ETHICAL LANDSCAPES OF THE HUMAN TERRAIN SYSTEM

A Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty
of the
North Dakota State University
of Agriculture and Applied Science

By

Jenna Lark Clawson

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS

Major Department:
Anthropology

October 2014

Fargo, North Dakota
North Dakota State University
Graduate School

Title

Ethical Landscapes of the Human Terrain System

By

Jenna Lark Clawson

The Supervisory Committee certifies that this disquisition complies with North Dakota State University’s regulations and meets the accepted standards for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE:

Dr. Joy Sather-Wagstaff
Chair

Dr. Jarret Brachman

Dr. Christina Weber

Approved:

11/21/14

Date

Dr. Jeffrey Clark

Department Chair
ABSTRACT

This thesis addresses current controversy over ethical practices in the Human Terrain System. In the past decade the Department of Defense has adopted a cultural approach in the science of military control consequently creating the controversial HTS program. The HTS employs anthropologists to create ethnographic data sets on target populations, which has created ethical concerns for the anthropology discipline. This phenomenon is situated in the context of anthropologists’ roles in colonial population control, prior military engagements, and the discipline’s reactions to late 20th century ethics issues. This ethical dilemma is analyzed using discourse of the military, academics, and the public. Themes found are contextualized in an analysis of ethics standards and practices for anthropology and the military and the AAAs opposition to the HTS. Findings are explained through application of Hoffman’s cultural response to disaster model. Based on this research, I make some initial suggestions for resolving this ethical dilemma.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my utmost gratitude to a number of people. There have been a variety of individuals who have helped me in one way or another along this journey. I write this to thank those of you who have shared in my happiness, setbacks, and successes throughout this thesis process. Namely I would like to thank my parents, Keith and Laurel Clawson. I attribute many of my successes to your endless examples of tireless work ethic, what it means to prosper through trials and tribulations, and why it is important to be both selfless and valiant in the face of difficulty.

I also want to thank my siblings: Crystal, Kaela, Bridget, and Tom, all of which are always a phone call or glass of wine away. One way or another, each of you have attributed to my personal and professional growth my entire life. Each of you have always led by example and truly shown what grit is and for that I am indebted. I want to express my thanks to Jared Huibregtse who came into my life at just the right time. It thrills me that we were able to experience and conquer the last year of our theses process together. Last, but certainly not least, I want to thank my friends, fellow graduate students who have become friends, and a variety of faculty and staff in the NDSU Anthropology Department who have helped inspire and motivate me in a variety of ways throughout this program.
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the professionals willing to engage in discourse surrounding shunned controversy and then advocate for change. This thesis is also dedicated to the millions of people, both civilian and military, who have been and will be affected both positively and negatively by the work of social scientists and the military throughout history and in the future. May the deaths, knowledge, struggles, and successes endured not be in vain.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................. iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................................................................ iv

DEDICATION ........................................................................................................................ v

LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................. viii

LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................ ix

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ....................................................................................................... x

CHAPTER 1. AN ETHICAL QUANDARY IN AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 1

The Human Terrain System and Anthropology: An Introduction to the Conflict ............ 1

Framing the Thesis Questions ......................................................................................... 5

Outline of the Thesis ........................................................................................................ 7

CHAPTER 2. SOURCES AND ANALYSIS METHODS .............................................................. 8

Framing Sources: Ethics vs. Morals and “Studying Up” ................................................. 8

Sources .............................................................................................................................. 10

Methods: Discourse Analysis ......................................................................................... 15

Analysis by Coding and Theming ................................................................................ 16

Thematic Findings .......................................................................................................... 17

Applying Results .......................................................................................................... 19

CHAPTER 3. THE HISTORICAL PAST AND ITS ENDURING CONTROVERSIES ........... 21

Social Sciences, Politics, and the Military ................................................................. 21

Late Colonial Past ........................................................................................................ 21

Early 20th Century Backlash ...................................................................................... 23

Late 20th Century: Darkness in El Dorado and its Significance to Framing the HTS .... 24
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Categories and Media Types</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. All Themes/Frequencies</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Main and Secondary Themes/Frequencies</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Number of civilian casualties in the War on Terror</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. On-site research areas and expertise of anthropologists present at the 2013 AAA annual conference noted with red circles. Graphic design courtesy of Sophie Haren. (See Appendix A for the original source for the graphic.)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Timeline: List of Significant Events: HTS (Forte 2010b)</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Screenshot of HTS recruitment email (Crockford 2012)</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Government Official Semi-Structured Questionnaire (part 1 of 3)</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Government Official Semi-Structured Questionnaire (part 3 of 3)</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS


AAA .......................................................... American Anthropological Association

AO ............................................................ Area of Operation

CEAUSSIC ................................................ Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology with US Military and Intelligence Communities

CDA .......................................................... Critical Discourse Analysis

CIA .......................................................... Central Intelligence Agency

COIN ....................................................... Counterinsurgency

DAC .......................................................... District Area Councils

DAHR .......................................................... Declaration of Anthropology and Human Rights

DHA .......................................................... Discourse Historical Approach

DoD .......................................................... Department of Defense

DoD 5500.7-R ............................................. Department of Defense Joint Ethics Regulation

DoJ .......................................................... Department of Justice

IED .......................................................... Improvised Explosive Device

EDPM ........................................................ Ethical Decision-Making Plan

FM 3-24 .................................................... Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24

FM 100-20 ................................................ Counterinsurgency Field Manual 100-20

FWA .......................................................... Federalwide Assurance

HSPP ........................................................ Human Subjects Protection Program

HTR .......................................................... Human Terrain
HTS.................................................. Human Terrain System
HTT.................................................. Human Terrain Team
HTTHB ............................................. Human Terrain Team Handbook
IDPs............................................... Internally Displaced Persons
IRB ............................................... Institutional Review Board
JER................................................ Joint Ethics Regulation, DoD 5500.7-R
JIEDDO.......................................... Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
NAC ............................................... Neighborhood Area Councils
NCA ............................................... Network for Concern Anthropologists
NGO ............................................... Non-Governmental Organizations
OE ................................................ Operational Environment
RPSH............................................... Research Plan: STRIKE HTT
TRADOC ........................................... United States Army Training and Doctrine Command
UCMJ ............................................... Uniform Code of Military Justice
UDHR ............................................... Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN ................................................ United Nations
USDA............................................... United States Department of Agriculture
USNWC .......................................... United States Naval War College
WWI............................................... World War I
WWII ............................................... World War II
CHAPTER 1. AN ETHICAL QUANDARY IN AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGY:
AN INTRODUCTION

The Human Terrain System and Anthropology: An Introduction to the Conflict

This thesis is an analysis and evaluation of conflicts and debates between anthropologists and the military focused on the ethics of human subjects research and the ethical uses of data collected through social scientists contracted by the military. For many decades, US military operations and national security and intelligence agencies have utilized social scientists to gain sociocultural information on indigenous populations in order to assist in military decision-making. This practice is an extension of 19th and early 20th century colonial era government, military, civilian uses of social research to learn about, control, and exploit colonized and/or civilian populations. In contemporary practice, such research takes numerous forms, from psychologists having “been involved in designing torture since at least the Vietnam War” (Gray and Zelinski 2006:128) to the creation of the Human Terrain System (HTS) by the US Army to reduce collateral damage, particularly civilian deaths, and engender other, more positive outcomes for local populations.

The HTS is a contract-based program whereby the Army embeds social scientists, including anthropologists, with troops in areas of conflict in order to gather sociocultural information on indigenous populations. The aim of HTS is to gather local sociocultural knowledge from indigenous populations to be used in decision-making for a diversity of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. HTS is founded on the premise that “all insurgencies, even today’s highly adaptable strains, remain wars amongst the people” (Sewell 2007:xlv) thus knowledge about indigenous people is critical to COIN success. The HTS was implemented in 2007, paralleling the so-called “surge” in Iraq when 9,000+ US troops were added to the war in
the Middle East and the military began a focus on humanizing relations with local populations. The program became a permanent US Army contract operation in 2010 and the most current Human Terrain Team (HTT) deployments have been in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, and other neighboring Middle Eastern countries during the “War on Terror.”

![Figure 1. Number of civilian casualties in the War on Terror.](image)

The late 2007-2013 period following the “surge” and the implementation of the HTS saw a major decline in civilian fatalities (see Figure 1). This decline can be attributed to a variety of factors, including the significant increase in troops, as well as the contribution of HTS-generated ethnographic data to decision-making. Yet despite this demonstrated value of anthropological knowledge, involvement in current military operations remains so controversial that participation in such by qualified anthropologists other than in leadership positions is low. For example, all three of the Directors of the HTS Social Sciences Directorate (past and present) have doctoral degrees in anthropology. According to King (2011:10), in 2011 fewer than 10% of the 77 HTS social scientists were anthropologists. Among the 32 HTS social scientists with a Ph.D. and 45 with a master’s degree, 11 were anthropologists (four with a Ph.D., seven with a master’s).

While anthropologists are not alone in working with the military through HTS or other programs – scholars trained in other behavioral and social sciences disciplines do as well and as the
previous numbers indicate, more so – no other discipline has generated as much outspoken
debate and concern over working relationships with the military as anthropology has.

The creation and implementation of the HTS, and specifically the “recruitment of
anthropologists to provide ‘cultural knowledge’ for the purpose of more effective
counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan” has created numerous conflicts and debates between
HTS advocates and anthropological critics (Forte 2011:149). Some professional academics find
that a practicing anthropologist’s involvement in the HTS or in other work for military or
government intelligence is a violation of ethics codes as provided by anthropology’s primary
professional organization, the American Anthropological Association (AAA) (see Forte 2011,
states that “a primary ethical obligation shared by anthropologists is to *do no harm*” and that the
protection of ethnographic participants from physical, social, and psychological harm is critical
(2012, emphases added).

The AAA also states that “among our goals are the dissemination of anthropological
knowledge and its use to solve human problems” (2012). Given that the aim of HTS is to use
local sociocultural knowledge for better operational decision-making and minimizing collateral
damage, particularly indigenous civilian deaths, it would seem that the involvement of social
scientists such as anthropologists in HTS meets AAA goals, the needs of national security, and
reducing casualties. And indigenous populations are not the only group to benefit from HTS
research. Soldier safety increases greatly if they are taught about the local culture and how to
interact respectfully, effectively, and cooperatively with locals. Without input from those well-
trained in ethnographic research, bystander populations may continue to be exploited or harmed,
intentionally or otherwise, by the US military. Military personnel may unknowingly participate
in harmful or dangerous practices due to a lack of culture-specific knowledge or to avoidable 
cross-cultural misunderstanding.

However, “weaponizing culture” through the HTS is not supported by the AAA and is 
opposed by many anthropologists. Hugh Gusterson has forcefully argued that “the ‘war on 
terror’ has disturbed [our] settled norms, [and] that anthropologists should not assist 
counterinsurgency campaigns” (2007:155). Yet for anthropology to completely opt out of any 
engagement with the military is not a valid solution since war and other sociopolitical conflicts 
will continue, bringing with them ongoing potentials for harm to civilians and soldiers alike. If 
anthropology as an entity were to step out, a vacuum is created whereby other disciplines can 
dominate the military intelligence realm and pick up where anthropology left off, but perhaps in 
a less rigorously trained fashion in terms of ethnographic methods and cultural sensitivity. And if 
anthropologists do not cultivate a working relationship with the military, what will stop them 
from creating their own “anthropologists” instead? What will this do for reducing harm?

Harm, in all forms, is both a violation of AAA professional ethics and basic human 
rights. According to Article 3 in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), “everyone 
has the right to life, liberty and security of person” (United Nations N.d.:1). Rights as laid out by 
the United Nations (UN), of which the US is a member, and human rights criteria closely 
followed by the AAA (as guided by “UDHR, the International Covenants on Civil and Political 
Rights, and on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights, the Conventions on Torture, Genocide, 
and Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and other treaties which bring 
basic human rights within the parameters of international written and customary law and 
practice”) are being violated by a HTS that is currently not bound to or capable of protecting its 
human subjects to the fullest capacity (AAA DAHR 1999). Yet as Michael Carrithers suggests,
the UDHR “amounts merely to a time and culture bound artefact, an expressions only of some people’s ideas at a particular time” (2005:435) and similarly, the AAA’s DAHR has not been updated for well over a decade.¹

As a profession, anthropology should to find a means through which it can use its knowledge to speak to issues of harm, international human rights, and the HTS. Addressing this in updates to the AAA’s DAHR is one possible step in this process but one that would be mostly symbolic. The findings in this thesis suggest that a more substantial first step is for anthropology to work with the military to make human subjects protections policies, protocols, and practices in the HTS more transparent and accountable, reflecting the same ethical practice accountability that academic anthropologists are bound to through their institutions’ Human Subjects Protections Programs (HSPPs) and Institutional Review Boards (IRBs). As it stands, a key concern is that data that is collected by social scientists in the HTS are not controlled by them or subject to transparent human subjects protection assurances and could thus be used for military decision-making that harms the populations involved. The rationale for this thesis is thus the need to move towards a reformed, ethically accountable HTS that can provide legally-enforceable protection to all inhabitants of war zones (i.e. civilians, soldiers, HTS operatives and other contracted employees, etc.) to prevent harm.

Framing the Thesis Questions

In manners not dissimilar to those in the past (see chapter 3), anthropologists began working for the military and other government agencies during the War on Terror and work by those scholars quickly engendered concern in the larger community of anthropologists in the US. Anthropologist Felix Moos (1995, 2004) assisted former Director of the Central Intelligence

¹ This was a concern I brought up at the AAA 2013 meeting at the AAA Committee for Human Rights Public Forum. The committee members agreed and created a spot for discussion in their annual meeting for the next day.
Agency, General Petraeus, in military intelligence decision-making, initiating the vocal disapproval of many in the AAA, Network for Concerned Anthropologists (NCA), and the academic and professional anthropological community in general. Montgomery McFate (Anthropology PhD from Yale University, Juris Doctor from Harvard Law School, now the Minerva Chair at the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, US Naval War College) was the leading and most influential anthropologist in the development of the HTS program.

McFate and Andrea Jackson’s 2005 pilot-program paper proposing the HTS for US Army COIN operations, *An Organizational Solution for DOD’s Cultural Knowledge Needs*, marks the beginning of critical discourse against the HTS by anthropologists. Groups such as the AAA (2007), NCA (N.d.b), and anthropologists such as Forte (2007, 2008, 2010a, 2011, 2013) as well as others already against the military co-optation of anthropology, including Roberto González (2004, 2007, 2009), Hugh Gusterson (2003, 2007), and David Price (2002, 2004, 2008, 2009b, 2011), began speaking out and writing against the program as it developed, was implemented, and became permanent.

In the present, questions with respect to the ethics of ethnographically collecting sociocultural data for military intelligence purposes endure, creating ongoing debates. Given that war and other sociopolitical conflicts will not disappear in the future, in this thesis I thus analyze the ethical dilemmas surrounding sociocultural knowledge-based COIN practices by the military by posing the following research questions:

1) *Are there common themes to be found in discussions regarding the HTS in the government/military, anthropology, and general public spheres?*
2) *Are there disparities in the ethics standards of AAA, human subjects research in academe, and the military?*

**Outline of the Thesis**

In this chapter I have established the basic context for the research, the rationale for the work, and research questions. Chapter 2 provides a discussion on sources and methodologies employed for the thesis. Chapters 3-4 provide an historical context on anthropology as a discipline, the emergence of HTS, and an analysis of ethical standards, policies, and practices for anthropology and the military as framed by the discourse analysis findings and the additional analysis of other source materials. Chapter 3 provides a concise overview of the historical relationships between the social sciences and the military/government and the emergence of the HTS. It also includes an overview of the events leading up to the implementation of General Petraeus’s Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24) and HTS informed COIN tactics in the Middle East and the public controversy in anthropology over ethics, the Darkness in El Dorado investigation.

Chapter 4 outlines and analyzes the ethics standards, policies, and practices in anthropology, the military, and the HTS, concluding with the AAA position on and ethics concerns with the HTS. Chapter 6 provides a conclusive overview and addresses possibilities for future research and the future of the HTS, suggesting that a transformed and transparent program is the best route for the future, be it for the HTS or one of a similar fashion yet to be developed given that a COIN program informed by the social and behavioral sciences is inevitably and irrefutably here to stay.
CHAPTER 2. SOURCES AND ANALYSIS METHODS

Framing Sources: Ethics vs. Morals and “Studying Up”

A guiding focus for this work is informed by suggestions that we consider “current anthropological knowledge and its moral import” as key factors when addressing the human world including interconnected relationships such as those in the military and academic spheres (Carrithers 2005:433). Didier Fassin (2008) and Carlo Caduff (2011) address anthropological discomfort with reflexivity about morals in their work and Fassin, in particular, notes that he is not trying to “defend any kind of moral obligation for anthropologists” but instead argues “for a moral anthropology” (2008:334). For Fassin, anthropologists should privilege a “human belief in the possibility of telling right from wrong and in the necessity of acting in favor of good and against evil” (2008:334). Fassin argues that attention to morals would indeed assist in understanding “the evaluative principles and practices operating” between different spheres like the military and anthropology as well as the “debates they arouse, the processes through which they become implemented, the justifications that are given to account for discrepancies observed between what should be and what is actually” in a system like the HTS (2008:336). Fassin goes on to suggest the necessity of considering anthropologists' own moral prejudices or value judgments “as objects of…scientific investigation as well as those of his [sic] ‘others’” (2008:337), with the “others” here being users of the HTS.

According to Fassin, considering both moral and ethical reflexivity as part of research activity is epistemologically and politically crucial if one is to question the judgment and values which do indeed underlie any ethnographic research (2008:341). The theories of Fassin and Michael Carrithers overlap because they both suggest questioning institutional and academic ethical and “moral grounds” (Fassin 2008: 342) as part of research into “the understanding of
societies and their moralities” (Carrithers 2005:445). It would seem that adding a moral dimension to studying the military would be thus be productive. However, the 2012 AAA Statement on Ethics notes that morals are not ethics, that ethics and morals differ in important ways. The complex issues that anthropologists confront rarely admit to the simple wrongs and rights of moral dicta, and one of the prime ethical obligations of anthropologists is to carefully and deliberately weigh the consequences and ethical dimensions of the choices they make — by action or inaction. Navigating “core moral dimensions of anthropology as a way of paying attention to—and acting within—a human world” (Carrithers 2005:446) is perhaps valuable for a self-study of anthropologists. However, the inclusion of moral positions in arguing for a HTS program that is bound as an institution to protect its subjects from all possible harm and be accountable for such is an impossible aim. This is because morals are individual, subjective positions that inform personal behavior, beliefs, or character while ethics belong the realm of negotiated standards of behavior for a given group such as anthropologists, a company, or the military.

Stepping away from issues of morals (and thus individual subjectivities that inform morals such as political beliefs) allows for a focus on ethical practice as required, or not, by the professions involved with the HTS. This requires a careful analysis of the multiple discourses on and about the relationships between the social sciences, the military, and the HTS with careful attention to these as institutions of power. Anthropologists such as Hortense Powdermaker (1966) and Laura Nader (1972) have argued for an “upward anthropology” or “studying up” where the ethnographic focus is on mainstream individuals and institutions who wield social power. Both suggest that anthropological fieldwork on those who are powerful/dominant and is important for anthropology to participate in critiques of a hegemonic world order (Carrithers
2005: 445). Studying up has been applied to the military, both in ethnographies of the military and scholarly critiques of military power. This investigation thus analyses past and current ethics issues regarding the HTS and the social scientists it employs through the investigation of a number of published academic works, public media, policy documents, and military doctrine documents. The literature used for this project as both historical context and for analysis includes that from researchers who have intently studied the involvement of social scientists with the US government/military (from both inside and outside) and anthropologists who have specifically studied the HTS.

Sources

For this thesis, materials available as physically published works or via the internet served as my sources given that doing on-site fieldwork on the HTS was not an option due to issues of finances, access, and safety. It is worth noting that current ethnographic research in areas affected by the War on Terror is extremely rare (and for the same reasons noted above), making my “research at a distance” not out of the ordinary (see Figure 2); this may change in the future. In recent years the HTS has taken interest in Latin America, Africa, and the Caribbean (Forte 2008) thus the potential growth of this program creates space, and perhaps safer places, to conduct fieldwork in the future. I may eventually be able to conduct fieldwork in areas where the HTS has operated or with persons who have been involved with HTS programs for a future project such as a dissertation.
The selection of relevant sources for analysis began with crafting an understanding of what the HTS does according to directions and protocols provided for those working in and with the HTS. In December of 2008, Wikileaks made a complete copy of the US Army’s Human Terrain Team Handbook (HTTHB) available online. A complete research plan, “Research Plan: STRIKE HTT” (RPSH), is included in the HTTHB and this provides a concise idea of what types of information HTTs are expected to collect in the field (see Finney 2008:104-106 and Appendix A for the full outline). The RPSH is a working template for HTT members on what sociocultural information is desired on various aspects of the indigenous civilian population and in some cases, internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the area of operation (AO). This information becomes a form of local intelligence critical to US military intelligence and operational decision-making as a COIN strategy. The type of information collected requires social sciences training and thus this is why the US military employs professional
anthropologists and other social scientists for data collection. The HTTHB also contains specific information on best practices for HTTs, the protocols for creating a research project, statements on ethical practice, and reporting procedures.

I read the HTTHB as an anthropologist “insider” (I have a bachelor’s degree in cultural anthropology) as well as an outsider to the military as I have not been a member of the military. This allowed me to think about the contents in both a subjective and objective manner. Once I was familiar with the HTTHB, research into the origins of the HTS program and its history into the present was undertaken. For needed historical context, additional information was collected on the US military, with an emphasis on the Army and the War on Terror given priority because the HTS officially began operating during this particular conflict. Further works on the roles of anthropology and the military in World War I (WWI), World War II (WWII), Cold War, and the Vietnam War were secured as were scholarly publications on the history of anthropology and colonial government relationships in order to understand anthropology’s long history with military and government intelligence. Information from these items are presented as historical context in Chapter 3.

With this context in place as a frame, sources for the thesis analysis were selected. Since the advent of the HTS, academic and public discussion on the role of social science in the military has been in surplus. Discourse surrounding the HTS is thick with debate regarding ethical issues, often in the context of the US’ past and present wars (Price 2008). This discourse, found in both print and online-only works, is a form of “indirect observation data” through which I would be able to study “the traces of human behavior and thought…analyze archival data…and secondary analysis, [and] reanalyzing data that were collected for other projects” (Bernard and Ryan 2010:19). I thus applied methods for online/virtual ethnography that adapt “common
participant-observation ethnographic procedures to the unique contingencies of computer-mediated social interaction: alteration, accessibility, anonymity, and archiving” (Kozinets 2010:58). This methodology utilizes both “online and offline techniques” by using “ethnographic and netnographic approaches” (Kozinets 2010:58). This process would hopefully enable the creation of rich ethnography or as Geertz (1973) has called it, “thick description,” not limited to the Internet alone (Sade-Beck 2004:1).

Deep searches for and through articles, blogs, AAA statements, the HTS official government website, social media (Facebook, Twitter, hashtag tracking), Google Scholar tracking, and news media facilitated the identification of a broad array works on and information regarding the HTS and ethics issues. Sources were selected from this large body of information available based on the following criteria: 1) they must concern the HTS and/or working relationships between the social sciences and the military and 2) they must be produced by a person of professional standing in the military, anthropology, or general public spheres including journalists, scholars, civilian employees of the military or government, and military personnel. At least one third of the total material collected focused explicitly on ethical concerns with the HTS.

134 significant works were located and those that dealt with ethics standards and practices where analyzed to provide an outline of information on standards and policies for ethics in anthropology the military and the AAA position on the HTS in Chapter 4. Over the course of many weeks, I then further narrowed these 134 works found down to 22 key items (see Appendix B for complete bibliographic information) specifically for a discourse analysis. As noted in Table 1 these selected works represented an array of media types including scholarly

---

2 The general public includes publicly available discourse by professionals in academia or of PhD standing who do not identify with the military or anthropology but discuss the HTS in a public arena.
journal articles, journalism, blogs, and selections from books. After close review of the 22 items, each item was categorized into one of three text-type categories (see Table 1) based on the intended audience for and author affiliation of the work: Military/Government Discourse, Academic Discourse, Public Discourse. These 22 items became the data set for performing discourse analysis to identify patterns that could help in understanding concerns over the HTS, similarities and differences in ethics codes, and the core procedural and ethics issues that form the controversy over social scientists working for military operations.

Table 1. Categories and Media Types.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Media Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military/ Government Discourse</td>
<td>Connable</td>
<td>Military journal article</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cornell &amp; Jackson</td>
<td>Book, risk management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finney</td>
<td>Military directives/protocol publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foust</td>
<td>Blog</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jager</td>
<td>Military journal article</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>McFate &amp; Fondacaro</td>
<td>Military journal article</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Petraeus, et al.</td>
<td>Military directives/protocol publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic Discourse</td>
<td>AAA (x2)</td>
<td>Professional academic organization publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Albro &amp; Gusterson</td>
<td>Military news media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Forte</td>
<td>Blog feature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Glenn (x2)</td>
<td>Academic news media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>González</td>
<td>Academic news media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>Professional academic organization publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Price (x2)</td>
<td>Popular news media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Discourse</td>
<td>Gezari (a)</td>
<td>Non-fiction book</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gezari (b)</td>
<td>Popular news media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weinberger</td>
<td>Popular news media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wintersteen</td>
<td>Blog feature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wynn</td>
<td>Blog feature</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Methods: Discourse Analysis

There are multiple definitions for “discourse” itself so it is first it is necessary to understand which definitions were used in this research. Encarnacion Hidalgo Tenorio (2011:185) provides six different definitions of discourse, three of which I used to define discourse in this thesis:

1. communication expected in one situation context
2. human interaction through any means, verbal and non-verbal
3. a whole communicative event

Discourse here is thus found in physical and online publications in the form of analytical narratives, quotes and transcribed interviews, historical information, and newer forms of “information/conversation” such as blogs.

Due to the need to understand the context from which HTS emerged as well as the contexts informing concern over the HTS by anthropologists, a discourse-historical approach (DHA), was used to “integrate…all available background information in the analysis and interpretation of the many layers of written and spoken text” (Van Dijk 2011:364; see also Wodak and Meyer 2009). DHA creates traceable patterns in discourse over time (Van Dijk 2011:364) and thus used to identify such in academic, military, and public discourse on the HTS.

A critical discourse analysis (CDA) perspective was also utilized in order to identify and account for power dynamics present in discourse on the HTS and the power of those producing that discourse. Producers of this discourse include members of the military, anthropology, and news media, all “powerful” in society in different yet intersecting ways. A CDA perspective specifically allowed me to analyze discourse as it both upholds power and challenges power dynamics (Fairclough 2008; Foucault 1981, 1982; Jorgensen and Phillips 2002; connable 2007;
Van Dijk 2003; Wodak and Meyer 2009). This is because “CDA focuses on the ways discourse structures enact, confirm, legitimate, reproduce, or challenge relations of power and dominance in society” (Van Dijk 2011:353). Through analyzing the “relationship between discourse and power,” one finds that “power and domination are reproduced by text and talk” (Wodak and Meyer 2009:23) and this is particularly true in the ongoing dialog on the HTS.

**Analysis by Coding and Theming**

Preparation for discourse analysis of the sources collected followed methodologies proposed by Bonnie Nastasi (1999). These “approaches to selecting segments for transcription” and analysis included: “purposefully or randomly” selecting segments of public discourse and published documents, “selecting relevant segments” to “transcribe only segments…that are relevant to the research question,” and identify “critical incidents” (Nastasi 1999:21-22). Relevant excerpts from the 22 selected works were thus copied and pasted or transcribed in segments (2-3 sentences per segment) into an Excel workbook for organized coding. This resulted in 99 pages of text for coding.

Coding was done manually in the Excel workbook and was completed in two steps. The first step was initial coding (see Bernard and Ryan 2010; Emerson et al. 2011; Schensul and LeCompte 2013; Schensul, et al. 1999). In this process I used codes to assign simple, descriptive labels to a phrase, sentence, or cluster of sentences. Coding highlighted consistencies, inconsistencies, and concerns across the military, academic, and public domains of discourse surrounding the HTS. The initial coding process consisted of 273 codes.

The next step of the coding process was sorting and creating a codebook containing two kinds of codes: theme codes and memos (Bernard and Ryan 2010:76). First code duplicates were accounted for and minimized. Next, codes were ranked according to usefulness for this project.
Secondary coding was then conducted to identify overarching theme codes from initial codes, grouping the initial codes into broader categories of similarity (“themes”). The codebook also contained information on where the coded discourse actually occurred in the original text. My memos acted as field notes about codes and contained a running commentary of ideas and questions as I analyzed the discourse segments (Bernard and Ryan 2010:76).

**Thematic Findings**

Tables 2 and 3 outline the themes and frequency of themes identified through the process of discourse analysis. The top six themes for each of the 3 discourse categories (Military/Government, Academic, Public) are listed in Table 2 along with their raw and averaged frequencies of appearance in the codebook and the discourse source authors. Table 3 outlines the main themes and subthemes identified. By numerically analyzing the average frequency of themes, I found three dominant, main themes across categories: *uncertainty*, *vulnerability*, and *social control*. Among the remaining themes, two secondary themes emerged: *coproduction of knowledge* and *data control*. *Uncertainty*, *vulnerability*, and *social control* are thus the three most prominent concerns regarding the HTS across government/military, anthropology, and general public spheres. Issues regarding the *coproduction of knowledge* and *data control* are secondary concerns. A few distinctions regarding these concerns must be made. First, the coproduction of knowledge is a top three concern (more “main”) in military discourse but secondary in academic and public discourse. Second, data control is of higher concern (although still “secondary”) in military and academic discourse versus public discourse. Third, uncertainty is the top concern in academic and public discourse but is the lowest of the top 6 concerns in military discourse.
Table 2. All Themes/Frequencies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Coded Themes</th>
<th>Raw Theme Frequency</th>
<th>Frequency Average</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military/ Government Discourse</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social control</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>Connable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>Cornell &amp; Jackson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Coproduction of knowledge</em></td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>Finney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Data control</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Foust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Power</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Jager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uncertainty</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>McFate &amp; Fondacaro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Petraeus, et al.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Academic Discourse</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uncertainty</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>AAA (x2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>Albro &amp; Gusterson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social control</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>Forte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Data control</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Glenn (x2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Coproduction of knowledge</em></td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>González</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disaster</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>NCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Price (x2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public Discourse</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uncertainty</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>Gezari (x2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social control</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>Weinberger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>Wintersteen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Coproduction of knowledge</em></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Wynn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Data control</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Problem-solving</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Main and Secondary Themes/Frequencies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Themes</th>
<th>Raw Theme Frequency</th>
<th>Frequency Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainty</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social control</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subthemes</th>
<th>Theme Frequency</th>
<th>Frequency Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Data control</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Coproduction of knowledge</em></td>
<td>78</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Applying Results

Differences in concerns over human subjects research in general is not unexpected given that the anthropological community is concerned with the variation among humans and the study of that which makes people human, whereas the military is concerned with upholding the security of national affairs both foreign and domestic. These differences are indeed reflected in frequency variance of the themes identified across military, academic, and public discourse. Much of the discourse surrounding the HTS leads readers to believe these spheres have significantly different views and agendas and that there is no common ground on which to cultivate constructive discussions. Indeed, where these spheres intersect is not necessarily in their views or agendas, but rather in shared areas of concern. The discourse analysis performed here revealed that there are indeed three common threads of concern across all three spheres.

The results indicate that the main themes and thus common areas of concern are over uncertainty, vulnerability, and social control. The secondary themes, coproduction of knowledge and data control, also inform concern with the ethics of HTS in practice. While no particular theory or model was selected to frame this research prior to the discourse analysis, each of the main and secondary themes that came out of the discourse analysis were found to resonate with key parts of Susanna Hoffman’s (1999) model for a cultural response to disaster. In a past examination of Hoffman’s model for a different research project, I became familiar with how the model is used to explain the processes and particularities of humans’ cultural responses to disaster. This model was thus chosen for use in understanding how the emergence and current practices of the HTS represent a type of disaster. However, both Hoffman and Anthony Oliver-Smith do not consider war or other human-made events as disasters (1999:2) despite the fact that
Hoffman’s model can apply to such and to my knowledge, applying Hoffman’s model to understand war-time practices (such as the HTS) has not been done before.

The application of Hoffman’s (1999) model will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5 as a model for understanding ethical issues with HTS as a form of disaster-in-process. But before this can be done effectively, a discussion of the historical contexts for the concerns identified through the discourse analysis as well as the discourses themselves is necessary. This is because both anthropology and the military are products of historical particularity and can only be understood in historical context. The social and structural forces that dictate conditions of or concerns over vulnerability, uncertainty, and social control are shaped by each institution’s complicated history and positions on ethics standards and practices. It is to this history and into the present that I attend in the next two chapters.
CHAPTER 3. THE HISTORICAL PAST AND ITS ENDURING CONTROVERSIES

Social Sciences, Politics, and the Military

The social sciences, governments, and the military share a complex, intertwined history. Pierre Bourdieu suggests that social scientists should “pursue and generalize the work of historical anamnesis” (2008:224), and this is most valuable when attempting to recall troubled pasts to understand the present. To better understand the controversy surrounding the employment of anthropologists (and other social scientists) in the military, and specifically the HTS, it is thus imperative to understand the discipline’s engagement with governmental entities in the past as well as its own internal and public controversies over ethical practices.

Late Colonial Past

While there has been much anthropological concern over the HTS for the past decade, mutually beneficial relationships between the anthropological community and government entities are indeed historically commonplace. Involvements both in and against war efforts around the world are not unprecedented in the social sciences. An acknowledgement of anthropology’s role in late colonialism is a necessary step in understanding the current relationship between anthropology and entities of power.³

The academic discipline of anthropology materialized, in part, out of late colonial expansion of Europe for the “colonization of the non-Western world” in the 19th and early 20th century (Lewis 1973:582). Many methodological and conceptual frameworks in the discipline were, in large part, shaped by the unequal relationship between colonized peoples, anthropologists, and colonized powers (Forte 2007). Diane Lewis states that “anthropologists found themselves participants in the colonial system which organized relationships between

³ “Entities of power” is a reference to militaries and governments of varying countries that anthropologists around the world have worked for, with, or against.
Westerners and non-Westerners” (1973:582). Most notably, the French and British colonial endeavor enlisted anthropologists and the research of anthropologists to better understand, colonize, and control India and parts of Africa.

Anthropologists Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski are among those whose research and fieldwork were used by British colonial powers in their endeavors. Ethnographic knowledge produced by anthropologists was used to enrich social, economic, and culturally interested imperial powers. Peter Foster argues that “Malinowski was constantly concerned to stress the value of anthropology in administration…he suggested that the practical man should state problems to stimulate the anthropologist” (1994:51). Malinowski “expressed support for the idea of Indirect Rule, though he urged that knowledge of indigenous culture was important for any kind of rule (Foster 1994:51). As Malinowski writes,

forced labour, conscription or voluntary labour contracts, and the difficulties of obtaining sufficient numbers—all these form another type of practical difficulties in the colonies.

The chief trouble in all this is to entice the Native or persuade him to keep him satisfied while he works for the white man. [1929:35]

Another prominent figure in the history of this relationship is Henry Sumner Maine (2008 [1861]) who researched the “the early history of society, and its relation to modern ideas” and shared this knowledge when serving as a member of the council for the governor-general of India from 1863-1869.

Anthropologists do indeed occupy “a position of economic, political, and psychological superiority vis-à-vis the subject people” (Lewis 1973:582) yet during this time this power was not considered problematic nor was the use of that power to engage in work on behalf of colonial

---

4 It is important to note that Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown were very much products of their time and their research and fieldwork were not seen as ethically problematic at the end of the 19th century when they were partaking in it.
governments. At the beginning of the 20th century, only a very few anthropologists in the western world began to see the issues that arose from colonial endeavors. While anthropology had begun to create its enduring legacy as a scientific discipline in the 19th century, in the early part of the 20th century it began collecting baggage surrounding its emergence from colonialism. As Pels writes, “the discipline descends from and is still struggling with techniques of observation and control that emerged from the colonial dialect of Western” rule and influence (1997:164).

**Early 20th Century Backlash**

At the beginning of the 20th century, Franz Boas, founder of anthropology as an academic discipline in the US, began speaking out about the controversial relationship between anthropologists and military entities and governments around the world. Even though he was alone in this endeavor, in December of 1919 Boas wrote a letter to the *The Nation*. In this letter, titled “Scientists as Spies” and as cited by the AAA (2005:27), he wrote:

> I wish to enter a vigorous protest…that a number of men who follow science as their profession, men whom I refuse to designate any longer as scientists, have prostituted science by using it as a cover for their activities as spies.

Just ten days later “a motion of censure…was passed” on him “by the governing council of the” AAA “effectively removing him from the council” and they threatened “…expulsion from the Association” (AAA 2005:27). During the annual meeting in 2004 the AAA agreed “in principle to rescind the original 1919 motion and vote of censure on Boas (AAA 2005:27). This happened because the AAA realized “…the points Boas originally raised in his letter” 93 years ago “continue to have relevance today” (AAA 2005:27).

Since Boas’ letter and censure, social scientists have continued to research under the funding and interests of governments, including many of Boas’ own anthropology students. Ruth
Benedict conducted research titled “Patterns of Culture” (2006[1934]) and later applied it to her research in Japanese culture during WWII (1946). Margaret Mead (2000[1953]), and Rhoda Metraux (2009[1980]) studied “culture at a distance” during and post-World War II (WWII) including but not limited to the “Soviet Union…Germany…and China” (Beeman 2000:xii). Other anthropologists were prominent advisors in early 20th century war efforts and continuing colonial rule around the world or had research funded by governments with the purpose that the findings be used by the military or other government entities.

**Late 20th Century: Darkness in El Dorado and its Significance to Framing the HTS**

David Price suggests that at times the anthropological community has chosen to ignore parts of its politicized past and gloss over less savory aspects of its history (2008:xvi). Indeed, it was not until the last quarter of the 20th century that discussion on anthropology’s participation in colonial and war efforts re-emerged. This was largely based on questioning the power of anthropologists over their subjects, with the emergence of post-colonial thought and theory from historically subjugated feminist theorists in the 1970s and scholars from previously colonized nations in the 1980s, centered on critiquing authority and power in the anthropological discipline. As Peter Pels notes, the anthropological discipline “descends from and is still struggling with techniques of observation and control that emerged from the colonial dialectic of Western governmentality” (1997:164).

However, this moment of reflexivity over power and the ethics of practice was internal to anthropology. It was not until a transformative controversy arose in 2000 that anthropology as a discipline was forced to publicly confront ethical concerns regarding anthropological practices. In 2000, journalist Patrick Tierney published *Darkness in El Dorado: How Scientists and Journalists Devastated the Amazon*, accusing anthropologist Napoleon Chagnon and geneticist
James Neel of conducting extensive ethnographic research with the Yanomami Indians in Roraima, Brazil in 1995 little regard for their subjects’ welfare (2000:xxi). Chagnon’s work had, until then, been held in esteem and was being used by “thousands of anthropologists…in their classrooms, even though it was clear the field practices he described in it violated the American Anthropological Association’s code of ethics” (Borofsky 2005:14).

Among the issues raised by Tierney are how this research was framed and what transpired in Brazil. For example, Tierney wrote that Chagnon, having difficulty getting permission for ethnographic work, managed to get the “Indian Agency [of Brazil] to grant special permission for a ‘visit of a journalistic or documentary character’” (Tierney 2000:xxi). This special request was granted to a photographer who included Chagnon “as a member of his ‘work team’” (Tierney 2000:xxii). However, once there, Chagnon was actually collecting social information and “collecting Yanomami blood samples” (Tierney 2000:xxii). A measles epidemic then struck “the same village where…James Neel had scientists inoculate the Yanomami with a live virus” that was safe for American children “but was known to be dangerous for immune-compromised people” (Tierney 2000:17).

While some of the claims by Tierney were later proven to be false or exaggerated, the book launched a public controversy for anthropology, prompting academic and public discourse on ethics in the practice of anthropology. Headlines across the country read similar to one from Business Week: “Tierney makes a persuasive argument that anthropologists for several decades engaged in unethical practices” (Borofsky 2005:12). The AAA eventually commissioned a Task Force to investigate the findings in Tierney’s book but according to Rob Borofsky, “leaders of the American Anthropological Association initially addressed the controversy more as a problem of public relations than as a problem of professional ethics: they were more concerned with
protecting the discipline’s image than with dealing directly with the issues Tierney had raised” (2005:14, 15). This was despite outrage by anthropologists in the academy and professionals external to the discipline over the “media storm that spread around the world” concerning the accused “unethical behavior…that at times bordered on the criminal” (Borofsky 2005:3). This left many wondering if “anthropology and perhaps science itself had gone astray in allowing such behavior to take place” (Borofsky 2005:3).

According to Thomas A. Gregor and Daniel R. Gross, at the core of criticism surrounding the El Dorado controversy was the finding by the AAA Task Force “that Neel and Chagnon misused their subjects in the course of ethnographic and biological research, that they failed to obtain adequate informed consent for their work, and that their research left the Yanomami psychologically damaged” (2004:687). As a result of uncovering these ethical violations, Donald Brenneis suggests that the Task Force’s “greatest value... is not to find fault with or to defend the past actions of specific anthropologists, but to provide opportunities for all anthropologists to consider the ethics of several dimensions of the anthropological enterprise” (2009:8).

Many current core concerns over the HTS are then not surprisingly identical to those that emerged from the Darkness in El Dorado controversy. Similar to the AAA report on the El Dorado controversy, the Network for Concerned Anthropologists (NCA) argued that “like medical doctors, anthropologists are ethically bound to do no harm…the HTS program violates scientific and federal research standards mandating informed consent by research subjects” (N.d.). The NCA also stated that the

HTS is unethical for anthropologists…in 2007, the AAA determined HTS to be ‘an unacceptable application of anthropological expertise.’…”The AAA commission found
that HTS ‘can no longer be considered a legitimate professional exercise of anthropology’ given the incompatibility of HTS with disciplinary ethics and practice. Anthropology has taken the lead on public and academic criticisms of the HTS and general working relationships between the military and members of the discipline. While other social scientists also currently work with the military (i.e. psychologists, sociologists, political scientists), the historical particularity of past colonial and war endeavors and the specificity of the Darkness in El Dorado controversy shaped anthropology as the dissent leader against the HTS.

Price forcefully argues that “our memory gaps have political consequences. Anthropologists’ ignorance of the range of anthropological contributions to…war is now being used in CIA and Pentagon recruitment campaigns” (2008:xvi). However, concerns stemming from the Darkness in El Dorado controversy clearly bear heavily on anthropology’s issues with the HTS as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. While Tierney’s claims have been met with skepticism, they have served as a prelude to discussion about the HTS, brought ethics to the forefront of the conversation in the social sciences again, and revived discussion on the ethics of anthropology’s engagement in war efforts. Both the HTS and the El Dorado controversies encompass ethical concerns relevant for all educational sectors that overlap with governmental operations. But in order to begin understanding the complexity of the current controversy over the HTS, an overview of the recent creation of the program and its relationship to anthropology is necessary.
The Emergence of the HTS

A rationale for the HTS began in 2002 with an identified need for counterinsurgency (COIN) actions in the War on Terror (see Figure 3 for additional reference)\(^5\). COIN, by definition, is when military or political action is taken against the efforts of revolutionaries/guerrillas and “organized military activity is designed to combat insurgency” (Merriam-Webster 2014). In US military’s history there has been an extensive record of cultural gaps and a need for a “focus on counterinsurgency” but when an insurgency in Iraq began in 2003, the US was unprepared to fight such (Nagl 2007:xiiiv). Unlike other major wars the US had experienced, the enemy was aware it could not “defeat the U.S. Army on a conventional battlefield” and instead chose to “wage war against America from the shadows” (Nagl 2007:xxiv). According to Nagl (2007), there are a variety of reasons proposed about why the U.S. was not prepared for insurgency in Iraq. “Among the most important [of these] was the lack of current counterinsurgency doctrine when the war began” as the Army had not published a counterinsurgency manual for over twenty years, the last one being Field Manual 100-20 (FM 100-20), in the wake of the El Salvador campaign (2007:xiv). According to Andrew J. Birtle, prior to that there was largely an absence of “formal, written doctrine” and soldiers had to “develop concepts and theories” themselves, “some of which became enduring principles that guided Army operations for decades” (2003:vii).

---

\(^5\) Not all events listed in the timeline are addressed in this thesis. However, all events (small or large) must be listed to understand the main events that are discussed. Forte’s (2010b) timeline was used as a guideline.
Figure 3. Timeline: List of Significant Events: HTS (Forte 2010b).
After the beginning of the War on Terror, the Army realized they were unprepared and began investing money in research for a program that would assist them in developing effective COIN tactics. The result of this investment was the HTS. As Nagl suggests, the army learned via HTS that the “key to success in counterinsurgency is protecting” local populations and empowering them with “political, diplomatic, and linguistic skills” in order for them to accomplish objectives (2007:xv). Nagl even goes so far as to suggest that most “Army officers knew more about the U.S. Civil War than they did about counterinsurgency” (2007:xv).

After General Petraeus returned from a second tour in Iraq, the Army began focusing on “economic and political development” (Nagl 2007:xv). According to Nagl, Petraeus received a promotion as “Lieutenant General with responsibility for the Multi-National Security Transition Command in Iraq” and “he focused on the Army’s extensive education systems, making training officers about counterinsurgency his top priority” (2007:xv). This training centered on the US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 (FM 3-24), released in 2006. FM 3-24 was long awaited by not only by military personnel, but also journalists, academics, and the enemy. According to Nagl, “the field manual was widely reviewed, including on several Jihadi websites; copies have been found in Taliban training camps in Pakistan. It was downloaded more than 1.5 million times in the first month after its posting to the Fort Leavenworth and Marine Corps Web sites” (2007:xvii).

According to the FM 3-24, “the key to victory in counterinsurgency is intelligence on the location and identity of the insurgent enemy derived from a supportive population” (Nagl 2007:xviii). FM 3-24 notes that “defeating insurgency hinges on understanding the nature of insurgency and selecting methods that will win the people’s hearts and minds” (Kagan and Kagan 2009:x). Mike Moyar points out that COIN tactics require “gaining the cooperation of
allied leaders, organizing allied leaders, organizing self-defense forces, winning the support of
the population, motivating troops, persisting in the face of difficulty, or adjusting methods in
response to enemy tactics” (2009:126). In order to accomplish this as part of a COIN agenda, the
U.S. Army recognized a need for cultural advisors and they turned to the discipline that produces
cultural experts, anthropology, for potential Human Terrain Team (HTT) members.

Cultural anthropologists, by definition, “deal with human culture especially with respect
to social structure, language, law, politics, religion, magic, art, and technology” (Merriam-
Webster 2014). While cultural anthropologists are specialists on people in geographical
locations, they more importantly understand the overall patterns of complexity and diversity of
human culture. This, along with the qualitative inquiry methods used by cultural anthropologists,
make them ideal candidates for collecting the information that the US Army needed on local
populations in areas of operations. As the Army’s target group of prospective employees,
cultural anthropologists were not only desired for their educational and applied training, but also
because, as discussed previously, the discipline has a long history of working with the US
government and military. Anthropologists have historically worked for many governmental
organizations including the U.S. Department of War, Department of the Interior, Department of
State and the White House, Institute of Human Relations, Office of Naval Intelligence, the
Cross-Cultural Survey Project, the Smithsonian Institution’s War Background Studies, the
Ethnogeographic Board, the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, and more
Starting with the pilot program in 2007 and into the present, anthropologists and other social and behavioral scientists have been actively recruited for the HTS. The email screenshot above (Figure 4) is an example of a recruitment email sent by Aerotek, a company who does HTS recruitment for the US Army, to scholars at a variety of universities across the country (Harvard, NYU, and Georgetown, to name a few). Recruitment has been relatively successful, at least enough to maintain HTS programming. This is likely due in part to the generous compensation\(^6\) paired with downturns in the academic job market since before 2007.

\(^6\) For a recruit with a master’s degree, the domestic pay is slightly above the average pay for a first-year university assistant professor with a doctoral degree and the deployment pay is nearly twice that of the average salary.
HTS and COIN Tactics in the Middle East

From the advent of the HTS and to this day, trained anthropologists, along with other social scientists, have involved in COIN operations through employment with the HTS. These operations have evolved significantly in the last seven years as has the criticism of such operations by the military, academics, and the public. The HTS significantly expanded in 2010 from 5 teams to 30 and from a $20 million budget to a $150 million annual budget (Brook 2014:1) During this time, an increasing number of military personnel and academic anthropologists began paying attention to the 2007 FM 3-24 and the 2008 HTTHB. Such attention to increasing demand for the people-centered, ethnographic skills of HTT members not only initiated criticism from academics but also from on-the-ground military personal deployed in the Middle East. One of the FM 3-24’s most repeated messages in political discourse is to “win the hearts and minds” of locals in areas of interest and if possible, of the enemy. However, there are gaps between what actions the FM 3-24 outlines for military and HTT members and what actually happens on the front lines, in practice for COIN operations.

Figures 5-7 are the COIN checklist and interview guides from the HTTHB that both HTT members and military personnel are expected to use in the field. It must be noted that there is a push toward creating specific questionnaires for the following categories: mosque participants, mullah and other religious leaders, business & commerce, business owners, second layer leadership: mirro (water distributor), teachers, doctors, and elders (Finney 2008:116). Soldiers and HTT members alike are given this generic, semi-structured COIN questionnaire and are expected to apply it to all people of interest that they encounter, using these basic sets of questions when attempting to gain information from the local population.
Appendix D

Sample Interview Questions

Example Semi-Structured Interview

Government Official Semi-Structured Questionnaire

Human Terrain Team, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division
24 February 2008

Research Program: The objective of this research program is to examine the inter-
relationship between: official’s backgrounds; their affiliations and relationships
(whose current and previous roles); and their values (views of future action). Critical
questions include: Are affiliation networks intermingled or distinct? Do individuals
cooperate and communicate with those with different backgrounds? Some tentative
hypotheses include:
- Historic affiliation determines current political position
- DSGs come from more similar rather than dissimilar backgrounds
- DSG ties constitute a distinct/separate social network, separate
- from other networks

Visual Assessment: Assess who spends time together, observe formal seating
versus informal interactions.

Prior to beginning interview determine whether official has completed the
questionnaire.

Personal Background:
- How old are you?
- Where were you born?
- Where were you raised?
- What is your qawn and khel?

Where and when did you finish your school?
- What groups have you previously belonged to (NGOs, universities, newspapers,
tunists)?
- Are you a mohab or mawlavi?

What is your father’s profession?
- What are your brothers’ professions?
- Do you have relatives who work in government, police or military?
- If you have family members in the government, how can you help each other for
solving problems?
- What did you do during previous governments?
- Please list any previous government positions (years held, district, province):

Government Background:
- What is your position?
**Human Terrain Team Handbook**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How long have you been in this position?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the responsibilities of your position?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How did you decide to become a [insert position]?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How were you selected for a government position?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who first recommended you for a government position?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can you support your family by doing this job?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Network and Affiliation Mapping:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What 5 people here have you known the longest?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What 5 people here were you most recently in contact?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who are the most important people here?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who are the most important people in Logar?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What other provincial officials do you work with?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What DSGs do you know the best? How long have you known them?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We heard that one can only become the DC if he knows some government official.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is that true?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We heard that one of Logar’s DC is the most powerful. Can you tell us who he is?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Views on DSGs/District Commissioners:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the job of a sub-governor?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What qualities should a sub-governor or district commissioner have?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are DC’s responsibilities to the Provincial Governor?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the DC’s responsibility to the people?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What kind of Government officials do the people want? Do they want religious people, educated people, or Mujahide?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who should get the higher positions, in your opinion?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why do people want to get higher positions?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currently, what kind of people can easily get high government positions?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Views on Afghanistan:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What needs to be done in Afghanistan?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How does the current government compare to previous governments?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is a good government?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How should government be run?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Produced by Tom Garcia and Michael Bharia, Version 2, Aug 2008 ©

U.S. UNCLASSIFIED 114

---

Figure 6. Government Official Semi-Structured Questionnaire (part 2 of 3).
Example Tribal Research Questions

I am interested in learning about the tribes. I would like to learn about your tribe and which tribes are above and below your tribe.

1. What is your Ethnicity?
   a. Pashtun?
   b. Tajik?
   c. Other?
2. What is your tribe?
3. Which tribes are under your tribe?
4. Which tribes are above your tribe?
5. Would you write the information for me in Pashto?
6. What is the history of your tribe?
   a. How long has your tribe been in this area?
   b. Are they any disputes with other tribes?
   c. Which tribes are your allies?
   d. What other villages do people of your tribe live?
7. In which other villages do people in your village have family?
8. What is your first language?
9. Why is that your first language?
   a. Is that the language of your mother?
   b. Is that the language of your father?
   c. Is that the language of your village?
In addition to, and based from these questions, social scientist HTT members are expected to come up with a mapping system for “social structures, linkages, and priorities, just as a recon team might map physical terrain” (Pelton 2009:1) For example, this process would ideally mean that “by talking to locals the teams might help identify which village elder the commander should deal with or which tribe might be a waste of time” or whether or not a rebuilding project might engender a conflict between two villages or tribal units (Pelton 2009:1). While this may indeed be an outcome from the information collected, there are multiple issues that arise with collecting information from people whose human subjects rights may not protected after they provide this information.

A typical pro-HTS rebuttal to this concern would be that this information is collected anonymously. However, even if it is completely anonymous, an unlikely possibility given some of the questions in the surveys, participants have no way of retracting the information they provide. Additionally, providing information to HTT members can place participants in harm’s way because there is potential for them to be seen talking to HTTs or perhaps become identified as the informant for particular information maybe only they would have known.

Initial attention to the gap between the practices outlined in the HTTB and FM 3-24 and on-the-ground action is worthy of note. In a case study on HTT by Norman Nigh, an unnamed Marine Corps captain jokingly told Nigh “‘yeah, I’m all about hearts and minds, two shots in the heart and one in the head, now that’s COIN’” as he flipped through the FM 3-24 (2012:5). Another anonymous military personnel participant in the same 2010 meeting concerning the FM 3-24 told Nigh that

The people who wrote this [FM 3-24] don’t understand what it’s like on the ground. It sounds good on paper and stuff like this gets people promoted but at the end of the day it’s

---

7 Specific violations in the HTS will be discussed in detail in subsequent chapters.
our lives they are playing with. I am told to secure a village, get to know the people, shake hands, take pictures with locals and tell my superiors about what the hell is going on---what bullshit…I have no idea who these people are, what they want, or how to communicate with them. The locals accuse me of killing their friends. When we’re not getting shot at or finding IEDs, local kids throw rocks at my guys and the locals demand money. Yet I am told to exhibit tactical patience and focus on the big picture. The situation is fucked. [2012:5]

According to Nigh, this response represents what is faced by many military personnel operating on the ground in Afghanistan at the time. He notes that “talk of COIN is everywhere, especially on the lips of senior military and civilian leadership. In practice, COIN presents complex operational challenges” (Nigh 2012:6) He agrees that in order for a “company or platoon” to fully understand the people they are dealing with they must have knowledge of “local customs…and traditions” (Nigh 2012:6). However, most soldiers have not “studied the region’s history or its tribal languages, and consequently struggle to interact with local populations” and instead “the generic COIN checklist and principles handed down from headquarters are rarely applicable to specific situations, and only exacerbate the challenges of implementing counterinsurgency strategies” (Nigh 2012:6, see Figures 6-8).

The directives provided in the FM 3-24 do not always become actualized in COIN in practice on-the-ground and this is a critical example of how the humanistic goals of HTS are compromised in real-life application, a key component of academic, military, and public criticism of HTS. It also underscores the very real need for quality-trained social scientists as well as the challenges they face on HTTs and while working with military personnel who do not
have the same social sciences training. However, issues over non-transparent ethical practice in the HTS are, in many ways, preventing constructive discussion on this very real need.
CHAPTER 4. ETHICS: STANDARDS AND PRACTICE

What, precisely, are the distinctions in ethics positions between anthropology and the military that inform anthropology’s concern with the HTS and ethical practice? In this chapter I address these positions and the policies and practices required of anthropologists and persons in human subjects research in the military, specifically the HTS. This frames and outlines what I argue to be the key theme of the controversy and conflict, uncertainty, which takes several forms.

Ethics in Anthropology

The AAA represents anthropology as an academic and professional organization. As with other academic organizations, particularly in the social and behavioral sciences, the AAA produces official statements on many issues including on the ethics of professional practice. These are, however, just guiding standards for practice rather than enforceable policies for practice. Policies and protocols are the domain of the federal government via local human subjects protection units within organizations. For academic anthropologists employed by universities and practicing anthropologists in organizations such as museums and social or medical services, Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) associated with their institutions oversee the review and approval of research protocols, ethics training, and practice accountability. Most of these IRBs are internal to institutions themselves but operate under federal oversight, bound to follow the regulations set forth by the government for human subjects research. This section outlines the AAA ethical practice guidelines as they are reinforced by IRBs and federal human subjects research regulations.

The AAA’s position on ethics is laid out in the American Anthropological Association’s Statement on Ethics; Principles of Professional Responsibility (2012). This statement has been updated a total of four times since its original creation in 1971. It was amended up through 1986,
and then significantly updated in 1998, 2009, and 2012 (AAA 2012). The fairly regular updates indicate that anthropology has responded to ethical issues over time as new contexts of practice and ethics issues have arisen.

The AAA statements on ethics includes seven “core principles” for practice: 1) Do no harm 2) Be open and honest regarding your work 3) Obtain informed consent and necessary permission 4) Weigh competing ethical obligations due collaborators and affected parties 5) Make your results accessible 6) Protect and preserve your records 7) Maintain respectful and ethical professional relationships (2012:1). The most important of these for the sake of this thesis is the principle of “do no harm” as the goal is to protect the subjects of anthropological study from physical, social, and psychological harm. This goal is rooted in both the Belmont Report (as will be discussed in the next section) and a shared professional ethic of human rights as foundational to human culture.

The AAA declaration in regards to anthropology and human rights “defines the basis for the involvement of the American Anthropological Association, and more generally, of the profession of Anthropology in human rights” (AAA 1999, emphasis added). The AAA declares “an ethical commitment to the equal opportunity of all cultures, societies, and persons to realize this capacity in their cultural identities and social lives” (1999). The AAA states, “when any culture or society denies or permits the denial of such opportunity to any of its own members or others” that the organization itself has an ethical responsibility to protest and oppose such deprivation” (AAA 1999). The discipline of anthropology, academic or professional, is thus “a profession is committed to the promotion and protection of the right of people and peoples everywhere to the full realization of their humanity, which is to say their capacity for culture”
(1999). The AAA position grounds practice expectations for anthropologists working in any capacity and this includes working for the military.

The 2012 AAA statement on ethics reflects the Belmont Report’s three “basic ethical principles”: “1) Respect for Persons 2) Beneficence 3) Justice” (1979:1). The 1979 Belmont Report lays out ethical principles and guidelines for research involving human subjects” and this informs policies for human subjects protection in research as provided in the Code of Federal Regulations for the Department of Health and Human Services (45 CFR 46). 45 CFR 46 outlines compliance required of any institution whose members do research supported by any federal agency or department.⁸ It includes the establishment of and procedures for institutions’ IRBs and clear and concise rules for human subjects research protocols.

While the Belmont Report and subsequent policies in 45 CFR 46 were all created with biomedical research in mind, all forms of social research involving living humans is subject to 45 CFR 46 including anthropological research. Every practicing anthropologist working in the academy is bound by the Human Subjects Protection Program (HSPP) and its IRB at the university where they are employed. Ethics training is required and all research proposals must be submitted to their HSPP for review by the IRB and comply with all policies and regulations of the IRB and 45 CFR 46. Research projects are subject to ongoing oversight by HSPP/IRBs including audits to ensure that protocols are followed and ongoing ethics training is required. Violations of these policies and regulations can result in sanctions as extreme as the suspension of research and institutional de-funding.

---

⁸ Many organizations and companies outside of academia (i.e. medical clinics and large corporations doing social and biomedical research) also have to comply with 45 CFR 46.
Ethics in the HTS

The military’s overall position on ethics is applicable to both active and non-active duty members in multiple branches. The official document on ethics is the Department of Defense Joint Ethics Regulation (JER), referred to here by its issuance number, DoD 5500.7-R. DoD 5500.7-R states that:

Ethics are standards by which one should act based on values. Values are core beliefs such as duty, honor, and integrity that motivate attitudes and actions. Not all values are ethical values (integrity is; happiness is not). Ethical values relate to what is right and wrong and thus take precedence over nonethical values when making ethical decisions.

[1993:118]

This document also includes two lists regarding ethics. The first is a list of individual character values: “1) Honesty 2) Integrity 3) Loyalty 4) Accountability 5) Fairness 6) Caring 7) Respect 8) Promise Keeping 9) Responsible Citizenship 10) Pursuit of Excellence (DoD 5500.7-R 1993:118-119). The second list, more relevant to concerns with the HTS, is titled “Ethical Decision-Making” (EDMP) and lists its values as follows: 1) Define the Problem 2) Identify the Goal(s) 3) List Applicable Laws or Regulations 4) List the Ethical Values at Stake 5) Name all the Stakeholders 6) Gather Additional Information 7) State All Feasible Solutions 8) Eliminate Unethical Options 9) Rank Remaining Solutions 10) Commit To and Implement the Best Ethical Solution (DoD 5500.7-R 2011:119-121).

In terms of policy and procedures as required in federal policy, in 2002 Paul Wolfwitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, “canceled previous DoD directives concerning research with human subjects and implemented 32 CFR 219” and “32 CFR 219 is identical…to 45 CFR 46, ‘the common rule’” (Strong 2007:1) Multiple “federal departments and agencies” had begun
“implementing the Common Rule” (e.g., 45 CFR 46) and those such as the DoD, Department of Justice (DoJ), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), all of which are now in part involved with the HTS, are to adhere to the Common Rule of protecting human subjects (Rose 2012:3-5). Standards in DoD-Supported Research do now require that “all research involving human subjects that is conducted or supported by the Department of Defense shall comply with part 219 of Reference (c) [32 CFR 219] which incorporates the ethical principles of respect for persons, beneficence, and justice” (DoD 3216.02 2011:2). However, “there are waivers they can apply to programs like the US Army’s HTS” (Stanton 2010:1).

It remains unclear what policies were being followed by the earliest HTS teams prior to 2008 or how reviews of proposed research for human subjects protection were being performed then and into the present. The 2010 Congressionally Directed Assessment of the Human Terrain System report notes that a 2008 change to the HTS was the “creation of an ethics committee and the writing of guidelines” (Clinton et al. 2010:72). This is consistent with information from the HTTHB whereby HTTs must create, as part of area of operations research proposals, a document explaining how the “research will comply with the protection of human research subjects according to 45 CFR 46 to ensure the research falls within accepted ethical guidelines” (Finney 2008:55). According to the handbook, HTT research is to be implemented “in the same manner in which academic social scientists conduct their research and is similarly rooted in theory and complete with ethical review boards” (Finney 2008:56). The HTTHB also lists the following as an entry under “Team Best Practices”: to “provide focused study on social science, cultural or ethnographic issues of specific concern to the Commander by conducting social science research that adhere to the ethics of Anthropology and Sociology (Finney 2008:81).
In mid-2010, the HTS Social Science Directorate was currently seeking to fill two positions whose responsibilities included “to review all HTS research plan designs, determine whether they adhere to research and ethical guidelines, and provide mentorship to new personnel who are writing research plans” (Clinton et al. 2010:35). The HTS Social Science Directorate hired Christopher King (Ph.D. in anthropology) as Director in 2011, replacing McFate who had been the director since the inception of HTS. As Director, King oversaw the HTS HSPP. At a presentation at the University of Hawaii Manoa, King outlined current HTS practice in 2011 as was possible using unclassified information.

According to King, ethics training occurs before deployment with eight hours and 14 modules an “online CITI training accompanied by two hours for broad overview of federal standards” followed by “approximately 22 hours of ethics training for social scientists and about 10 hours all other positions” (2011:9). For social scientists, an addition 12 hours of time is spent covering “ethical research and design,” ethical practices exercises, and compliance form use (2011:9). This is part of a 55-day pre-deployment training/pre-mission certification program that also includes research design/implementation training as well as culture and language training.

Ethics training and follow-up continue the field with the Social Science Directorate communicating with teams through emails, telephone, teleconference, and quarterly analysis of finished products. The Social Science Mobile Knowledge Team also “provides on-site assistance and mentoring to deployed HTTs and Human Terrain Analysis Teams (HTATs)” (King 2011:9). While it is clear from the HTTHB and the HTS Social Science Directorate that ethics standards exist and that ethics training is critical to HTS, the process for review and approval of human subjects research proposals by the equivalent of an IRB as required by 45 CFR 46 or 32 CFR 219 is not clear.
Anthropology’s Position on the HTS

As institutions with significantly different goals, anthropology and the military both “draw distinctions [between how they go] about research, data collection, advising, and intelligence, as well as differences between these activities” (AAA 2009a:25). However, both are, as noted above, grounded in professional ethics standards as well as have policies and regulations for ethical practice regarding the protection of human subjects. A “cultural shift” in the military brought discrepancies in ethical practice and all other aspects of research related to human subjects protection to the forefront of professional discourse. For one, in 2008 the DoD-funded Minerva Initiative was enacted “to balance military-funded research in support of ‘basic research’ in the social sciences” and more strongly incorporate “people and perspectives from the social science disciplines that foreground field research” (AAA 2009a:25). This followed the emergence of the deployment of HTTs in the HTS program and the early formalization of the AAA’s position opposing the HTS. The incorporation of social scientists in research for COIN in areas of operations produced a still-ongoing controversy over precisely how ethics are practiced and human subjects protected.

The AAA’s disapproval of the HTS became public in October of 2007, just nine months after the launch of the HTS in the Army’s COIN program. This very prompt public response is likely the result of intersecting issues. First, anthropology’s past history (see Chapter 3) with the military and working on behalf of colonial powers is likely a key motivation for a rapid response to current military intelligence research activities. Second, such a quick response may, in part, be credited to anthropology’s last major public ethics debacle, the El Dorado controversy (see Chapter 3). As Borofsky has suggested, “anthropologists cannot simply claim to be moral and expect others in nonacademic settings to trust them on that basis, especially given the
discipline’s record to date” (2005:16) thus their reputations are at stake when any ethics issues related to the discipline arise.

The public statement was produced by a commission established by the Executive Board of the Association and “based on information in the public record, as well as on information and comments provided to the Executive Board by the Ad Hoc Commission and its members” (2007:1). Five major concerns stated in the AAA 2007 Executive Board Statement on the Human Terrain System Project (2007:1, emphases added) are as follows:

1. As military contractors working in settings of war, HTS anthropologists work in situations where it will not always be possible for them to distinguish themselves from military personnel and identify themselves as anthropologists. This places a significant constraint on their ability to fulfill their ethical responsibility as anthropologists to disclose who they are and what they are doing.

2. HTS anthropologists are charged with responsibility for negotiating relations among a number of groups, including both local populations and the U.S. military units that employ them and in which they are embedded. Consequently, HTS anthropologists may have responsibilities to their U.S. military units in war zones that conflict with their obligations to the persons they study or consult, specifically the obligation, stipulated in the AAA Code of Ethics, to do no harm to those they study.

3. HTS anthropologists work in a war zone under conditions that make it difficult for those they communicate with to give “informed consent” without coercion, or for this consent to be taken at face value or freely refused. As a result, “voluntary informed consent” (as stipulated by the AAA Code of Ethics, section III, A, 4) is compromised.
4. As members of HTS teams, anthropologists provide information and counsel to U.S. military field commanders. This poses a risk that information provided by HTS anthropologists could be used to make decisions about identifying and selecting specific populations as targets of U.S. military operations either in the short or long term. Any such use of fieldwork-derived information would violate the stipulations in the AAA Code of Ethics that *those studied not be harmed.*

5. Because HTS identifies anthropology and anthropologists with U.S. military operations, this identification—given the existing range of globally dispersed understandings of U.S. militarism—may create serious difficulties for, including grave risks to the personal safety of, many non-HTS anthropologists and the people they study.

This statement strongly highlights key issues of ethical responsibility, to “do not harm,” the risk of information misuse to harm, and the risks that a militarization of anthropology could have.

The AAA openly concedes it did not complete a full “systematic study” for this statement (AAA 2007:1). In a field of study where rigorous ethnographic inquiry key to evidence for making any hypothesis or claim, this lack of depth is uncharacteristic of the discipline. The 2009 Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology with United States Military and Intelligence Communities (CEAUSSIC) completed a more systematic study that included accounts of HTS issues from both soldiers’ and anthropologists’ perspectives. Concerns raised in the CEAUSSIC report focus on “the establishment of voluntary informed consent, taking care to insure that no harm comes to research participants as a result of HTS research, and full disclosure to research participants what will be done with collected data” (AAA 2009a:42). This centered primarily on two issues. One was the absence of consideration of AAA ethics standards during the design of
HTS by HTS personnel. The second was confirmatory evidence that the HTS has thus far had an “avoidance of Institutional Review Board oversight” (AAA 2009a:42).

The CEAUSSIC report included some positive material regarding the HTS and HTT as assisting in harm reduction. For example, one HTT employee, an anthropologist working with the 2nd Brigade Combat Team/1st Armored Division in Iraq told CEAUSSIC that “we were able to directly or indirectly conceptualize and influence virtually all of our brigade’s problem sets and provide nonlethal options to resolve them” (AAA 2009a:27). However, other information revealed problems with training. HTT members said that “the concept of HTT is good. What I think we’re missing is that we’re not recruiting the right people” and “the training curriculum (for HTS) was put together in ad hoc fashion by a retired colonel with no social science background” (AAA 2009a:20). These same HTT employees noted that “training was completely inadequate and doesn’t prepare people…it’s generic training” and “everything is extremely rushed, in part because they are trying to ramp it up so fast” (AAA 2009a:20).

Another issue raised in the CEAUSSIC report was of militarization of HTT members. One HTT employee confessed that “they [the soldiers who accompany HTT members making the rounds] expect you to be fully engaged in the heat of battle, during a course of action, not taking a knee” (AAA 2009:22). This also speaks to a serious concern with the safety of and violence against a number of people whom the HTS involves, one informed by the AAA’s position on human rights. The AAA declares an ethical commitment to the equal opportunity of all cultures, societies, and persons to realize this capacity in their cultural identities and social lives. However, the global environment is fraught with violence which is perpetrated by states and their
representatives, corporations, and other actors. That violence limits the humanity of individuals and collectives. [AAA 1999]

Violence against innocent bystander civilians is thus also an issue for the AAA. In HTS practices there is an undeniable threat of violence given that HTTs operate largely in a conflict zone and collateral damage is always possible. The CEAUSSIC report “highlights the admission – in a response by HTS to a query from the commission – that it is possible that those who interact with HTTs may become subject to ‘lethal targeting’, even if by insurgent groups rather than US forces” (AAA 2009a:32, Zehfuss 2012:179). The safety of anthropologists is also at stake. Three anthropologists died in the field while working for HTS: Michael Bhatia was killed along with two other soldiers by an improvised explosive device (IED), Nicole Suveges was killed beside 11 other soldiers when a bomb exploded at the District Council building in Sadr City, and Paula Lloyd was fatally injured when she was doused with gasoline and lit on fire in the village of Chehel Gazi (Stanton 2009:189).

**The Conflict: Uncertainty**

Anthropology and the military do share a concern with ethical practices. Both have ethics guidelines, aspirational statements aimed at educating institution members about professional values, representing disciplines to the public, preempting external regulation, and, not inconsequentially, “providing members with professionally principled rationales in employment and consultancy contract negotiations” (Lederman 2009:12). Both are bound in practice, to federal regulations, the DoD to 32 CFR 219 and academic anthropologists to 45 CFR 46. Yet the controversy, conflict, and debate over ethics remains.

Based on the discourse analysis of materials covering the issue of ethics in the HTS from three domains (military/government, academe, the public), the discussion of the ethics standards and practices of both anthropology and the military, and identification of the AAA position on
HTS, I argue that uncertainty is at the heart of this conflict. For the AAA and many anthropologists, this includes uncertainty over policies and protocols that ensure HSPP review to ensure, as much as is possible, that no harm is done in the process or as a result of HTS operations. This encompasses not only IRB review but informed consent and issues surrounding the used of data collected that could cause harm. Uncertainty exists about the rigor of training and the militarization of HTS social sciences and over the risk of violence and death for HTT members and indigenous civilian populations. This overwhelming uncertainty is, in large part, what makes the HTS, at least in its state from inception into the present, a disaster-in-process.
To better understand the complexity of the conflict over the HTS and identify potential ways to move forward with ideas for addressing those concerns, the initial discourse analysis results were applied to Hoffman’s (1999) model of cultural response to disaster in the context of the discussion on ethics standards and practice. Hoffman’s (1999) model is useful in disaster studies not for analyzing disaster events (“the actual tornado”) but the processes of sociocultural human behavior and response to a disaster. Oliver-Smith argues that a focus on the social and cultural aspects of disaster allows us to be “dealing with one dimension of the processual aspect of disaster” over time instead of just the event itself. (2002:23). However, as previously noted, both Hoffman and Oliver-Smith do not consider war and man-made events disaster (1999:2) thus the application of the model to HTS as a wartime phenomenon is novel. This model will thus be used to argue for an understanding of the HTS as a disaster-in-process. The model allows for a critical discussion of the themes that arose through discourse analysis as they represent discourses of military, academics, and public spheres and the conflicts between these spheres over ethical practices.

Hoffman’s (1999) original model, created to map and understand the sociocultural phenomena that followed the Oakland firestorm of 1991, includes four phases: the disaster event, the crisis, the aftermath nexus, and the passage to closure. The conceptual illustration below (Figure 8) is inspired by this model and adapted to frame the concerns about HTS. The emergence and establishment of HTS as an Army COIN program is the “disaster event.” The “crisis” phase is represented by issues of uncertainty and vulnerability. Next, issues of social control are represented as the “aftermath nexus.” Last, the actual and potential outcomes of HTS are represented as the “passage to closure” which cycles forward back to disaster. The center of
the model represents the continual coproduction of knowledge by involved and concerned institutions. The discussions below of each phase of the model refer both to the materials subjected to discourse analysis (see Chapter 2) and information from Chapters 3 and 4.

Figure 8. Conceptual model based on Hoffman (1999).

**The Crisis Phase: Uncertainty and Vulnerability**

The HTS was created by the US military when successes in the War on Terror were in steady decline and new methods to fight insurgents were needed. The HTS was developed by persons trained in anthropology and once established, anthropologists found themselves to be desirable for their cultural expertise and ethnographic skills, much as they were in the past. The
HTS was created as a response to military uncertainty about and vulnerability to insurgents and it in turn created a crisis phase of concerns over uncertainty and vulnerability affecting a much broader set of involved populations. In the crisis phase, social groups (here the military and anthropology) are disrupted by a disaster event and placed into a shared liminal state through which they negotiate transformed subject positions shaped by the disaster itself.

**Uncertainty**

The most dominant theme revealed in the process of discourse analysis was uncertainty. It was the top theme for both academic and public discourse while it was the lowest-ranking theme in military discourse. According to Gregory Button, “uncertainty does not simply exist—it is produced, and the production of uncertainty can result in new political, economic, and social formations. This informational uncertainty generates conflicting public discourse about blame and the responsibility for remediation” (2010:11). Contemporary relations between the military and anthropology were already tenuous going into the War on Terror. “Informational uncertainty can create individual and community-wide stress” and exacerbate existing relations (Button 2010:11) and this phenomena is at the start and heart of the crisis phase following the emergence of HTS as a pilot program. In the crisis phase and beyond, uncertainty here is produced and maintained largely by the military as an entity of power.

One reason for so much tense uncertainty between the military and anthropology is the need for the coproduction of cultural knowledge but an unresolved lack of transparency over the use of data collected by HTS social scientists. Sheila Miyoshi Jager states that “especially amid the domestic acrimony spawned by the Iraq War, inadequate coordination between military and nonmilitary power [such as academics] will severely hamper U.S. counterinsurgency capabilities.” (2007:vii). Kevin Orr and Mike Bennett argue that “cooperation and greater
interaction between theory and practice can generate a whole range of benefits including bringing local knowledge to bear on a problem” (2012:1) including military challenges. According to Price, “asymmetrical wars of the twenty-first century now look toward anthropology with hopes of finding models of culture, or data on specific cultures to be conquered or to be used in counterinsurgency operations” (2009b:1).

Many military personnel believe that the work of embedded social scientists via the HTS is invaluable to the military agenda. McFate and Steve Fondacaro quote an active duty soldier noting:

This is my third rotation, but we’ve always done a horseshit job at it [referencing cultural data collection]. We don’t have enough patience. Everything we do is focused on security. But they can get after a problem set and be more academic about it…We have a tendency to bullshit and say ‘this is how people feel’ but having a dedicated academic supported by operators, they can achieve a lot more accurate data. [2012:78]

But Orr and Bennett also indicate that “such research takes place within a political environment that requires continual negotiation of different interests” and because of this, there are also negative aspects to coproduction of knowledge (2012:1). Major Ben Connable suggests that “by doctrine, mission, and organization, the US military is mandated to train and maintain organic cultural expertise. Staffs are required to conduct training in the navigation of cultural terrain. Cultural information is inextricably linked to the intelligence process” (2009:59).

The emergence of the HTS made the collection of this kind of cultural information possible internally by employing academics but the use of that information to potentially cause harm concerns many. “Scientific practice and knowledge-making is constantly producing new parameters of what risk means, and thus molding the ever-changing landscapes of uncertainty”
(Cornell and Jackson 2013:508) and in the context of war, new kinds of risks emerge. Concerned anthropologists see novel risks in coproducing knowledge with the military because of uncertainty over how this information is going to be used in COIN operations in terms of potential harm to civilians. This is where uncertainty creates questions about making vulnerable populations in conflict zones even more vulnerable, violating ethical values of “do no harm.”

**Vulnerability**

By definition, vulnerability is to be in a position to be easily hurt or harmed physically, mentally, or emotionally and/or open to attack harm, or damage (Merriam-Webster 2014). Lakshmi Fjord notes that “vulnerable persons are... people, grouped by their lack of particular physical, emotional, cognitive or social resources which seem to explain their disproportionate harms from disasters and the everyday” (2010: 13). Human vulnerability, specifically regarding time of war, is shaped by cultural, political, and social conditions and exploited by those in power, be they insurgents or counterinsurgency forces. Vulnerability as a dominant theme was identified in all coded institutions discourses and ranked as the #2 most dominant in military and academic discourse and #3 in public discourse. Of concern in this discussion “is the way in which people construct or ‘frame’…vulnerability, including at times the denial of it” (Hoffman and Oliver-Smith 1999:8). The actual term “vulnerable” was almost non-existent in the military discourse, mentioned only once. Instead military discourse spoke to “risks” in lieu of vulnerability proper while academic and public discourse focused on “the underlying conditions [and outcomes]” (Alwang et al. 2001:ii). The explicit use of the terms “vulnerable/vulnerability” were primarily found in academic and public discourse.

According to Price, “safeguards protecting gathered data for use by military or intelligence agencies are absent” (2009b:4) and HTS employed anthropologists are unable to
guarantee that the data they collect for HTS will cause no harm those who are noncombatant participants in the research. A lack of being able to control data produces uncertainty about creating new forms of vulnerability or exacerbating existing vulnerability given that populations in areas of war are vulnerable before foreign military powers intervene. Price argues that HTS practices raise “serious political, ethical, and practical problems for anthropologists” because HTS social scientists’ reports “can be used by military and intelligence agencies in ways that can make studied populations vulnerable” (Price 2009b:3). As González argues, “widespread concern” and uncertainty are key concerns for other, even more extreme forms of vulnerability such as “how interrogators might use readily accessible ethnographic data for the abuse and torture of prisoners” (2007:2).

Anthropologists are the experts in ethnographic research and their primary focus is to “do no harm” to their subjects, and “weigh competing ethical obligations to research participants,…professional colleagues, employers and funders,…while recognizing that obligations to vulnerable populations are particularly important and primary (AAA 2012). The complexity inherent in these multiple relationships creates sometimes competing loyalties for an anthropologist as “varying relationships may create conflicting ethical obligations, reflecting both the relative vulnerabilities of different individuals, communities or populations, asymmetries of power implicit in a range of relationships, and the differing ethical frameworks of collaborators representing other disciplines or areas of practice” (AAA 2012). A primary concern for anthropologists concerned with the HTS is thus how to decrease noncombatant populations’ “struggle to secure an increasingly uncertain tomorrow from an increasingly vulnerable today” (Sider 2011:1). A lack of control over data is directly linked to the
continuation or exacerbation of vulnerability and, “if vulnerability was part of the ideology, it is now manifest” (1999:140) in the crisis stage.

**The Aftermath Nexus: Social Control**

Concerns over uncertainty and vulnerability emerged as soon as the HTS was proposed and they multiplied as the HTS became a permanent Army program. These concerns remain unresolved and have continued into the aftermath nexus stage, the phase when social groups affected by a disaster event attempt to re-ground after experiencing the crisis. This is “more prolonged phase… its length depends on the…particular circumstance, but generally lasts from some months to some years” according to Hoffman (1999:141). It is in this phase that affected groups establish new social and/or ideological boundaries between one another or reinforce older ones as a means to recover from or resolve the crisis at hand. Hoffman claims that its length “depends on the place, the disaster, and the particular circumstance” (1999:141).

In this particular case, vulnerability and uncertainty in the crisis phase produces a concern with and enacting of social control. Social control, by definition, “refers generally to societal and political mechanisms or processes that regulate individual and group behavior in an attempt to gain conformity and compliance to the rules of a given society, state, or social group” (Merriam-Webster 2014). Social control was an unexpected theme that emerged through the discourse analysis – it took reading between the lines to find that the other two dominant themes were in fact informing social control concerns about the military and the HTS. Social control is not only produced by vulnerability and uncertainty, but it is enforced through the coproduction of knowledge and data control, primarily by the military. Social control was the #1 theme in military discourse analyzed and #2 in academic and public discourse on the HTS. Discourse from anthropologists demonstrated explicit concern with social control whereas in military
discourse, social control was a part of agenda content and goals. This creates two distinct and opposing groups, one concerned with social control, the other concerned with implementing social control.

For example, anthropologist Price writes that “in the past, when military planners and colonial administrators sought the counsel of anthropologists, they looked for a social science stripped of ambiguity, meaning, and context. They wanted simple analytical tools that might help them accomplish short-term objectives” of governance and control (2009b:5). Likewise, anthropologists currently “commissioned by the Pentagon as counterinsurgency consultants use the same tools as instruments for manipulation and social control—not as a means of humanizing other people” (Price 2009:5).

As the HTS has become a permanent program and grown, social control and power over populations in war zones is thus being facilitated by anthropologists in the HTS coproducing cultural knowledge with other HTS social scientists and military personnel. What the anthropological perspective has added to a “simplistic counting of the number of war dead as an indicator” of how lethal the military is without the HTS, is that it “provides more nuanced and multifaceted data” on lethal vs. non-lethal, “inequality, and social control” (Harrod and Martin 2014:11). The potential for social control to have no limits is because HTT members do not “maintain control over the collection and storage of the data they collected. HTS, as a program, cannot guarantee that this data could not be used by others for other purposes, potentially including lethal targeting” (McFate and Fondacaro 2012:3) and, I argue, less deadly but potentially dehumanizing forms of social control.

Also of concern are the outdated and “primitivist” concepts, theories, and methods being used in the HTS for research design. González states that “Montgomery McFate (the Pentagon’s
senior social science advisor for HTS)” has revealed that she “relied heavily upon the concept of ‘tribalism’, functionalist theory, and data collection methods developed for the Human Relations Area Files” and the use of “social network analysis” (2009:2). He continues by stating that all of “these elements was either created or elaborated” when anthropologists were employed by colonial governments “to more effectively control indigenous populations” (2009:2). González insists that “it’s no accident that these are precisely the tools advocated by the HTS’s architects” (2009:2). Social control is “established in…roles” (like HTS) “and is perpetuated by the very forces directed to its elimination or control” (Lemert 1972:i).

Concern over social control is an element that “contributes to the complexity of recovery” from and working through issues of uncertainty and vulnerability as they presented in the crisis phase after the emergence of the HTS (Hoffman 1999:144). It bears on how anthropology and the military engage in discourse on the HTS and address each others’ concerns in ways that consider the different goals of each institution in constructive dialog as a part of the passage to closure on this controversy. And it wraps back to issues of uncertainty as they bear on transparency for the HTS in regards to ethical research practices, something currently deeply hidden in the classified world of military procedures, exemplifying yet another form of power and social control: the control of information.

**The Passage to Closure: More Uncertainty**

Despite its name, the “passage to closure” phase does not signal a finite end; it is simply a step in the cycle that continues into the future as new crisis phases may occur (Hoffman 1999:149). It is a phase where social groups engage in a “return to…the calamity” in order to re-make their social worlds as they have been transformed by crisis (Hoffman 1999:149). Hoffman notes that in this step, “some sort of settlement” is appropriate, “desirable or not” (Hoffman
1999:149) and here the “settlement” is potentially coming to a working relationship for the
coproduction of cultural knowledge between anthropology and the military as institutions of
power. This requires change on the parts of both anthropology and the military and it can create
more uncertainty as part of moving towards closure.

Hoffman suggests that in this phase, “the question of change is a complex one.
Sometimes a calamity is a bridge to change…at other times changes meld together, with timeless
practices providing only new content for old formats” (1999:151). She also states that “if little
else, disaster usually spurs increased political awareness” (Hoffman 1999:151) or other forms of
awareness. It has been argued that anthropology’s public and disciplinary reputations have been
questioned because of the concerns over ethical practice in the HTS, as both an ethical dilemma
and an ethical disaster (Lin 2009:155). And while “perpetuating former practices” (like those
from the troubled history of anthropology and the military) can occur in this phase, “a new
horizon” may also emerge (1999:152). A new horizon here would be to create an opportunity for
anthropology to continue the discussion on the HTS and military/anthropology relationships but
in the context of creating transparency regarding the protections of human subjects.

We are, at this moment, in the passage to closure phase, at a detente between
anthropology and the military. Anthropology and the military need to engage in discourse on the
HTS and address each others’ concerns in ways that consider the shared and different goals of
each institution in constructive dialog as a part of the passage to closure on this controversy. And
this wraps back to issues of uncertainty as they bear on transparency for the HTS in regards to
ethical research practices, something currently deeply hidden in the classified world of military
procedures. We must also come to an understanding that like HTT members, some
anthropologists “may [too] have doubtful motivations, that their work may be improperly used,
and that the ultimate effect on those studied is not predictable” (Whittaker 1981:437). Likewise, as Orr and Bennett suggest, “it is disingenuous to imply through the presentation of social science that research is a clean, objective process carried out by purists who stand above politics, and this picture if further complicated in join projects, where participants are mindful of a complexity of interacting demands and interests” (2012:3).

Catastrophes and the social responses that follow may vary from calamity to calamity, but the disasters that occur, and the human response to them, is a cycle repeated time and again that has within in the potential for positive transformation. But how can anthropologists work toward addressing the ethical issues evident in working with the HTS? I thus argue that moving forward in the passage to closure on the HTS requires anthropology to engage productively with the military on neutral ground rather than opt out of all engagement. Several scholars have made recommendations for such that are centered on the concerns with ethical practice found in this thesis: uncertainty, vulnerability, social control, transparency.

For example, George R Lucas, a military ethicist at the US Naval Academy, that anthropologists should “create a nongovernmental organization” like “Anthropologists Without Borders…that would advise the military but would not actually be employed by the military” (Glenn 2009b:1). While Connable suggests that “the practice of deploying academics to a combat zone may undermine the very relationships the military is trying to build, or more accurately rebuild, with a social science community that has generally been suspicious of the U.S. military since the Viet Nam era” (2009:58), for anthropology to not work with the military is to fundamentally violate our own publically stated value of working to solve real world problems with our research.
CHAPTER 6. HTS NOW, HTS IN THE FUTURE: A CONCLUSION

Conclusive Overview

The chief objective of this study was to analyze and evaluate conflicts and debates between anthropologists and the military focused on the ethics of human subjects research and the ethical uses of data collected through social scientists contracted by the military. At the center of this conflict was the creation and implementation of the HTS by the US military, and specifically the “recruitment of anthropologists to provide ‘cultural knowledge’ for the purpose of more effective counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan” (Forte 2011:149). Research questions thus focused on ethical practices in the HTS, contextualized by the history of anthropology’s role in military and government operations, ethics standards and protocols in anthropology and the HTS, and the AAA’s public position against the HTS. In this thesis I sought to provide answers to the following research questions:

1) Are there common themes to be found in discussions regarding the HTS in the government/military, anthropology, and general public spheres?

2) Are there disparities in the ethics standards of AAA, human subjects research in academe, and the military?

Context for these questions was established to better frame the controversy surrounding the employment of anthropologists (and other social scientists) in the military, and specifically the HTS. Both anthropology and the military are products of historical particularity and can only be understood in historical context. Information was thus collected on the US military, with an emphasis on the Army and the War on Terror given priority because the HTS officially began operating during this particular conflict. Further works on the roles of anthropology and the military in other wars were secured and analyzed as were scholarly publications on the history of
anthropology and colonial government relationships in order to understand anthropology’s long history with military and government intelligence. The Darkness in El Dorado ethics controversy for anthropology as a discipline was analyzed as a precursor to the AAA response to the emergence of the HTS. The initial creation of the HTS was also outlined. Establishing this historical context produced an understanding of anthropology’s engagement with governmental entities in the past as well as its own internal and public controversies over ethical practices.

This context both framed and complimented the discourse analysis used to address the first research question: Are there common themes to be found in discussions regarding the HTS in the government/military, anthropology, and general public spheres? Through discourse analysis of selected government/military, anthropology, and general public materials on the HTS, five common themes were found across these discussions: uncertainty, vulnerability, social control, the coproduction of knowledge and data control. First, 134 significant works were located and those that dealt with ethics standards and practices were analyzed to provide an outline of information on standards and policies for ethics in anthropology the military and the AAA position on the HTS in order to address the second research question. For the first research question, these 134 works were narrowed down to 22 key items specifically for discourse analysis to identify common themes across the categories of military, academic and public discourse on the HTS.

Uncertainty, vulnerability, and social control were found to be the three most prominent concerns regarding the HTS across government/military, anthropology, and general public spheres. Issues regarding the coproduction of knowledge and data control were found to be the next set of primary concerns. The identification of these five themes aided in addressing the
second research question: *Are there disparities in the ethics standards of AAA, human subjects research in academe, and the military?* The conclusive answer to this question is complex.

Anthropology and the military do share a concern with ethical practices. Both have ethics guidelines and standards and both are bound in practice, to federal regulations, the DoD to 32 CFR 219 and academic anthropologists to 45 CFR 46. While it is clear from the HTTHB and the HTS Social Science Directorate that ethics standards exist and that ethics training is critical to HTS, the process for review and approval of human subjects research proposals for HTTs by the equivalent of an IRB as required by 45 CFR 46 or 32 CFR 219 is not transparent. In contrast, for practicing anthropologists who are employed as academics, policies and processes for human subjects research review and oversight are very clear and available to the public via the websites for any academic institution’s HSPP unit.

For the AAA and many anthropologists, this disparity produces uncertainty over policies and protocols for HSPP review to ensure, as much as is possible, that no harm is done in the process or as a result of HTS operations. This encompasses not only IRB review but informed consent and issues surrounding the used of data collected that could cause harm. Uncertainty exists about the rigor of training and the militarization of HTS social sciences and over the risk of violence and death for HTT members and indigenous civilian populations.

To better understand this uncertainty and the complexity of the conflict over the HTS as well as identify potential ways to move forward with ideas for addressing those concerns, the themes addressing the first research question were applied to Hoffman’s (1999) model of cultural response to disaster in the context of the answers to the second research question. The use of this model allowed a conceptualization of the HTS and the ensuing controversy to be understood as a disaster-in-process and to identify common ground for recovery. Concern over social control was
identified as an element that “contributes to the complexity of recovery” from and working through issues of uncertainty and vulnerability as they presented in a crisis phase after the emergence of the HTS (Hoffman 1999:144). This was found to bear on how anthropology and the military might possibly engage in discourse on the HTS and address each others’ concerns in ways that consider the different goals of each institution in constructive dialog as a part of the passage to closure on this controversy.

The Future of Debates and the HTS

The AAA states that “among our goals are the dissemination of anthropological knowledge and its use to solve human problems” (2012). Given that the aim of HTS is to use local sociocultural knowledge for better operational decision-making and minimizing collateral damage, particularly indigenous civilian deaths, it would seem that the involvement of social scientists such as anthropologists in HTS meets AAA goals, the needs of national security, and reducing war casualties. However, as demonstrated in this thesis, “weaponizing culture” through the HTS is not supported by the AAA and is opposed by many anthropologists.

So how might anthropologists work toward addressing the ethical issues evident in working with the HTS? I argue that moving forward in the passage to closure on the HTS requires anthropology to engage productively with the military on neutral ground rather than opt out of all engagement. Opting out is not a valid solution since war and other sociopolitical conflicts will continue, bringing with them ongoing potentials for harm to civilians and soldiers alike. If anthropology as a discipline were to completely disengage, a vacuum is created whereby other disciplines can dominate the military intelligence realm and pick up where anthropology left off, but perhaps in a less rigorously trained fashion in terms of ethnographic methods and cultural sensitivity. And if anthropologists do not cultivate a working relationship with the
military, what will stop the military creating their own “anthropologists” instead? What would this do for reducing uncertainty and vulnerability?

As institutions with significantly different goals, anthropology and the military both “draw distinctions [between how they go] about research, data collection, advising, and intelligence, as well as differences between these activities” (AAA 2009a:25). However, both are, as noted above, grounded in professional ethics standards as well as have policies and regulations for ethical practice regarding the protection of human subjects. Anthropology and the military do need to engage in discourse on the HTS and address each others’ concerns in ways that consider the shared and different goals of each institution in constructive dialog as a part of the passage to closure on this controversy.

The findings in this thesis suggest that a more substantial first step is for anthropology to find ways to work with the military to make human subjects protections policies, protocols, and practices in the HTS more transparent and accountable, reflecting the same ethical practice accountability that academic anthropologists are bound to through their institutions’ Human Subjects Protections Programs (HSPPs) and Institutional Review Boards (IRBs). As it stands, a key concern is that data that is collected by social scientists in the HTS are not controlled by them or subject to transparent human subjects protection assurances and could thus be used for military decision-making that harms the populations involved.

Several scholars have made recommendations for collaboration on these issues and that addresses the shared concerns over ethical practice as found in this thesis: uncertainty, vulnerability, social control, transparency. For example, George R Lucas, a military ethicist at the US Naval Academy, that anthropologists should “create a nongovernmental organization” like “Anthropologists Without Borders…that would advise the military but would not actually be
employed by the military” (Glenn 2009b:1). While Connable suggests that “the practice of deploying academics to a combat zone may undermine the very relationships the military is trying to build, or more accurately rebuild, with a social science community that has generally been suspicious of the U.S. military since the Viet Nam era” (2009:58), for anthropology to not work with the military is to fundamentally violate our own value of working to solve real world problems with our research.

Additionally, more research needs to be done on the HTS. The HTS is now an established COIN entity and will continue to be used to achieve military and foreign policy objectives. The HTS is less than 10 years old and thus little real ethnographic work has been done on the program or with populations where the HTS has operated. Currently, research that has been conducted on the HTS primarily addresses concern for participants of ethnographic study and military agendas, both of which are important areas to scrutinize. This thesis is a contribution to this particular body of work. Further work with HTS social scientists and military personnel such as that by Nigh (2012) and found in the CEAUSSIC report (AAA 2009a) needs to be done as the HTS program expands. Future explorations could include fieldwork in HTS locations (i.e. headquarters in U.S., deployed HTS areas) to address current HTS experiences, what is and is not actually applied in the HTT fieldwork after training, and post-HTS ethical, physical, and, career risk assessments.

In the future there will be more ex-HTS employees with firsthand experience who are able to freely write and speak about their experiences without this being “subject to review and approval by Army security and public affairs” (HTS 2014). This will provide opportunities for engagement in reflexive research on HTS. Even though the official HTS website claims that “HTS is not an applied anthropology program” (HTS 2014), a majority of ex-HTS employees
will be found coming from and returning to work in applied anthropology fields thus creating a new branch of research on the HTS and its relationship to applied work in the discipline. Yet even with future research, the solution to the controversy between anthropology and the military will remain very complex. I hope, however, that this fractious relationship can evolve into a mutually productive one. Beginning to navigate the ethical landscapes of anthropology and the military to find common ground, as I have done in this thesis, is just one step toward this as a possibility.
REFERENCES

Albro, Robert and Hugh Gusterson


Albro, Robert and George Marcus, Laura A. McNamara and Monica Schoch-Spana


    Walnut Creek: Left Coast Press.

Alwang, Jeffrey and Paul B. Siegel, Steen L. Jorgensen


American Anthropological Association


Beeman, William


Benedict, Ruth


Bernard, H. Russell and Gery W. Ryan


Birtle, Andrew J.


Boas, Franz


Borofsky, Rob

Bourdieu, Pierre


Brenneis, Donald


Brook, Tom Vanden

2014 Human Terrain System tab up to $726M since ’07. *USA Today*, January 2.

Button, Gregory

2010 *Disaster Culture: Knowledge and Uncertainty in the Wake of Human and Environmental Catastrophe*. Walnut Creek: Left Coast Press.

Carrithers, Michael


Caduff, Carlo


Chilungu, Simeon W.


Clinton, Yvette and Virginia Foran-Cain, Julia Voelker McQuaid, Catherine E. Norman, William H. Sims

Connable, Ben


Cornell, S.E. and M.S. Jackson


Crockford, Kade


Culture Matters


Department of Defense


Department of Health & Human Services


Emerson, Robert, with Rachel I. Fretz and Linda L. Shaw


Fairclough, Norman


Fassin, Didier


Foust, Joshua


Finney, Nathan


Fjord, Lakshmi


Foucault, Michel,


Forte, Maximilian C.


Foster, Peter

Geertz, Clifford

Gezari, Vanessa M.
2013 The Human Terrain System Sought to Transform the Army From Within. *Newsweek*, August 16.

Glenn, David

González, Roberto J.
2004 *Anthropologists in the Public Sphere: Speaking Out on War, Peace, and American Power*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Gusterson, Hugh
Gray, Gerald and Alessandra Zielinkski


Gregor, Thomas A. and Daniel Gross


Harrod, Ryan P. and Debra L. Martin


Hoffman, Susanna M.


Hoffman, Susanna M. and Anthony Oliver-Smith


Human Terrain System


International Committee of the Red Cross

Jager, Sheila Miyoshi


Jayson, Sharon

2007 Anthropologists Battle Over Ethics of Embeds. USA Today, November 27.

Jorgensen, Marianne W. and Louise J. Phillips


Kagan, Donald and Frederick Kagan


King, Christopher

2011 The Five Year Development, Current State, Future Direction of Human Terrain System and Social Science with the U.S. Government and Military. Presented at the University of Hawai'i at Manoa, Anthropology Colloquium Series, September 29.

Kozinets, Robert V.


Lederman, Rena


Lemert, E M

Lewis, Diane


Lin, Kanhong


Lucas, George R.

2009  *Anthropologists in Arms: The Ethics of Military Anthropology*. Walnut Creek: AltaMira.

Maine, Henry Sumner


Malinowski, Bronislaw


Marshall, Patricia A.


McFate, Montgomery


McFate, Montgomery and Andrea Jackson

McFate, Montgomery and Steve Fondacaro


Merriam-Webster


Moos, Felix


Moyar, Mark


Nader, Laura

Nagl, John A.


Nastasi, Bonnie K.


Network of Concerned Anthropologists.


Nigh, Norman

Oliver-Smith, Anthony


Orr, Kevin, and Mike Bennett


Petraeus, David H. and John Nagl, James F. Amos, John Hagl and Sarah Sewall


Pels, Peter


Pelton, Robert Young


Powdermaker, Hortense.


Powers, Rod


Price, David


Rose, Susan


Sade-Beck, L.


Schensul, Jean J. and Margaret D. LeCompte

Schensul, Jean J. and Margaret D. LeCompte, Bonnie K. Nastasi, Stephen P. Borgatti.  

Sewall, Sarah  

Sider, Gerald  

Stanton, John  


Strong, Thomas  
Tenorio, Encarnacion Hidalgo


Tierney, Patrick


United Nations


U.S. Department of Health & Human Services


Van Dijk, Teun A.


Weinberger, Sharon

2007 Anthropology Ass’n Blasts Army’s “Human Terrain.” *Wired.*

Wintersteen, Ben


Whittaker, Elvi


Wodak, Ruth, and Michael Meyer


Zehfuss, Maja


Zigon, Jarrett

This world map was anonymously posted on the wall at the AAA annual conference in Chicago, IL for conference participants to mark their geographic areas of field research and expertise. This photo of the map was used to create the Figure 2.
APPENDIX B. SOURCE MATERIALS FOR DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Albro, Robert and Hugh Gusterson


American Anthropological Association


Connable, Ben


Cornell, S.E. and M.S. Jackson


Culture Matters

2008 *The Story Behind an HTS Picture*. Culture Matters.


Foust, Joshua

Finney, Nathan


Forte, Maximilian C.


Gezari, Vanessa M


2013 The Human Terrain System Sought to Transform the Army From Within. *Newsweek*, August 16.

Glenn, David


González, Roberto J.


Jager, Sheila Miyoshi


McFate, Montgomery and Steve Fondacaro

Network of Concerned Anthropologists

N.d. HTS WANTS YOU! BE WARNED! Network of Concerned Anthropologists.


Petraeus, David H. and John Nagl, James F. Amos, John Hagl, Sarah Sewall


Price, David


Weinberger, Sharon

2007 Anthropology Ass’n Blasts Army’s “Human Terrain”. Wired.


Wintersteen, Ben

APPENDIX C. RESEARCH PLAN: STRIKE HIT, HUMAN TERRAIN TEAM

HANDBOOK (2008)

Human Terrain Team Handbook

Appendix C

Sample Research Plan

Research Plan: STRIKE HIT

Project Lead: Dr. Omar Al-Talib in collaboration with Dr. Griffin (Team II)
Work Plan Design by: ILT Abeita & MSG Howard
Team Lead: Mr. Jonas Reventas

Research Focus: Internally Displaced Persons (IDP)

Research Statement: When reconciliation breaks down – IDPs result. How do we involve IDPs in the reconciliation process and relieve social pressures exerted by IDPs and social pressures exerted on the IDPs by others? Is it sectarian violence that is causing increased tensions in the AO or is the increased pressure of overcrowding stretching limited essential services far beyond their capacity?

Question: What issues are affecting IDPs and what issues are being caused by IDPs?

Data needs:

- Surveys: Both direct and indirect, via interviews or questionnaires, oral histories of post 2003 experience that addresses concerns about basic needs and living condition such as demographics, food purchases, diaries, and perceptions of violence and crime. As much information as we can obtain on the plight of IDPs in the Operational Environment (OE).

- Background data for comparison: US
  - United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) measurement of poverty for cross-national analysis
  - Statement: Sunni vs. Shia may be a surface issue, the real issue may be ecological

U.S. UNCLASSIFIED 104
Human Terrain Team Handbook

- Comparison populations (i.e. Victims of the tsunami in Asia, victims of Hurricane Katrina in the U.S.)
  - Relocation plans
  - Anti-IDP attitudes
  - Essential Service Needs (sewage, water, electricity, trash removal)

- Surveys: Means of ascertaining population size and location.
  - Use of UAV for aerial survey –
    - Settlement areas
    - Impact of IDPs on local environment
      - Iraqi Ministry of Displaced Persons & Migration
      - U.S. Army Patrol Reports
      - Iraqi Ministry of Planning
      - Iraqi Ministry of Interior

- Info About IDPs – From District Area Councils (DAC)/Neighborhood Area Councils (NAC), community leaders, government officials, then local population, NGOs, BBA’s, and Interpreters. Iraqi Army Civil Affair units
  - Problem that may be an issue with data collected from DAC/NACs is a bias that exists with local government leaders referring to IDPs as “Squatters”, they may either overestimate numbers to increase the burden they place on the local government or underestimate them in an effort to marginalize them from being included into society.

- Info From IDPs – Life stories, Interviews, personal narratives, and social network analyses (How did they get into this situation? What is their current situation? How do they plan on changing their situation? Who are their informal leaders alleviating the effects of social dislocation?) Some examples of areas that the team can begin to focus on are:
  - Hygiene and health care issues (quality of life) – What is important to IDPs health wise? (e.g. How do they contribute to the problem of tapping into water pipes, which leads to sewage contaminating the water lines? This in turn can lead to health problems.)
Link into Crime/Violence (quality of life) – What is the crime index compared to a city of the same size and same SES, when the comparable index is removed from equation what level of violence in the city due to the insurgency?

Link to Reconciliation – Is the increase of violence because of sectarianism or is it because of instability due to economic pressures and IDPs? Who are the key players for reconciliation among the IDP’s? Also, is there any link to Shia leaders in the AO that we can utilize as an entry point into the local political environment?

Resources:

- Dr. Al-Talib (Social Scientist): Team lead on research plan, design and implementation
  - Interview Iraqi officials, citizens, Dips, NGOs
  - Attend meetings with Government leaders (DAC/NAC) track needs and ID gaps where cultural intervention may be needed
  - Help facilitate cooperation between CF and Iraqi Forces during meetings/conferences
  - Provide guidance to CF who are seeking to engage Iraqi Forces, Local Nationals and NGOs on reconciliation
  - Analyze acquired data for social science insight, provide guidance to team members during product development
  - Quality control of final products for social analysis and provides final comments to product

- MSG Richard Howard (Cultural Analyst): Interacts with key personalities both inside and outside the brigade
  - Updates database with key officials, stakeholders, dynamic personalities that can analyzed for linkages we can use to maximize effort (i.e. personal/professional/social connections amongst players). Does one group have a solution that can be used to help another group or can