at-large impact of the event (e.g., disasters are events that result in “great damage or loss of life”, “mass loss of property and human life”,

“impacts [to] all sectors in the community”). Thus, while patterns emerged, the ones evidenced did not provide the researcher with a sense of how nonprofits collectively conceptualize disaster.

With respect to government’s conceptualization of disaster, a number of patterns also emerged. First, government participants seem to define disaster in terms of large-scale impact (e.g., disaster is “severe”, “affects the entire population”, “affecting a large group of people or property”, and “affects a vast number”). Government participants also seem to define disaster in terms of resources; specifically, the overwhelming of jurisdictional resources. They used language such as “emergency situation beyond our resources”, “when all of my ‘local’ resources are or soon will be used or depleted”, and “resources organic to jurisdictions of the county are insufficient” to describe this disaster feature. They also saw disasters in terms of jurisdictional capability, i.e., disasters overwhelm the capability of a jurisdiction to address the needs of the event on their own. Phrases like “not enough help”, “depletes the capability for a county to effectively respond”, “exceeds the normal day-to-day emergency response capabilities of our community”, and “beyond your normal capability” were used to describe disaster.

Based on this data, it does appear that nonprofit and government organizations have somewhat different views of what a disaster is. It seems that the government participants in this study had a clearer conceptualization of what a disaster is than nonprofit participants. It also seems that government participants had, to some extent, a shared sense of some of the key characteristics that define these events. The nonprofit participants did not seem to have any sort of collective notion of what a disaster is, and the two themes of meaning that were discovered seemed in contrast to one another. Based on this limited analysis, the following hypotheses regarding nonprofit and government organization conceptualizations of the concept of disaster might be explored through future research:

H1: Nonprofit and government organizations both conceptualize a disaster primarily in terms of impact but do so in different ways.

H2: Government organizations have a more specific, or operational definition, of disaster than do nonprofit organizations.

Analysis of Data Related to the Meaning of Response

Study participants were asked two survey questions regarding their conceptualization of response—one question asked what response means to them and the other asked them to identify their organization’s response activities. Since both of these questions were included in the survey to shed light on the meaning of response to study participants, the analysis of the data from both questions has been integrated in the paragraphs to follow.

Nonprofits seemed to define response in terms of the specific activities they do in the aftermath of disaster. For instance, when asked what response meant to them, one participant wrote “we have building teams, cleaning teams, chainsaw teams, counseling teams, and case management teams, etc.”, another “response to us means...ensuring their ongoing needs are being met, that they are safe, sheltered, and being fed”, “response for us is not life, property, or asset protection but meeting the...needs of individuals through providing shelter and food”. It appears that nonprofit participants considered any activities their organization carries out after a disaster to be “response” activities (i.e., “response would be things that we do that are directly related to the event”). Most of the “response” activities they identified generally begin in the initial hours after disaster impact. And, while some of these activities might cease within several days of the disaster impact, most would continue on into the weeks and, possibly, months following the event. The data also showed that the activities of nonprofits tend to be directed toward meeting the basic needs of individuals and households. Examples of the tasks and

activities included “providing additional food, water, and services to people who have been impacted”, “specific things we have done in the past include in the short term providing food, water, clothing, financial resources, transportation, communications, counseling, referrals for housing”, and “we provide food, shelter, clothing, clean-up supplies, and grief counseling as we help people get back on their feet”.

With respect to government, the data revealed a number of patterns related to their understanding of response. Government participants seem to associate response with efforts directed toward the community as a whole (e.g., “...we approach the emergency from a whole community aspect”, “we send our emergency first responders to provide assistance to the residents/businesses of the area”). They also seemed to understand the concept of response in terms of its goal. They used phrases such as “provide assistance”, “respond to the needs”, “handling the immediate issues”, “address the issues”, “attack the affects [sic] of the disaster by putting boots on the ground”, and “requesting the needed resources to handle the event” in their response to the question. Many participants used similar phrases in their definitions implying that a) they think of response in terms of its goal, b) that the goal of response is to meet whatever needs result from the disaster’s impact, and c) that the impact of the disaster will result in some range of needs.

Government participants defined response in terms of the general activity of deploying and managing resources and people. Participants also seemed to identify their response “activity” as using, or participating within, specific incident management systems and organizational structures such as Emergency Operations Centers, the National Incident Management System, Incident Command System, Emergency Management Plan, and mutual aid as opposed to specific activities their organization was responsible for completing (e.g., security,

debris clearance, extinguishing fire, etc.). Both the general activity and systems and structures identified by participants are directed toward the overall management of the incident.

Government participants also appear to understand response as intimately linked to coordination. Many participants referenced coordination in their definitions of response indicating that to them response meant “working together”, “bring in additional personnel, specialists and our partners in the surrounding community”, “provide assistance with police, fire, public works, and assist with utility services”, “coordinating mutual aid between agencies for delivery of personnel and/or equipment”.

Based on the limited data available, it appears that nonprofit and government organizations conceive of response differently. The data suggested that nonprofits think of response in terms of their specific activities while government thinks of response in terms of coordination, resources, systems, and structures. Nonprofits seem to associate response with addressing basic needs of the individuals and households while government associate the concept with serving the community as a whole and managing the overall incident. And, nonprofits seem to include both short-term and long-term activities within the rubric of response while government participants seemed to respond with short-term activity only. Based on this analysis, the following hypotheses regarding nonprofit and government organization conceptualizations of response might be tested through future research:

H1: Nonprofit and government organizations utilize different criteria to define the concept of response.

H2: Nonprofit and government organizations target their activities toward different social units (i.e., individuals and households, community wide, respectively).

H3: Nonprofit and government organizations are involved in different activities during the period after disasters that they understand as response.

H4: Nonprofit and government organizations perceive the duration of response differently.

Analysis of Data on Response Effectiveness

The data seemed to suggest that nonprofits measure their effectiveness in three ways. Nonprofits seem to assess their organizational effectiveness in terms of general conditions, e.g., “people in need are being served...people are safe”, “when life sustaining needs are available to the community at a pre disaster availability”, “we don’t leave until the last roofing shingle is in place”, “individuals impacted begin transitioning into the recovery process”. Nonprofits also appear to assess their effectiveness through the participation in/completion of activities. For example, when asked directly how their organization assesses its effectiveness, participants replied, “participate with long term recovery committees and monitor long term recovery efforts”, “we developed a response team that did inventories on all the resources we were receiving...”, “we monitor official reports...we maintain internal activity reports”, “distributions are completed as ordered by local/state emergency operations centers and FEMA”. Finally, nonprofits tend to evaluate their effectiveness in terms of the feedback they receive, e.g., “feedback from those with which we have had contact...feedback form the first responders”, “when the public feels that adequate resources are available”.

With respect to government participants, they seem assess organizational effectiveness in terms of general conditions as opposed to things government organization do during response, how they do it, and what happened as a result. Participants identified criteria they use to judge their organization’s effectiveness in terms of general conditions brought about after a disaster

such as “have we become ‘whole’ again”, “stabilize the jurisdiction affected by the disaster”, “return to a state of normalness”, “signs of recovery and responsiveness of the other public safety agencies within the affected area” and in terms of general things that do not come to fruition such as “safety-no personnel or citizens injured due to our actions”, “no injuries to responders”, “relief”, “protection of people and property”. While government organizations do not seem to be using any specific, measurable, objective criteria to assess their effectiveness, there was indication that the effectiveness of their organization is being assessed. Many government participants mentioned after action reviews and several others feedback from the community, or entities within it, as a means of assessing their effectiveness (e.g., “we usually have an after action meeting to discuss/review utilizing SWOT analysis approach”, “utilize an after action report”, “HOT Washes and After Action Reviews/Reports”, “by input from community and other public safety agencies”).

The data revealed more similarities than differences in how each type of organization conceptualizes the effectiveness of their response efforts. Both nonprofits and government agencies seem to evaluate their effectiveness based on communitywide, general conditions and feedback from others (as opposed to an self-assessment). Nonprofits also evaluate whether they met the needs of individuals and whether they completed the activities they intended to in assessing organizational effectiveness while government organizations did not seem to evaluate anything their organization did/did not do or achieved/did not achieve through their response efforts. Based on this analysis, the following hypotheses about nonprofit and government organization conceptualizations of effectiveness might be tested through future research:

H1: Nonprofit and government organizations evaluate their organizational response effectiveness based on the presence/absence of communitywide, general conditions.

H2: Nonprofit and government organizations assess their organizational effectiveness primarily through feedback from external sources (e.g., feedback from responders, feedback from clients, after action review processes).

H3: Nonprofit organizations evaluate whether they met the needs of individuals when assessing organizational effectiveness.

H4: Government organizations do not evaluate whether they met the needs of individuals when assessing organizational effectiveness.

H5: Nonprofit organizations evaluate whether they completed the activities they intended to in assessing organizational effectiveness.

H6: Government organizations do not evaluate whether they completed the activities they intended to in assessing organizational effectiveness.

Conclusion

The patterns that emerged are not enough to allow the researcher to offer even a tentative suggestion as to what the concepts of disaster, response, and effectiveness mean for nonprofit organizations or government organizations. Nevertheless, the researcher did hone in on themes related to how nonprofits and government organizations perceive these concepts. Table 1 summarizes the themes evidenced in the data.

Table 1. Patterns from the government and nonprofit data.

Concept	Government Organizations	Nonprofit Organizations
Disaster	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • large scale impacts • overwhelmed local capability • overwhelmed local resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • no consensus
Response	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • define response in terms of goal—to meet a range of disaster related needs • response involves coordination of government and deployment of personnel and resources as key activities • time span of response short • response directed toward community as a whole 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • define response in terms of the activities their organization does • all activities undertake are “response” • time span of response ranges from short to long • response directed toward individuals
Effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • assessment of effectiveness based on based on presence/absence of general conditions • assessment of effectiveness based on external feedback 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • assessment of effectiveness based on external feedback • assessment of effectiveness based on meeting the needs of individuals • assessment of effectiveness based on completion of activities

The researcher also suggested a number of ways that nonprofit and government conceptualizations were different from one another. Yet, while the researcher has tentatively suggested a number of patterns and differences may exist, she has done so through informal analysis of circumspect data and as a result the analysis should be viewed with utmost caution.

The lack of rich, detailed data discussed in Chapter Three significantly limited the analysis that could be conducted. Furthermore, the researcher was unable to clarify with study participants whether her interpretation of their survey responses was what they intended. Thus, the patterns and differences she identified may not have existed had a) better data been available for analysis and/or b) a formal and rigorous analysis of the data using an accepted analytical technique been conducted.

The brief discussion in this chapter has not been shared as the culmination of an analytic process. It has been shared because it provides some support for the notion that differences exist in how the two types of organizations view disaster response effectiveness as well as some indication of what might be found through further research on this topic. By offering hypotheses for future testing on this topic, this study has contributed to the research literature.

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

Contending with the aftermath of disasters is not a simple matter for impacted locations. One key complicating factor for response is that meeting the needs associated with these events often involves a range of groups from the government, nonprofit, and business sector. While nonprofits have the longest history of involvement in dealing with disasters, government has had an ever increasing role over the last century. Government assistance is typically directed toward serving the needs of the community at-large (e.g., clearing debris, providing security) while nonprofit assistance is typically directed at meeting the needs of individuals and households (e.g., providing food, water, shelter).

While the involvement of both types of groups after a disaster is critical, the two types of groups have not been successful in coordinating their efforts. Their failure to coordinate has resulted in significant criticism and a series of attempts throughout recent decades by government to develop coordination systems to address the coordination problem. Yet, even recent attempts to unify the efforts of all of the groups involved after a disaster have met with limited success.

Perhaps one reason why coordination systems have met with limited success is that they were devised without first examining how the various groups involved in the aftermath of disasters (in this case nonprofits and government agencies) conceptualize the events in which they are involved, their activities related to it, and how they assess the effectiveness of their response. It seems intuitive that these issues ought to have a significant role in shaping the mechanisms we create to coordinate our efforts after disasters.

The literature suggests that nonprofits and government agencies are different in fundamental ways. Some of the ways in which these types of agencies differ day-to-day include

their mission and functions, organizational culture, power structure, and resources. And, in disasters, these two types of groups are involved in different tasks, organize themselves differently, use different resources, and have different overall goals. It is reasonable to think that because these types of organizations are so dissimilar they may perceive disasters, response, and effectiveness differently.

This study attempted to explore how nonprofits and emergency management related government agencies conceptualized these key concepts. The ultimate goal of the study was to contribute to emergency management theory and practice by identifying the extent to which nonprofits and government view these concepts similarly, articulating where differences exist, and suggesting the possible implications of their views for efforts to develop coordination systems for the aftermath of disasters.

As has been discussed in the preceding chapters, the researcher was unable to explore her research question by fully and formally analyzing the data collected. Thus, this study did not meet its goal. Yet, in examining the connection between the data issues observed and the chosen data collection method and the connection between the data issues observed an alternate method that would limit, if not eliminate, the data issues in the future, this study has made a contribution. In this case, an internet survey was not the best data collection approach to explore the research topic and in-depth, semi-structured interviews would have been a far better choice. Future researchers investigating the meaning of disaster response effectiveness should bear in mind what was discovered through this research attempt.

Exploration of the topic of disaster response effectiveness is critical for both practice and the emerging discipline of emergency management. And, in light of this fact, the researcher made a superficial attempt to informally explore the data she had collected to see if there was

any indication of what these concepts meant to nonprofit and government organizations as well as whether any differences might exist in how each views the concepts. The analysis revealed some patterns in nonprofit and government organization views and some evidence that differences in how each views the concepts may exist. Based on the analysis, hypotheses of what future research might discover were offered.

It is this researcher's hope that research is initiated again on the topic in the near future. A better understanding of how disaster response effectiveness is conceptualized by practitioners from both nonprofits and government would provide the information needed to compare each type of group's views to current coordination systems to analyze their goodness-of-fit. If a poor goodness-of-fit is found between current coordination systems and one or both types of groups views of disaster response effectiveness, then based on the information collected through future research a new coordination system could be devised. Information about how each type of group perceives this topic could also be communicated in emergency management trainings so that representatives of both types of groups can better understand how the other works.

Exploration of this topic is also central to the development of the emergency management discipline. The concepts of disaster, response, and effectiveness remain undefined in the literature while still being central sensitizing concepts within the emerging discipline (Jensen, 2010). Research, such as that attempted by this study, stands to make significant contributions to the discipline by beginning to operationalize these concepts so that future students and researchers can begin their study with a clear understanding of the phenomena they are studying/about to study.

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APPENDIX A: FOUR-STEP SAMPLING PROCESS

First Step

The first step was to determine locations that had experienced significant disasters in recent years. Receipt of presidentially declared disaster (PDD) is one way of determining a given area (at the county level) has experienced a disaster. While there are a number of criteria that are considered in the process of determining whether a PDD will be awarded, generally speaking, PDDs are awarded when a given location experiences impacts from an event that overwhelm its capacity as well as the capacity of the state in which it is located (FEMA, 2010). It was assumed that individuals who worked with organizations in areas that had experienced a number of disasters in recent years would be in the best position to provide rich, meaningful data regarding the topics under study in this research. Based on this rationale, counties in states that received three or more PDDs between 2003 and 2012 were identified based on information available at the Federal Emergency Management Agency's website.

Second Step

The second step was to identify all the counties within the state that received three or more PDDs that included access to the federal individual assistance program. For counties to be granted access to the individual assistance program as part of a PDD additional criteria related to the impact of the event on individuals and households within the area have to be met (FEMA IS-208a, 2010). The rationale for this step was that the researcher assumed that nonprofits would be more likely to be engaged in the aftermath of a disaster, if individuals and families are significantly impacted; and, hence, have organizational representatives who could offer richer information.

This step resulted in an initial sample of 78 counties; however, most of the counties were from the State of Indiana – 58 counties. As Indiana represented a large number of counties, researcher used a random sampling to select six counties from the list of 58. The rationale for choosing six counties from Indiana was because six was the greatest number of counties that qualified for selection from any other state (i.e., Illinois) using the aforementioned process. Random written generator was used to identify starting point which is number 4. Researcher selected every 10th county on the list until 6 counties were selected from Indiana. Thus, a sample of 26 counties resulted from the second step.

Third Step

The third step is intended to narrow the sample to geographical areas within counties that received PDDs where a range of individuals representing both nonprofits and government who could speak to their organization's views of disaster response effectiveness would likely exist. It was assumed that the largest urban area within the counties that received PDDs would likely have a combination of nonprofits and government entities that would have staff that could be contacted. Outside of urban areas, the likelihood increases that representative of government entities (such as law enforcement and fire) and nonprofits would be volunteers and/or part-time, and/or hard to reach.

Fourth Step

The fourth step was to identify nonprofits and government organizations that were likely to be involved in disaster relief in the urban areas identified. The types of government organizations selected were based on their recognition in the disaster literature as “first responders” or “the first line of defense” in emergencies and disaster within communities across the United States (Auf der Heide, 1989; Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977). These agencies include fire

and law enforcement. In addition to these two types of organizations within the urban area, emergency management offices at the city level (if such an office existed) or at the county level were selected. Emergency management offices were selected because the profession of emergency management is that which “coordinates and integrates all activities related to preparedness, response, mitigation and recovery” within jurisdictions (Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977). This study will target one representative of each of these organizations within each county to include in the sample. Specifically, the chief of police department, the chief of fire department and the local emergency manager will be invited for interviews.

The researcher also invited 3 nonprofit representatives to participate in this research study. Like in the case of the government organizations, the ideal nonprofit organizations to participate in this study would be those who actually participated in one of the recent disasters experienced in the area. Thus, nonprofits were selected to be invited to participate in this research if the local news media or publicly available government incident briefings/after action reports reported their involvement.

Using this four-step sampling process, six representatives from each of the 26 counties in the sample were invited for participation for a potential total of 156 potential participants (78 nonprofit and 78 government representatives). Specifically, the contact information for the individuals who were invited to participate were located from public resources including websites and phone books resulting in contact information for 151 potential participants (contact information for 5 potential participants could not be found).

APPENDIX B: COUNTIES THAT RECEIVED PDD BETWEEN 2003-2012

Counties that received PDD that included federal individual assistance program between 2003 and 2012											
States	Counties	Year									
Alabama	Jefferson	2012	2011				2007				2003
	Walker		2011	2010							2003
	Marshall		2011	2010							2003
	DeKalb		2011	2010							2003
	Baldwin								2005	2004	2003
	Washington		2011						2005	2004	
Subtotal:	6										
California	Los Angeles					2008	2007		2005		2003
	Ventura						2007		2005		2003
Subtotal:	2										
Florida	Pasco	2012								2004	2003
	Wakulla	2012				2008			2005	2004	
	Duval	2012				2008				2004	
	Franklin	2012							2005	2004	
	Volusia				2009	2008	2007			2004	
	St. Lucie					2008			2005	2004	
	Seminole					2008	2007			2004	
Subtotal:	7										
Georgia	Carroll				2009	2008				2004	
	DeKalb				2009	2008				2004	
	Fulton				2009	2008				2004	
Subtotal:	3										
Illinois	Winnebago			2010		2008	2007				
	LaSalle					2008	2007			2004	
Subtotal:	2										
Indiana	LaPorte				2009	2008			2005		
	Dearborn					2008			2005	2004	
	Hamilton					2008			2005	2004	2003
	Vanderburgh							2006	2005	2004	
	Kosciusko				2009	2008			2005	2004	
	Shelby					2008			2005	2004	2003
Subtotal:	6										
TOTAL :	26										

APPENDIX C: SURVEY INVITATION LETTER

Note: This invitation was sent by e-mail. It looked as follows.

From: North Dakota State University
Center for Disaster Studies and Emergency Management
Dept. 2351
P.O. Box 6050
Fargo, ND 58108-6050
(701) 231-5595

Dear Sir or Madam

North Dakota State University's Center for Disaster Studies and Emergency Management needs your help for an exploratory study of the role of local agencies in disasters. Your agency has been selected for participation because your local jurisdiction has been impacted by a number of disasters in recent years and was likely involved in dealing with the impacts from the disaster.

While much has been written about disasters and how communities cope with them, very little research has focused on the role of individual agencies in disasters and their views. This study intends to address the gap by asking you—someone we believe has relevant, recent experience dealing with disasters—what you think.

I am eager to learn about your organization's involvement disasters. I hope that you will take a few minutes to complete the following survey on behalf of your agency at:

https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/Local_Organization_Involvement_in_Disasters

When you click the survey link, you will first encounter an information sheet providing additional information about this study. Following the information sheet, you will find a short survey.

It is expected that it will take approximately 20 minutes to complete the survey. Should you need to exit the survey prior to completing it, you can return to your survey from the same computer any time prior to [X DATE] to finish by following the link above.

Your participation in this survey and your survey responses will be kept confidential; your participation is voluntary; and, you may choose not to participate in the study anytime. Should you have any questions, feel free to contact me by phone at 701-540-2682 or email at nazgul.borkosheva@my.ndsu.edu. You may also contact Dr. Jessica Jensen, who is assisting with this project, by phone at (701) 219-4293 or by email at ja.jensen@ndsu.edu.

Thank you in advance for your participation in this research project.

Sincerely,

NazgulBorkosheva

APPENDIX D: INFORMATION SHEET AND SURVEY

Local Organization Involvement in Disasters Study

North Dakota State University
Department of Emergency Management
Center for Disaster Studies and Emergency Management
Department 2351
P.O. Box 6050
Fargo, ND 58108-6050
(701) 231-5595

DIRECTIONS: Please review the following information sheet. You will be directed to the short survey after you indicate your willingness to participate at the bottom of this information sheet.

Research Study

You are being invited to participate in an exploratory research project entitled "Local Agency Involvement in Disasters". This study is being conducted by Nazgul Borkosheva from the Center for Disaster Studies and Emergency Management at North Dakota State University.

Purpose of Study

The purpose of this research is to explore the roles of local agencies in disasters and their views.

Basis for Participant Selection

You are being invited to participate in this research project because your local jurisdiction has experienced several disasters between 2003 and 2012 and we assume that your agency has been involved in dealing with one or more of those disasters.

Explanation of Procedures

Should you choose to participate, we will send you a survey link within two weeks. The survey is comprised of seven questions and would take approximately 10-15 minutes to answer. The survey will be sent via email to each participant's email address.

Potential Risks and Discomforts

There should be no potential discomfort or physical, social, psychological, legal, or economic risk to you due to your participation in this study.

Potential Benefits

There is a considerable amount of disaster literature on how disasters impact communities and how communities attempt to deal with them. However, there is little empirical research as to how individual agencies in local jurisdictions are involved in disasters and their views. This research intends to address, this gap in knowledge.

Your participation in this project will increase the information available to educate students and faculty in emergency management higher education programs as well as agencies involved in dealing with disasters across the United States.

Assurance of Confidentiality

If you choose to participate in this study, you are guaranteed confidentiality. Your survey and the responses you provide in the survey will not be accessible to anyone but the researcher, and once your survey is no longer relevant to this research project it will be destroyed.

Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal from the Study

Your participation is voluntary and you may quit at any time. Your decision whether or not to participate will not affect your present or future relationship with North Dakota State University or any other benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. If you decide to participate, you are free to withdraw your consent and to discontinue participation at any time.

Offer to Answer Questions

Local Organization Involvement in Disasters Study

You should feel free to ask questions now or at any time. If you have any questions, you can contact me, Nazgul Borkosheva, at (701) 540-2682 or nazgul.borkosheva@my.ndsu.edu or Dr. Jessica Jensen, at (701) 231-5886 or ja.jensen@ndsu.edu. If you have any questions about the rights of human research participants, or wish to report a research-related problem, contact the NDSU Institutional Research Board (IRB) Office at (701) 231-8908 or by email at ndsu.irb@ndsu.edu.


***I have read the preceding information sheet; and, I would like to participate in this study.**

Yes

No

Local Organization Involvement in Disasters Study

*How would you describe the day-to-day, overall mission of your organization?



Local Organization Involvement in Disasters Study

*What makes a disaster "a disaster"?


A large, empty rectangular text input field with a light gray background and a thin black border. It includes a vertical scrollbar on the right side.

*How does your organization respond after a disaster occurs in your community?

A large, empty rectangular text input field with a light gray background and a thin black border. It includes a vertical scrollbar on the right side.


Local Organization Involvement in Disasters Study

*In the context of disasters, what does the term "response" mean to you?



Local Organization Involvement in Disasters Study

*How do you assess the effectiveness of your organization's response?



Local Organization Involvement in Disasters Study

*In what city, county, and state is your organization located?

*What is the name of your organization?

*Please identify the category to which your organization belongs.

- Government agency
- Nonprofit/voluntary organization
- Other (please specify)

Please use this space to address anything related to disasters and the involvement of your organization that you think I should know.

May a researcher associated with this project contact you by phone with any follow-up questions to your survey responses?

- Yes
- No

If yes, at what phone number can you be reached?

Phone number:

APPENDIX E: REMINDER E-MAIL

Note: The reminder was sent by e-mail. It looked as follows.

North Dakota State University
Center for Disaster Studies and Emergency Management
Dept. 2350
P.O. Box 6050
Fargo, ND 58108-6050

Dear Sir or Madam,

Approximately a week ago, a formal invitation to participate in an exploratory study on the role of local agencies in disaster was sent to you along with a link to a survey. To the best of our knowledge, your survey has not yet been completed.

This survey represents an opportunity for you to educate students and faculty in emergency management higher education programs as well as agencies involved in dealing with disaster across the United States. Please do not allow the chance to share your organization's views to pass. You can complete the survey about your organization's role in disaster now at:

https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/Local_Organization_Involvement_in_Disasters

The survey should take about 15 minutes to complete and you can stop and return to the survey any time before December 21st from the computer on which you started the survey.

Should you have just completed the survey, thank you for your contribution to the emergency management community's knowledge about disaster response. If you have any questions, feel free to contact Nazgul Borkosheva at 701-540-2682 or email at nazgul.borkosheva@my.ndsu.edu. You may also contact Dr. Jessica Jensen, who is assisting with this project, by phone at (701) 219-4293 or by email at ja.jensen@ndsu.edu

Sincerely,

Nazgul Borkosheva

APPENDIX F: THANK YOU E-MAIL

Note: The thank you was sent by e-mail. It looked as follows.

North Dakota State University
Center for Disaster Studies and Emergency Management
Dept. 2350
P.O. Box 6050
Fargo, ND 58108-6050

Dear [*Potential Participant Name*]

Thank you for your contribution to the emergency management community's knowledge about disaster response. Each individual who completes the survey puts us one step closer to meeting the standards for scientific research. If you have any questions, feel free to contact Nazgul Borkosheva at 701-540-2682 or email at nazgul.borkosheva@my.ndsu.edu. You may also contact Dr. Jessica Jensen, who is assisting with this project, by phone at (701) 219-4293 or by email at ja.jensen@ndsu.edu

Sincerely,

NazgulBorkosheva

APPENDIX G: SECOND SURVEY INVITATION LETTER

Note: This second invitation was sent by e-mail. It looked as follows.

From: North Dakota State University
Center for Disaster Studies and Emergency Management
Dept. 2351
P.O. Box 6050
Fargo, ND 58108-6050
(701) 231-5595

Dear Sir or Madam,

About two weeks ago, you were sent a link to a survey about your agency's role in disasters. To the best of my knowledge, you have not yet completed the survey.

The participation of your agency is important, as the findings from this study will be used to educate the future emergency managers and other agencies involved in disasters.

I am contacting you again because of the importance of your survey in helping get accurate results. Your agency has been selected for participation because your organization has experienced a number of hazard events in recent years and more than likely has been involved in disaster relief operations. Your participation is needed to ensure that the survey results meet the scientific standards for research.

I hope that you will take this last opportunity to participate in this research endeavor. I hope that you will take a few minutes to complete the following survey on behalf of your agency at:
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/Local_Organization_Involvement_in_Disasters

Should you have any questions, feel free to contact me by phone at 701-540-2682 or email at nazgul.borkosheva@my.ndsu.edu. You may also contact Dr. Jessica Jensen, who is assisting with this project, by phone at (701) 219-4293 or by email at ja.jensen@ndsu.edu.

Thank you in advance for your participation in this research project.

Sincerely,

Nazgul Borkosheva

APPENDIX H: SECOND FOLLOW-UP E-MAIL

Note: This follow-up was sent by e-mail. It looked as follows.

North Dakota State University
Center for Disaster Studies and Emergency Management
Dept. 2350
P.O. Box 6050
Fargo, ND 58108-6050

Dear Sir or Madam,

We are hoping you may be able to give about 15 minutes of your time to help us collect important information on disaster response by completing a short survey. We plan to end this study next week, so we wanted to e-mail everyone who has not responded to make sure you had a chance to participate.

Please do not allow the chance to share your organization's views to pass. You can complete the survey about your organization's role in disaster now at:

https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/Local_Organization_Involvement_in_Disasters

The survey should take about 15 minutes to complete and you can stop and return to the survey any time before December 21st from the computer on which you started the survey.


If you have already completed the survey, we really appreciate your participation and thank you for your contribution to the emergency management community's knowledge about disaster response. If you have any questions, feel free to contact Nazgul Borkosheva at 701-540-2682 or email at nazgul.borkosheva@my.ndsu.edu. You may also contact Dr. Jessica Jensen, who is assisting with this project, by phone at (701) 219-4293 or by email at ja.jensen@ndsu.edu

Sincerely,

Nazgul Borkosheva

APPENDIX I: MODIFIED SURVEY

***How would you describe the overall mission of your organization during nondisaster times?**



How would your organization define a disaster?

Please provide two characteristics of disaster that distinguish it from other types of events.

***Characteristic one:**

***Characteristic two:**

Other characteristics?

How does your organization respond after a disaster occurs in your community?

Please provide two examples.

***Example one:**


***Example two:**

Other examples?

In the context of disasters, what does the term "response" mean to your organization?

Please provide two examples of what distinguishes response from things in which your organization engages.

***One example:**



How do you know if your organization's response has been effective?

Please provide two examples of criteria your organization does/would use.

***Criteria one:**

***Criteria two:**

Additional criteria?

***In what city, county, and state is your organization located?**

***Please identify the category to which your organization belongs.**

- Government agency
- Nonprofit/voluntary organization
- Other (please specify)

Please use this space to address anything related to disasters and the involvement of your organization that you think will benefit this research project.

May a researcher associated with this project contact you by phone with any follow-up questions to your survey responses?

- Yes
- No

If yes, at what phone number can you be reached?

NOTE: Please do not include parentheses or dashes in the phone number you provide. An example of the phone number format the system will accept is: 7019998282.

Phone Number:

APPENDIX J: SECOND REVISED SURVEY INVITATION LETTER

Note: This revised invitation was sent by E-mail. It looked as follows.

From: North Dakota State University
Center for Disaster Studies and Emergency Management
Dept. 2351
P.O. Box 6050
Fargo, ND 58108-6050
(701) 231-5595

Dear Sir or Madam,

About two weeks ago, you were sent a link to a short survey about your agency's role in disasters. To the best of my knowledge, you have not yet completed the survey.

The survey asks only general questions that solicit your thoughts and opinions. There are no technical questions and no formal training or expertise is necessary to respond.

The participation of your agency is critical to this research project. Thus, if you have a few minutes to complete the survey, I would be most grateful.

I hope that you will take this opportunity to participate in this research endeavor by completing the survey at: https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/Local_Organization_Involvement_in_Disasters
Should you have just completed the survey, thank you for your contribution to the emergency management community's knowledge about disaster response.

Should you have any questions, feel free to contact me by phone at 701-540-2682 or email at nazgul.borkosheva@my.ndsu.edu. You may also contact Dr. Jessica Jensen, who is assisting with this project, by phone at (701) 219-4293 or by email at ja.jensen@ndsu.edu.

Thank you in advance for your participation in this research project.

Sincerely,

Nazgul Borkosheva

APPENDIX K: DEFINITIONS OF DISASTER

Government

Participant	Responses
1*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A minor disaster is an adverse event that may have impacted more than one jurisdiction, or may pose a threat of additional danger to public safety across several jurisdictions. Mutual aid is required from adjacent jurisdictions. A major disaster is an adverse event that impacts numerous county jurisdictions. Resources organic to jurisdictions of the county are insufficient and direct mutual aid is immediately required from either adjacent counties or state agencies. A catastrophic disaster is an event that has impacted severely on a major segment of the county involving many jurisdictions. Mutual aid is necessary from adjacent counties, state, federal and private sector resources for a prolonged period to meet both human response and recovery needs and reestablish the infrastructure.
2*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> When all of my "local" resources are or soon will be used or depleted. 75 +% of primary Law Enforcement, Fire and/or Medical units have been committed to a single event/incident. The local hospital has been overrun.
3*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Any situation that requires the coordination of city resources and outside resources and the opening of the City Emergency Operations Center for more than one operational period (12 hours).
4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An event that overwhelms the resources assigned to mitigate the emergency An event that uses the full spectrum of resources available to the City to maximum capacity A disaster is defined as an event that uses the resources of the City, Region, State and Federal levels and is growing or expected to grow despite our efforts
5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unplanned Disrupting
6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Emergency situation beyond our resources Not enough help
7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Usually unexpected can build over weeks or happen very quickly - disasters result in damage Disasters can create hazards Disasters can be natural or manmade
8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The first characteristic of a disaster that distinguish it from any other type of event(s) is an act of nature related to a weather event that causes injury or/and death to people, damage to property, and destruction in an area located in our jurisdiction. The second characteristic of a disaster that distinguish it from any other type of event(s) is an industrial accident that causes chemical substance to be released in the city that causes injury and/or death to people, damage to property, and destruction in area located in our jurisdiction. Another characteristic of a disaster that distinguish it from any other type of event(s) is a an act of terror designed to cause injury and/or death to people, damage to property, and destruction in an area located in our jurisdiction.

Participant	Responses
9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Disaster most often is widespread and affects the entire population to some extent. • Disasters create a separation from normal daily routines and operations and cause a sense of panic and discord among those affected.
10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An event which depletes the capability for a county to effectively respond to a disaster • An incident in which on scene incident management does not have the tools necessary to be successful
11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Anything that affects our area • All disaster starts and ends local
12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An unexpected natural or man-made event that exceeds the normal day-to-day emergency response capabilities of our community • Catastrophic event covering affecting a large group of people or property, whether physical or mental
13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It has the magnitude to greatly impact the normal daily routine of our community, affects a vast number of our customers, or overwhelms our response capabilities. • It is an event that may be man-made or natural.
14	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Any event that involves mass casualties, or the potential of mass casualties beyond your normal capability • An event that requires more resources (hazmat, technical rescue EMS etc.) than are normally available. All available resources from surrounding cities and county agencies could be required (State and local mutual aid agreements are activated)
15	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overwhelms the department's capabilities and resources • Forces the department to categorize its functions and only provide its Primary Mission Essential Functions.
16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Volume and magnitude of calls for service • Resource needs are dramatically increased

Nonprofits

Participant	Responses
1*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We define two kinds. On the one hand, you have local small events, such as an apartment building fire or flooding in a subdivision. We can completely support these occurrences with our local resources. On the other hand, you have national level events that are massive, such as Hurricane Sandy. In both cases, a disaster is defined as any sudden occurrence that forces a person to be unexpectedly homeless and potentially without documents, medicine, clothes or food
2*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We are the "guardians" over 300 plus children and are the main resources for 100 plus older adults through our core programs. When a storm hits Florida we have the responsibility to ensure that our children and seniors are properly prepared, aware of resources and moved to a safe place if needed. We coordinate with other non-profits in the area to make sure we are able to meet the needs of all vulnerable people in our community.
3*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A disaster is an event or series of events of either natural or man-made causes that stretch the normal response capabilities of individuals and communities beyond their limits.

Participant	Responses
4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Displaces individuals • Damages or destroys public or private property • Creates a gap in basic human needs being met
5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Urgency of need with constrained transportation and storage at the point of disaster • Calls for support are routinely overblown and prioritization of distribution of assistance is often emotionally driven as opposed to actual need.
6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A sudden event, such as an accident or a natural catastrophe • That causes great damage or loss of life • Can be unexpected
7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Damages resulting from natural causes • Size and scope relative to a community population; one house is a very small matter relative to 100 houses, etc.
8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If the event effects more than 500 families that temporary or permanently displaced • 500 families that temporary or permanently displaced • Special needs populations are 50% of the effected group and the under insured or not insured
9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Disasters can be either man made (i.e. airplanes crash or terrorist attack) or the result of nature's violent storms such as hurricanes and tornados. • Disasters are often unexpected and usually affect a large segment of a local population. • Disasters often cause mass loss of property and human life.
10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Manmade or natural disaster event that impacts all sectors in the community • Disruption due to emergencies • EMA, Business Continuity Plan enacted
11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An abnormal event that requires the response to regain stability • Resulting in chaos requiring support to establish a normal
12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A disaster would be an event that results in people's lives being turned upside down. It somehow strips away their comfort and security and places them at risk. • A disaster is an event that results in unusual suffering, physical, mental, or spiritual. • Disasters do not have to be widespread. It is important that we understand that personal disasters - for a child, the loss of a parent, or for a parent, the loss of a child - are often just devastating as natural disasters and the like.
13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An entire community, town, or city is effected • People are without basic needs.
14	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A calamitous even • An event that causes loss of life, damage, or hardship

APPENDIX L: ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSE ACTIVITIES

Government

Participant	Responses
1*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> We activate our Emergency Operations Center and respond under that NIMS organizational structure.
2*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Emergency Management may initially respond to the scene with resources as needed. And then would open an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to provide support to the scene in the form of requesting and tracking resources from outside the local jurisdictions. Once the response is under control a damage assessment would be conducted in an attempt to gain Federal assistance. After the damage assistance in complete we would switch to recovery planning.
3*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Manages the Emergency Operations Center for the coordination of resources. Supervises the long-term recovery and unmet needs committees. Manages the post disaster mitigation projects and funding.
4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> We respond as first responders as providers in the initial operational period. We then proceed using the Operational P as a model to develop situational awareness to handle the emergency for extended operational periods. We approach the emergency from a whole community aspect. We activate the DOC's in each Department and open the City EOC to manage the emergency using the appropriate resources from each Governmental and Non-Governmental agency.
5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Response and rescue Assist with recovery
6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assistance Coordination
7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> After the earthquakes in Haiti we participated in the evacuation of expatriated Americans from to our Airport. This involved a large Incident Command System - over 10 thousand were evacuated During hurricanes we use ICS as well
8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Once the disaster occurs we send in our emergency first responders to provide assistance to the residents/businesses of the area. The police department will send in officers and supervisors and the fire department will send in paramedics, fire engines, and rescue and recovery personnel and equipment and provide an assessment for activation of the Emergency Management Plan. Search and recovery of individuals are carried out. Our Incident Command System (ICS) is activated and the various departments respond under our Emergency Management Agency to assist in the disaster area. The public works department responds with police and fire after an assessment has been made to restore the area. Debris is removed; utility companies come in to restore power, water, and gas service. Local, state, and federal agencies provide assistance for recovery
9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This agency coordinates with local emergency response agencies to meet their needs to effectively respond to the disaster. This agency coordinates with state and federal agencies to meet the needs of those affected by the disaster.
10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Relief - food, clothing, shelter Recovery- getting agencies back to predicate conditions

Participant	Responses
11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Working together every day • Within in 30 min
12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We function as an emergency operations center, coordinating response and recovery. • We provide incident management teams
13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We utilize standardized response models for our jurisdiction immediately. Then, depending on the variables of the incident, utilize appropriate automatic and mutual aid. These methods are utilized to address life safety until all life safety needs have been met. • Once life safety needs have been met, we return to normal emergency response platforms. We also enter into recovery and service operations assisting other city departments and customers.
14	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fire, EMS, hazardous material, technical search & rescue etc. • We also are major participants in our county EMA Operations Center
15	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It upgrades it's response to attempt to overwhelm the incident and gain control immediately. • It automatically seeks out resources from other agencies and jurisdictions to include non-governmental organizations and faith based groups
16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It models itself after its Federal (FEMA) and State (GEMA) partners to rapidly bring the incident into recovery, mitigation and COOP functions. • Dependent on the type of disaster • responds during a disaster and continues the efforts until the incident is mitigated or turned over to FEMA or other agencies that would take care of long term issues. We prepare for typically 72 hours of support. The response will include activating our Emergency Operations Center, creating a unified command system that involves any organization that has been effected or can aid in the recovery

Nonprofits

Participant	Responses
1*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We have volunteers on call 24/7/365. For small events, they are dispatched through the 911 call center and go directly to the scene. Depending on the size and need of the disaster, I might receive a call from the local EMA director and would then initiate a call-down of our phone tree to activate the appropriate volunteers. I would establish the necessary facilities and let the community know what is available.
2*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prior to the storm we make contact with all vulnerable clients to develop disaster plan- evacuation plan if needed. 24 hours post storm we make contact with them again to ensure they are not in need of anything

Participant	Responses
3*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> We are members of local, community, state and national response organizations. We work with each of these entities to develop a coordinated plan of response that targets the needs and applies the available resources. If resources are not available we work to develop them. Specific things we have done in the past include in the short term Providing food, water, clothing, financial resources, transportation, communications, counseling, referrals for housing. In the long term we provided case management, financial resources for home repair
4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provides Sheltering Provides feeding Provides bulk distribution of supplies, provides follow-up client casework, assists in recovery process
5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Attempts to identify areas of greatest need, prioritize distribution of food and water and report projected needs to national-level support elements. Works to contact partners in impacted areas to determine their ability to support and inventory on-hand Develops media releases to discuss needs, both food and financial.
6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Providing additional food, water and services to people who have been impacted by an emergency or disaster. During a catastrophic event, emergency food and disaster supplies are distributed from local points of distribution which may include churches, schools, businesses, parking lots and mobile vehicles. Response functions are initiated by an incident that causes major disruption to the surrounding community or the notification of a pending event. We may also distribute food, water and disaster supplies to Food Banks in other parts of the State and the US. We may also provide personnel services to Food Banks in affected areas.
7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> We use a protocol of contacts with people responsible for being eyes on the ground reporting to specific persons, and that begins a chain reaction of support and resources.
8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Disasters are often characterized as response or recovery. We monitor response to address what's left to be done in the recovery phase We find out what unmet needs are discovered We may collect data, then request assistance from businesses or community.
9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> We offered the use of our facilities as a Command Center for Tornado Relief efforts to both civil/secular agencies (American Red Cross and FEMA) and Christian Disaster Relief Organizations (Alabama Baptist Disaster Relief and The Church of Christ Disaster Relief) We also worked closely with local government authorities, local police and fire rescue departments along with the Mayor's Office here in Center Point. We were also a housing and distribution center for victims of the disaster providing food, water, shelter, tarps and many of the daily hygiene needs of individuals.

Participant	Responses
10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mass Care • Individual and Family Recovery
11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2-1-1 is available 24 hours/day to provide information and referral in disaster response and recovery. • Financial support for long term recovery efforts • Volunteer opportunities listed in volunteer match database
12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Our congregation looks to support the first responders. For them, the suffering and pain that they deal with on an ongoing basis can be overwhelming. We are there to love and care for them. We provide meals. We pray for tem regularly and let them know that we are doing so. The pastor of our church also serves as a volunteer chaplain. • We have paid to bring in help from outside our community to help in dealing with the pain and suffering.
13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Utilize 2-1-1 • Set up a volunteer center to handle volunteers and donations.
14	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We provide food, shelter, clothing, clean-up supplies, and grief counseling as we help people get back on their feet.

APPENDIX M: MEANINGS OF THE TERM RESPONSE

Government

Participant	Responses
1*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Response means handling the immediate issues and preparing for the extended response. For example, our last declaration for disaster as a result of the floor included rescuing over 300 citizens from flooded homes and cars and then setting up command for housing, food, damage assessment, utilities and information. • Activating the Emergency Operations Center and working under the NIMS organizational structure with its assigned roles.
2*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As is indicated in my response to the prior question, all of the topics listed are a "response" from my organization. My job in a disaster is to respond to the NEEDS of not only the responders but also the impacted people of my jurisdiction as well as the elected officials.
3*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • First responders are considered those agencies tasked with rapid response to save lives and protect property.....we send a liaison to the incident commander to assist with the response phase if needed.
4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Again we respond as first responders within the context of our Department Mission. As the incident progresses as either planned or immediate we activate our next level of response be it DOC or EOC.
5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide assistance to the community when services may not be available Assure safety of the residents during a disaster
6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • open EOC
7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the context of disaster, response is specifically geared to the disaster. We bring in additional personnel, specialists and our partners in the surrounding community to address the issues generated by the disaster. We engage daily in the business of public safety and law enforcement
8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Our organization will arrive in a timely manner to provide assistance to our citizens, businesses and guest involved in a disaster and provide assistance with police, fire, public works, and assist with utility services coming into the area
9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Response is an active approach to attack the affects of the disaster by putting boots on the ground; additionally, response is actually making contact with those directly affected by the disaster. This agency's response is passive because the agency's personnel play a more active role behind the scenes and do not initially make direct contact with those affected by the disaster.
10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Effectively managing resources to ensure on scene management is occurring.
11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Every one working together
12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Response to us may mean coordinating mutual aid between agencies for delivery of personnel and/or equipment. Response may also mean deployment to a scene where we assist with Unified Command as well as logistics.

Participant	Responses
13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> First, it is the performance of our normal operations. Operations which may be expanded continuously to meet the requirements of the demand. 2. It continues until our jurisdiction recovers to a normal daily routine.
14	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dispatching fire/EMS personnel to the scene, establishing command and requesting the needed resources to handle the event. In our department, "response" is used to describe emergency operations.
15	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The organizations responds in two elements: 1.Command and Control to implement strategic plans (IAPs) to take control of the incident and manage resources. 2. Task and Tactics: to conduct operations based off of strategic planning
16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The deployment of resources to mitigate the disaster. The number and type of resources are dependent on the type of disaster and can change throughout the course of the response.

Nonprofits

Participant	Responses
1*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> We would respond with shelter (cots, showers, heat, and ac), teams of client caseworkers, health and mental health professionals, disaster assessment teams, IT functionality, toiletry bags, even cleaning supplies. Our response would be provided to people that bridge between when a disaster occurs and when they have had time to figure out what to do, make other arrangements, allow insurance to kick in, whatever the case may be.
2*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Response to us means preplanning and preparing our clients for the “what ifs” and then post disaster responding means ensuring their ongoing needs are being met, that they are safe, sheltered, and being fed.
3*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The operative rule is be part of the solution not part of the problem. First of all, all response must be planned. There must be leadership and a framework to coordinate the response entities otherwise there is chaos at best and people get hurt at worst. The time to plan the disaster response is not after the fact. There must be ongoing, coordinated, collaborative plans that are practiced and exercised via training opportunities.
4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Response for us is not life, property, or asset protection but meeting the immediate disaster caused needs of individuals through providing shelter and food.
5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Transition to emergency operations which converts us from an agency support model to direct support to the community where needed.
6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Distribution of food, water and supplies as ordered by local or state Emergency Operations Centers, or by FEMA.
7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> We have building teams, cleaning teams, chainsaw teams, counseling teams, and case management teams, etc.

Participant	Responses
8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Response term means fire and rescue, police, medical, power restoration, safe roads from debris and feeding and shelter
9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Response to our disaster for our organization meant that we were willing to be open to almost every and all efforts that would help our church respond to the tremendous needs our community faced following the tornado disaster. An example is our church opening our facilities as shelter for those left homeless after the tornado. We also provided food and basic clothing needs for these victims. All of this was done in cooperation with the Red Cross and the Alabama Baptist Disaster Relief Agency. Another would be offering tree removal with Emergency Chain Saw crews which removed fallen trees from house tops, cars, and entrances to homes and driveways.
10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The immediate phase of disaster where chaos ensues and requires outside resources. Begins at impact and morphs into recovery when chaos abates and rebuilding begins.
11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Based on partnerships established with Red Cross and EMA's, United Way is responsive on the level appropriate to the disaster.
12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Response would be things that we do that are directly related to the event.
13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ways to help...through funds, volunteers, and supplies
14	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Response: For most disaster situations, we have a 2 hour window of time for our staff to arrive at the scene of the emergency. That is what our "response" is.

APPENDIX N: ASSESSING ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSE EFFECTIVENESS

Government

Participant	Responses
1*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have we become "whole" again. Have I fixed as many of the problems caused by the disaster as is possible.
2*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The effectiveness of our organization has increased dramatically over the past five years with the numerous disasters we have had to face and the preparedness that we go through as a community. On a scale of 1-10, we would rate a 8.
3*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We usually have an after action meeting to discuss/review utilizing a SWOT analysis approach.
4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We know if the initial response has been effective based on the situational awareness and battle rhythm of the incident. If a fire is extinguished using our resources then we know the effort has been effective. if the fire continues to grow beyond the objectives of the IC then we know the response needs to be enhanced with more robust resources or strategy needs to change. • At the DOC and EOC level we use the Planing P to assist with determining if incident objectives are being met in a timely, efficient manner.
5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Injuries or loss of life • What the increase in criminal activity was during the event
6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Responder coordination • Relief
7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protection of people and property During hurricanes, we assist int the evacuation of people to shelters and prevent looters from taking advantage of the situation - it has been effective if our officers return safely, the criminals are incarcerated and there is minimal loss of property due to theft. • Prior to the disaster, mitigation processes have been put in play. Citizens prepare for the approaching storm and heed the warning to evacuate. We are successful if no citizens are lost in the process. One is too many.
8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Our agency utilize an action report that we utilize to evaluate our effectiveness. We work with our EMA to gauge our effectiveness. • We document the resources that are utilized during the event and measure our results. We work with the state and federal agencies that assist with measuring our effectiveness.
9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The most important factor in any disaster is ensuring life safety for response agencies and the public. • The next important factor is to stabilize the jurisdiction affected by the disaster to a point where recovery can begin.
10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • After action review • Effective communication and coordination

Participant	Responses
11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • By input from community and other public safety agencies • Staying in contact with everyone
12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Signs of recovery and responsiveness of the other public safety agencies within the affected area • Feedback from citizens via verbal, written, social and news media. Feedback from elected officials is huge.
13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We return to a state of normalness experienced prior to the disaster. • All objectives of the incident action plan have been met.
14	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Safety - no personnel or citizens injured due to our actions. • A positive outcome dealing with life and property conservation
15	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The organization maintains a situational awareness to provide updates to command on the progress made during an incident via communications such as Plans and Operations Meetings, Real Time Field Reporting, Web EOC, etc. • Continuous evaluation and analysis of progress to ensure that the IAP is working • HOT Washes and After Action Reviews/Reports
16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mitigation of the event • No injuries to responders • After -action report in accordance with HSEEP.

Nonprofits

Participant	Responses
1*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clients can voluntarily fill out surveys after things have settled for them. We also track figures, such as how many became homeless or were able to retain their employment as the result of our support.
2*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Our funders dictate to us the protocols and our funding is impacted if we do not follow the protocols. There has not been any concern in the past but luckily our area has not suffered a direct hit of a storm in years.
3*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We are very effective
4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Client surveys • Fire rescue relationship
5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • People in need are being served. • People are safe
6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Feedback from those with which we have had contact • Feedback from the first responders
7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participate with Long Term Recovery Committees and monitor long term recovery efforts • Utilization of volunteer match for disaster related activity • Analyze 2-1-1 disaster related call service

Participant	Responses
8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • When life sustaining needs are available to the community at a pre disaster availability • when the public feels that adequate resources are available to help them on the road to recovery.
9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We developed a Response Team that did inventories on all the resources we were receiving both locally and across the U.S. We were overwhelmed at first with the sheer amount of resources that came in. By inventorying the supplies we were able to keep an accurate accounting of supplies received and supplies distributed. • We had teams of Chaplains and church volunteers that went into the affected areas offering assistance, gathering information and sharing prayer, consolation and counseling. We thus had registered the names of individuals, addresses, etc., which enabled us to follow up with these individuals at a later date. • Simply the numerous outlets and agencies as well as local citizens who recognized our church for our contributions in the disaster relief efforts, (i.e. local news media covered our response, the Alabama Baptist State Convention Executive Director came to our facilities and commended and contributed to our response efforts, local agencies such as the Birmingham Baptist Association did the same as did the Mayor's office).
10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We become part of the Long Term Recovery Group who will communicated with and through local Emergency Management daily via conference calls • We monitor official reports • We maintain internal activity reports
11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We work exclusively with the community organizations, and other responder organizations. We never just drop in and start working out of the local context • We don't leave until the last roofing shingle is in place
12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Distributions are completed as ordered by local/state Emergency Operations Centers and FEMA. • Critical services to our Partner Agencies resume.
13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Distribution of meals compared to disaster foot print.
14	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All individuals in need of meals as a result of the disaster have meals provided for them. • All individuals seeking shelter in response to the disaster have a temporary place to stay. • Individuals impacted begin transitioning into the recovery process.