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1 **Closed Form Models to Assess Railroad Technology Investments**

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11
12 **Abstract**

13 Class I railroads in North America collectively invested \$11.2 billion to comply with a federal
14 mandate to deploy positive train control. This amount dwarfs the potential savings from
15 accidents the technology could prevent. Therefore, railroads must seek additional benefits. This
16 research contributes simple closed-form models to inform strategies that can leverage the
17 technology deployment by estimating the annual additional net benefits, internal rate of return,
18 and benefit-cost ratio needed for a desired payback period.

19
20 **Keywords:** Benefit-cost analysis; internal rate of return; non-destructive evaluation; payback
21 period; positive train control; railroad safety.

23 **1. Introduction**

24 The United States Congress established the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA08) in
25 response to fatal train accidents caused by human error. As a countermeasure, the law mandated
26 installation of a positive train control (PTC) system on:

- 27 1. Class I lines, which are those that carry more than five million gross tons annually, and
28 over which trains transport any poisonous- or toxic-by-inhalation (PIH/TIH) hazardous
29 materials.
- 30 2. Any railroad’s main lines that operate regularly scheduled passenger intercity or
31 commuter rail.

32 PTC is a communications-based train control technology that can stop a train automatically
33 before accidents due to human error can occur (GAO, 2010). PTC uses signals and sensors along
34 the track to communicate train location, speed restrictions, and moving authority. Manufacturers
35 designed PTC to prevent train-to-train collisions, derailments due to excessive speed,
36 unauthorized entry into established work zone limits, and the movement of a train through an
37 improperly lined switch (Badugu & Movva, 2013). Hence, the system must be able to precisely
38 determine train speed and location, warn operators about potential issues, and control the train
39 within a few seconds if the operator fails to respond to warnings (FRA, 2018). A typical PTC
40 system contains more than 20 major components. Figure 1 shows the typical architecture of a
41 PTC system. [Figure 1 near here]. Most of those components were not available prior to the
42 introduction of PTC, and designs are still evolving to assure interoperability. The installation of a
43 PTC system involves the following three segments (AAR, 2018):

- 44 1. **Locomotive**: contains on-board computers, a location tracking system, and a digital data
45 link to manage train speed.

- 46 2. **Wayside:** contains devices that monitor signals, track switches, track circuits, and lamps,
47 among other things. These devices communicate with the train via radio towers to
48 authorize movement; the devices also communicate with the central office systems over
49 220 MHz (PTC 220) radios, Wi-Fi, cellular, or Ethernet to provide system status.
- 50 3. **Central Office:** contains dispatcher interfaces and computers that store and act on
51 information from train systems, wayside systems, and maintenance personnel. These
52 systems exchange messages over both wired and wireless connections.

53 The federal mandate resulted in an installation scope of more than 40 railroads that includes all
54 seven Class I freight railroads, many passenger railroads, and a few short-line railroads (FRA,
55 2018). The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) estimated that PTC implementation would
56 cover approximately 60,000 route miles of the 140,000-mile railroad network that carries more
57 than 20,000 locomotives. The RSIA08 required that railroads complete PTC implementations by
58 the end of 2015. However, in October 2015, Congress extended that deadline to the end of 2018,
59 with further extensions allowed through 2020 to test newly installed systems (AAR, 2018).

60 A Government Accountability Office (GAO) analysis of FRA accident data from 2000 to
61 2009 found that 35% of the accidents were due to human factors (GAO, 2010). According to the
62 Association of American Railroads (AAR), human error was the leading factor in 25% of
63 mainline train accidents from 2013 to 2017 (AAR, 2018). One major limitation of PTC systems
64 is that they cannot prevent accidents at rail-grade crossings, incidents involving people
65 trespassing on tracks (Lobb, 2006), or occasions when track segments or equipment
66 malfunctions. A Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, updated in 2018, stated that PTC
67 would not prevent the majority of rail-related fatalities from pedestrians trespassing on railroad
68 tracks or motor vehicle crashes at rail-grade crossings (Peters & Frittelli, 2018). The report noted

69 that train derailments or collisions, which PTC could prevent, caused relatively few fatalities.
70 Concerning the perceived negligible benefits of PTC relative to its deployment cost, the National
71 Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) testified to Congress that since 1969, PTC could have
72 prevented the loss of 300 lives (Sumwalt (III), 2018).

73 U.S. Class I railroads own and maintain the majority of U.S. freight track miles (AAR,
74 2018). Hence, compliance with safety and other regulations presents significant economic
75 challenges. Nevertheless, this problem is not unique, as railroads around the world face similar
76 challenges (Friebel, McCullough, & Angulo, 2014). There is a scarcity of data about the actual
77 costs and benefits of PTC deployments because of the proprietary nature of U.S. railroad
78 implementations, and the rush to comply with the 2018 mandate. Furthermore, the lack of
79 standards and the variety of technologies available to achieve the implementation goals resulted
80 in widely varying deployments. PTC implementation also presents new challenges, such as
81 cybersecurity, big data mining, system failures, and interoperability (Zhang, Liu, & Holt, 2018).
82 During the first half of the implementation deadline year, the FRA had approved and certified 10
83 different types of PTC systems (FRA, 2018). After the first quarter of that year, only one of the
84 seven major Class I railroads achieved interoperability with some of their tenant railroad's PTC
85 system (FRA, 2018). Even so, only 29% of their tenant railroads achieved interoperability by the
86 end of the third quarter of the compliance year.

87 Previous analyses about PTC deployment costs are dated. A study commissioned by the
88 FRA in 2009 determined that the total cost for PTC implementation over 20 years could range
89 from \$10 billion to \$13.8 billion (Roskind, 2009). Peabody & Associates, Inc. revised the
90 analysis in 2010 to include other direct, indirect, and societal costs that increased the total
91 estimate to \$15.2 billion (L. E. Peabody & Associates, Inc., 2010). A Canadian working group

92 on rail safety estimated that the average Class I railroad PTC implementation cost was \$192,000
93 per route mile (Advisory Council on Railway Safety (ACRS), 2016), which equates to \$11.5
94 billion for the U.S. network. In 2018, the USDOT estimated that, not including Class I railroads,
95 the 37 railroads that collectively received \$2.9 billion in grants would spend \$4.2 billion to
96 implement PTC (DeWeese, 2018). Hence, the total estimate for all railroads was \$15.7 billion
97 (11.5 + 4.2), which is consistent with the Peabody & Associates estimate. Beyond the initial
98 deployment cost, railroads will need to maintain the PTC system. The 2009 FRA-commissioned
99 study estimated that the annual maintenance cost for PTC deployments would be approximately
100 15% of the accumulated deployment investment (Roskind, 2009). In 2016, the American Public
101 Transportation Association (APTA) estimated that commuter railroads would spend \$100 million
102 each year to operate and maintain PTC installations (DeWeese, 2018).

103 The most recent analysis of potential PTC benefits was eight years prior to the mandated
104 deadline year of 2018. The 2009 FRA-commissioned study found that railroads would realize
105 \$90 million in annual safety benefits after full implementation of PTC (Roskind, 2009). It is
106 clear that the potential savings from accident risk reduction dwarfs the estimated PTC
107 deployment costs. Hence, railroads must seek additional net benefits from PTC deployments to
108 recover their investments. In particular, the installed infrastructure of sensor interfaces and
109 wireless networks provides opportunities to realize additional benefits from incremental
110 investments in interface systems. For example, overlay sensors could monitor rail-grade
111 crossings and provide real-time diagnostics. Non-human factors such as track irregularities are a
112 common cause of accidents (Liu, Saat, & Barkan, 2017). Therefore, on-board sensors could use
113 the PTC network to communicate data relating to track irregularities (Chia, Bhardwaj, Lu, &

114 Bridgelall, 2018). Other potential benefits could include business enhancements, such as
115 improved line capacity, service reliability, equipment utilization, and fuel savings.

116 A closed-form model to predict net additional benefits needed, the internal-rate-of-return
117 (IRR), and the benefit-cost-ratio (BCR) within a fixed period is generally not directly realizable.
118 Hence, the main **contribution** of this paper are simple closed-form models to inform planning
119 strategies by estimating the additional net benefits needed as a function of the payback period,
120 given the initial investment to deploy PTC systems. Subsequently, the **goals** of this research are
121 to:

- 122 1. Estimate the cost of PTC deployments based on data gathered from various railroad
123 company reports.
- 124 2. Estimate the financial loss from railroad accidents that PTC implementations may have
125 prevented.
- 126 3. Develop a simple model to the estimate the net additional benefits needed to achieve a
127 desired payback period by conducting a benefit-cost analysis (BCA) with FRA
128 recommended discount rates.
- 129 4. Develop simple models to estimate the IRR and the BCR, given a series of net additional
130 benefits needed to achieve a desired payback period.

131 The organization of the remainder of this paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the BCA
132 method and optimization procedure used to determine the net additional benefits needed as a
133 function of the payback period, the corresponding IRR, and the 10-year BCR. Section 3
134 summarizes the stated 2018 costs of PTC deployments and identifies the data sources. Section 4
135 summarizes the Class I railroad reported financial losses from all accidents during the five years
136 prior to the mandate year. The analysis also computes the proportion of financial loss that PTC

137 deployments could have prevented. Section 4 uses the financial loss data to compute the net
138 additional benefits needed as a function of payback period. The section also estimates a simple
139 model that best fits the computed data points. Section 5 discusses the potential for realizing
140 additional net benefits from PTC deployments. Section 6 offers concluding remarks about the
141 possible generalization and utility of the research contribution.

142 **2. Methods**

143 More than 600 railroads in the U.S. freight rail industry utilize the 140,000 miles of rail
144 network (AAR, 2018). Approximately 97% of the network carries freight, and Class I railroads
145 dominate those movements. Hence, this analysis focuses on data from Class I railroads. The cost
146 estimates are the publicly disclosed expenditures accumulated for full PTC implementations.
147 Some of these cost data are scattered among press releases, financial statements, and government
148 reports.

149 Mining data from the FRA accident database for the five years preceding the 2018 mandate
150 provided an estimate of the potential savings from accidents that PTC could have prevented. The
151 premise was that a fully implemented and reliable PTC system could have prevented all
152 accidents due to human factors or failures in the existing signalling and communication systems.
153 This analysis used the railroad reported financial losses as the potential savings from accident
154 avoidance.

155 The cumulative discounted net benefit, which is a return on the investment (R), is

$$R = \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{B_i - C_i}{(1+r)^i} \quad (1)$$

156 The variable r is the discount rate, i is the future year, and n is the total number of years for
157 payback. Per the FRA guidelines for BCA, the model uses discount rates of 7% and 3% for
158 payback period calculation and sensitivity assessments, respectively (FRA, 2016). Based on the

159 2009 FRA-commissioned study (Roskind, 2009), the model used 15% of the initial deployment
 160 investment as the average annual cost C_i for operating and maintaining the PTC system.
 161 Subsequently, the optimization problem was to determine the annual average *net* benefits B_i
 162 needed to achieve a payback period of n years. The annual average net benefits are the actual
 163 benefits minus the costs needed to achieve them. The *objective function* was $R - I = 0$ where I
 164 was the initial investment for PTC deployment. The *constraint* was that the annual average net
 165 benefits B_i as a proportion of the initial investment I must be positive.

166 Given the solution for B_i as a function of payback period years, the internal rate of return
 167 (IRR) is the value of r that satisfies the following equation:

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \frac{B_i - C_i - I_i}{(1 + r)^i} = 0 \quad (2)$$

168 where $I_0 = I$ is the initial investment, and future year investments are zero. Subsequently, the
 169 BCR is based on a customary 10-year period (FRA, 2016), and is given as

$$BCR = \sum_{i=1}^{10} \frac{B_i}{(1 + r)^i} / I \quad (3)$$

170 Iteratively solving the equations as a function of the desired payback years produced a set of data
 171 points. Subsequently, estimating the closed form predictive function used a standard method,
 172 such as the minimization of a means-squared-error.

173 3. Data

174 3.1 Deployment Costs

175 Class I railroads collectively reported a total cost of \$11.2 billion for PTC deployments. Table 1
 176 summarizes the Class I railroad stated 2018 costs, and the source of those data. The railroad PTC
 177 implementation progress reports are located at the website: <https://www.fra.dot.gov/Page/P0628>
 178 [Table 1 near here]

179 **3.2 Accident Prevention**

180 The industry's expectation is that a fully functioning, reliable, and back-office monitored PTC
181 system should be capable of circumventing nearly all failures due to human factors and failures
182 in the signalling and communications systems. Together, this study considers those factors as
183 PTC-addressable (PTC-A). The FRA database (FRA, 2018) classifies the causes of accidents
184 into one of the following categories:

- 185 1. Mechanical and electrical failures (for example, axles, bearings, locomotive/truck
186 components, wheels, brakes)
- 187 2. Rack, roadbed and structures (for example, track geometry, broken rail, defective
188 switches/frogs, settled roadbed)
- 189 3. Train operation - human factors (for example, poor throttling/braking, ignore
190 signals/rules/orders, drowsy, ill)
- 191 4. Signal & communications failure (for example, automatic stop device, power switch,
192 radio, computer, remote control)
- 193 5. Miscellaneous (for example, environmental conditions, loading procedures, vandalism)

194 One limitation of this dataset is that it contains information about accidents reported by the
195 railroads involved, and that those reports are required only for accidents that resulted in damages
196 in excess of an annually adjusted threshold of \$10,500. According to the FRA website, the
197 reported financial loss from accident damages include the loss and/or repair of cars and
198 locomotives, the repair of signal systems and other structures, and the repair of roadbed and
199 track. Not included are financial losses associated with clean up, lost freight, societal damages,
200 fatalities, injuries, and line closures.

4. Results

This section summarizes results from the analysis of financial loss from accidents, the benefit-cost assessment, and estimation of the benefit prediction model.

4.1 Financial Loss

Table 2 summarizes the five years of FRA accident data before the mandate year of 2018. The average number of annual Class I railroad accidents were 1,774 (row labelled AVG). [Table 2 near here]. The standard deviation (STD) was 102.4, thus the coefficient of variation (CV) was 5.8%. This indicates a relatively high consistency in annual accident occurrence. Therefore, using the average of those historical values is justifiable for quantifying the potential financial benefits from avoiding those types of accidents. For that period, accidents due to human factors or failures in signaling and communication systems (PTC-A) accounted for 44.6% of the average annual accidents. This is comparable to the GAO 2010 estimate of 49% for the 2000 to 2009 years. The PTC avoidable accidents amounted to 31.6% of the average annual financial loss (TFL). Hence, had there been a PTC system that worked flawlessly, Class I railroads collectively would have avoided nearly 45% of those accidents, which amounted to nearly \$92 million in average annual financial losses (PTC-A FL).

4.2 Benefit Cost Assessment

Table 3 lists the net additional annual benefits, beyond accident avoidance, that the Class I railroads need collectively to achieve the payback period listed. [Table 3 near here]. The table lists the additional net annual benefits as a proportion of the total Class I railroad initial investment to achieve the mandated deployment. The table also lists the IRR and the 10-year BCR for the 3% and 7% discount rates. One data point is that at a 3% discount rate, Class I railroads must realize an additional net annual benefit of nearly 26% of the initial PTC

224 investment to achieve a payback within 10 years. The additional net annual benefits increase to
225 28.4% with a discount rate of 7%. The IRR for 10 years of those additional net benefits amounts
226 to 10% and 13% for discount rates of 3% and 7%, respectively. Figure 2 and Figure 3 plots the
227 data in Table 1 for the 3% and 7% discount rates, respectively. It is evident that the data follows
228 a non-linear trend. [Figure 2 near here]. [Figure 3 near here].

229 **4.3 Model Estimation**

230 Figure 2 plots power model estimates of the data in Table 3. The model form for the three
231 variables of benefit proportion, IRR and BCR, as a function of payback years is a power form
232 such that:

$$B = \alpha i^{-\beta} \quad (4)$$

233 The estimated parameters are α and β . B is one of the three predicted variables and i is the
234 payback year. Table 4 summarizes the model parameter estimates and the coefficient of
235 determination R^2 for the best fit to the data. [Table 4 near here]. The consistently high coefficient
236 of determination indicates that the power model is a good estimator for the predicted variables as
237 a function of the desired payback period.

238 **5. Discussion**

239 Railroads can leverage the installed PTC communications infrastructure to enhance safety
240 further and to realize additional business benefits. However, the assessment of potential benefits
241 has been controversial, largely because of the uncertainties involved. It is possible to use the
242 PTC communications framework to add different types of sensors that could potentially prevent
243 other types of accidents. In particular, the PTC framework has the potential to accommodate
244 additional sensors at rail-grade crossings to detect oncoming trains if the crossing gate
245 malfunctions, or to detect vehicles on the tracks. Recognizing this potential, Congress charged

246 the FRA with studying the potential effectiveness of PTC technology in preventing grade-
247 crossing incidents (Peters & Frittelli, 2018).

248 According to the AAR, issues with track and equipment were responsible for 54% of
249 mainline train accidents from 2013 to 2017 (AAR, 2018). Hence, the ability to monitor
250 continuously the health of installed equipment and track conditions would contribute toward
251 further overall accident reduction. For example, a fully deployed PTC infrastructure could
252 support the incremental addition of train inspection devices, such as wayside defective bearing
253 detectors (WDBD). Since defective bearings can lead to derailments, railroads can update their
254 PTC software to stop a train for inspection if the WDBD units identify any defects. The PTC
255 infrastructure could also accommodate train inspection devices that already exist by using
256 interface translation devices. Interfaces to existing detectors could include wheel-impact load
257 detector (WILD) that measure the condition of the wheel surface, and truck hunting detectors
258 that monitor for excessive lateral oscillations. Other non-destructive evaluation (NDE) devices
259 could include machine vision systems that use lasers to analyse wheel profiles while a train is in
260 motion.

261 To realize additional savings, railroads can use the PTC network and back office computer
262 upgrades to monitor and manage the health of installed equipment. The ability to monitor in real-
263 time the operational status of installed technology can improve reliability, minimize down time,
264 and optimize maintenance practices. According to the FRA, societal benefits from railroad
265 projects could include enhancements in air quality, mobility, and transportation system
266 connectivity (FRA, 2016). To enhance business efficiencies, railroads can use the PTC data links
267 to exchange information about locomotive health, work orders, job status, and crew schedules in
268 real time. If business efficiency gains lead to lower cost services that encourage a diversion of

269 freight from trucks, then societal benefits could include reductions in overall fuel consumption
270 and reduction of truck accidents. Future research will investigate other potential business
271 benefits of PTC in detail because such an analysis is outside the scope of this article.

272 **6. Conclusions**

273 Railroad accidents of any type represent huge financial losses, regardless of the number of
274 fatalities involved. Therefore, policies to prevent accidents will provide a financial benefit. To
275 comply with the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Class I railroads and other railroads that
276 meet certain conditions had to complete installation of positive train control (PTC) systems by
277 the end of 2018. Railroads view PTC implementation as one of their most complex and
278 expensive undertakings. Analysis of the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) accident
279 database found that PTC preventable accidents in the decade prior to the deployment mandate
280 year of 2018 accounted for nearly 45% of Class I railroad accidents. Those accidents amounted
281 to an equivalent of nearly \$92 million in annual financial losses. Class I railroads collectively
282 reported their PTC deployment costs accumulated to more than \$11 billion by the end of the
283 congressionally mandated deployment year of 2018. Hence, it is clear that PTC deployment costs
284 greatly exceed the potential safety benefits from preventing financial losses due to accidents.
285 Therefore, railroads must seek additional net benefits from PTC deployments to recover their
286 investments.

287 A closed form model to predict net additional benefits needed, the IRR, and the BCR is
288 generally not directly realizable for a spreadsheet model of BCA. This research developed a
289 simple closed form model to predict the additional net benefits needed as a function of payback
290 years. Using discount rates of 3% and 7%, one data point is that Class I railroads need to realize
291 an additional net annual benefit of nearly 26% and 28% of the initial investment, respectively, to

292 achieve a payback within 10 years. The corresponding IRR was 10% and 13%, respectively.
293 Plotting the solutions for payback years from one to 20 revealed a simple closed form expression
294 as a power function with only two parameters. The parameter estimation for benefit proportion,
295 IRR, and 10-year BCR produced a high coefficient of determination with R^2 values ranging from
296 95.7% to 99.9%. For consistency with previous FRA-commissioned analysis, this assessment
297 used a proportional annual maintenance cost of 30%. However, the methodology presented can
298 estimate a model based on any other level of initial investment and proportional annual
299 maintenance cost.

300 Railroads can use the simple closed-form model to inform planning strategies by providing
301 quick estimates of the net annual proportional benefits required to achieve a desired payback
302 period, given their initial investment and projected operating and maintenance costs. To achieve
303 net additional benefits, railroads must seek to leverage the installed infrastructure of sensor
304 interfaces and wireless networks to realize further enhancements in safety and business
305 efficiencies. Those benefits could include rail-grade safety sensors and potential business
306 enhancements, such as improved line capacity, service reliability, equipment utilization, real-
307 time diagnostics, fuel savings, and non-destructive evaluations. Future work will examine the
308 potential benefits and incremental costs of using the installed PTC infrastructure to achieve
309 autonomous operations.

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



Fig 1. A typical architecture of PTC systems

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Fig 2. Benefits needed at 3% discount rate as a function of payback period

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


Fig 3. Benefits needed at 7% discount rate as a function of payback period

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Table 1. Sources for the Class I Railroad Stated Deployment Costs

Railroad	Cost (\$B)	Source
Union Pacific Railroad	2.900	Company webpage on PTC (Union Pacific Railroad, 2018)
BNSF Railway	2.000	Company webpage on PTC (BNSF Railway, 2018)
CSX Transportation	2.400	CRS 2018 Report (Peters & Frittelli, 2018)
Norfolk Southern Railway	1.800	Company news webpage (Norfolk Southern Railway, 2017)
Canadian National Railway	1.400	Company press release (Canadian National Railway, 2018)
Kansas City Southern Railway	0.300	USDOT Report on Grant Distribution (DeWeese, 2018)
Canadian Pacific Railway	0.375	Canadian Working Group Report (Advisory Council on Railway Safety (ACRS), 2016).

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Table 2. Financial Losses from Human, Signalling, and Communication Errors

Year	Accidents	PTC-A	PTC-A (%)	TFL (\$)	PTC-A FL (\$)	PTC-A FL (%)
2013	1806	771	42.7	361,341,622	120,788,225	33.4
2014	1836	789	43.0	296,289,876	86,366,068	29.1
2015	1892	993	52.5	311,490,762	90,034,696	28.9
2016	1650	679	41.2	253,430,453	96,279,982	38.0
2017	1686	724	42.9	226,583,986	64,887,319	28.6
AVG	1774	791.2	44.6	289,827,340	91,671,258	31.6
STD	102.4	120.7		52,320,684	20,107,467	4.1
CV (%)	5.8	15.3				

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Table 3. Results of the Benefit Cost Analysis

Payback Years	3% Discount			7% Discount		
	Additional Net Benefits (%)	IRR (%)	10Yr BCR	Additional Net Benefits (%)	IRR (%)	10-Yr BCR
1	117.2	103.0	8.79	121.2	107.0	7.52
2	66.4	52.2	4.46	69.5	55.3	3.88
3	49.5	35.3	3.02	52.3	38.0	2.68
4	41.1	26.7	2.29	43.7	29.4	2.07
5	36.0	21.4	1.86	38.6	24.1	1.71
6	32.6	17.8	1.57	35.2	20.5	1.47
7	30.2	15.1	1.37	32.7	17.9	1.30
8	28.4	13.0	1.22	30.9	15.9	1.18
9	27.0	11.3	1.10	29.5	14.3	1.08
10	25.9	10.0	1.00	28.4	13.0	1.00
11	25.0	8.8	0.92	27.5	11.9	0.94
12	24.2	7.8	0.86	26.8	11.0	0.88
13	23.6	7.0	0.80	26.1	10.3	0.84
14	23.0	6.2	0.76	25.6	9.6	0.80
15	22.6	5.5	0.71	25.2	9.0	0.77
16	22.1	4.9	0.68	24.8	8.5	0.74
17	21.8	4.4	0.65	24.4	8.1	0.72
18	21.5	3.9	0.62	24.1	7.7	0.70
19	21.2	3.4	0.60	23.9	7.3	0.68
20	20.9	3.0	0.57	23.6	7.0	0.66

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Table 4. Model Parameter Estimates

Discount Rate	Benefit Proportion			IRR			BCR (10-Yr)		
	α	β	R ² (%)	α	β	R ² (%)	α	β	R ² (%)
3%	0.94	0.54	96.5	1.28	1.16	98.2	8.22	0.90	99.8
7%	0.96	0.51	95.7	1.04	0.90	99.9	6.54	0.80	99.2

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