LAWTON'S BLOODHOUNDS: INDIGENOUS RECRUITS IN THE SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN WAR, 1899-1902

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The Supervisory Committee certifies that this ***disquisition*** complies with North Dakota State University's regulations and meets the accepted standards for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

Following the Spanish American War, the United States became embroiled in a guerrilla war with Filipino insurgents who had sought independence from Spain. They objected to the purchase of the Philippine Islands by the United States. The result was the Philippine American War, 1899-1902. At that time, the United States Army had no written doctrine and provided no formal training in the prosecution of a guerrilla war. This study traces American success in the Philippines to reliance on a proven technique utilized by colonial armies of the period: recruitment of native allies.

American General Henry Ware Lawton served in the Indian Wars. He was directly responsible for the surrender of Apache leader Geronimo, who surrendered after Lawton's dogged pursuit over thousands of miles. Lawton was assisted by Apache scouts. In the Philippines, he recognized how advantageous it would be to have the support of indigenous recruits. General Lawton was the driving force behind the development of an indigenous force that altered the way in which the United States Army approached irregular warfare.

Relying on an examination of primary sources including letters, diaries, official reports, and newspaper articles, this dissertation explains American success in the Philippine American War in the context of global imperialism and the colonial practice of depending on indigenous recruits.

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While my name is on this dissertation as the author, it would have been impossible for me to do this alone. I would like to thank the following people who hold a place in my heart for their support and encouragement:

I would not have even attempted this without the unwavering dedication of my husband, Marc. My daughter Deja plowed through pages of academia to provide her expert proofreading and editing talents. It was serendipity that my path crossed that of Dr. Tom Isern, who has so ably guided me through the process, and who made me a better writer. Dr. Angela Smith opened entire worlds for me and was instrumental in the creation of both a documentary and a museum exhibit based on my work. Dr. Mark Harvey introduced me to the wonders of environmental history, an aspect that turned out to be crucial in this work. Dr. Elias generously devoted his time and support. I never took a class from Dr. Bradley Benton or Dr. John Cox, but they were both there for me at every turn with encouragement and guidance. My "squad" – Johannes Allert, Jamie Slaughter, and Vanya Eftimova Bellinger – was determined to get me through this. My dear friends Monti Willett and Donna Stork were always willing to read and comment on my work.

A work of this magnitude does not come from one person alone. My undying gratitude to all those who own a piece of my success.

DEDICATION

When we lived in Cleveland, my husband Marc told me I may as well get my associate degree. We moved to Dayton, and he said I may as well get my Bachelors' Degree. In Binghamton, New York he said that as long as I had my Bachelors' Degree I may as well get my Masters' Degree. Then it was off to western Minnesota, within easy driving distance of North Dakota State University. You can see what's coming. This work simply would not exist without you, Marc. Thank you.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CA.....Comprehensive Approach

COG.....Center of Gravity

COIN.....Counterinsurgency

CW.....Compound Warfare/Conventional Warfare

DOD.....Department of Defense

HN.....Host Nation

IED.....Improvised Exploding Device

IW.....Irregular Warfare

RMA.....Revolution in Military Affairs

SOF.....Special Operating Forces

UW.....Unconventional Warfare

CHAPTER 1: THE STRENGTH OF WEAKNESS

This dissertation undertakes an analysis of the United States' reliance on native recruits to prosecute wars by examining American military strategy in the context of global imperialism. It focuses on the enlistment of indigenous recruits into the service of the United States as a widely practiced if not formally recognized aspect of American military doctrine.

In 1898 the United States became embroiled in a conflict with Spain. The fighting in the Philippines was resolved in a matter of weeks when Spain was willing to sell its colony. When the United States purchased the Philippines instead of liberating the islands, the Filipinos mounted a resistance. The United States responded to the resulting guerrilla war by adopting a staple of colonial military forces then utilized by colonial powers around the world: recruiting indigenous personnel to fight on the side of the invader. Lacking a formal doctrine to meet the challenges of irregular warfare, the United States Army instinctively adjusted to the unforeseen circumstances by relying on experience hard-won in the Indian Wars, in which indigenous personnel were a crucial element of success.

This dissertation examines how American military personnel, trained and prepared for conventional warfare over the course of the American Civil War, adapted to guerrilla warfare in the Philippines without a written doctrine or formal training. When officers and enlisted men resorted to irregular tactics and enlisted the aid of indigenous military recruits in response to the unexpected turn of events, they were actually returning to the Army's well-established but oft forgotten roots.

The Philippine-American War (1899-1902) is a little understood and largely overlooked event in American history. Formerly called the Philippine Insurrection, the conflict was not an insurrection according to the definition of the term: an act or instance of revolting against civil

authority or an established government.[1] The Filipinos did not recognize the United States as the established government. The conflict was an anti-colonial movement mounted by natives determined to resist a government imposed by a foreign power. This conflict has not been widely studied. Military historians as well as the general public tend to focus on major conventional wars as opposed to the "small wars" that make up much of America's military history. The term "small wars" refers to the tactics involved and does not reflect on the size or importance of the conflict. The suppression of insurgencies and the constabulary duties that follow the successful prosecution of small wars have traditionally received little attention.

A recently introduced term in the Department of Defense lexicon is "compound warfare." This is defined as "the simultaneous use of a regular or main force and an irregular or guerrilla force against an enemy."[2] Although the term may be fairly new, compound warfare is anything but. Early colonists in North America frequently found useful allies in indigenous tribes. The Continental Army teamed with local militias and partisans as well as natives during the American War of Independence, and Britain did the same. The United States Army partnered with both civilian and indigenous personnel to protect the 19th century westward expansion. Apache scouts were invaluable in forcing the surrender of Apache leader Geronimo in the Apache War. The Army was ably assisted by civilians like Frank Grouard, Frederic Burnham, Tom Horn, and, perhaps the most famous civilian scout of all, Buffalo Bill Cody.

The same was true of America's adventure in global colonialism in the Philippines. General Henry Ware Lawton enlisted the services of American civilian William Henry Young, a man who had scouting experience in the Nez Perce War (1877), to form and lead a scouting unit.

[1] Merriam-Webster Dictionary. "Insurrection."
[2] Thomas M. Huber. "Compound Warfare: A Conceptual Framework," in *Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot,* ed. Thomas M. Huber (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army General Staff College Press, 2002), 1.

When Young was killed and volunteer scouts were mustered out of the Army, Lawton turned to native Filipino scouts. Throughout American history, the United States military has employed irregular forces as a force multiplier. Indigenous personnel are particularly useful, freeing up more highly trained troops for technically demanding tasks.

The United States has struggled to define irregular warfare and understand the threat it poses. According to the Department of Defense, "Irregular Warfare [IW] is defined as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations….IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will….It is inherently a protracted struggle that will test the resolve of our Nation and our strategic partners."[3]

Conventional warfare consists of traditional maneuver tactics, with two armies representing organized nation-states facing off across a defined field of battle with the goal of defeating the opposing force. Irregular warfare on the part of the weaker opponent utilizes tactics that take advantage of its strengths and mitigate its weaknesses in order to overcome the opponent's military advantage and gain the support – or at least the acquiescence – of the local populace. The strengths of the weaker force typically include an intimate knowledge of the terrain, environment, language, and local customs. Tactics of the weaker force can include attacking from ambush, passing as friendly civilians, and infiltrating the enemy force. Irregular warfare in the twenty-first century has come to include cyberwarfare, suicide bombings, and improvised explosive devices [IEDs].

[3] Department of Defense. *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept* (Department of Defense: Washington, DC, 2010), 1.

Irregular war is not a lesser form of warfare. Instead, it encompasses a broad spectrum of tactics and strategies that differ significantly from conventional warfare. Conventional and irregular warfare are not mutually exclusive, as noted by the previous Department of Defense definition of compound warfare. Irregular war is particularly fluid, and the nature of the conflict can change quite rapidly. Every small war is unique and has its own characteristics.

The United States Marine Corps describes irregular warfare as messy and complex, "a violent clash of interests between or among organized groups characterized by the use of military force."[4] Irregular war consists of indirect methods and nontraditional means often utilized by non-state actors. The goal of the weaker force in an irregular war is to achieve and maintain control and influence over a relevant population in order to attain political authority and legitimacy. The weaker opponent can force its more powerful opponent to engage in tactics for which it is not trained and prepared. American Air Force General Curtis e. Lemay recognized that victory in irregular warfare would be achieved by means different than those in a conventional war. He observed, "In this type of war you cannot – you must not – measure the effectiveness of the effort by the number of bridges destroyed, buildings damaged, vehicles burned, or any of the other standards that have been used for regular warfare. The task is to destroy the effectiveness of the insurgent's efforts and his ability to use the population for his own ends."[5]

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] recognizes that irregular warfare poses unique challenges. According to NATO, conventional war "requires a modern, well-balanced force, with its air, sea, and ground components. But a revolutionary war is primarily a war of infantry. Paradoxically, the less sophisticated the counterinsurgent forces, the better they are."

[4] MCDP 1, *Warfighting* (Washington DC, United States Marine Corps, June 1997), 3.
[5] United States Air Force, *Irregular Warfare Document 2-3* Washington DC, 2013), vi.

NATO has referred to twenty-first century irregular warfare as its "Achilles' heel." This Achilles' heel "has consistently proven to be a failure to effectively promote establishment of a governance authority considered legitimate by the populace of a nation within a reasonable time frame."[6]

There are numerous examples of powerful armies that have come to grief at the hands of a smaller and weaker force utilizing the tactics of irregular warfare. The term "guerilla war," meaning "small war," comes from the Peninsular War (1791-1814) in which irregular warfare forced Napoleon off the Iberian Peninsula. The established European powers were shaken by a successful slave uprising in the Haitian Revolution (1791-1804). Giuseppe Garibaldi's redshirts, outnumbered five to one, overcame a professional army in Sicily (1860). The British won the Second Boer war (1899-1902) but at a great cost. Unable to defeat the British on a conventional battlefield, the Boers turned to guerrilla tactics and inflicted severe damage on the British before being forced to surrender. During World War II (1939-1945) the British were the ones to resort to irregular warfare, finding it useful in Burma. During the Indo-China War (1950-1954) the French were unable to use their tanks in the jungle terrain while the irregular Vietnamese used bicycles to maneuver. The Vietnamese were able to force the French out of Indochina. This was followed by the Vietnam War (1955-1975) in which the powerful American military was driven from the country by a smaller force that relied on irregular warfare.[7]

The other side of the coin is a conventional force that adapts to the tactics. The United States Army defeated the Apache by adopting the tactics of the opponent. British Colonel T.E.

[6]David Galula. *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice.* 21. Lieutenant Colonel Christian Jeppson. "NATO's Approach to Irregular warfare: Protecting the Achilles' Heel," *Military Review,* September-October 2015, 28.
[7] War History Online. "Seven Wars Where Irregular Forces Thwarted Professional Armies."

Lawrence, better known as Lawrence of Arabia, was successful in the Middle East by doing the same. British Major-General Orde Wingate was a champion of irregular warfare, creating British irregular units first in Abyssinia and then in Burma.

As will be demonstrated in this study, the United States did not have a formal military doctrine to address unconventional war in the Philippines. The Army was prepared through informal means. Officers like Generals Elwell Otis and Henry Ware Lawton had served in the Indian Wars, as had many of their officers and enlisted men. Lawton in particular had extensive experience working with both civilian and indigenous scouts. While the Army was hampered by the lack of a formal method of preserving and passing on the hard-won knowledge of small wars, it was possible for officers and enlisted men with personal experience in the Indian Wars to translate their knowledge from the American West to the Philippines. They communicated their wisdom to the inexperienced officers and men who swelled the ranks of the Army in response to President William McKinley's call for volunteers. Lawton had the confidence to put his faith first in a civilian scout and later in indigenous scouts because of his experience in the Indian Wars.

Historian Max Boot gives a description of small wars as "a foggy, swamp-bottomed noman's land….an empty space in an army's traditional reality, where there are no friends and no enemies, no front or rear, no victories and, likewise, no defeat, and no true endings."[8] Irregular wars offer challenges both during the conflict and following its resolution. The war that thrust the United States onto the global stage was a controversial event with consequences that reached far into the future.

[8] Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Perseus Books, 2002), iv.

Historians sometimes portray the Philippine-American War as America's "first Vietnam." There is, however, a major distinction between the Philippines and Vietnam: the American military might and American diplomacy. Even though the military capabilities of the United States expanded in the Twentieth Century to include air, space, and cyberspace, it is instructive to view the country's current conflicts in the light of America's first experience as a world power.

Brian McAllister Linn has written two books regarding the Philippine-American War: *The Philippine-American War 1899-1902* and *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine-American War 1899-1902.* David J. Silbey's *War of Frontier and Empire: the Philippine-American War 1899-1902* presents a broad history of the conflict. Some books, like Max Boot's *Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present* and Boot's *Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power,* briefly mention the Philippine-American War in the context of a larger study. This lack of books on the subject demonstrates that historians have generally overlooked this conflict.

Brian McAllister Linn is the primary military historian specializing in the Philippine American War. *The Philippine War 1899-1902*, published in 2000, is the most comprehensive work on this conflict. Linn is a professor of history at Texas A&M University and was a visiting professor at the US Army War College and Carlisle Army Barracks. Linn covers the military aspects of the war including the major personalities involved.

Part One of Linn's book is a chronological description of the conventional war that preceded the guerrilla action. This portion of the book is a straightforward account of the conflict that took place primarily in the north on the main island of Luzon. Part Two is more relevant to this dissertation, since it covers the guerrilla war that spread across the entire archipelago from

Luzon in the north to Samar and Leyte in the south. Linn's focus is on the pacification of the resistance through military methods. He credits General Arthur MacArthur with the successful prosecution of the guerrilla war, asserting that the insurgency was in large part over by the time MacArthur relinquished his command.

Linn's work is primarily an operational history covering the broad scope of the war. Linn notes that the struggle was regional in nature, with the conflict varying from island to island and even from town to town. He acknowledges the evolution from conventional to unconventional warfare. Linn also addresses the lack of broad popular support among Filipinos for the resistance. Resistance forces were spread out over numerous islands and consisted of participants with different motivations and agendas. Resistance leadership had only the most tenuous control, and that control was focused on the island of Luzon. The inhabitants of the Visayas, Samar, Leyte, and other remote islands considered themselves independent and were not always inclined to act in concert with allied but widely separated forces. Linn's work paints a clear picture of the events and is an excellent place to begin an examination of the Philippine American war. As it relates to this dissertation, Linn's work serves as a useful starting point. Linn only briefly mentions General Henry Ware Lawton's military scout unit. He goes into more detail regarding the indigenous scouts who were recruited following the death of Lawton's chief of scouts, William Henry Young, and the mustering out of scouts who were serving as volunteers. However, Linn does not connect the Army's experience in the Philippines to the previous experience of the Indian Wars. This is a critical aspect of the war which up until now has been overlooked. Many of the officers and enlisted men who served in the Philippines brought valuable experience from their service in the Indian Wars. This experience directly influenced

Lawton's decisions to recruit first an experienced chief of scouts and later on the indigenous scouts.

In his review of this work, historian Greg Bankoff calls the book 'an apologia to excuse American actions in the Philippines without coming to terms with what their [America's] soldiers were doing there in the first place."[9] This is not a fair assessment. Linn is adamant that historical figures should be judged by the mores of their day. He avoids passing judgment on past actions based on modern sensibilities.

Historian David J. Silbey also examines the Philippine American War in *A War of Frontier and Empire*. His work is a compact overview of the entire conflict, from America's entrance into its first global engagement to the guerrilla war as it evolved between the United States and the opposing Filipino forces. While not as detailed at Linn's work, it provides an understanding of the political and military forces at work.

As it relates to this dissertation, there is a major deficiency in Silbey's work. Although Silbey addresses America's entrance into global imperialism and the competition with European nations that were at the time scrambling to collect colonies, he fails to appreciate the role of scouts as a factor that was integral to America's success. Young's Scouts do not rate even a brief mention. Silbey overlooks crucial engagements in which the scouts played a pivotal role. He mentions the indigenous Macabebe Scouts only in passing and does not demonstrate an appreciation of their value to the American war effort, including the capture of resistance leader Emilio Aguinaldo. This is a cursory history that leaves many questions unanswered, particularly where the connection to the Indian Wars is concerned.

[9] Greg Bankoff. "Review." *American Historical Review,* 107, no. 2 (April, 2002): 530.

The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power is the first of two books by historian Max Boot about small wars and guerrilla warfare. Boots says conventional warfare "is only one way of American war. There is another, less celebrated tradition in U.S. military history – a tradition of fighting small wars." Boot goes on to relate historical conflicts to the current military situation of the United States in the Middle East. Examples of American troops hunting a notorious warlord could be the pursuit of Pancho Villa in 1916 or the pursuit of Osama bin Laden in 2001. Instances of the Navy's battle against pirates could be the confrontation with Barbary pirates in 1801 or the protection of American oil tankers in the Persian Gulf in 1987. The Marines invaded Caribbean islands in 1915 and again in 1916, 1965, and 1983.[10] The thread of small wars and guerrilla warfare is clearly woven throughout the course of United States military history.

The Philippine American War fits into this pattern of small wars. When the United States purchased the island instead of liberating them, the force that was seen as a colonial invader faced a determined Filipino resistance that challenged American control of the Philippines. While the conflict began as a conventional war, resistance leaders quickly came to the realization that the Americans were not the Spanish, and there was little chance that resistance forces would be able to win a conventional war against this more powerful opponent. It became apparent that guerrilla warfare was the best weapon of the weaker participant in the armed conflict. It was only by resorting to guerrilla tactics that the resistance saw any hope at all of defeating the United States.

Boot's second book, *Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present,* is a broader historical study of guerrilla warfare on an international

[10] Max Boot. *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2002) xiii-xv.

scale. Beginning with an examination of the ambush at Beth Horon in 66 BCE, Boot's ambitious work traces small wars through the current Islamic insurgency. According to Boot,

> Professional soldiers naturally want to prove their mettle fighting against other professional soldiers. Ture warriors would like nothing better than to take part in a clash of armies on empty plains or fleets on the high seas or airplanes in the blue skies, all spheres where martial skill can be displayed in its 'pure' form, without worrying about nettlesome political complications….Small wonder then that most military services conceive their role in big war terms – closing with and annihilating the armed forces of the enemy.[11]

Boot demonstrates that a great deal of global military conflict throughout the ages comes in the form of guerrilla warfare. In the span of American history, conventional warfare is an aberration rather than the norm. The Philippine American War falls into the category of small wars. The author is successful in familiarizing the reader with history's numerous small wars, although he omits the Indian Wars except for a brief mention in passing. He therefore overlooks the role that experience in the Indian Wars played in the victory in the Philippines. He also fails to address the role played by native recruits in colonial armies. This omits an examination of the Macabebe scouts who served the United States during the Philippine American War and proved to be an indispensable element in the eventual success of the United States.

Military historian Russell F. Weigley tackles American military thought in *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy.* This extensive work traces Americas's evolving strategy from the American War of Independence through the Vietnam War. Published in 1973, this work predates the War on Terror. Weigley's examination of America's exercise of military power is one of the most comprehensive works on the subject.

The author concludes that the United States has developed a military doctrine that strives for the decisive victory. He writes, "Through the earlier era when strategy meant in America

[11] Max Boot, *Invisible Armies.* 282.

mainly the use of combat to attain the objects of war, the principal object sought was simply military victory."[12] The destruction of the opposing force was the ultimate goal. The lessons of Gettysburg and Vicksburg and Robert E. Lee's unconditional surrender clarified the conviction that a decisive victory was always possible and always preferable to any less conclusive outcome. This belief was solidified by the successful demand for German's unconditional surrender and the nearly unconditional surrender of Japan at the end of World War II. This reinforced the belief of the American military that anything less than unconditional surrender.

For Weigley, the American way of war could better be described as an American way of battle, since little thought was given to what would come after victory on the battlefield. American failure on the battlefield could be traced to a deeply held belief in massive resources and overwhelming force followed by unconditional surrender. When those elements were not in evidence, the military had no doctrine as an alternative. Once again, the American civilian and the indigenous personnel serving as scouts who contributed to victory in the Philippines are omitted from the story.

David R. Contosta examines the "small wars" aspect of the Philippine American War in *America's Needless Wars: Cautionary Tales of US Involvement in the Philippines, Vietnam and Iraq.* Contosta asserts that all three of these wars were needless and did nothing to further the interests of the United States. The author believes that all three wars incorporate the lack of necessity, a perceived but inaccurate sense of national interest, and a conflict involving a "lesser" (nonwhite) opponent. When the *USS Maine* exploded in the night and sank to the bottom of

[12] Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1960), xx.

Havana harbor, only the twisted superstructure rising above the waves, the march to war in Cuba and the Philippines was irresistible.

Contosta argues that neither the Philippines, Vietnam, nor Iraq posed any genuine threat to the interests of the United States. He points out that fighting with the Filipinos broke out only after the United States chose to annex the Philippines instead of liberating the islands from Spain. This conflict was not anticipated by either side, although according to the author it should have been. Instead of responding to an actual danger to the country, Contosta says that the United States was motivated by ignorance, arrogance, and fear.[13]

The author seems determined to prove that the Philippine American War falls into the category of "needless." At first glance, he seems to be successful. On closer examination, some evidence is missing. In order to compete in a global economy, the United States required coaling stations throughout the Pacific Ocean. Germany was also interested in obtaining coaling stations in the Pacific, as was Japan. The German Navy sent a fleet of eight warships to Manila in case the United States abandoned the islands. The threat was so alarming that Admiral Dewey warned off the Germans lest a conflict accidentally break out between the two navies. The appearance of the fleet and the threat that Germany would occupy the islands figured into America's decision to annex the Philippines. The Japanese Navy was also present, ready to take possession of the Philippines should the United States leave them undefended.[14] In addition to Germany and Japan, warships from Great Britain and France also began to arrive in the area. The United States had every reason to fear that any of these countries would claim the Philippines if American

[13] David R. Cantosta. *America's Needless Wars: Cautionary Tales of US Involvement in the Philippines, Vietnam, and Iraq* (New York: Prometheus, 2017), 72.
[14] Axis History Forum. "German Designs on the Philippines." Accessed 4/23/2019.

forces abandoned the islands.[15] While possession by Britain or France would have economic consequences for the United States, occupation by Germany or Japan would pose a distinct danger to Filipinos. They would have faced a dangerous and oppressive foreign occupation beyond anything enacted by the United States. Cantosta does not address these genuine concerns.

The author's focus is political rather than military. He mentions the indigenous Macabebes who were recruited to assist the American forces. He writes, "The Macabebe Scouts, as they were called, turned out to be fierce and effective fighters and did, in fact, contribute greatly to breaking the rebel resistance."[16] That is the only attention Cantosta pays to indigenous fighters in the service of the invading force in any of the three conflicts addressed in this book. The author completely overlooks the Montagnards who fought alongside the American Special Forces in Vietnam and fails to address the Kurds who threw in their lot with the invading American force in Iraq.

Military historian John Grenier makes a strong case for small wars as America's preferred method of fighting in *The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier.* Grenier argues that early Americans relied on irregular warfare as the primary tactic of choice. The author makes a convincing case that a new method of warfare emerged on the frontier of the New World. Colonists resorted to what they called "skulking," a tactic based on what proved to be successful for the indigenous population. Although Grenier does not move past the early 1800s, his arguments can be applied to the Indian Wars and the Philippine American War.

The heavily forested hills of North America were not suitable for the European tactics of massed armies and conventional maneuvers. The first colonists quickly learned to follow the lead

[15] University of Alberta. "Spanish-American War/War of Philippine Independence 1898-1901." Accessed 12/8/2018.
[16] Cantosta, 54.

of the first inhabitants. According to Grenier. “For the first 200 years of our military heritage, then, Americans depended on arts of war that contemporary professional soldiers supposedly abhorred: razing and destroying enemy villages and fields; killing enemy women and children; raiding settlements for captives; intimidating and brutalizing enemy noncombatants; and assassinating enemy leaders.”[17]

This work traces the development of American military philosophy from the early colonial period through the French and Indian wars and the American War of Independence to the Indian Wars in the Northwest Territory against Tecumseh and in the South against the Creeks and Seminoles. Grenier shifts the focus of American military history from conventional warfare to what he calls “the first way of war”: a method that included such famed irregular units as Rogers’ Rangers, a unit that was formed in 1755. This sets the stage for an eventual irregular war in the Philippines as the United States moved onto the stage of global imperialism. Grenier lays down solid footing for the complicated alliance between the colonizers and the colonized. Conventional warfare has always been emphasized by American military leaders, but “skulking” was the basis for successful military actions. Periodically forgotten, irregular warfare rises to the surface over and over again.

Antulio J. Echevarria II also examines the history of American military tradition in *Reconsidering the American Way of War: US Military Operations from the Revolution to Afghanistan.* Echevarria, a retired United States Army colonel, concludes that despite a tendency to consider unconditional surrender to be the ideal end result of armed conflict, the American way of war rarely employed overwhelming force and rarely achieved decisive results. Rather

[17] John Grenier, *The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 5.

than a historical study, Echevarria's work is an examination of military strategy as exercised by the United States.

Echevarria is one of the foremost scholars of nineteenth century Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz. One of Clausewitz's most famous assertions is, "War is a mere continuation of policy ["politics"] by other means." Echevarria ties this to American strategy by pointing out that every conflict is determined by the politics of the time. Overwhelming force might be an appropriate response. At other times, a war of attrition is called for. Proxy wars, with the conflict fought by participants representing state or non-state actors, might be a viable choice. Needless to say, condensing over two hundred years of military history into two hundred pages is a challenge. The book is more of a primer than a comprehensive history. It fits well with Grenier's work, reinforcing the collaboration between the United States Army and native recruits.

Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot is an interesting compilation of papers, edited by military historian Thomas Huber and published by the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press. After an introduction by Huber, the papers ranging from the Colonial Wars in North America to the American War of Independence to Vietnam and the Soviet Union's incursion into Afghanistan.

Of particular interest is Jerome E. Brown's paper on compound warfare as it relates to the Indian Wars. Brown explains that compound warfare was especially suited to the vast expanse of the great Plains. He notes that the conditions for a successful compound war in the Indian Wars included a vast and sparsely populated area. This environment required skill in tracking. The Army's opponent had adapted to the environment over centuries. They did not find it necessary to return to a fixed base. They relied on hit and run tactics, striking the invading force and then

rapidly disappearing into the vast expanse of the American West. The military leadership did not fully understand the conditions. Brown observes that an element that was missing was "an understanding by the U.S. Army of the use of compound warfare and the political will of the U.S. government."[18]

Brown notes that the arrival of Europeans in North America resulted in a sudden and dramatic shift in the cultural, social, and technological aspects of native life. It also caused a change in the sociopolitical relationships between native tribes. The indigenous population had to make a calculated choice: form an alliance with the newcomers or form an alliance with other tribes and resist the European encroachment. These relationships were fluid and could change over time with changing opportunities.

While Europeans engaged in conflicts with the natives living in America almost from the time they stepped ashore, there was a distinct difference between the fighting in the heavily forested east and the fighting in the wide-open expanses of the west. Eastern tribes tended to be more sedentary. Eastern tribes became involved in the rivalry between the French and the British. Efforts to stay neutral often became overwhelmed by the need to become the ally of one side or the other.

As Manifest Destiny became an accepted ideology and Americans moved West, Indians were seen as an impediment to progress. Early explorers and fur traders had tales of friendly Indians who assisted them, but the stories that made the headlines were those of the hostile Indians. There was little distinction made between the tribes. The threat was seen as monolithic. All Indians were lumped together. Westward travelers learned that the Western tribes were

[18] Jerome E. Brown. "Compound Warfare on the Great Plains: A Missed Opportunity" in *That Fatal Knot,* Thomas Huber, ed. (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and Staff College Combat Studies Institute, 2002), 112.

different than those in the East. Western tribes were far more mobile. They were accomplished horsemen who could quickly cover vast distances on the open plains. Survival depended on the skills of hunting and fighting: hunting to feed and clothe the tribe and fighting to protect what they had. Tribes relied on the proficiency of their hunter-warriors.

This environment was, according to Brown, ideal for compound warfare. Tribes were divided by cultural differences as well as rivalries for hunting grounds and limited resources. Brown writes, "Thus, if cleverly exploited, the Indians' training and experience, the inherent animosities between the Indian tribes, and the Indians' dependence on white trade goods could have led to the successful use of irregular indigenous units to complement regular U.S. Army units in subduing and suppressing the Plains tribes."[19] The Army took advantage of tribal differences to recruit natives to the service of the United States. The Arikara and Crow, for example, were more than willing to serve as scouts for Custer at Little Big Horn against the Dakota and Lakota, with whom they had a longstanding feud. While Brown does not continue his study into the Philippine American War, he does explain how the Army was able to attract indigenous recruits. This tactic would stand the Army in good stead in the Philippines.

Another military historian who focuses on irregular warfare as practice by the United States Army is Andrew J. Birtle with his book *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941.* Birtle agrees with Grenier that "skulking" is a longstanding tactic of the American military, and one that is often overlooked and discounted. Birtle presents a well-balanced approach. The Civil war is generally thought of in terms of conventional warfare, but Birtle offers a different picture. The Army considered irregular warfare to be a lesser form of combat. The Army relegated it to the status of a sideshow, to be relied upon only when

[19] Brown, 119.

absolutely necessary, but it was an integral element of the American Civil War. Confederate Colonel John Singleton Mosby was a formidable opponent who relied on hit and run tactics, as did Confederate General Nathan Bedford Forest. The head of General Robert E. Lee's cavalry, Major General Jeb Stuart, utilized a fast-moving unit to bedevil Union forces. It was necessary to respond in kind. The Union forces, however, were not as adept as the Confederates in adopting irregular tactics.

As the Army moved out onto the Great Plains following the Civil War, officers learned to adapt to the conditions. General George Crook was instrumental in formulating tactics that led to success in the Southwest. Birtle calls Crook "one of the Army's leading counterguerrilla experts."[20] A few other officers came to embrace the concept of irregular warfare and the advantages of indigenous recruits. General Nelson A. Miles experimented with a unit of mixed cavalry, mounted infantry, and native auxiliaries. He placed the unit under the command of Captain Henry Ware Lawton. After four months and 4,000 miles, Lawton's tenacious pursuit convinced Apache leader Geronimo to surrender. Birtle writes, "Pulling all of these adaptations together – finding the enemy with Indian scouts, following him with flying columns of light cavalry, mounted infantry, and mules, and defeating him with aggressive, small unit tactics – was easier said than done. Not all commanders could do it."[21] Henry Lawton was one commander who could.

Officers and men remembered the lessons of the Civil War, when the Union had to counter guerrillas and partisan raiders. The War Department compiled a portfolio of counterinsurgency tactics utilized during the Civil War. Nevertheless, counterinsurgency was

[20] Andrew J. Birtle. *U.S. Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941* (Washington DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 2009), Kindle Edition Location 1252.
[21] Birtle, 1408-09.

never a priority. According to Birtle, "Not only had pacification duty proved to be difficult and unrewarding, but the highly political content of the work made the subject unappealing to most soldiers. Moreover, what lessons the Army might have derived from its counterguerrilla experiences were overshadowed by the conventional aspects of the conflict."[22]

Without recognition from the Army that a counterinsurgency was required, Birtle observes "At the senior levels of command, most division, department, brigade, and regimental commanders were old Army hands who brought to the islands [the Philippines] experience in either the Civil or Indian Wars, if not both." At the junior officer level, "Officers demonstrated a willingness to learn by trial and error that enabled them to adjust their methods according to the methods they faced."[23] Fighting Indians on the Great Plains differed significantly from fighting guerrillas in the jungles of the Philippines. More than specific techniques and tactics, the officers brought a mindset that allowed them to be flexible and take advantage of every opportunity.

Birtle recognizes how valuable Indian War experience proved in the Philippines. While he overlooks the contributions of Young's Scouts, the forerunners of the indigenous Macabebe Scouts, he notes that the practice of enlisting the aid of the Macabebes "had the additional benefit of undermining Filipino unity by exploiting preexisting fractures in Filipino society."[24]

Birtle agrees with Grenier that irregular warfare is the norm, not the anomaly, with the U.S. Army focusing its energies and manpower on conventional warfare while overlooking the increased trend toward the irregular. Birtle writes, "Much of the Army's combat experience prior to World War II was gained not in conventional battles against regular opponents, but in unconventional conflicts against a bewildering array of irregulars."[25] Birtle does not make a

[22] Birtle, 936-38.
[23] Birtle, 2073, 2076-78.
[24] Birtle, 2132-33.
[25] Birtle, 303.

specific connection between Lawton's experience with Crook in the Powder River Campaign and Apache War with his later success in the Philippines. This dissertation will make that connection clear.

Major Wesley M. Pirkle focuses his examination of irregular warfare on General George Crook in his master's thesis, "Major General George Crook's Use of Counterinsurgency Compound Warfare During the Great Sioux War of 1876-77." This is a particularly relevant work since Lawton served under Crook in the Powder River Campaign before their service together in the Apache Wars. Pirkle defines compound warfare as "the simultaneous use of a regular or conventional force and an irregular, indigenous force in unison against a common enemy." This is how Crook took advantage of indigenous recruits, outside of the generally accepted use of them as scouts. Pirkle says that using both conventional and unconventional forces "enhances the strengths of both forces while limiting their inherent weaknesses."[26]

Pirkle warns that utilization of indigenous forces is not a panacea for all ills. It comes with problems of its own including "ethnic divisions, interagency rivalry, and political hindrances." General Crook experienced all of these. Lawton's service under Crook gave him the opportunity not only how to effectively utilize indigenous recruits, but also how to negotiate the non-military pitfalls associated with that service. As noted previously, the term "small wars" describes neither the scale nor the importance nor the complexity of a conflict. It describes the tactics. Pirkle says that "to consign it [irregular warfare] to a subset of warfare is an underestimation of the difficulty and complexity required to study and successfully win an

[26] Wesley M. Pirkle. *Major General George Crook's Use of Counterinsurgency Compound Warfare During the Great Sioux War of 1876-1877* (Master's Thesis, North Georgia College, 1993) iv,

insurgency or counterinsurgency." He calls this way of thinking "an institutional misconception within the U.S. Army."[27]

According to Pirkle, the Army put the Indian conflict on hold during the American Civil War. This is not accurate. The U.S. Dakota War in Minnesota required immediate attention in 1862. This was followed by expeditions against the Dakota in Dakota Territory during 1863-64. The author is focused on Crook and his Powder River Campaign. The author says the purpose of the thesis is to determine if General William Tecumseh Sherman was correct when he named Crook "the greatest Indian fighter and manager the United States ever had."[28] Pirkle concludes that Crook did not allow his nineteenth century mindset and mores to "undermine the logical decision to employ Indian scouts to the greatest extent possible."[29] While this thesis does not continue the story into the Philippine American War, Pirkle lays a solid foundation for Lawton's success in that conflict as Lawton had an innovative instructor when it came to utilizing indigenous recruits.

Historian Mark Cocker examines the willingness of natives to ally with invaders in *Rivers of Blood, Rivers of Gold: Europe's Conquest of Indigenous Peoples.* Cocker focuses on four conflicts: the European collisions with foreign cultures in Mexico, Tasmania, Southwest Africa, and the American Southwest. He relates the conflicts to the disdain in which Europeans held the "savages" of the world. He writes, "It was a simple step for colonists in America and Africa to conclude that since hunters and gatherers, like Indians, or pastoralists, like the Khoikhoi, did not actually work the land in the form of cultivation, they were not therefore in

[27] Pirkle, 1.
[28] Pirkle, 6.
[29] Pirkle, 78.

possession of it. The answer was to take it from them."[30] European racist attitudes towards the "savages" of the world merged with the pursuit of gold to form a deadly combination.

Cocker's work is an expansive history of European colonialism. Although primarily a social history, it also addresses the related military history. By extension, it also addresses natives who chose an alliance with the invading force. Cocker calls the status of these "ambiguous." He notes, "For their collaboration with the colonists often hastened the disintegration of tribal order and its assimilation into the imperial structure….Moreover, the cross-cultural double act that they performed so brilliantly in Mexico is a partnership replicated in each of this book's quartet of histories."[31]

The book is a valuable resource for understanding the wide-ranging effects of imperialism and highlights a major problem for anyone researching this topic: there is a serious imbalance of evidence. The colonizers left extensive documentation behind in the form of letters, diaries, official reports, and newspaper articles. The colonized did not. Until recently, historians routinely discounted the oral histories and pictographs of the indigenous people. This is a largely unexplored resource.

Rob Johnson, director of the Changing Character of War program at the University of Oxford, examines the role of indigenous recruits in colonial forces in his book *True to Their Salt: Indigenous Personnel in Western Armed Forces.* Johnson points out that European colonial forces depended on just such personnel. He writes, "There has been a long historical precedent for the Europeans' use of local forces across the globe. Indigenous troops were always used to compensate for the lack of their own manpower."[32] This book a detailed examination of the role

[30] Mark Cocker, *Rivers of Blood, Rivers of Gold: Europe's Conquest of Indigenous Peoples* (New York: Grove Press, 2001), 17.
[31] Cocker, 17.
[32] Rob Johnson, *True to Their Salt* (London: Hurst and Company, 2017), xx.

of indigenous personnel in global imperialism. Johnson delves into how Britain, France, and the United States relied on native recruits to achieve success in the Americas, Asia, and Africa. He examines how and why the Europeans held such an appeal for non-Europeans when the culture, language, and religion of the two groups were so alien from one another.

Johnson calls his work a "grand narrative." He explores the use of indigenous forces by colonial armies. He also provides a contemporary context. He says the colonial experience is "remarkably instructive" when applied to modern political and military actions, adding, In the last decade an Iraqi Army and an Afghan National Army were created entirely from scratch, the founding of which was deemed to be a crucial measure for the establishment of security and the withdrawal of Western forces from Iraq and Afghanistan. Johnson explains, "Historical examples invariably yield some instructive and useful ideas about how local forces were used."[33] He feels these examples are particularly relevant to twenty-first century warfare. This historical precedent lays the foundation for the modern strategy of using proxy forces to fight wars while limiting the negative consequences for the intervening power.

Johnson said his work was inspired by his discomfort with the Western-centric nature of military history. Non-Western actors are routinely omitted from the story. This skews history in favor of Western actors. Indigenous participants are often regarded as lacking agency, responding to outside forces while failing to initiate actions. The entire story cannot be told until they are included as full participants in events.

Wolves for Blue Soldiers by Thomas Dunlay examines Indian scouts who served the U.S. Army, 1860-1890. The author notes that following the Civil War, the main purpose of the Army was to subdue and control the Indians in the Trans0Mississippi West. This presented significant

[33] Rob Johnson, xii, xiii.

challenges. Dunlay argues that in order to achieve success, there was a "reversion to a practice followed by European armies in North America for centuries: the employment of American Indians as scouts and auxiliaries against other Indians." The author says his purpose is to "discover the broader meaning of episodes and personalities that have previously been viewed in isolation or in passing."[34] Many of these Indian auxiliaries did not write or even speak English, making it difficult to understand their motives and expectations. This is even more complicated because of the diversity of Indian culture and the differences between the tribes.

The affiliation between the Army and the Indian auxiliaries developed into a complex relationship. The Indians influenced the Army to adopt tactics that were less rigid and more applicable to the environment. Dunlay argues that the Europeans could not have successfully achieved the subjugation of North America without the assistance of Indian allies. While not going into detail about the Philippine American War, Dunlay does recognize the value of the Army experience in the Indian Wars. He writes, "Yet the Indian scouts like the rest of the Indians, had a degree of influence on the army. When confronted with the Philippine insurrection at the turn of the century, the old Indian fighters were not wholly at a loss. As soon as possible they enlisted Filipinos to fight other Filipinos. The most prominent in this role were the Macabebes of Luzon…."[35] While Dunlay begins to make the case that success in the Philippine American War is connected to success in the Indian Wars, this is not the focus of his work. He goes no further into detail on this aspect of the Army experience.

Mark Van De Logt also examines the experience of Indian scouts with the Army in *War Party in Blue: Pawnee Scouts in the U.S. Army.* His focus on the experience of the Pawnee with the Army is relevant to this study as the Pawnee served in the Powder River Campaign under

[34] Dunlay, 197.
[35] Dunlay, 197.

Crook, and Lawton was under Crook's command. It was in this campaign that Lawton first learned to work with Indian scouts.

Congress was in the process of downsizing the Army when the disaster at Little Big Horn changed the emphasis of both the Army and Congress. Congress immediately shifted financial resources to the Army and repealed an appropriations bill that limited the number of Indians the Army was permitted to hire. The Act Concerning the Employment of Indian Scouts went not effect on August 12, 1876. It allowed the Army to hire up to one thousand Indian scouts. In addition, the Army could pay the Indians forty cents per day for each horse they furnished. If they had no horses, the Army was authorized to purchase mounts for them. General Philip Sheridan was skeptical about relying on Indian scouts, but he allowed the recruitment of several companies. He anticipated a major campaign against the Sioux and Cheyenne. He understood the potential value of Indian scouts. He overcame his reticence and authorized their recruitment.[36] Sheridan's three-part plan to end the conflict included sending Colonel Nelson A. Miles with the Fifth Infantry into the Yellowstone area to contain the Sioux there; authorizing a military takeover of Sioux agencies in Dakota Territory and Nebraska; and sending General Crook on the Powder River Campaign.

Lawton, a lieutenant at the time, served directly under Major Ranald Mackenzie, with General Crook in overall command. This was fortunate for Lawton. Crook was one of the most experienced and effective Indian fighters of his day. De Logt says of Crook, "In large part his success depended on his understanding of Indian warfare. Rejecting orthodox military tactics as taught at West Point, Crook developed his own methods of campaigning against Indians."[37]

[36] Mark Van De Logt. *War Party in Blue: Pawnee Scouts in the U.S. Army* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2010), 195.
[37] Van De Logt, 195.

Crook preferred pack mules to wagon trains. He traveled with a minimum of supplies, and he pushed his men at a fast pace. He was a strong advocate for recruiting Indians as auxiliaries. He felt no guilt about using Indians against Indians. He said in an interview, "If I can kill one rattlesnake by make another bite it, I shall do it."[38]

Lawton learned how to manage Indian scouts on the Powder River Campaign. The Pawnee were eager to enlist in the Powder River Campaign. Some were enticed by the pay. Some wanted a respite from the monotonous reservation life and the restrictions that the government imposed on them. Others were interested in taking vengeance on the Sioux and Cheyenne, with whom they had a longstanding enmity. There was also the attraction of serving as warriors once more with the opportunity to prove their bravery and manhood. Mackenzie took advantage of these motivations.

De Logt argues that the Pawnee scouts were not coerced into enlisting with the Army. Instead, their service gave them an opportunity "to exact revenge on their Sioux and Cheyenne enemies – and be paid for it….Throughout the existence of the Pawnee battalion, scouts counted coups on their enemies, changed their names after performing brave deeds, and celebrated their victories in scalp dances." They also captured horses and escaped the poverty and disease of the reservation."[39] De Logt's work meshes with that of other historians who contend that indigenous recruits were motivated by a variety of "push" and "pull" factors to form an alliance with the United States Army. De Logt demonstrates that the Pawnee exercised agency and made conscious decisions about the advisability of an alliance with the Army.

General Henry Ware Lawton is a key figure in the story of the Philippine American War. He pioneered a serious effort to employ native skills. He learned from the best when he served

[38] Van De Logt, 166.
[39] Van De Logt, 241.

under Crook in the Apache War. Crook employed Apache scouts not only for scouting but also in fighting roles. Lawton was able to translate his experience from that conflict to the Philippine American War.

Historian Michael Shay recognizes that Lawton has been a minor figure in American military history and seeks to address that oversight with his book *Henry Ware Lawton: Union Infantryman, Frontier Soldier, Charismatic Warrior*. This book is a basic biography rather than military history. Lawton served in the Army for over forty years, rising from private to general. He was highly respected by officers and men alike. While the book recognizes his service, it lacks a broader context. Lawton was an important officer during America's first venture into global imperialism. His innovative tactics in the Philippines, first with a military scouting unit and then with Filipino recruits, was integral to America's success. Shay, however, does not explore insight or analysis. Relying on primary sources as he does, he produces a basic biography with a useful bibliography.

Shay wrote a second book that relies on the diary and letters of Robert D. Carter. Carter served on Lawton's staff in the Philippines. He was the son of Robert G. Carter, who served with Lawton in the Apache War. The younger Carter served as Lawton's quartermaster clerk in the Philippines. This gave him inside knowledge of the campaign. The author begins each chapter by setting the stage, letting the reader know where Carter is and what is happening. He has also chosen not to edit out the racial terms which were so common but are considered offensive today. This is an important choice, as it helps the reader to understand the historical period in which the Philippine American War occurred. It also explains the ease with which the United States took on a "civilizing" mission, picking up the "white man's burden."

Once again, Shay does not offer context or nuance. This is a straightforward presentation of Carter's writings. It is less a historical investigation than a snapshot of a particular period. However, his research is meticulous, and he provides a valuable bibliography.

In short, there are numerous written works that offer pieces of the story of colonial reliance on native recruits. Some examine the Army tactics in the Indian Wars but do not connect that experience to the Philippines. Some examine the Philippines but fail to acknowledge the connection to the Indian Wars. Others offer a broad history of the Philippine American War but neglect the challenges America faced when thrown into a guerrilla war. None tell the entire story, and this overlooked aspect of the indigenous scouts needs to be explored in order to provide a fuller understanding of the conflict.

This dissertation broadens the understanding of the Philippine American War. Chapter Two, "Looking for the Center of Gravity," details the central importance of a complex military concept. Nineteenth century military strategist Carl von Clausewitz was first described this concept in his seminal work *On War.* Clausewitz is still studied today. The center of gravity is unique to each conflict. It is the key to achieving victory. Understanding the enemy's center of gravity can mean the difference between success and failure.

Chapter Three, "In the Service of Empire," explains how imperialist nations enlisted the service of natives in the quest for empire. Building and maintaining an empire was an expensive undertaking, not only financially but also in manpower. Imperialist nations did not have enough manpower to win and maintain sprawling empires. Native recruits were integral to successful colonialism. The relationship between the colonizers and the colonized was complicated and fluid. The natives exercised agency and made conscious decisions about the most advantageous

course of action. They had to decide whether it was of greater benefit to fight the invaders or form an alliance.

The Philippine American War is broadly reviewed in Chapter Four, “A Splendid Little War.” This chapter includes information on how the environment of the Philippines played an important role in the conflict. It also details the reasoning behind the American decision to purchase the islands from Spain rather than granting immediate independence to the inhabitants, a decision that led directly to the war.

Chapter Five, “The War of the Flea,” details the challenges of guerrilla warfare for both the conventional force and the irregular fighters. At the time of the Philippine American War, the United States had no formal military doctrine to address the possibility of engaging in an irregular war. The entire focus of the United States was on conventional warfare. Chapter Five delves into the difficulties of adjusting to an unexpected guerrilla war.

General Henry Ware Lawton is a key figure in the ability of the United States to make the shift from conventional to unconventional war. Chapter Six, “The Night General,” explains how Lawton gained the experience that led to American success in the Philippines. This chapter clearly makes the connection between the Indian Wars in the United States and the Philippine American War. While the Army offered no formal instruction or guidance for irregular warfare, Lawton relied on his experience in the Indian wars. He put his trust first in an experienced civilian scout and then in a force of indigenous Macabebes.

Chapter Seven, “A Brave and Gallant Man,” explains who William Henry Young was and how he came to be Lawton’s Chief of Scouts. As the leader of Young’s Scouts, he proved invaluable to American success. Little is known about Young, but through diligent research this

dissertation brings to light new facts about Young's background and how he came to be in the Philippines at the start of the Philippine American War.

After the death of William Henry Young, General Lawton promoted an audacious plan. Chapter Eight, "Lawton's Bloodhounds," explains how a unit of indigenous recruits came to be. Remembering how valuable Apache scouts were in the surrender of Geronimo, Lawton pushed for the formation of a scouting unit of Macabebes. This plan was met with skepticism on the part of Generals Elwell S. Otis and Arthur MacArthur but was finally approved. The unit was so successful that it was the foundation for the broader Filipino constabulary.

Chapter Nine, "No Friends But the Mountains," bring this dissertation into the present. Western military powers continue to rely on indigenous support in military actions around the world. For example, Kurdish support has been vital to American forces in the Middle East. The British military depends on the Afghans. The French Foreign Legion relies on native support in Mali, Burkina Faso, the Ivory Coast, and Senegal. These relationships continue to be complex. Natives face a dilemma: ally with foreign invaders or resist them. They must make careful calculations and decide which offers the best opportunity for survival. This is further complicated by proxy wars in which foreign powers engage in conflicts through support for opposing native forces. In addition, natives know that they will be left to their own devices when the temporary alliance outlives its usefulness. Great Britain, Russia, and the United States all discarded native allies in Afghanistan. Most recently, the United States abandoned the Kurds. It gives poignant meaning to an ancient saying of the Kurds, that they have no friends but the mountains.

Winning a small war comes with no great satisfaction. Such a victory means remaining in a foreign country and taking on obligations such as rebuilding a justice system and the country's

infrastructure, a process with no clear end. There is no unconditional surrender with the euphoria that accompanies a clearly defined victory. Losing a small war comes with great grief, as a glance at Vietnam will show. Without an obvious field of battle and against an opponent who relies on tactics that early colonists described as "skulking," small wars are fraught with dangers that are not a factor in a conventional war. Do it right and there is no glory. Make a mistake and court martial is a strong possibility, as Major Littleton W.T. Waller learned in the Philippines and Lieutenant William Calley learned in Vietnam.

Military power alone cannot achieve success in a small war. Successful prosecution of such a conflict requires providing support for the civilian populace. An unfortunate result of a lack of strategic focus has resulted in failure to turn military victories into strategic success. Winning a battle is not the same as winning a war, and winning a war is not the same as winning the peace. Truly winning a war requires translating battlefield victories into strategic victories. Turning a strategic victory into winning the peace means looking beyond the battlefield. One underlying reason for America's success in the Philippines. was Governor William Howard Taft's emphasis on building an alliance with the local populace.

According to former Secretary of Defense James Mattis, "Ultimately, a real understanding of history means that we face nothing new under the sun. We have been fighting on this planet for over 5,000 years, and we should take advantage of their experience. For to be a committed student of war is first to be a student of military history."[40] In 2006, the Department of Defense acknowledged that the American defense forces still suffer from a "doctrinal gap."

With American forces facing insurgents in the Middle East, it is crucial for personnel to have a full understanding of counterinsurgency operations. While it is important to incorporate

[40] Murray Williamson and Richard Hart Sinnreich, eds. *The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession* (New York: Cambridge Press, 2007),7.

current conditions in any manual addressing counterinsurgency, the Army recognizes that "such guidance must be grounded in historical studies."[41] While every insurgency is unique and presents its own challenges, there are some consistencies such as enlisting the cooperation of the local populace.

This study demonstrates that though many works have examined aspects of the Philippine American War, there is a connection that has been missing. This dissertation brings all the elements together to clearly illuminate the connection between the recruitment of native allies in the Indian Wars and that same strategy in the Philippine American War.

[41] *Counterinsurgency* (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 2006, Kindle Edition), Location 4.

CHAPTER 2: LOOKING FOR THE CENTER OF GRAVITY

> One must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics, a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed. Carl von Clausewitz[42]

While the goal of war is often to destroy the enemy's military forces, this is not always the most likely means of achieving victory. Destruction of the enemy force is illustrated by familiar conventional set-piece battles like Waterloo and Gettysburg. The same cannot be said of unconventional warfare, in which there is a shift from the scenario of two armies facing each other on a recognized field of battle. The rules are different in irregular warfare, to the point where it sometimes seems as if there are no rules at all. One major difference is shifting focus from the goal of destroying a military force to the goal which will most effectively force an end to the conflict. For example, according to the Department of Defense, "The manual [Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual] directs U.S. forces to make securing the civilian rather than destroying the enemy, their top priority as the center of gravity – the deciding factor in the struggle."[43]

In the realm of military activity, concepts that are not effective tend to be cast aside. In order to be useful, a concept has to stand the test of time. Successful tactics are developed and honed by the military personnel in the field. Eventually they are adapted into formal military doctrine. Thus, the troops on the front lines are on the cutting edge of military doctrine, with the command staff learning from them and catching up to them.

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[42] Carl von Clausewitz, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. *On War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 23.
[43] Department of Defense. *Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 1940), xxv.

There are a few military strategists whose theories are so adaptable and useful that they continue to be studied long after the work was first published. Sun Tzu is one such strategist. He is credited with writing a major work on military strategy, *The Art of War*, in the late sixth century BCE.

Another strategist who has stood the test of time is Carl von Clausewitz., He wrote his seminal work *On War* in the nineteenth century. He still plays a central role in the study of the military arts. His work continues to be studied by military forces around the world. Clausewitz's "fog of war" and his understanding of the role that uncertainty and chance play in military activities are embedded in the military lexicon. He is recognized as the father of modern military strategy.

One of Clausewitz's most important concepts continues to be the center of gravity. which he defined as "the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act."[44] It has sometimes been described as a point of strength which must be overcome in order to defeat an enemy, but it is not a source of physical strength as such. It is more accurate to think of it as a point of balance as found in physics. According to the Merriam- Webster Dictionary, the center of gravity in physics is "the point at which the entire weight of a body may be considered as concentrated so that if supported at this point the body would remain in equilibrium in any position."[45] Disturb the center of gravity and the object will tip out of balance. The same is true in the military sense.

Center of gravity is the characteristic from which the enemy derives the will to fight. By overcoming the enemy's center of gravity, a military force can tip the enemy out of balance and create an opening for victory. It is the primary factor that stands in the way of a military force

[44] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 595-6.
[45] Meriam-Webster Dictionary. "Center of Gravity." Accessed 4/21/2020.

successfully accomplishing its objective and overcoming the enemy. Modern military strategists Dr. Joe Strange and Colonel Richard Iron referred to center of gravity as "a dynamic and powerful agent in its own right….a critical vulnerability."[46] Lieutenant Colonel Rudolph Janiczek describes center of gravity as "a giant lens for focusing military effort to achieve a central element of campaign planning for the United States Army."[47] On the other side of the coin, a strong center of gravity has the ability to protect the opposing force and prevent a military defeat. Even a partially functional center of gravity can present a substantial obstacle to the opposing force. It should be noted that, while the center of gravity can be vulnerable, it is always a source of strength.

Although it is widely acknowledged as one of Clausewitz's most important concepts, center of gravity was not formally incorporated into the formal doctrine of the United States Army until 1986. The Army's *Operations Field Manual 100-5* finally included center of gravity as a concept to be studied and considered while planning military operations.[48] It was not without controversy. Some thought it was an outdated theory that was no longer relevant. Others embraced center of gravity with enthusiasm. While most writers conceded that the center of gravity could be a valuable tool, each had his or her own perception of how it should be defined, exactly what it means, and how it fit into the military doctrine of the United States. There was disagreement between the services that only added to confusion.

Each service provides its own definition of center of gravity tailored to the perception of that service. The Army relies on Clausewitz's original definition, adding, "in theory, destruction

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[46] Joe Strange and Richard Iron. *Center of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities* (Quantico: Marine Corps War College, 2007), 3.
[47] Rudolph Janiczek. "A Concept at the Crossroads: Rethinking the Center of Gravity" (Carlisle PA: US Army War College, 2007), 1.
[48] Department of the Army. *Operations Field Manual 1009-5* (Washington DC: US Department of the Army, 1986), 3.

or neutralization of the enemy COG is the most direct path to victory." According to the Air Force, "A COG is a primary source of more (i.e., military, industrial, or economic) strength from which a nation, alliance or military force in a given strategic operational, or tactical context derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight." Naval Doctrine Publication-1 defines center of gravity as "something the enemy must have to continue military operations – a source of his strength, but not necessarily strong or a strength in itself." According to the Marines, "Centers of gravity are any important sources of strength….We want to attack the source of enemy strength, but we do not want to attack directly into that strength. We obviously stand a better chance of success by concentrating our strength against some relative enemy weakness….The most effective way to defeat our enemy is to destroy that which is most critical to him. We should focus our efforts on the one thing which, if eliminated, will do the most decisive damage to his ability to resist us."[49]

The fact that each service addresses it and recognizes it as a crucial focal point demonstrates the continued importance of center of gravity in modern military doctrine. It is also problematic. The author of a Department of Defense publication observes that the process of allowing each service to define the center of gravity resulted in "a lack of cohesive joint doctrine. The services put their own parochial spin on the concept as they attempted to incorporate it into their separate doctrines, often in isolation from the interpretations and applications by sister services."[50] The fact that the definition of center of gravity has not been coordinated between all the branches of the United States military creates a unique set of challenges, particularly when the military is engaged in irregular conflict. Dr. Joe Strange calls this "a self-inflicted wound."[51]

[49] Field Manual 3-o, Operations, 5-7. Air Force Doctrine Document 1-2, 3w6. Naval Doctrinal Publication 1, 35. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication-1, Warfighting, 45-47.
[50] Rudolph Janichek, "Rethinking the Center of Gravity," 2.
[51] Joe Strange, 17.

Military forces around the world acknowledge the value of the center of gravity as an enduring concept. According to retired British Colonel Ian Kippen, "Love or hate the Centre of Gravity (COG) concept, it is here to stay." He goes on to note, "There are several good reasons why it should remain within the NATO planners' tool box." Colonel Henri Bore of the French Army says that the center of gravity "is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as for the insurgent."[52]

The enemy's center of gravity might be its military force. It might also be territory, the enemy's capital, the political or military leadership, the populace, or the means of production. With today's reliance on technology, the center of gravity might be the enemy's cyber infrastructure. The center of gravity may shift over the course of a campaign. It might shift rapidly and unexpectedly due to unforeseen circumstances. It is vital to correctly identify the enemy's center of gravity. Overcoming it can be decisive. Failure to do so can result in a major setback.

There are cases in which misidentification of the enemy's center of gravity resulted in military disaster. At the Battle of Cowpens during the American War of Independence, British Colonel Banastre Tarleton incorrectly identified the enemy center of gravity as the American force opposing him. His mistake was not understanding the makeup of that force. Tarleton thought he was facing American militia. The militia had a reputation for collapsing under a British bayonet charge and had done just that when faced with Tarleton's terrifying charge at Waxhaws. Tarleton launched a similar attack at Cowpens. When the American front line, made up of militia, collapsed as expected, the British broke into a headlong charge. They lost unit cohesion as they sensed victory was within their grasp. They knew from experience that the

[52] Ian Kippen, "Center of Gravity: Joining the Dots from Strategic to Tactical Level Plans." *Small Wars Journal* Accessed 4/20/2020.

militia would not stand up to the onslaught and would break into a disorganized rout. According to American militiaman Thomas Anderson, “The enemy thinking that we were broke set up a great shout charged us with their bayonets but in no order.”[53]The outcome of the battle, however, was not what the British expected.

Besides not fully understanding the enemy force, Tarleton was not familiar with the terrain. The militia stood at the top of a small rise, concealing what was behind them. When the British Legion came over that rise at a full run, they found themselves facing not the militia, but the seasoned Continentals who opened a withering fire. This time it was the British who broke and ran. Tarleton did not understand the enemy force and therefore could not correctly identify the opposing center of gravity, which was not the entire American force but the portion of it made up of regular Continental soldiers.

American General Daniel Morgan has been hailed as a military genius for understanding both his own troops and those he faced. He understood that his militia could not stand up to a British charge. He told the militia prior to the battle, “Give me two good shots, boy, and then retire. You can go home as heroes to your wives and sweethearts.” A simple man who grew up on the frontier, Morgan had no military training. It is doubtful if he ever studied Von Clausewitz or had the vocabulary of center of gravity. He instinctively knew that his own center of gravity was not his entire force, or the militia. He knew that if his Continental’s stood firm, as they had in the past, his force would win the day. He also understood his enemy. The British Legion had a single tactic. Morgan was sure he could depend on them to launch a frightening charge and then lose unit cohesion as they pursued their fleeing enemy. His opponent’s center of gravity was the British Legion itself.[54]

[53] Historum. “Tidbits from the American Revolution.” Accessed 4/22/2020.
[54] Journal of the American Revolution. “Eyewitnesses at Cowpens.” Accessed 2/8/2020.

Morgan's victory at Cowpens is considered by many military historians to be the greatest and best managed battle of the war. It signaled the end of British dominance in the South. It also broke the terrifying mystique of the British Legion. The name of Tarleton did not hold the same terror for American troops following the battle. They knew he could be defeated. Cowpens has gone down in history as a brilliantly led battle overseen by a military genius. It is still studied at West Point today.

In a more unusual example, both commanders of the opposing naval forces at the Battle of Leyte Gulf in 1944 misidentified the enemy's center of gravity during the engagement off the coast of the Philippines. In October, American Admiral William F. Halsey took the U.S. Third Fleet north in pursuit of the Japanese Northern Force. Since it was a carrier fleet, Halsey assumed that it was the enemy's center of gravity and, as such, was his primary target. He left behind a miniscule task force of six small escort carriers, three destroyers, and four destroyer escorts. Halsey assigned this small force, known as Taffy 3, the task of blocking any Japanese attempt to land a force on the island of Samar. Since he was chasing what he thought was the primary Japanese fleet, Halsey was confident that Taffy 3 would be sufficient for the task.

Halsey was wrong. The Northern Fleet was a decoy to lure Halsey away from the Philippines and clear the way for a Japanese landing. Rear Admiral Clifton A.F. Sprague, the commander of Taffy 3, was stunned as the sun rose on October 25. He found himself facing four Japanese battleships, six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and eleven destroyers. Among the Japanese force was the legendary *Yamato*, the largest battleship ever to take to the sea. Displacing 72,000 tons, the *Yamato* alone outweighed all the ships of Taffy 3. Her massive 18-inch guns could hit a target at twenty-five miles. Knowing his little force was the only thing

standing between the American Marines on the beach and certain disaster, Sprague did the only thing he could think of. He attacked.

The Japanese sank one American ship after another, with the Americans losing a total of six. The damage was not one-sided. Thirteen Japanese battleships suffered severe damage and three cruisers were sunk. Then the unexpected happened. American sailors were astonished to see the Imperial Japanese Navy suddenly withdrawing from the fight. Admiral Kurita had seen masts on the horizon. Convinced that Halsey would never have left such a small force without support he assumed that the masts belonged to the main American fleet. Just as Halsey had done before him, Kurita misidentified the enemy center of gravity. He broke off the fight, not know that the masts actually belonged to another small task force coming to the aid of Taffy 3.[55]

Both commanders in this battle incorrectly identified the enemy center of gravity, yielding a less than satisfactory result. While not culminating in the decisive victory that Halsey had hoped for, neither was the battle a draw. Taffy 3 suffered significant damage but also inflicted damage. Most importantly, the withdrawal of Kurita's fleet led to the end of any further Japanese expansion in the Pacific. The American forces prevailed in spite of Halsey's error. The outcome, however, was less than ideal since Halsey lost the opportunity to destroy the enemy fleet and put an end to the Japanese threat in the Pacific.

Overcoming an enemy's center of gravity is not a guarantee of success. A commander must first properly identify the enemy's center of gravity. The next step is to formulate a plan that can take advantage of the enemy's critical vulnerability. If successful, overcoming the enemy's center of gravity opens the door to a possible victory. Breaking that center of gravity is not the only avenue for success. That may be obtained by other means. War is fluid and the

[55] Naval History and Heritage Command. "The Battle of Samar: The Sacrifice of Taffy 3." Accessed 2/5/2020.

situation can change rapidly. Using the physics analogy, tipping the enemy out of balance offers the possibility of success provided the attacking force takes advantage of the opening.

Center of gravity is not solely the construct of western military theorists. Eastern military thinkers do not use the term, however, they clearly understand the concept and how crucial it is to identify the source of the enemy's strength, as well as one's own. Sun Tzu, a prominent advisor to Chinese nobility, is credited with writing *The Art of War* in the fifth century BCE. He did not use the term "center of gravity." His theories, however, embody that concept. His work includes models that are reflected in Clausewitz's *On War*. The center of gravity correlates to Sun Tzu's philosophy which defines the focal point of an organization as that which unites and focuses its people. According to Sun Tzu, when a force gives up faith in goals and core beliefs, their war is lost.

Sun Tzu advocates studying the situation carefully to determine the best route to victory. According to Sun Tzu, "A wise leader plans success. A good general studies it….The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations before hand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can fore see who is likely to win or lose.[56]

Mao Zedong was another Chinese military theorist who understood the center of gravity, even if he did not call it that. In his most famous quote about guerrilla warfare. Mao emphasized "the relationship that should exist between the people and the troops. The former may be likened to water, and the latter to the fish who inhabit it. How may it be said that these two cannot exist together?"[57] Mao believed that a guerrilla war could be successful only with the support, or at least the acquiescence, of the populace, which he considered to be his own center of gravity.

[56] Sun Tzu. *The Art of War.* 201.
[57] Mao Zedong, *Yu Chi Chan,* trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Newport: Naval War College, 1950), 92-3.

Military historian Russell F. Weigley observes that in the American military mind, the enemy "must be overthrown. Given this tendency of later American wars to be aimed candidly and from the outset at the overthrow of the enemy, the main problem of American strategists was usually that of encompassing the destruction of the enemy's armed forces."[58] This focus on the opponent's military force ignores other possible centers of gravity, including the populace.

In the Vietnam War, North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyan Giap fully understood Mao's admonition that the people are the center of gravity in a guerrilla war. He understood Clausewitz's statement that war is politics by other means. Giap stressed the importance of the intersection between war and politics. He writes, "If insurrection is said to be an art, the main content of this art is to know how to give to the struggle forms appropriate to the political situation at each stage, how to maintain the correct relation between the forms of the political struggle and those of the armed struggle in each period."[59]

In reference to the military strategy of North Vietnam, military historian John Collins observes, "A ninth rate nation, in concert with a collection of motivated peasants" was able to keep the world's greatest military superpower at bay for fourteen years and was ultimately successful.[60]

This failure of the United States to correctly identify the enemy's center of gravity led to defeat. The American effort to win "hearts and minds" came far too late, was not fully embraced by military leaders, and was not consistent. It was painfully obvious by 1965 that North Vietnam had a viable avenue for success. Sir Robert Thompson, serving as an advisor in Vietnam, warned that "An insurgent movement is a war for the people. It stands to reason that government

[58] Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War,* xii-viv,
[59] Vo Nguyen Giap, *People's War, People's Army* (New York: Frederic A. Prager, Publishers, 1962),76.
[60] John M. Collins, *Grand Strategy* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1972), 255.

measures must be directed to restoring government authority and law and order throughout the country, so that control over the population can be regained and its support won."[61]

An unconventional foe does not necessarily fit into neat formal military doctrine. It is a greater challenge to identify the enemy's center of gravity in irregular warfare. In recent irregular conflicts in which the United States is still involved, personnel have demonstrated a lack of understanding regarding center of gravity. In his examination of the center of gravity as it relates to irregular warfare, military historian Jonathan King notes, "Some units conducting counterinsurgency operations incorrectly determined centers of gravity, which led to unnecessary expenditure of time, blood, and treasure." King argues that there may well be more than one center of gravity. Instead, "Rather than one static, monolithic center of gravity, there are multiple operational and tactical centers of gravity in counterinsurgency that vary by insurgent political purpose, location, approach, and phase."[62]

Military strategist Celestino Perez describes the challenge: "I was initially I was not involved in the Stabilization Force planning, so it was safe to throw darts at the wall to determine the unit or headquarters or personality which might be the enemy center of gravity; but we didn't really have a focused enemy, or, depending on to whom you spoke, everyone was our enemy. It was then that it dawned on me: there was no logical process to identify a center of gravity. There was no principle or criteria available for testing the validity of a proposed center of gravity. Furthermore, there was no procedure or process included in our doctrine to coherently discern how to 'attack' the enemies' [sic] center of gravity in this peace enforcement mission."[63]

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[61] Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, (1966), 1.
[62]Jonathan King. "Beyond the Mosaic: Insurgent Centers of Gravity and Counterinsurgency" in *Addressing the Fog of COG* (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2012), xiii.
[63] Celestino Perez, Jr., ed., *Addressing the Fog of COG*: *Perspectives on the Center of Gravity in US Military Doctrine* (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2012), 9.

Insurgencies re complex. Countering an insurgency requires patience and creative thinking. The commander facing an unconventional force must understand and appreciate the operational environment. This is a particular challenge when facing an unfamiliar culture speaking an unfamiliar language operating in unfamiliar terrain. Insurgents are often fluid in their operations. They can easily pass as members of the friendly population. As such they have the ability to misdirect the opposing force by offering misinformation. They are familiar with the environment and understand how to take advantage of the opportunities it offers. Although these are advantages, the operational methods of insurgents can provide unique opportunities for counterinsurgents. Insurgents often disperse their strength and frequently lack supplies. Counterinsurgents are usually well supplied and can exert their greater power, relying on superior military resources to enforce their will.

Modern military commanders demonstrate that the center of gravity remains a relevant if sometimes misunderstood concept long after Von Clausewitz wrote his major work. According to a 2002 Department of Defense publication, center of gravity consists of "those aspects of the adversary's overall capability that, theoretically, if attacked and neutralized or destroyed will lead either to the adversary's inevitable defeat or force opponents to abandon aims or change behavior."[64] United States Army Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria II states that the center of gravity "has come to occupy a common place in the vocabulary of professional soldiers….It has become one of today's most popular military concepts despite the fact that its origins extend back to the early industrial age….Clausewitz intended to COG to function much as its counterpart in the mechanical science does, that is, as a focal point."[65]

[64] Department of defense Joint Publication 5-000, 2002. II-6.
[65] Antulio J. Echevarria II. *Clausewitz' Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine – Again!* Kindle Edition, Location 1214, 1233,

The concept has become deeply ensconced in modern military thinking. It has served the US military well in conventional conflicts. However, the question becomes how or even if center of gravity translates to success in unconventional engagements. This dissertation demonstrates that when properly recognized, as in the Battle of Cowpens, center of gravity can be a valuable tool even if the commander does not use the terminology of Clausewitz. The Battle of Leyte Gulf illustrates how failure to recognize the enemy's center of gravity can end in a less than desirable result. History shows that past irregular conflicts can shed light on the relevance of center of gravity beyond conventional warfare.

Published in 2007, *The U.S. Army Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* highlights center of gravity and its place in the modern military as it relates to irregular warfare. According to the *Field Manual*, the most important insurgency characteristics – and the ones that are the most difficult to ascertain – are objectives, motivations, and means of generating popular support or at least the tolerance of the populace. The ability to generate popular support "is usually the insurgency's center of gravity."[66] This does not mean that an insurgency demands full and enthusiastic support of the populace. At the very least, however, an insurgency requires the passive tolerance of the people. This may be given willingly, or it may be coerced. If the populace determines that it is more advantageous to support the counterinsurgent force, the insurgency will face difficulties in mounting a viable resistance.

In addition to having a center of gravity that is difficult to identify, an insurgency does not always respond to an enemy's center of gravity in a traditional manner. In his observations on Vietnam, General David Petraeus observes the insurgency "did not attack a single enemy center of gravity; instead, it put pressure on several, asserting that, over time, victory would

[66] John A. Nagl. *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 13-14.

result in one of two ways; from activities along one LLO (logical lines of operation) or the combined effects of efforts along several."[67] The insurgency may well respond to its enemy in an unconventional and unexpected manner. Insurgency generally does not adhere to the "rules of war." It is imperative for the counterinsurgency force to be aware of and prepared for these possibilities.

During the nineteenth century, west Point was primarily known as an engineering school. Studies of the military arts focused almost entirely on conventional warfare. Cadets who would go on to be the leading military officers of the United States Army were introduced to irregular warfare only in passing. They had to learn on their own how to adjust conventional tactics to the irregular warfare they would meet in the Indian Wars of the American West. West Point instructors Dennis Hart Mahan and Colonel J.B. Wheeler lectured on small unit tactics, raids and ambushes.[68] While this information was presented briefly, with little detail and almost in passing, it would prove useful to officers who were sent west to serve on the American frontier.

Mahan continued to lecture periodically on the subject throughout his forty-year teaching career at West Point. He stressed the value of winter campaigns, night marches, and dawn raids. While Mahan suggested utilizing the skills of frontiersmen and friendly Indians, he warned against attempting to adopt the tactics of the Indians. He believed the soldier was inferior to the Indian when it came to marksmanship, horsemanship, and knowledge of the terrain. Instead, he taught that the Indian should be forced to fight on the Army's terms.[69] This was easier said than done. Mahan did not address precisely how to identify the Indian center of gravity in order to goad them into the conventional engagement that the Army had a better chance of winning.

[67] Nagle, *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual,* 101.
[68] Birtle, Location 1190.
[69] Birtle, Location 304.

Mahan's work stressed conventional war. He discusses tactics of massed units, both in columns and dispersed. He does note that a military force should not be completely locked into regulations and should take advantage of any opportunity that afforded itself as "no soldier will allow himself to be trammeled by any exclusive system." According to Mahan, no military force should adhere to regulations at the expense of opportunities. He points out one advantage of the American soldiers: they are "habituated to handling firearms almost from childhood." To Mahan, this benefit meant that American soldiers would be more likely to be cool under fire, and they were comfortable with firearms even with little formal training.[70]

Mahan then goes on to describe what he sees as a uniquely American class of soldier. These soldiers function independently to accomplish small goals and support the larger force. Mahan calls them "a third class of infantry, termed riflemen, which does not form a part proper of the arm of infantry; partaking, when properly constituted, more of the character of partisan than of regular troops; being chosen only from that portion of a population whose habits lead them to a daily use of fire-arms and give them unerring aim. As an auxiliary to the defence [sic] of particular localities, where they are secure from the attack of the bayonet, or of cavalry, can deliver their fire with that deliberation which their weapon demands, riflemen will often be found invaluable; as nothing is more dreaded by troops generally than this lurking, and often invisible foe, whose whereabout is only divined by the destruction he deals around him."[71]

Mahan includes a chapter on reconnaissance work, saying that reliable guides "are invaluable, but most rare, in an enemy's country. He says the best guides are people like hunters and smugglers. The officer in charge of the reconnaissance should seek these people out and

[70] Dennis Hart Mahan. *An Elementary Treatise on Advanced-Guard, Out-Post, and Detachment Service of Troops* (New York: Wiley and Putnam, 1847), 27-29.
[71] Dennis Hart Mahan, 33-34, 42.

enlist their aid.[72] Mahan does not equate reconnaissance with irregular warfare, but he does encourage the use of reliable civilians. He advises enlisting the assistance of local inhabitants who will be familiar with the terrain, the environment, the population, and the language.

Mahan comes closest to describing irregular warfare in the chapter titled "Detachments." He notes that while detachments are connected to the main body of troops and carry out a related mission, their work is generally "performed beyond the sphere of its support….the combat detachments will be mostly restricted to firing, and the skillful employment of skirmishers." Mahan emphasizes the value of the skirmishers. He explains, "Skirmishers play so important a part in all affairs of detachments, as well as in engagements of larger bodies, the circumstances being rare, either in the attack or defence [sic], where they cannot be employed with considerable effect, either to harass or occupy the enemy, that a few words may be here especially given to the manner of handling them…."[73] Mahan cautions that such skirmishers should not engage in heavy fire, but should aim and shoot carefully, never taking a shot unless they are sure of the result. He says skirmishers should avoid open ground, keeping to the cover of forests and heavy brush, and utilizing the camouflage techniques of skilled frontiersmen.

One other chapter offers advice applicable to irregular warfare: "Surprises and Ambuscades," with surprise referring to an unexpected attack on the enemy and ambuscade referring to a planned ambush in which a force plans an attack and waits for the enemy to arrive at the designated location. For either type of engagement, Mahan says it is necessary to have "secrecy, good troops, and a thorough knowledge of the localities." Since the officer in charge "must spare no pains in ascertaining the face of the country leading to and in the immediate

[72] Dennis Hart Mahan,109.
[73] Dennis Hart Mahan, 109.

vicinity of the enemy's position, reliable scouts are invaluable."[74] This is the tactic that Lawton used in the Philippines. His employment of William Henry Young was serendipitous. His formation of the Macabebe Scouts was genius based on experience.

Mahan's work was useful only to a small degree to officers who found themselves looking for a center of gravity in small wars. Although the United States Army had engaged in numerous irregular conflicts throughout its history, this was not the major focus of military training. Military leaders assumed that the main work of the Army would be conventional in nature. The partisan aspect of warfare in the American war of Independence and the American Civil War were quickly forgotten, as was the experience of the Indian Wars. The tradition of small wars would be crucial, however, when America ventured into the realm of global imperialism.

The United States Army of the late nineteenth century was a creation of the frontier. The conventional tactics of the Civil War were irrelevant to the Indian Wars. The Army had to make a major shift in thinking, had to do it in the moment, and had to do it without the guidance of formal military doctrine. The Indian Wars were prolonged because of the Indians' reliance on guerrilla warfare combined with the failure of the Army to recognize it as such and develop an effective response. When the officers and men on the frontier finally devised unconventional means to combat an unconventional foe, the tables began to turn. The Army's new tactics included night attacks, winter campaigns, and dawn raids. These were all tactics suggested by Mahan but never adopted.

The center of gravity in the Indian Wars was never the enemy force. The experience of set-piece battles of the Civil War had to be put aside. The Army began to put the priority on

[74] Dennis Hart Mahan, 165.

resources. Troops routinely destroyed enormous amounts of food, shelter, clothing, and weapons. This put pressure on the populace which put pressure on the warriors. One of the most crucial elements of this new and ultimately successful campaign strategy was the integration of indigenous personnel into the military force.

Mahan's book and his classes gave passing knowledge of irregular warfare, but there were no formal West Point classes dedicated to small wars.[75] As Andrew J. Birtle points out, "It has long been accepted that the U.S. Army did not have an official, codified, written doctrine for the conduct of counterguerrilla, pacification, and nation-building activities prior to World War II."[76] Officers and enlisted men alike developed their own theories derived from personal experience. Their unofficial method of passing valuable experience by conversations and informal writings to the next generation of soldiers would stand the Army in good stead when it moved from the Indian wars of the American West to a guerilla war in the Philippines in 1898.

Birtle calls the process of developing doctrine "an evolutionary one, in which field experience is gradually distilled and codified, only to be eventually modified and replaced after new experiences have demonstrated the inadequacy of existing thought." Brigadier General Theodore Schwan wrote in the fall of 1899 that the Filipinos "are in identically the same positions of the Indians of our country have been for many years, and in my opinion, must be subdued in much the same way, by such convincing conquest as shall make them realize fully the futility of armed resistance, and then win them by fair and just treatment."[77] As the fighting in the Philippines gradually evolved from conventional to unconventional, the experienced Indian fighters like Generals Elwell Otis and Henry Ware Lawton recognized the similarities

[75] *The Centennial of the United States Military Academy at West Point, 1802-1902, Volume 1, Addresses and Histories* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1904.
[76] Birtle, Position 30-32.
[77] Birtle, Position 2069-2071.

with their battles against the Indians. They were able to adapt their experience in the Indian wars to a new environment on the other side of the world.

The British were masters of small wars. Sir Garnet Wolseley (1883-1913), immortalized by Gilbert and Sullivan as the "very model of a modern major general" in the musical *HMS Pinafore,* appreciated the importance of center of gravity as it relates to small wars.[78] Wolseley spent much of his career as a British officer in the non-European theater including Burma, India, and Africa. According to Wolseley, "In planning a war against an uncivilized nation who have perhaps no capital, your first object should be the capture of whatever they prize the most, and the destruction or deprivation of which will probably bring the war most rapidly to a conclusion."[79]

The colonial wars in which Wolseley gained his experience were almost exclusively asymmetric and often difficult to analyze, even by those who were on the ground and directly involved. The only avenue for success was to make the necessary adjustments. The British often engaged in what today is referred to as "compound warfare." Some forces were deployed in a conventional manner while others were utilized unconventionally. Military historian Emrys Chew describes the British as having "virtually shape-shifting capabilities across multiple geostrategic areas."[80] This allowed British military forces to quickly adapt to the enemy whether conventional, guerrillas, or hybrid armies utilizing both conventional and unconventional tactics.

Wolseley also emphasized how crucial it was for subordinate officers to have a full understanding of tactics. According to Wolseley, junior offices should "Practise [sic] yourself constantly in forming plans of how you would handle independent brigades, battalions, and even

[78] National Army Museum. "The Modern Major General." Accessed 8/3/2018.
[79] Emrys Chew. "How Big Powers Fight Small Wars: Contending Traditions of Asymmetry in the British and American Ways of War" (*Armed Forces and Society*40, no.1, Spring 2014), 18.
[80] Chew, 19.

companies, on various sorts of ground, for attack and defense. Do not run away with the idea that tactics is an affair for the general only."[81]

In the early 1990s, the United States Department of Defense condensed the theory of center of gravity to a concise statement. According to this statement, the center of gravity is "the basis for devising both national military and theater strategies."[82] The understanding of center of gravity, however, can be confusing even to experienced military personnel. Different officers might look at the same situation and identify a different center of gravity. This can pose a serious problem, particularly if leaders identify conflicting centers of gravity. During World War II, the German Luftwaffe correctly identified the Royal Air Force [RAF] as the enemy center of gravity. A successful German invasion of Great Britain depended on German air superiority, which in turn required the destruction of the capability of the RAF. Adolf Hitler's decision to shift focus away from military targets and focus on civilian targets saved what little was left of the RAF, allowing that force to successfully fend off the Luftwaffe. The misidentification of the British center of gravity resulted in a stunning failure of the Luftwaffe to achieve air superiority, and the Germans discarded the planned invasion of Great Britain.

Dr. Eliot A. Cohen, director of the Gulf War Air Power Survey, observes that "Clausewitz argued that the essence of strategy lies in discerning the opponent's 'center of gravity.'" While not arguing with Clausewitz's premise, Cohen has questions. Can there be more than one center of gravity? What are the alternatives if the center of gravity is out of reach? Cohen observes, "During the planning of the coalition's campaign against Iraq in 1991, the term 'center of gravity' was used repeatedly, but it was not clear what it really was – the person of

[81] Chew, 19.
[82] Joint Publication (JP) 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, 11 November 1991, 65 JP 1, 10 January 1995, III 8-9 and IV-2.

Iraq's dictator, Saddam Hussein, his system command and control, the elite forces that were loyal to him (the Republican Guard), Iraqi military industry, or the forces occupying Kuwait that were the proximate cause of the war. The confusion over the center of gravity had real consequences for planning and for action, as American commanders struggled over the priority of various targets for air attack."[83]

Army doctrine defines terms. These definitions are designed as a framework that will provide all personnel involved with a common understanding. Such is the definition of center of gravity. It is impossible, however, for doctrine to identify the enemy's center of gravity as that will change with every conflict and sometimes even with the same conflict. While identification of the center of gravity can be confusing in a conventional conflict, it is even more so in a small war. A 2012 US Army War College publication identifies the challenge. "I led the staff through several planning exercises and developed Division level operation s orders that were intended to be training aids for Brigade Combat Teams which were preparing to deploy to the National Training Center. The staff included enemy and friendly centers of gravity in the written orders. The G3 and Division Commander were duly impressed. They were impressed when the staff identified the enemy and friendly centers of gravity in an operations order for a US-Russian tactical exercise. Trouble emerged in 1995 when the Commander asked his staff what the enemy and friendly centers of gravity were in the developing situation in Bosnia Herzegovina. This peace enforcement operation did not fit the mold of scenarios that had been discussed and debated in Fort Leavenworth or within the Commander's headquarters."[84]

[83] Eliot A. Cohen. Quoted in Richard H. Schultz and Andrea J. Dew, *Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 365.
[84] Celestino Perez, *Addressing the Fog of COG,* v.

If properly understood an applied, Army doctrine will help the commander to not only identify the enemy's center of gravity but also to develop alternate ways to attack it directly or indirectly. There is rarely only one possible path to success, but there is generally one avenue that provides the most likely scenario to accomplish the goal. The process also helps the command to identify the center of gravity of the friendly forces in order to properly defend it.

An observer can look back in history and identify a moment when victory started to tip inexorably into the camp of one side and away from the other. It can be difficult while in the midst of the conflict, but the benefit of hindsight makes it far easier to recognize a pivotal action. Such actions are not instant but are the result of careful preparation, disastrous error, or a combination of both.

A United States Marine Corps publication states, "The essence of operational design lies in the identification of what's going to be decisive in a joint campaign, and an understanding of what shaping operations are needed to achieve that decisive action." According to the Global Securities Organization, "Shaping operations create conditions for the success of the decisive operation. They include attacks in depth to secure advantages for the decisive operation and to protect the force. Commanders conduct shaping operations by engaging enemy forces simultaneously….These attacks deny the enemy freedom of action and disrupt or destroy the coherence and tempo of his operations. Attacking enemy formations in depth destroys, delays, disrupts, or diverts enemy combat power. They may expose or create vulnerabilities for exploitation."[85]

In 1906, British Colonel C.E. Callwell defined small wars as "all campaigns other than those where both the opposing sides consist of regular troops. It comprises the expeditions

[85] Global Securities Organization. "Offensive Operations." Accessed 8/5/2019.

against savages and semi-civilised [sic] races by disciplined soldiers, it comprises campaigns undertaken to suppress rebellions and guerrilla warfare in all parts of the world where organized armies are struggling against opponents who will not meet them in the open field…."[86] The reference to savages and semi-civilized races is illustrative of the Western colonial mindset of the period. "Civilized" countries fought wars in a "civilized" manner with organized and uniformed military forces representing recognized nation states. Small wars, according to Callwell, pit those "civilized" military forces against unconventional foe that takes advantage of guerrilla tactics – in short, savages. Although the United States Army had long been engaged in irregular warfare during the Indian Wars, as the country moved into war with Spain, military leaders operated on the assumption that the primary mode of operation would be conventional warfare. They were prepared for war against a "civilized" foe. Instead, the Army would be forced to adapt to an unforeseen small war. Conventional warfare, however, was the anomaly. From the time Europeans arrived in North America, they had to learn how to fight in an unconventional manner to achieve a successful outcome. The military commanders in the field incorporated the tactics of small wars into what they saw as a conventional conflict. They considered the irregular component as inconsistent with their primary mission. But relying on their experience during the Indian Wars, they were able to make the necessary adjustments in the Philippines without having to rely on formal written doctrine.

During the Philippine American War, American commanders determined that the resistance center of gravity was resistance leader Emilio Aguinaldo. From their preliminary assessment, they determined that he was the driving force behind the insurrection. The American commanders felt that without his presence the insurgency would quickly crumble. But at the

[86] C.E. Callwell. *Small Wars: Their Principles and Tactics* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, (1906) 11.

tactical level, commanders on the ground saw a different center of gravity. Just as the old Indian fighters knew, the center of gravity was the supply chain. Without ammunition, food, and clothing, the resistance would dwindle away. Disillusioned fighters would return home to care for their families. By correctly identifying the center of gravity, General Henry Ware Lawton helped to bring a successful end to the Philippine American War.

Throughout history there are numerous examples that illustrate the difficulty of identifying the center of gravity under the best of circumstances when facing a conventional enemy. Early in the American Civil War, for example, successive Union generals were fixated on capturing the Confederate capital of Richmond. As he marched through Georgia, General William Tecumseh Sherman realized that the center of gravity that he had to tip out of balance was the civilian population. In "making Georgia howl," Sherman destroyed everything from civilian homes to provisions to livestock and crops. Civilians were left destitute and Confederate soldiers were anxious to get home to protect their families. Sherman broke the will of the Southern civilians and, in doing so, shook the resolve of the enemy soldiers. He correctly identified the enemy center of gravity and was instrumental to the success of the Union in the American Civil War.

CHAPTER 3: IN THE SERVICE OF EMPIIRE

> He ordered Sieber and me to San Carlos to enlist Apache scouts to Mexico, for we had long before decided that only Apache scouts could ever be effective on a campaign in the Sierra Madres. We enlisted one hundred scouts of the San Carlos and White Mountain tribes for a six months' campaign in Mexico, and all to go on foot. Tom Horn[87]

Military historians Geraint Hughes and Christian Tripodi note that it has long been the practice of conquering armies to enlist the conquered. As examples, the authors cite the American war of Independence, the American Civil War, and the American Indian Wars. Their article refers to the Ottoman Janissaries in the Roman Legion and the British recruitment of the Gurkhas and Sikhs in India. Native recruitments come with certain disadvantages, including a potential lack of reliability and the presence of competing agendas. But they also bring familiarity with the language, terrain, environment, and culture. Their advantages outweigh the disadvantages, and it has been a standard approach throughout history for conquering armies to enlist native recruits.[88]

As the Age of Imperialism dawned in the Nineteenth Century, European nations began ranging across the globe collecting colonies. This was a massive and expensive undertaking. It was expensive financially and it was also expensive in manpower. The imperialist powers discovered the value of recruiting natives in the cause of colonialism. Natives came with knowledge of the culture and language of an area as well as familiarity with the terrain and environment. They were also less expensive to maintain than conventional armed forces. Native recruits became a bedrock of imperialism.

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[87] Tom Horn, *Life and Times of Tome Horn: Government Scout and Interpreter* (San Francisco: Albion Press, 2008), 33.
[88] Geraint Hughes and Christian Tripodi, "Anatomy of a Surrogate (*Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 20:1, 1-35,2009),2.

As economic historian Benedikt Stuchley observes, "The Treaty of Tordesillas put global power thinking into words that perceived of colonial possessions as a political, economic and cultural right, last not least even as an obligation to a civilizing mission…." The treaty, signed in 1494, divided land outside of Europe into spheres of influence between Spain and Portugal. The treaty was intended to ensure the peaceful and rational development of newly discovered lands while decreasing the potential for armed conflict between two powerful empires. Spain's sphere of influence was west of the 370th meridian. Portugal occupied lands to the east of that line. Ignoring the wishes of native populations, the treaty declared that any lands with a Christian king would not be colonized, but populations that were not Christian would be colonized by European powers. Since Christianity had not yet spread to the areas governed by the treaty, it left the indigenous population at the mercy of Spain and Portugal.[89]

The Europeans extended their domination over the globe. They disregarded the people who were already living in what, to Europeans, were "new" lands. The Treaty of Tordesillas jump-started the colonial movement which would spread to every continent. Imperialism reshaped the entire world, redrawing borders and redefining countries.

Beginning with the arrival of Columbus in the "New World" in 1942, Spaniards splashed ashore and claimed control over a vast territory that included the Caribbean Islands, much of South America, and Central America. In what is now the United States, the Spanish empire extended from Florida across the Southwest to the Pacific Coast. They did not do it alone. It is questionable if they could have been successful without the assistance of indigenous allies.

In June 1520, Hernando Cores made his first attempt to invade Mexico-Tenochtitlan, the island capital of the Aztec Empire. The effort was a disaster. The Spanish sustained heavy

[89] Benedikt Stuchley, "The Treaty of Tordesillas." National Geographic. Accessed 2/16/2019.

casualties as they fled the city after night. It was remembered as *noche triste* – "the sad night." The Spanish were in desperate need of allies. According to Fra Toribio de Benavente Motolina, The conquistadors say that the Tlaxcaltecs deserve that His Majesty grant them much favor, and that if it had not been for them, they [the Spaniards] would all have been dead, when the Mexica repulsed the Christians from Mexico, and that the Tlaxcaltecs offered them a haven."[90]

Cortes was not about to give up. He formulated an improved plan. The Spaniards would attack by boat as well as by marching across the causeways that connected Tenochtitlan to the mainland. The important element that promised success was the large number of indigenous fighters swelling the ranks of the Spanish. The natives were drawn from a broad region from tribes such as the Tlaxcaltecs who were rivals of the Mexica. These allies were crucial to Cortes' eventual victory. It was not the first time that an indigenous population would throw in their lot with an invading force, and it would not be the last.

The period from the Sixteenth to early Nineteenth Centuries has been called the Age of Old Imperialism. As European nations spread across the globe, they concentrated on increasing trade. They established settlements and training posts, gaining footholds in North and South America, Africa, and Asia. Their focus was on forming trade alliances with the indigenous people. They showed little inclination to exercise total dominion over the new locations.

The latter half of the Nineteenth Century saw a shift. Historians refer to that period as the Age of Imperialism. Major changes in Europe triggered the "scramble for colonies." The Industrial Revolution made material goods more readily available. The French Revolution led to recognition of the strength of the nation-state. The Napoleonic Wars brought a fuller

[90] Matthew Restall. *Seven Myths of the Spanish Conquest* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 44.

understanding of the military strength of European powers. These changes ushered in a period of intense national competition.

This new form of imperialism was a significant shift from the previous era that focused on trade. Not satisfied with mere footholds, European countries began to amass vast empires as they collected colonies. There was a new emphasis on spreading European culture, language, and religion. This inevitably brought European countries into struggles not only with each other but also with the native populations. The resulting conflict in turn required a military response to protect colonies from encroachment by rival European countries and also to maintain the subjugation of native populations. The colonial powers found unlikely allies. They relied on native support from the earliest days of their colonial adventures. When these native populations chose to form an alliance with an invading force they did so consciously and purposefully, determining that advantages outweighed any potential dangers.

In 1795 Sir Joseph Banks retained the services of Mungo Park to find the fabled city of Timbuctoo. For the sum of eleven pounds per month, Park embarked on a solo journey and is credited as being the first Westerner to reach the interior of the mysterious Dark Continent. On his two-year journey Park endured a four-month imprisonment at the hands of a Moorish chief and a seven-month recovery from a serious illness. By the time he returned to Scotland in 1797 he was assumed to be dead. The tales of his travels through Senegal and Mali and his discovery of the Niger River sparked interest in exploring Africa and inspired the others who followed him. Park returned to Africa in 1805. He did, indeed, reach Timbuktu and traveled much farther on the Niger. He wrote to the British Colonial Office, “If I could not succeed in the object of my journey, I would at least die on the Niger.” His letter was prophetic. During an attack by a native war party his canoe struck a rock. Park and all of his party except for one servant were drowned.

The lone survivor was able to return with news of the explorer's death.[91] The tales of his adventures created excitement and enthusiasm throughout Europe. An enormous continent was waiting to be explored. The Scramble for Africa had become.

While the early colonial movement was spurred by Europe, there were influential Americans who sought to enter the globalist movement. In his book *The Problem of Asia,* first published in 1900, American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan articulated the intriguing international possibilities for the United States. He wrote, "It is but one phase of a sentiment that has swept over the whole civilized European world within the last few decades, salient evidences of which are found in the advance of Russia in Asia, in the division of Africa, in the colonial ambitions of France and of Germany, in the naval growth of the latter, in the development of Japan, and in the British idea of Imperial Federation, now fast assuming concrete shape in practical combined action in south Africa." He went on to discuss the "impulse towards expansion" with the "intrinsic importance" of Cuba, the West Indies, and the Isthmus of Panama "to the political, commercial, and military interests of the United States." Mahan noted that until the war with Spain, America's expansionism was dominated by defensive needs. The Spanish American War and the Philippine American War that followed shifted the country's focus from national defense to wars of expansion.[92]

Between 1815 and 1814 Great Britain engaged in only one European conflict, the Crimean War against Russia. Great Britain's military activity during that period took place primarily outside of Europe. While France was somewhat more active militarily in Europe, a major portion of French military action took place in Africa. Sixty-seven of France's one

[91] Public Domain Review. "Mungo Park's Travels in the Interior of Africa." Accessed 7/24/2019.
[92] Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Problem of Asia and Its Effect on International Policies* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 2017), 5-7.

hundred infantry regiments served in Africa for an average of six years between 1830 and 1854.[93] European powers gained a vast amount of knowledge and expertise in serving outside of Europe and working in concert with indigenous recruits.

Rather than insisting on using European tactics on another continent, the French army adapted to their new environment. Far from resisting adaptation, the French took great pride in their ability to adapt to the need for new tactics. In his paper on French colonial warfare, military historian Douglas Porch writes that almost as soon as they arrived in North Africa in 1830, "many soldiers of the armee d'Afrique began to exhibit the desire to 'go native' that was to characterize the French approach to colonial conquest." The British Army abroad maintained the European model. British colonial regiments reflected the European style. French soldiers were more likely to adopt the practical clothing of the natives. They also adapted native tactics and saw that as an element of their success. Rather than trying to force conflict in Africa into a European mold, the French were willing to learn from their indigenous recruits. They took advantage of tactics that had proven successful over time in the unfamiliar environment.

The colonial period is sometimes considered as being devoid of justice and morality on the part of colonizers and devoid of agency and choice on the part of the colonized. The reality, however, is far more complex. The colonizers brought with them advancements such as improved health care and new farming methods that would prove beneficial to the native population. The colonized often viewed the newcomers as welcome allies in the struggle for survival, as illustrated by the Tlaxcaltec alliance with the Spanish invaders. Far from being a simple system of the colonizer gaining the unwilling acquiescence of the colonized through

[93] Douglas Porch. "Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare." *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age.* Peter Paret, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 376.

force, it sometimes developed into a symbiotic relationship with each deriving benefit from the other.

Motivations for joining the invading force vary as widely as the individuals involved. They might be attracted by an impressive uniform and the stature that would come with wearing it. They might hope to escape a life of boredom and drudgery in exchange for the adventure of military life. There was the promise of a regular paycheck that could lift the recruit and his family out of poverty. There was the potential of receiving prestigious awards such as the Order of British India that were specifically available to indigenous personnel. The inducements were wide ranging.

It is a serious mistake to lump all indigenous recruits together, assuming that they all fought under duress and against their will. Historian Rob Johnson identified two types of motivations. “Push” factors tend to be negative in nature. They work by pushing the potential recruit away from one course of action and towards another. These would include poverty, starvation, and threats against the recruit and his/her family. “Push” factors put pressure on the native recruit to serve the invading force. The motivation is the desire to avoid negative consequences.

The concept of “push” factors is not merely a historical curiosity. Push factors are a dynamic that must be considered in the modern era. A 1969 report by the Central Intelligence Agency describes push factors that were evident in Vietnam. In December, 1967, the Viet Cong cadres moved into rural districts and instructed people to be prepared to support the Viet Cong forces that would be arriving in the coming months. They were told to save their rice for the liberation forces. They were also told they would have to carry food and supplies and to act as guides.

According to the report, the people were afraid of the Viet Cong and did not trust them. They tried to leave their villages but were caught and brought back. The CIA observed, "The villagers were not allowed to leave the village with their families for fear they would not return. The only way a man could leave the village was alone [sic] his family had to stay behind, in bond so to speak. The people in Buon Co Hamlet could not go to the GVN (South Vietnamese) authorities at will and draw their attention to Viet Cong activities in the area for fear that if the Viet Cong found out about it their families in the hamlet would suffer reprisals."[94]

More recently, in the early stages of Iraqi Freedom, American forces enlisted the support of a local businessman who owned a transportation company. As the working relationship solidified, the businessman and his employees furnished intelligence as well as transportation. The arrangement worked well as long as the original American unit was in place. When a new unit took over, the relationship began to deteriorate. Insurgents took advantage of the change in the relationship. They murdered the businessman. In doing so they sent a clear message to other local vendors that it was dangerous to work with the Americans. An Army publication notes that American forces "must remember the grave risks people take by accepting these jobs. Insurgents are exceptionally adept at finding ways to attack logistics. When insurgents attack people branded as traitors, there is an added terror or political message benefit."[95] A push factor is always negative in nature, pushing an individual away from one action and towards another. It can come from either side in the conflict. It puts a tremendous amount of pressure on a potential recruit and can add terror and a clear message.

"Pull" factors are positive in nature and serve as an attraction. "Pull" factors promise some type of reward such as monetary remuneration, supplies, better living conditions, or taking

[94] Central Intelligence Agency. "Vietnam: Situation Report." 9 September 1969.
[95] United States Army. *Counterinsurgency*. Location 5447.

revenge against a traditional enemy. In some instances, native recruits were allowed to avoid paying taxes. Military enlistment held out the possibility of excitement, allowing a recruit to trade a life of boredom for one of adventure. Natives who were already in the service of the empire might influence others to join. Community leaders often saw an advantage in having their young men join the force and encouraged their sons to enlist.[96]

Modern medicine is an example of a pull factor that attracted indigenous support. The British Army routinely included a medical officer on staff. The medical support staff assisted the medical officer in providing medical care not only for recruits but for their families as well. These services "became the nucleus of an indigenous cadre of medical personnel and encouraged the subsequent development of large civil medical services.[97] They offered a badly needed service to the native population and encouraged local civilians to support the invading force.

Johnson asserts that patriotism was rarely a motivation. "Instead, with a tradition of having served whoever was in power, regardless of their background, race or religion, the colonial soldiers were mercenaries…." While the push and pull factors could change over time as circumstances changed, evidence shows that the mercenaries generally remained faithful to their commitment. "There was a contract, often vague and unspecified, that held the men in bond. So long as the authorities did not break their side of the bargain, men in the ranks would generally remain true to their salt."[98]

Rather than simply being coerced into service, natives often saw substantial benefits in throwing in their lot with the invading force. Those perceived benefits were a strong inducement for recruitment. These pull factors were an attraction that offered advantages to the indigenous

[96] Rob Johnson, 20
[97] Rob Johnson, 69.
[98] Rob Johnson, 68.

recruits. This illustrates how indigenous recruits exercised agency and made conscious decisions about the best course of action. The situation was complex, and it is crucial to consider individual reasons for joining the invaders.

Some British authorities understood the value of rule by attraction rather than rule by force. According to Lord Comer, it was true that the British Empire depended on a military force. But if the sword had to be drawn "to overcome a general upheaval of subject races goaded to action either by deliberate oppression, which is highly improbable, or by unintentional misgovernment, which is far more conceivable, the sword will assuredly be powerless to defend us for long."[99] He understood that enticing support and offering benefits to natives would be far more effective than demanding obedience.

There were limits to the value of forcing acquiescence. Colonial forces relied on the assistance of indigenous recruits. It was simply too costly both financially and in manpower to impose rule solely with the regular military. This reliance on native recruits came with some misgivings. There was always the possibility that native forces would prove less than reliable. An Afghan army defeated a British force at Maiwand in 1880. When the outnumbered British force chose to defend an ill-advised location, the native recruits broke and ran. That proved to be the key factor in the outcome of the battle.[100] Local troops functioned under the command of regular officers, but this was not a foolproof solution. Indigenous recruits were sometimes reluctant to go into battle against their fellow natives or were not trained well enough to stand up to enemy fire.

The invading armies faced another challenge that required recruiting locals. European armies came with long baggage trains of horse drawn vehicles and heavy horse drawn artillery.

[99] Rob Johnson, 73
[100] Rob Johnson, 147

While in Europe they could be confident of traveling on roads or by rivers, the environment of Asia and Africa presented a daunting challenge. They had to haul their baggage train through dense forests, over mountains, and across rivers, often while guarding against hostile tribes and predatory animals. The assistance of locals was crucial, both for guidance in the unfamiliar environment and for manpower to serve as porters transporting supplies. This situation also meant that armies could not count on quick movement and surprise attacks. It was an easy matter for the opposing force to determine where the invading army was located, in what direction it was moving, and how large it was.

Colonial powers viewed certain groups as "martial races." British officials in India designated each Indian caste as "martial" or "non-martial." Some were considered marital because they were physically fit and had a reputation for bravery. Others were placed into the non-martial category due to their sedentary lifestyle and a reputation for passivity.

Carl von Clausewitz expressed his opinion about martial races as primitive and not intelligent. "In any primitive, warlike race, the warrior spirit is far more common than among civilized peoples. It is possessed by almost every warrior: but in civilized societies only necessity will stimulate it in the people as a whole, since they lack the natural disposition for it. On the other hand, we will never find a savage who is a truly great commander, and very rarely one who would be considered a military genius, since this requires a degree of intellectual powers beyond anything that a primitive people can develop. Civilized societies, too, can obviously possess a warlike character to greater or lesser degree, and the more they develop it, the greater will be the number of men with the military spirit in their armies. Possession of military genius coincides with the higher degrees of civilization: the most highly developed societies produce the most brilliant soldiers, as the Romans and the French have showed us. With them, as with every

people renowned in war, the greatest names do not appear before a high level of civilization has been reached.[101]

This concept was not entirely a British construct. One of the four Hindu social orders is Kshatriya," meaning "warriors." But the British embraced the theory and recruited natives accordingly. Martial races included Gurkhas, Sikhs, Zulus, and Maoris. It is notable that many of the "martial races" were successful in defeating British forces before being recruited into their ranks. The British still recruit the Gurkhas today. Professor Amardeep Singh observes, "It seems hard to escape the conclusion that the 'marital race' is a convenient term created by the British to continue military recruiting patterns favorable to the progress of imperial expansionism."[102]

Race played a major role in the interactions between the colonizers and the colonized. Major Frederick Burnham said of Cecil Rhodes, "He did not believe in lordship over subject races, but admitted that backward races should be guarded, conserved, developed…He did believe that the civilization of the English-speaking world was to become the pivotal point around which all peaceful nations might safely rally."[103]

Europeans routinely used demeaning and derogatory terms in reference to the "lesser races," in spite of the fact that these very races could be of great benefit to European military forces. In Mungo Park's book about his early African exploration, he said he endured "the attacks of wild beasts and savage natives." Burnham said of the Mashonas, "They are a cowardly, cringing thankless lot of dirty beasts, to say the least; lacking even that one redeeming quality possessed by many savage races – courage." The soldiers in the American West used the same language in reference to the Indians. General O.O Howard called them "a foe as brave,

[101] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War,* 72.
[16]Amardeep Singh. "The Myth of Martial Races. Lehigh University. Accessed 5.20.2020.
[103] Major Frederick Russell Burnham. Scouting on Two Continents (Caracara Press, Kindle Edition), Location 1554-5.

resourceful, and relentless as any savage race of which we have knowledge" and routinely referred to them as "savages" throughout his book.[104] Racial terms that are considered offensive today were commonly and routinely used to describe what Europeans saw as "lesser" races. Europeans were the epitome of the human race. Anyone less advanced was inferior.

One of the problems facing historians is a lack of written documentation on the part of the indigenous populations. This results in an imbalance of evidence. Europeans left reams of documentation behind: military records, diaries, letters, official government documents, photographs, and newspaper articles are all available to the modern researcher. But these tell only part of the story. These accounts were often skewed in favor of the colonizer over the colonized and were not unbiased renditions of the events. Any display of bravery and heroism on the part of native recruits was often overshadowed by the actions of the regular troops, particularly the officers.

On the other hand, indigenous people generally did not leave a great deal of written documentation. Their stories were handed down in the form of oral histories and pictographs. These have repeatedly been shown to be reasonably accurate renderings of historical events. They routinely match up with archaeology and historical research. Nevertheless, until fairly recently they have been discounted by historians who favor the familiar written formats of Western documents. It demands patience and perseverance to tease out the motivations of people who left little behind in the way of written documentation.

Oral history is not a precise term. While oral history today encompasses informal conversations among family members who reminisce about the "good old days," at one time it

[104]Mungo Park. *Life and Travels of Mungo Park in Central Africa.* 305. Major Frederick Russell Burnham. *Scouting on Two Continents*. 305. Major Frederick Russell Burnham. *Scouting on Two Continents.* 2338-2339. O.O. Howard. *My Life and Experiences Among Our Hostile Indians.* 50.

referred to formal and well-rehearsed verbal renditions of past events. According to Paul Thompson in *Voices of the Past*, oral history was "the first kind of history." When Greek historian Thucydides wrote a history of the Peloponnesian Wars in the Fifth Century BCE, he chronicled nearly thirty years of conflict between Athens and Sparta. He relied on eyewitness reports and oral histories, giving them the same consideration that modern historians give to actual physical documentation. He interviewed eyewitnesses "whose reports I have checked with as much thoroughness as possible." Likewise, the Venerable Bede, in his *History of the English Church and People* written in 731 CE, thanked "countless faithful witnesses who either know or remember the facts."[105] Oral history gradually fell out of favor with a heightened reliance on physical documents that were considered to be more academic and reliable. In the 1960s and 1970s historians began to realize that there was a treasure trove of unexamined oral histories, and it opened a new avenue of research.,

Many cultures handed down the history of their people in an oral fashion. These histories were not spontaneous performances embellished at will by the storyteller. They were carefully memorized, rehearsed, and repeated word for word as they were presented in a formal fashion to an attentive audience. In Norway, Scotland, Ireland, Wales, and Iceland bards repeated these histories and taught them to their apprentices, the next generation of bards who would keep the history alive. An apprentice was not raised to the level of full bard until he was able to accurately repeat the honored oral histories. The bardic arts were a demanding but honorable craft. Bards were held in high esteem. It was considered an honor to host a bard in one's home.[106]

The Norse bard was held in such high esteem that the learned skald [bard] Bargi [pronounced BRAG-ee] was installed in Valhalla, the hall of the chief god Odin, to remind the

[105] Oral History Association. "Oral History: Defined." Accessed 3/29/2019.
[106] Kitiara Newman. Interview with author. 3/29/2019.

gods of Norse history. Old Norse poems often feature him regaling those who dwell in Valhalla. His name became synonymous with "poet."[107]

Eventually many of these histories were written down and saved for future generations. *Heimskringla* [*History of Norse Kings*] is a Norse saga which was put into a written form after first being passed down in an oral tradition. It covers the history of Norway from legendary beginnings to the year 1177. The written version is attributed to the authorship of Icelandic poet Snorri Sturluson, who lived in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. He relied heavily on oral traditions as the source of his written work "through a chain of oral informants whose memory may well have reached back over three generations."[108]

The National Eisteddfod of Wales, a national gathering of modern-day bards, dates back to 1176. Lord Rhys invited poets and musicians from across Wales to a gathering at Castle Cardigan. Eisteddfod means "a sitting" [*eistedd:* to sit]. At the first event the Lord awarded a chair from his table to the best bard. Even today a chair is awarded as the prize in the "Crowning of the Bard."[109]

These examples demonstrate how some cultures elevated oral history to a fine and highly respected art. Far from brushing off oral histories as mere stories or fantasy, the people viewed the bard as an important and accurate link to the past.

Native American cultures offer much in the way of oral histories. There was a complex purpose behind the Native American oral tradition. Stories entertained the audience, related tribal histories, and preserved the language and culture. "Each time a story was told, it breathed life into the culture, cultivated their verbal language, gave meaning to the tribe's history, and also

[107] Norse Mythology. "Bragi." Accessed 4/5/2019.
[108] Alison Finlay and Anthony Faulkes, translators. *Snorri Sturluson: Heimskringla*.
[109] Historic UK. "The Eisteddfod of Wales." Accessed 4/5/2019.

taught life lessons about things like love, leadership, and honor, as well as their symbiotic connection to the earthy and intimate relationships with the animals they depended on."[110] Many of the stories were eventually written down.

This oral tradition among what Europeans considered "lesser races" did not square with the value that Europeans placed on written documentation. They discounted oral traditions and did not consider them a reliable source of information. Even today the oral tradition can be a source of conflict between cultures.

Native American lawyer Rachel Awan describes the challenges of incorporating the oral traditions into a culture that discounts such testimony. "One such bias concerns the use of oral traditional evidence as testimony at trial. Because Native American groups were largely non-literate prior to European contact, Native Americans often use oral traditional evidence as testimony if the matter requires evidence extending centuries into the past. Unfortunately, the law regarding Native Americans' use of oral traditional evidence as testimony has been particularly problematic because the existing jurisprudence has created uncertainty and inconsistency. This generates negative consequences because without the use of oral traditional evidence, Native American groups may lack the means to contend with opposing parties."[111]

Just as the courts can look with skepticism on the oral tradition, it can be all too easy for historians to discount the rich history found there. Nevertheless, America's Indian Wars represent one of the better documented conflicts from the indigenous perspective. Indians have left behind documentation about their interactions with the United States Army both as foes and as allies. One way they passed down their history is by the oral tradition. In 1912 nine Seventh

[110] Prairie Edge and Sioux Trading Post. "Native American Stories: A Tradition of Storytelling." Accessed 4/5/2019.
[111] Rachel Awan. "Native American Oral Traditional Evidence in American Courts: Reliable Evidence or Useless Myth?" Penn State Review. 2014. Vol 118:3. 697.

Cavalry Arikara scouts and children of scouts gathered at the Fort Berthold Reservation in North Dakota. They told their stories to Judge Beade. Beade said it was important to collect the stories "to make public the real story of the Arikara Indian scouts who served with Terry and under the immediate command of Custer."[112] These narratives offer insight into the motives of natives who allied with the invading force.

Sitting Bear agreed to pass on the story of scouting with Custer as he had heard it from his father. There had been a long conflict between the Arikara and the Dakota. In 1874 Son-of-the-Star, Sitting Bear's father, went to Washington with other Arikara and Mandan leaders. He reminded the Indian commissioner that the Arikara had been true to their word, keeping the peace and protecting white settlers. Now he wanted help against the Dakota who were raiding Arikara villages and stealing their ponies. The commissioner responded that the United States Army would soon set out on an expedition against Sitting Bull and asked the Arikara to provide scouts. He said that if any scouts were killed, the government would provide for their families. If a scout was wounded, he would receive a settlement. If any ponies were killed, the government would compensate the owners.

The commissioner then sealed the deal. He presented each Indian with a brand-new Winchester rifle. He told them, "Any time I issue goods to you, I will also send you guns. I will try and make you happy. I will provide you with cattle." Two years later the commissioner asked Son-of-the-Star to make good on his promise of providing scouts for the Army. The Arikara leader called a council meeting and announced to those attending, "Those here tonight volunteered to go, though some of them were very young. This is what we consider an agreement between the United States Government and ourselves." Son-of-the-Star understood that

[112] A. Beade. *The Arikara Narrative.* Location 73.

providing scouts for the Army could potentially bring the Arikara's longstanding feud with the Dakota to a satisfactory end. This is an example of a pull factor that provided a tangible benefit in exchange for service.

An Arikara named Soldier had a different incentive to scout for Custer, but it was also in the category of a pull factor. Each scout received sixteen dollars per month and twelve dollars extra for bringing his own horse. Soldier remembered that what first made him happy "was the sight of the green paper money in my hands." Money was also an incentive for others. When his father joined as a scout, Young Hawk decided to enlist as well and earn money of his own. The scouts could earn additional money by hunting game and selling it to both soldiers and civilians. Strikes Two remembered that he had earned $200 by selling game. Soldier, Goose, and Red Heart agreed that they had also earned extra money by hunting.[113]

The pictograph is another valuable tool for decoding the past. According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, pictographs "are usually considered to be a forerunner of true writing and are characterized by stereotyped execution and by omission of all details not necessary for the expression of the communication."[114] A pictograph is no less reliable because it is in a pictorial rather than verbal format.

A pictograph of the 1864 Battle of Killdeer Mountain in what is now North Dakota demonstrates the role of Indians as both enemies and allies. General Alfred Sully was determined to punish those responsible for the 1862 US-Dakota War and put a permanent end to the Dakota threat. In 1863 and again in 1864 Sully led expeditions into Dakota Territory. The United States' version of events can be found in letters, military reports, Congressional hearings, and newspaper articles. The Dakota left behind a record in the form of a detailed pictograph.

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[113] *The Arikara Narrative.* Locations 432, 448.
[114] Encyclopedia Britannica. "Pictography." Accessed 4/2/2019.

According to Great Plains historian Tom Isern, the pictograph is a valuable and accurate rendering of the battle. It illustrates the role of the Winnebagos as Army allies against the Sioux, a rival tribe. One portion of the pictograph illustrates a Winnebago scout cutting off the head of a dead Dakota warrior and holding it up in triumph. There was clearly no love lost between the two tribes.

Isern explains that the Winnebago allied with the Army because of a longstanding feud with the Dakota, just as the Arikara would serve with Custer a decade later. The Winnebago viewed an alliance with the Army as an alliance of convenience. They were not strong enough on their own to push the Dakota out of their traditional territory. It was obvious that the powerful United States Army would be much more likely to accomplish that goal. The Winnebago considered the situation carefully and came to the conclusion that it was in the best interests of the tribe to serve with the Army. The Army promised to be a lesser threat than the Dakota. Of course, the Winnebago hoped that once they assisted the Army and the Dakota were no longer a threat, they would be left alone to live their lives. They understood that might not be the case, as Americans seemed to have a voracious appetite for Indian land. But in the careful determination of Winnebago leaders, the alliance offered the more pragmatic choice with at least the possibility of relief from the Dakota threat.[115]

There is also a pictograph that tells the story of Little Bighorn from the Indian perspective. In 1881 Lakota warrior Red Horse created a detailed pictograph of the entire event from his memories of the battle. In addition to a detailed map of the battleground, Red Horse shows how the battle progressed. He shows the wounded and dead of both sides and the large numbers of dead horses. He shows Dakota warriors decapitating dead soldiers. Many of the

[115] Tom Isern. Interview with author. 3/26/2019.

soldiers have been stripped of their uniforms. Red Horse shows Indians armed with bows and arrows, spears, and rifles and carrying shields. Some of them are leading captured cavalry horses which are saddled and thus distinguished from Indian ponies. The figures in the Red Horse pictograph are individualized.[116] The pictograph is as accurate an account of Little Bighorn as any written official or personal document created by those associated with the United States Army.

Archaeology has demonstrated that this account by Red Horse and the tales of Arikara and Crow scouts are reliable versions of the battle. A prairie fire raced across the battlefield site in 1983. At first historians were dismayed. Then they realized they had been granted a rare opportunity. They were able to do a full archaeological survey without disturbing the environment. What they found was eye-opening. New information surfaced in the form of spent cartridges, arrowheads, discarded weapons, personal items, and human remains.

The 7th Cavalry faced perhaps as many as 4,000 enemy warriors. Custer's Indian scouts knew there were too many and the cavalry would be overwhelmed. Crow scout White Man Runs Him said, "We could see the smoke of their campfires as they cooked breakfast. We scouts thought there were too many for Custer to fight."[117]

The Sioux were armed with traditional bows and arrows and carried shields. However, there is evidence to show that they were, indeed, armed with Winchester repeating rifles. This bears out Son of the Star's account of being gifted with Winchester rifles by the Indian commissioner. It also gives credence to Red Horse's pictograph. These historical renditions must be seriously considered, even though presented in a less familiar form, in order to create a more

[116] Smithsonian Institution. "Red Horse Pictograph of Little Bighorn."
[117] Friends of Little Big Horn. "Archaeology." Accessed 2/18/2020.

accurate picture of past events. This is one example of a native account that has, until recently, been overlooked in the historical record.

As illustrated by the oral histories and pictographs, intertribal relations were complex. Indians did not belong to one homogenous group. Historian Thomas W. Dunlay refuses to lump all natives into the same category, recognizing that they made individual choices. He calls Indian recruits "renegades, patriots, and pragmatists." Dunlay highlights the complex relationships Indians had not only with the Army, but with each other.

Bad Soup, one of Sitting Bull's warriors, was derisive towards Indians who allied with the army. "They [the Army] arm the crows and Cheyennes, the Bannocks and Assiniboines, to murder our young men. Are the Americans afraid to fight themselves, that they hide in a cloud of Indian renegades?"[118] But those who allied with the invading force did so for personal and carefully considered reasons as demonstrated in the oral histories handed down from that time.

While Americans viewed Indians as one uniform group, the Indians did not see it that way. The relationships between tribes were as complex as the relationships between Western nations. Indians viewed tribes as separate and distinct groups, just as Europeans would see Germans, French, British, and Americans as members of different "tribes." Intertribal conflicts were nothing new. Just as with whites, alliances were made and broken. It was a situation that would be familiar to "civilized" nations that routinely made and broke treaties. Longstanding conflicts and feuds between tribes prompted some Indians to see Americans as useful allies against a common enemy.

Americans became familiar with indigenous fighters as supplements to conventional forces before the United States was a country through the experiences of the British and the

[118] Thomas W. Dunlay. Wolves for Blue Soldiers: Indian Scouts and Auxiliaries with the United States Army 1860-*90* (University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln: 1982). 109.

French. The French were quicker to adapt to new conditions by incorporating their First Nations allies into their military. The British were slower to learn that lesson. Both the British and the French brought native tribes under their influence. The French relied on the Abenaki, Mi'kmaq, Huron, Mississauga, Ojibwa, Winnebago, and Potawatomi. The British formed alliances with the Iroquois, Six Nations, and Cherokee. The rivalries between these tribes ran deep and didn't necessarily disappear as the British and French exited from America.

The French and British each approached their alliances differently. The French mixed freely with the indigenous inhabitants of the New World while the British never saw indigenous inhabitants as equals. French customs blended with those of the First Nations. French words found their way into Indian languages and vice versa. Intermarriage was common and not at all disreputable as it was to the British. The French viewed their First Nation allies as equal in many respects and found them to be a valuable addition to the Troup de Marine regulars. At the Battle of Monongahela French officer Daniel Lienard de Beaujeu went into battle bare-chested and wearing war paint. None of the French participants in the battle remarked on this as being anything unusual or scandalous.

British General Edward Braddock, however, had eschewed the assistance of indigenous allies. Braddock led a force of 2,000 regulars backed up by companies of militia. Braddock failed to consider the First Nations allies of the French and was confident he had numerical superiority. He was at a disadvantage and didn't know it.

In the initial engagement, Beaujeu was killed and the Canadian militia routed. The 600 First Nations fighters dispersed into the woods where they fought a rearguard action in their traditional manner, firing from behind trees. They held the British until French reinforcements arrived. For a time, Braddock was able to rally his troops but when he was killed the British

force fell apart. The First Nations fighters killed any stragglers they found. This defeat caused the British to rethink their tactics. They began to use light infantry that could fight on the same terms as the First Nations. But they never did embrace indigenous allies as fully as the French did.[119]

Frank Burnham was well qualified to speak to the necessity of having qualified scouts. He scouted for the United States Army in the Indian Wars before serving with the British in Africa. Lieutenant General Sir Robert Baden-Powell said of Burnham, "Having seen service against the Red Indians he brings quite a new experience to bear on the Scouting work here [in Africa]."[120] When venturing into unknown territory, the guidance of a reliable indigenous scout was invaluable. Among other advantages, these scouts could teach the invading force a thing or two about how to be successful in a foreign environment. According to Burnham, Europeans had a great deal to learn from natives. "What the white scout has to learn from the Indian is the power to endure loneliness, as well as stoical indifference to physical pain. The Boers of the high veldt, the Tauregs and Bedouins of the desert, and the Apaches, have this power in a superlative degree. Negroes and most savages, as well as many of the white races, are town dwellers by nature and have not the inner strength to meet this test of solitude."[121]

Working with indigenous scouts was not a guarantee of success. It was a complicated relationship. In 1863 and 1864 General Henry Sibley led punitive expeditions to punish the Sioux following the US-Dakota War. Sibley's force numbered slightly over 2,500 while the Sioux mustered about 1,600 warriors. Sibley was assisted by Dakota scouts. These were men who had been captured following the US-Dakota War and were being held at Fort Snelling in

[119] Rob Johnson, 42-44.
[120] Burnham, 49.
[121] Burnham, 45.

Minnesota. They had their own motives for assisting Sibley. They may have hoped to escape and rejoin their families. They may have hoped for a monetary reward. Or they may have had a somewhat more nefarious motive.

After a skirmish at Big Mound in what is now North Dakota, the Sioux fought a rearguard action as their families escaped across the Missouri River and into the Badlands. Sully followed. His scouts guided him to Dead Buffalo Lake, a place they identified as an excellent place to camp. The scouts suggested putting the horses and mules on a small peninsula that jutted out into the lake. There was ample grazing and access to water, and they would be safe from any attempt by the Sioux to run them off. What they didn't tell Sibley was that Clearwater Lake was only a few miles further down the trail. Dead Buffalo Lake had earned its name. The water was alkali. Horses and men would quickly become debilitated if they drank it.

In examining this event, an intriguing possibility comes to light. Dead Buffalo Lake was named that for a reason. It was a warning that the water was not good. That would have been known to Indians and fur traders who frequented the area. But Sibley did not understand that significance. The Dakota scouts may have purposely brought Sibley to that location hoping to slow down his pursuit of the Indians. This possibility gives more depth to the possible motives of Indians for working with a force they considered their enemy.[122]

General O.O. Howard dealt with a similar challenge during the Nez Perce War (1877). During that conflict he hired Bannock scouts. "At the foot of the mountains near Mary Lake forty horses belonging to citizens' teams, which were doing the transportation work for us, were turned out to graze. During the night these horses disappeared. The rough and indiscreet language of the Bannock scouts aroused my suspicion that a party of them had taken the horses. I

[122] Tom Isern. Interview with author. 4/10/2019.

arrested ten and held them as prisoners. Their leader, Raine, a half-breed, was surly and disrespectful. I had them all disarmed, their horses and rifles taken from them, and sent them as prisoners to the guard tent."[123]

While soldiers were often in a position in which they felt compelled to rely on their Indian scouts, there were very few who earned their full trust. Howard includes a chapter on "Guarding Against Indian Treachery." Howard often uses the term "treachery" to refer to what he sees as Indians not adhering to rules of war recognized by whites but not Indians. "I have seen several instances of treachery of Indian to Indian, and of Indians to white men, like that shown by the Modocs about the time General Canby was killed, but these instances, those referred to included, always occurred in what the Indians considered a state of war. According to our ideas of peace and war, the Indians would be condemned; we often thought that certain Indians were at peace when they were actually preparing for a hostile foray, or were in the frenzy of a warlike outbreak."[124] But he was aware he had to remain vigilant even with Indians who professed to be allies. They came with their own agendas that didn't necessarily match the plans of the Army.

In the early days of westward expansion, Indians sometimes resisted the incursion of white newcomers. At other times they found a relationship with the mountain men and fur traders to be advantageous. As the Army moved in force onto the Great Plains, the tribes there had to carefully consider their options. Was it wise to resist the Army? Was it more useful to form an alliance? While the Army was better equipped and armed, soldiers were not familiar with the environment. Their horses were heavier and slower than the Indian ponies. The Army was weighed down with heavy artillery and long baggage trains of supply wagons.

[123] O.O. Howard, *My Life Among the Hostile Indians*, Location 3563-5165
[124] Howard, 3563-4, 5165.

In spite of the apparent advantages that the Indians seemed to hold, they sometimes considered it more pragmatic to ally with the powerful new force against traditional enemies. If a tribe considered the traditional enemy as the greater threat, alliance with the Army was a logical choice. The Sioux in particular represented a significant threat to several Plains tribes. Those tribes that felt threatened found an alliance with the Americans to be both convenient and practical.

The United Army learned irregular warfare from experience in the Indian wars. When the conflicted in the Philippines evolved into a small war, the Army was surprisingly prepared. Major Allen Marple notes that "By 1898 when American military power was projected across the world into the Philippine Islands, the precedent had already been set within the U.S. Army experience to augment the use of military scouts with indigenous civilians."[125] When General Henry Ware Lawton's chief of scouts was killed in combat and his scouts were mustered out, he was in desperate need of intelligence. Lieutenant Matthew Batson proposed recruiting and training a cadre of indigenous scouts from the Macabebe tribe. The Macabebes had a longstanding feud with the Tagalogs, the dominant force on Luzon behind resistance to the American occupation. Based on his experience with the Apache scouts, Lawton knew this could be the answer to his problem. The Macabebes proved to be even more effective scouts than the Americans. They brought with them all the advantages of indigenous scouts: knowledge of the terrain, language, and culture. They were ultimately instrumental in the capture of resistance leader Emilio Aguinaldo and the resulting collapse of the resistance.

The United States Army continues to learn from past experience. In the 1960s the government of the Republic of Viet Nam agreed to let the U.S. Special Forces start training the

[125] Allen Marple. *The Use of Indigenous Soldiers During the Philippine Insurrection, 1899* (US Army and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth KS: 1983) Kindle Edition Page 1.

Montagnard tribal militias as support personnel. “Was the SF [Special Forces] soldiers found in the mountains of Vietnam was a group of people unparalleled in fierce fighting skills, personal courage, and loyalty to allies.” Estimates put the number of Montagnard recruits at about 40,000. One American Marine who worked with them called them “the bravest, most loyal, and fiercest fighters I have ever seen.”[126]

The Department of Defense concedes that alliances and partnerships continue to be crucial to America’s defense. This includes forming relationships with indigenous groups. The Department of Defense states that it is important to “uphold a foundation of mutual respect, responsibility, priorities, and accountability. Our alliances and coalitions are built on free will and shared responsibilities.” The department also intends to “Expand regional consultative mechanisms and collaborative planning,” including developing partnerships with indigenous populations with an eye to strengthening shared interests.[127] This is a policy that builds on the indigenous recruits who have served with the military forces of the United States throughout the country’s history.

[126] Defense Media Network. “Montagnards of Vietnam’s Central Highlands.” Accessed 2/19/2019.
[127] Department of Defense. *Summary of the National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington DC, 2018), 9.

CHAPTER 4: A SPLENDID LITTLE WAR

> It has been a splendid little war, begun with the highest motives, carried on with magnificent intelligence and spirit, favored by that Fortune which loves the brave. Ambassador John Hay[128]

The United States did not march boldly into the Philippine American War as much as it slid into the war accidentally. When the Senate passed the Declaration of War against Spain in April, 1898, it included the Teller Amendment. The amendment stated, "that the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island [Cuba] except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, that when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people."[129] The intent of the Amendment was to preclude any possibility that the United States would acquire Cuba as a colony. At that time, war in the Philippines was not a consideration. There was no reason to assume that the intent would not extend to the archipelago. But as imperialist voices became more strident, there was equally no reason to assume that the meaning included the Philippines.

In the late nineteenth century, there was a desire among influential Americans for the country to venture out on the global stage and take an equal place among the world's great powers. When Samuel Dole led the forces that deposed Queen Liliuokalani in 1893, he set in motion America's international aspirations. The United States had conquered a continent. Now American eyes turned outward.

As the nineteenth century drew to a close and memories of Civil War animosity faded, the United States experienced an outburst of patriotic fervor. In 1887, Union veterans of the

[128] Joseph Smith. "The 'Splendid Little War' of 1898: A Reappraisal." *History*, V. 80, No. 258 (February 1985), 22. Although the quote is widely attributed to Theodore Roosevelt, Ambassador John Hay wrote the statement in a letter to Roosevelt.
[129] HJ Res. 233, Teller Amendment, 16 April 1898.

Grand Army of the Republic made plans to invite veterans of the Army of Northern Virginia to the twenty-fifth anniversary reunion at Gettysburg. The following year, veterans of both armies came together on the battlefield, with former enemies famously shaking hands across the stone wall at the "high water mark of the Confederacy" in a public show of reconciliation and reunification. The stated aim of the gathering was that reconciliation between enemies "might on that occasion record in friendship and fraternity the sentiments of good-will, loyalty, and patriotism which now unite all in sincere devotion to the country."[130] Veterans of both sides pledged their loyalty to one Constitution and one flag.

Beyond the introduction of the Pledge of Allegiance (1892) and "America the Beautiful" (1895) as well as the increasing popularity and sentimentality of Memorial Day, the most spectacular self-congratulatory display of American exceptionalism took place in Chicago in 1893. The fabled White City of the Columbian Exposition proudly displayed American ingenuity and inventiveness. The fair featured electric lights powered by a giant dynamo. Crowds marveled at the toilets and typewriters on display. The Hunter's Cabin displayed muskets, a covered wagon, and other artifacts of a bygone era that stood in stark contrast to modern wonders like the refrigerator. But perhaps most telling of all was an exhibit in the Anthropological Building. An Apache Indian, related (it was said) to Geronimo, was living proof of America's success in civilizing a savage race. The Apache on display was pursuing an education at Harvard and had traveled to Europe.[131] It was a bold statement: it was impossible to forestall the inexorable march of American progress. "Inferior races" would either be brought into the fold of the civilized

[130] Karlton Smith, "The Grand Reunion of 1888." *The Blog of Gettysburg National Military Park*. Accessed 5 September 2017.
[131] Evan Thomas, *The War Lovers: Roosevelt, Lodge, Hearts, and the Rush to Empire, 1898* (New York: Little, Brown, and Company, 2010), 52.

world though the benevolent influence of the United States or they would simply disappear. American vanity knew no bounds.

There were those who, in pursuit of Manifest Destiny, turned towards the world beyond the boundaries of the United States. The temptations were many. Cuba had just burst into the consciousness of Americans. Pineapple and sugar barons set their sights on the islands of Hawaii. It was not much of a stretch to lust after the Philippines. This mindset brought the United States into direct conflict with indigenous people who held very different ideas about their future.

Counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen explains that the "accidental guerilla" takes up arms because "we are in his space, not because *he* wishes to invade ours."[132] In the late nineteenth century, European countries scrambled to claim colonies throughout Africa and Asia. Rubber, gold, diamonds, and other natural resources were ripe for the taking. The lure was too much to resist. Africa was divided into areas with names such as French West Africa, German East Africa, and the Belgian Congo, with no regards for the wishes of those who lived there. The British faced off against Zulus in South Africa. The French extended their adventures into Asia. Europeans became mired in conflict with poorly armed but resolute "accidental guerillas" who mounted a determined resistance and fiercely resented foreign intrusion.

The collision between technologically advanced European nation-states and traditional cultures that did not rely on technology was no accident. Europeans were voracious in their quest for colonies, and this inevitably resulted in conflict with traditional cultures that were no match for European technology, but whose warriors were every bit as determined as the European

[132] David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), xiv. Emphasis is the author's.

soldier. It was predictable that this conflict would evolve into irregular warfare. The results, however, could be devastating for both sides.

While the traditional cultures saw themselves as victims of foreigners who invaded territory and imposed alien ideas and customs, Europeans saw it quite differently. They viewed themselves as generously bestowing the benefits of modern society on "savages" and "inferior races" who were unable to properly govern themselves. Rudyard Kipling verbalized the European point of view in his poem "The White Man's Burden." While the poem is applicable to imperialist adventures around the world, Kipling wrote it specifically about the American intervention in the Philippines. The full title of the poem, first published in February 1899, is "White Man's Burden: The United States and the Philippine Islands." Kipling urged the United States to accept the responsibilities of a global power. He acknowledged that the burden he referred to was a heavy one, requiring America to "bind your sons to exile." But in his eyes civilized nations couldn't turn their backs on the poor savages of the world.

The White Man's Burden

Rudyard Kipling

Take up the White Man's Burden,
Send forth the best ye breed--
Go bind your sons to exile
To serve your captives' need;
To wait in heavy harness,
On fluttered folk and wild--
Your new-caught, sullen peoples,
Half-devil and half-child.[133]

Not all Americans were persuaded. Senator Benjamin Tillman interpreted the poem as a warning. He acknowledged the duty but also the danger inherent in global adventures. In a speech to the Senate he noted, "As though coming at the most opportune time possible, you

[133] Fordham University, "Modern History Sourcebook." Accessed 7 August 2017.

might say just before the treaty reached the Senate, or about the time it was sent to us, there appeared in one of our magazines a poem by Rudyard Kipling, the greatest poet of England at this time. This poem, unique, and in some places too deep for me, is a prophecy. I do not imagine that in the history of human events any poet has ever felt inspired so clearly to portray our danger and our duty. It is called "The White Man's Burden." With the permission of Senators I will read a stanza, and I beg Senators to listen to it, for it is well worth their attention. This man has lived in the Indies. In fact, he is a citizen of the world, and has been all over it, and knows whereof he speaks." After quoting several stanzas of the poem Tillman observed, "Those [Filipino] peoples are not suited to our institutions. They are not ready for liberty as we understand it. They do not want it. Why are we bent on forcing upon them a civilization not suited to them and which only means in their view degradation and a loss of self-respect, which is worse than the loss of life itself?"[134] But the Senators were not persuaded. They embraced a Manifest Destiny that spilled over beyond the bounds of the continental United States.

An attitude of superiority was common in western armies. In his 1906 book *Small Wars*, British Lieutenant Colonel C.E. Callwell repeatedly refers to "barbarous races," "nomad Red Indians," and "savages." This mindset was not confined to Europe. Americans were not immune to an attitude of cultural superiority, and that included both officers and enlisted men of the United States Army. General O.O. Howard titled his autobiography *My Life and Experience Among the Hostile Indians.* He writes of confronting "a foe as brave, resourceful, and relentless as any savage race of which we have knowledge." He refers to "recurring outbreaks of cruel and stealthy Indians" and calls them "savage" and "bloodthirsty."[135]

[134] National Humanities Center, "Senator Benjamin Tillman." Accessed 14 May, 2019.
[135] Callwell, 37. Howard, Position 50-58.

Howard's attitude is typical of American Army officers who had experience in the Indian Wars. General Elwell Otis wrote "The Indian Question" in 1878. One of the chapters is titled "Can the Indian Be Civilized?" Otis wondered, "Has the American Indian the capacity and inclination to adopt the customs, and receive the faith of the white man?"[136] He thought it was inevitable that Indians would have to adopt the ways of the white man or vanish from the earth. It was the only future he could imagine for an "inferior race."

There is an ongoing debate about America's motivation for venturing to the Philippines. There were many elements including economic and cultural. The provocation of the Yellow Press cannot be overlooked. There was also a concern that other colonial powers would move in to fill the vacuum left when Spain departed. Both Germany and Japan had navies in the immediate area, and it would not have been difficult for either one to claim the Philippines if the United States vacated the islands after pushing Spain out. In addition, the United States recognized the need for coaling stations for both naval vessels and commercial ships. The Philippines would be very convenient for that purpose.

At 9:40 p.m. on February 15, 1898 the battleship *USS Maine* exploded and sank in Havana harbor. 268 sailors were killed. On March 28, the United States Navy Court of Inquiry determined that the explosion was caused by a submerged mine. While modern research suggests that the explosion was actually an accident involving a spontaneous combustion fire in the coal bunker, Spain was immediately identified as the culprit. It was called a despicable act perpetrated by cowards. If the Americans had previously wondered if a war with Spain was necessary, they wondered no more.

[136] Otis, Elwell. *The Indian Question* (New York, Sheldon and Company, 1978), 251.

The United States was stunned and shocked by the attack. The *Paducah Daily Sun* reported that people were suspicious that facts were being withheld. Under the headline "Catastrophe a Mystery," the *Santa Fe New Mexican* announced, "Disaster to Battleship *Maine* Causes Great Excitement Through the Country – Many Conflicting Reports Received." The *Daily Morning Astorian* of Astoria, Oregon warned that "War may ensue. Events go to show that the terrible disaster was the work of demons." The newspaper went on to quote J.E. Montgomery, a former Confederate naval officer, as declaring the sinking of the *Maine* and the resulting casualties "to be the result of treachery and an act of treachery without parallel in the world's history." In Montgomery's opinion, war was the only recourse.[137]

On June 3, 1898 *The Herald* of Los Angeles printed a poem by H. W. Phillips titled *The Rough Riding Brigade.* The poet states that he does not know what the fighting is about, but it doesn't matter. He is ready and willing to follow Teddy Roosevelt regardless of the reasoning behind the war.

> Now, I don't know what the row's all about,
> But my trail lies before me plain;
> For Teddy you said that the thing to do
> Is to wallop the hide off Spain.
> So here we go off again fresh, my lad,
> And the Greaser will damn soon see
> That I'm with you, Teddy Roosevelt!
> Old "Laughing Horse" for me![138]

The majority of Americans were in agreement with the poet in that no one seemed to know exactly what the war was about, but they were willing to fight anyway. President McKinley himself never committed his motivations to paper, nor did he confide in his closest

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[137] "Terrible Fate of the Battleship Maine." *Paducah Daily Sun*. 16 February 1898. 1. "Catastrophe to Battleship Maine." *Santa Fe New Mexican*. 17 February 1898. 1 "Thinks War Will Follow." *The Daily Morning Astoria*. 17 February 1898. 1.

[138] H.W.Phillips. "The Rough Riding Brigade." *The Herald.* Los Angeles. 3 June 1898. 8. Dakota cowboys had given Roosevelt the nickname of "Laughing Horse." "The Greaser" refers to the Spanish.

aides and advisors. It is difficult to determine with certainty just what prompted him to disregard George Washington's caveat against foreign entanglements as he led the country into a global conflict, committing the resources of the United States to a remote venture on the other side of the world. Historian Brian Linn explains, "Efforts to prove that the president was guided by an imperial master plan have lacked the documentation sufficient to raise them above speculation."[139] But whatever the reason, Americans soon found themselves becoming familiar with names like Havana, Santiago, Manila, and Luzon. Maps of Cuba and the Philippines flew off store shelves as Americans were determined to learn about strange places with strange names where family, friends, and neighbors would be fighting.

Linn also conjectures that America's involvement in the Philippines may have been entirely accidental. According to this argument, neither McKinley nor his advisors sought a colonial empire. Instead, they saw the Philippines as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Spain to secure trade interests in Asia. But a colonial empire is an expensive undertaking, and it was costing Spain a great deal of money to maintain it. The Spanish government was unexpectedly amenable to quitting the islands, turning them over to the United States in exchange for twenty million dollars and a few shots fired to save face. Once America was involved in the Philippines, there was no going back. "As the consequences of their [the Army's] actions unfolded, they expanded their horizons from Manila to Luzon, and then the entire archipelago, but each time they were following less a premeditated course than seeking to deal with an immediate crisis. Each decision, in turn, committed them further."[140] Any attempt to disengage only resulted in a deeper involvement.

[139] Brian Linn. *The Philippine War, 1899-1890* (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2000), 3.
[140] Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899-1890*, 5.

On the positive side, the Spanish-American War played an unexpected role in the reconciliation of the North and South following the American Civil War. It was a source of pride that Northerners and Southerners alike answered their country's call, flocking to enlist. Veterans of both sides dressed in their Civil War uniforms to see off the next generation of troops. McKinley even appointed former Confederates as officers to battle the Spanish. The last Civil War veteran to serve in the White House, he saw the conflict as an opportunity to put the old hostilities to rest. McKinley warmly greeted Joseph Wheeler, who had served as a cavalry general in the Confederate States Army. Wheeler served at such notable battles as Chickamauga and Chattanooga. In 1898, Wheeler volunteered for the Spanish-American War. McKinley gratefully accepted his offer, telling him, "There must be a high-ranking officer from the South. There must be a symbol that the old days are gone. You are needed."[141] The President appointed Wheeler to the rank of major general. Wheeler assumed command of the cavalry division that included Teddy Roosevelt's Rough Riders. Following his service in Cuba, Wheeler arrived in the Philippines where he took command of the First Brigade of General Arthur MacArthur's First Division.

The conflict with Spain in the Philippines was a long time coming and grew out of the war with Spain over Cuba. That war in turn grew out of a sense of imperialism and entitlement that blossomed in the United States just prior to the turn of the Twentieth Century. There were Americans who looked longingly and jealously at the "scramble for colonies" in which European countries were engaged. The United States feared being left behind. It seemed as if European countries were scooping up everything that was left to be claimed. Expansionists like Teddy Roosevelt, William Randolph Hearst, and Henry Cabot Lodge looked for possibilities for the

[141] Emilio Aguinaldo. *America's Road to Empire: The War with Spain and Overseas Expansion* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), 69.

United States. A war with Spain presented an attractive opportunity, and the result seemed preordained. Little did the imperialists know that besides entering the global race to stake out colonies, America would face accidental guerillas who were determined to resist a new imperial power. They did not fight to free themselves from Spain only to submit to a new colonial master.

The Secretary of the Navy cabled Admiral George Dewey on 24 April 1898: "Dewey, Hongkong, China. War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to the Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy them." On April 30 Dewey led the American fleet into Manila Harbor. His six ships were superior to the Spanish fleet anchored in Manila Bay. The Americans quickly sank three Spanish ships including the flagship *Christina Reina.* The Spanish scuttled six more. Spanish casualties were 371, including 161 killed in action. The Americans suffered casualties of 9 wounded and the loss of no ships.[142]

One historian described the encounter as "a military execution rather than a real contest." Historian Agustin Gonzalez disputes the view commonly held by many historians that the Spanish fleet was far outclassed by the Americans. Most people, he writes, believe that "*La batalla que enfrento el 1 de Mayo de 1898 a las flotas estadounidense y espanola en la bahia de Manila estaba ya decidida de antemano. La vision mas divulgada cree que los barcos espanoles eran anticuados navios de madera, cuyos canones apenas alcanzaban a los, por otra parti, casi invulnerables acorazados americanos.*" ["The battle between the American and Spanish fleets in Manila Bay was already decided in advance. The most widely held view is that the Spanish ships were old-fashioned wooden boats whose cannon barely reached them [the enemy], while

[142] Karl Irving Faust. *Campaigning in the Philippines* (San Francisco: The Hicks-Judd Company. Kindle Edition.) Position 153. Brian Linn, 8.

on the other hand the American ships were nearly invulnerable."][143] Gonzalez rightfully points out that this is a simplistic view. In truth, only one of the Spanish ships was wooden and the American fleet was not invulnerable. But the fact that the Spanish were badly outmatched and outgunned cannot be ignored.

Notwithstanding the overwhelming advantage of their navy, Americans viewed the battle as a great victory over a formidable European colonial power. They were ecstatic at the news of a victory that squarely placed the United States on equal footing with European powers. They hailed Dewey as a great hero. Newspapers in every state splashed the news across their front pages in the most bombastic of terms. The *Dakota Farmers' Leader* of Canton, South Dakota ran a portrait of Admiral Dewey on the front page with the headline, "Admiral Dewey, the Hero of Manila." The *San Francisco Call* promised readers "Many Complications Will Be Avoided by the Taking of the Capital City of the Philippines by American Forces." The *Semi-Weekly Messenger* of Wilmington, North Carolina crowed "First Naval Battle: Spain Suffers Crushing Defeat from our Asiatic Fleet."[144]

Americans were delirious over Dewey's victory in the Philippines and his total annihilation of the Spanish fleet. In their eyes, America had claimed a rightful place among the global forces of the world. Americans very quickly tried to put the conflict into context. Henry Watterson published his history of the war in 1898 when the war with Spain was barely over and the war with the Filipinos had barely begun. The *Saline Republican* of Marshall, Missouri asserted the work "is the only authentic history of the Spanish American War that has come to

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[143] Michael Walzer. *Just and Unjust War,* (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 251. Agustin R. Rodriguez Gonzalez. "El Combate de Cavite: Un Hito Decisivo en la Perdida de Filipinas en 1898." ("The Combat of Cavite: A Decisive Landmark in the Loss of the Philippines in 1898") *Revista de Indias,* 1998, Vol.53, 213.

[144] "Admiral Dewy, the Hero of Manila." *Dakota Farmer's Leade*r, 13 May 1898. 1."Dewey and Merritt Force the Unconditional Surrender of Manila." *San Francisco Call*, 16 August 1898. 1. "First Naval Battle: Spain Suffers Crushing Defeat from our Asiatic Fleet." *Semi-Weekly Messenger*. 3 May 1898. 1.

our attention."[145] Watterson explained in his book, "The popular movement in favor of seizing the Philippines, which immediately followed the fall of Cavite, was the natural impulse of a people full of exultation and pride over the completeness, without precedent in naval wars, of the victory that Dewey had achieved with a skill and intrepidity that conferred splendor upon American arms."[146]

But there was a major problem with Dewey's victory: no one knew what to do next. Following his triumph, Dewey could have turned his fleet around and sailed back to the United States. But that would not have played well with an American public ecstatic over the country's first successful foray into global imperialism, and it would have left the door open for other global powers to take control of the islands. Dewey realized that maintaining a presence in the Philippines required ground troops. He cabled Washington with a request for soldiers. This set events in motion that inexorably led to the Philippine-American War.

Filipinos had assumed that the United States had come to their country to remove the Spanish oppressors and bestow freedom on the inhabitants of the islands. It doesn't seem to have occurred to anyone that the Filipinos might take offense when they achieved independence from Spain only to find themselves under the control of a new colonial power. It was the general consensus that "The Filipinos were mostly in primal savagery...they could not be expected to emerge from that condition under the sinister rule of Spain, and the United States had a similarly savage population when the country was first settled, and results had justified the methods of civilization."[147]

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[145] "History of the Spanish American War. *Saline Republican*. 23 December 1898. 1.
[146] Henry Watterson. *History of the Spanish-American War: Embracing a Complete Review of Our Relations with Spain,* (Chicago: A.B. Kuhlman, 1898), 277.
[147] Watterson,278.

The United States was in no way prepared for the country's first foreign war. The Army maintained a strength of 28,000 regular soldiers. They were spread out across the country, many of them in isolated frontier posts. Soldiers were generally organized into companies, and rarely had an opportunity to function at a regimental level. Soldiers posted in the West were trained to fight Indians. But the Spanish did not fight like Indians. They engaged in conventional warfare. This would require abandoning the unconventional tactics that were effective against Indians and returning to the conventional tactics of the Civil War, with two armies representing nation-states facing off across the field of battle.

In addition, the Army had sent the bulk of military resources to Cuba and Puerto Rico, not anticipating the need for soldiers to be sent to the Philippines. According to General Elwell S. Otis, "Suddenly called to meet an expected emergency in a far distant portion of the world, no preparations had been made to receive them [soldiers in San Francisco]. …The volunteer organizations were supposed to report equipped and uniformed, but a large majority of the arms they presented were worthless, and in some instances entire organizations had to be rearmed. Their clothing had evidently been in use for a long time in State service, was worn out, and many of the men were dressed as civilians." Otis called this state of affairs an embarrassment but noted that the troops were "equipped and made ready for the field" in short order. Much of what was needed was purchased from San Francisco merchants.[148] The Army was off to a less than auspicious start for its first venture onto the global stage.

The Army relied on citizen soldiers to volunteer in case of a conflict, filling out the ranks to the necessary level. But there was no coherent mobilization plan. McKinley called for 60,000 volunteers. This would suit the War Department which advocated for a slow, careful, and

[148] Elwell S. Otis. *Report of Major-general E.S. Otis on Military Operations And Civil Affairs In The Philippine Islands, 1899* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899), 2.

deliberate mobilization of the new troops. The Army did not have enough equipment for an overwhelming and sudden influx of volunteers. But there was an unexpected problem: too many volunteers. State National Guard units clamored for a chance to win glory and renown. Some units said that if any one of their state units was not included in the call-up, none would go. On April 23, McKinley called for an additional 65,000 men so all the eager new recruits could be accommodated.[149]

A ready supply of soldiers with basic military skills was to be found in the National Guard. These men had more knowledge of formal drills and maneuvers than the soldiers serving on the frontier, and they were adequate marksmen. But at the time, it was considered unconstitutional for the Guard to serve outside the bounds of the United States. The War Department proposed an expedient. States would call out their Guards and ask the members of each unit to resign. They could then enlist in the volunteer unit for their state.[150] The response was heartening. Most Guard members responded as the War Department had hoped and enlisted enthusiastically.

The formation of the First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry is an example of how a state volunteer unit came into being. The regiment was mustered in between May 13 and 16, 1898 and consisted of 27 officers and 658 enlisted men.[151] There were National Guard companies attached to several cities throughout the state: Company A was from Bismarck, Company B was from Fargo, and so on until there were nine companies. Officers called their companies together and asked if they were willing to resign from the Guard and enlist in the First North Dakota. An article in the *Fargo Forum and Daily Republican* proudly reported that the men of Company B

[149] John K. Mahon, *History of the Militia and the National Guard* (New York: Macmillan, 1982), 108-24.
[150] Linn. *The Philippine War, 1899-1902*, 11.
[151] North Dakota Department of Veterans Affairs. "Conflict: Philippine Insurrection." Accessed 22 August 2017.

chose to stand together. The article reported that "Captain Keye…. asked all who were willing to volunteer their services….to step two paces to the front. Every man of the fifty-four stepped up at once."[152] Company B was typical. The results were the same across the state. Virtually all the members of the North Dakota National Guard resigned so they could enlist in the First North Dakota.

The Guard members from Fargo formed the heart of Company B of the First North Dakota Volunteer Infantry, but there were not enough Guardsmen to form a complete company. Company B was filled out with willing volunteers. Twenty-three cadets from the recently formed North Dakota Agricultural College (now North Dakota State University) played a major role in Company B. Every one of them set aside their studies and enlisted. With a college enrollment of less than two hundred, the departure of so many students at the same time was a blow to the school. Every student knew a cadet who had chosen to go off to war. The school newspaper *The Spectrum* reported that the departing students took with them "the vitality of the whole college. The war has killed athletics, crippled society work and caused the students to lose all interest in their regular work." It was assumed at the time that the Spanish would be defeated quickly and "the boys" would be on their way home before anyone knew they were gone. No one could have imagined that North Dakota troops would be gone for eighteen long months. They would form the heart of Young's Scouts, and eleven of them would be awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for their valor.

Once in the Philippines, the Army found itself in a different world. This study is primarily concerned with Luzon, the largest and northernmost island, the location of Manila, the capitol of the Philippines. The Americans quickly discovered that the inhabitants of the

[152] "Co. B Stand Together." *Fargo Forum and Daily Republican.* 22 April 1898, 1.

Philippines are not one homogenous people. In addition to being a mixed people descended from Papuan, Arabian, Malay, Chinese, Japanese, and European ancestors, there were indigenous tribes that predated explorers. According to the 1903 census, 8.5% of the overall population was categorized as "uncivilized." These tribes inhabited the mountainous regions of Luzon and the islands of Panay and Negros. Author John Foreman, who spent a great deal of time in the Philippines at the turn of the Twentieth Century, describes the "wild races" of the Philippines as "indolent to the greatest degree." He portrays them as "a spiritless and cowardly race. They would not deliberately face white men in anything like equal numbers with warlike intentions, although they would perhaps spend a quiverful [sic] of arrows from behind a tree at a retreating foe. They offer little encouragement to those who would desire to train them…. Even when more or less domesticated, the Negrito cannot be trusted to do anything which requires an effort of judgement."[153]

This diversity in the population led to another obstacle facing the American soldiers: language. Tagalog was proclaimed the official language of the Philippines in 1897 by the Biakna-Bato Constitution, the first Constitution of the Philippines. Tagalog probably evolved from the language spoken by the first Indonesians to arrive in the islands about 1500 BCE. But Tagalog was not the only language spoken when the Americans arrived. *Barangays* (villages) were often isolated from each other, divided by the string of islands on which they were located and separated by distance and the difficulty of travel. There was not one unifying government to impose order. Thus, it was common for the *barangays* to speak different dialects of the same

[153] John Foreman. *The Philippine Islands: A Political Geographical, Ethnographical, Social and Commercial History of the Philippine Archipelago, Embracing the Whole Period of Spanish Rule* (Kindle Edition), 2846-2847, 2852-2853.

language as well as entirely different languages. The languages of the Philippines were heavily influenced by Chinese and Japanese.

When Spain claimed the Philippines in the 16th Century, priests and friars were encouraged to communicate with the indigenous people in their own languages. As a result, they were not united by one common language. By the time the Crown decreed that the official language was Spanish (or Castilian, as it was then called), the priests and friars were already fluent in the local languages and continued to act as a buffer between the Crown representatives and the locals. When the Americans came to the Philippines, they realized that it was imperative to have one official language in which to conduct business. But it was a slow process, and one that primarily affected official government activities. The soldiers in the field still had to cope with a myriad of local languages and dialects spoken by people who resisted giving up their own languages and cultures.[154]

The geography of the Philippines proved to be yet another challenge. Foreman goes on to describe the Philippines at that time:

> "The Philippine Islands, with the Sulu Protectorate, extend a little over 16 degrees of latitude—from 4° 45′ to 21° N., and longitude from 116° 40′ to 126° 30′ E.—and number some 600 islands, many of which are mere islets jutting out of the sea. The 11 islands of primary geographical importance are Luzon, Mindanao, Sámar, Panay, Negros, Palaúan (Piragua), Mindoro, Leyte, Cebú, Masbate, and Bojol. The climate is tropical, with hot and humid weather common throughout most of the year. Rainfall averages about 200 inches per year. The rainy season runs from June to September, and typhoons are not uncommon. A northeastern monsoon brings cooler and dryer weather from October to February. From March to May, the weather is particularly hot and humid. The highlands are considerably cooler than the lower elevations."[155]

The terrain was far different from anything the American soldiers had encountered, many of whom came from the Great Plains. While the Philippine islands consist of some coastal

[154] J. Nicole Stevens. "The History of the Philippine Language." Accessed 31 October, 2017.
[155] Foreman, Position 588-591.

plains, most of the land is mountainous and heavily forested. The capitol of Manila, located on the largest island of Luzon, was developed and had some paved roads. In the countryside, however, roads were narrow and unpaved if there were any roads at all. Some areas lacked even the most rudimentary of trails.[156] The Army faced daunting challenges. Conventional warfare would be nearly impossible, and it would be very difficult for the Army to transport men, artillery, equipment, and supplies overland.

Rivers and small streams crisscross Luzon. Some rivers, like the Pasig and the Rio Grande de la Pampanga, are navigable by sea-going vessels for a short distance. Others are considerably smaller and are considered unnavigable by any vessels larger than native canoes. All of these rivers and streams are unpredictable. They overflow their banks annually. At times of high water, it is impossible for the *barangayanes* [small native boats] to negotiate the waterways. Floods destroy bridges and wash out roads, complicating already limited transportation routes. The Rio Grande floods leave behind silt deposits which make the Cagayan Valley a rich growing district. At other times of the year the water falls to low levels making navigation equally difficult, although at these times rivers and streams are easier to ford.

Towns and villages are numerous but are widely separated and many are almost entirely isolated. Some are connected by dirt roads, but others are accessible only by narrow tracks through thick forests. While much of Luzon is covered by dense forest, Europeans decimated the forests around Manila when they used the trees for building.[157]

The Philippines are volcanic in origin. Most of the active volcanoes are on Luzon, the largest island. A chain of four volcanoes runs across the northern part of the island. Pinatubo, located about 200 miles northwest of Manila, is the largest volcano on Luzon. Pinatubo is

[156] World Weather and Climate. "The Philippines." Accessed 20 August 2017.
[157] Foreman. 641.

currently the best-known Philippine volcano due to eruptions in 1991 and 1992 that led to the evacuation of United States' Clark Air Force Base. The most dangerous volcano on Luzon is Taal, located in the southern part of the island. Taal accounts for the majority of volcanic fatalities with six eruptions since 1572. Prior to the arrival of American troops, Taal erupted in 1874, 1875, and 1885. American troops did not have to cope with a volcanic eruption during their time in the Philippines. But the presence of the volcanoes and the past volcanic activity meant the terrain was mountainous and difficult to negotiate. The guerillas took advantage of the mountainous terrain to take refuge from the Americans. General Frederick Funston led a daring and determined mission into the mountains to finally capture Emilio Aguinaldo, the head of the resistance. Funston credited the native Macabebe Scouts for the success of the mission. The Macabebes were completely familiar with the terrain which was valuable to Funston in his pursuit of Aguinaldo.

The environment was a major factor in the Philippines and should not be underestimated as an influence on the prosecution of the war. Professor of geography Harald A. Winters describes the environment as "hot, wet, and sick." He adds that "Forces fighting in the humid tropics must deal with oppressive temperature, overabundant moisture, and a myriad of related diseases. Sapped by the heat and constantly threatened by body-attacking organisms, the soldier soon finds that coping with the elements is every bit as challenging as meeting the opponent in the field."[158] Common diseases include typhoid, cholera, and malaria. Common pests include rats, fire ants, scorpions, and poisonous snakes. These could be every bit as dangerous to the soldier as the enemy. Fighting in such an environment poses unique challenges to a military force.

[158] Harold A. Winters. *Battling the Elements: Weather and Terrain in the Conduct of War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 232.

The Philippines are located in a monsoon region, resulting in alternating wet and dry seasons. The Philippines are the target of a regular cycle of typhoon activity. It is not unusual for the islands to be hit by ten to twenty cyclonic storms every year. Typhoons and the floods that accompany them are responsible for more damage in the Philippines than any other type of natural phenomena. While earthquakes and volcanic eruptions are intermittent and unpredictable, typhoon season occurs annually. It runs from June through November. The island of Luzon in the north is the area most affected. Most of the American actions during the Philippine-American War took place on Luzon.

Accurate records regarding Philippine typhoons are lacking in that they cover a relatively short period of time. However, there are records of a major typhoon in 1882 and another in 1897. The devastation caused by the 1897 typhoon was widespread, ranging from Luzon in the north to Leyte and Samar in the south. Entire towns were wiped off the map. Father Jose Algue of the Observatorio de Manila wrote about the devastation. Algue described the "*montaña o masa de agua*" (the mountain or mass of water). He reported that the typhoon inundated Samar and Leyte, with the monstrous wave "*causando la ruina y desolacion de sus polaciones*" (causing the ruin and destruction of the population).[159] The *Barrier Miner,* a newspaper from Broken Hill, New South Wales, reported that an estimated 7,000 people were killed in the Philippines. Numerous ships, including two Australian freighters, were wrecked and the crews were lost.[160] Fishing boats were lost, and acres of coconut palms were wiped out. Communities that depended on the sale of coconut oil were devastated. A coconut palm needs four to five years to become productive. The islands were still recovering when the Americans arrived.

[159] Algue, Father José, S.J. "El Baguio de Samar y Leyte, 12-13 de octubre de 1897." Manila: Observatorio de Manila, 1903.
[160] "Typhoon and Tidal Wave in the Philippines." *Barrier Miner*. January 1898, 1.

In his work on typhoons in the Philippines, James Francis Warren states that the environment is only one element of an environmental disaster. Other key factors either exacerbate or mitigate the effects of the environment.[161] In this sense, the Philippine-American War was an exacerbating factor, a key element in the deterioration of the quality of life in the Philippines. The inhabitants of the island were still recovering from the most recent typhoon when they found themselves having to cope with the outbreak of violence brought on by the Philippine-American War. As both sides destroyed resources to keep them from benefitting the enemy, the local inhabitants were left to suffer.

As a rule, the environment favors the defenders in a guerilla war. This is illustrated by the experience of the United States in Vietnam. Afghanistan, known as "the graveyard of empires," posed a similar problem for numerous invading forces including the British and the Russians. In both of these examples the insurgent force was familiar with the terrain and was also part of a cohesive population speaking the same language and having the same culture. The invading force was unable to entirely cut the insurgents off from receiving resources from foreign supporters.

But while the environment posed significant challenges to the American force in the Philippines, it also offered unique advantages. The island configuration of the Philippines presented a serious difficulty for the resistance. The United States Navy controlled the seas. It was virtually impossible for Aguinaldo to receive foreign aid. It was also impossible for Aguinaldo to consolidate his forces among the different tribes spread out across the islands. Rather than being a single cohesive force with a single agenda, the population of the Philippines was fragmented with longstanding tribal, language, religious and economic divisions. Geography

[161] James Francis Warren. "Typhoons and the Inequalities of Philippine Society and History." *Asian and Pacific Studies.* Vol. 64, 3-4, September-December 2016. 412.

professor William N. Holden notes that an insurgency is a spatial process, dependent on the surroundings in ways that differ from a conventional war.[162]

The seeds of the Philippine-American War were sown during the Filipino conflict with Spain. After Spain lost most of its empire, there was increased economic pressure to make the remaining holdings – primarily Cuba and the Philippines – more profitable. There was a shift to large scale commercial agriculture at the expense of the traditional patron/worker relationship. The result was a disaster. Many agricultural workers were forced into what was essentially indentured servitude. Others were pushed off their land entirely. Those who found themselves displaced often became *ladrones* (robbers) or joined militant groups. The economic turmoil was compounded by a series of natural disasters including typhoons and cycles of flood and drought. These were accompanied by malaria, smallpox, typhoid, and cholera. The Philippines were plunged into a downward spiral.

In the early 1890s, author Jose Rizal wrote extensively about the abuses inherent under imperialism. He was especially critical of the Catholic Church and its economic hold on the Philippines. His classic novel *Noli me Tangere* [Touch Me Not] condemned the Catholic Church for its support of Spanish colonial rule of the Philippines. Rizal did not advocate for revolution and he did not speak for the common man. Instead, he sought reforms that would address the grievances of the educated class, the *illustrados.* He campaigned for the inclusion of Filipino representatives in the Spanish Cortes. But even modest reforms were too much for the Spanish who, among other factors, had no desire for a confrontation with the Church. Even though Rizal

[162] William N. Holden. "The Role of Geography in Counterinsurgency Warfare: The Philippine American War, 1899-1902. GeoJournal. 2019.

was a champion of nonviolence and not an advocate of revolution, he was arrested by the Spanish, convicted of sedition, and executed on December 30, 1896.[163]

While Rizal expressed grievances, he did not advocate overthrow of the Spanish government. He had no desire to foment a revolution. Rizal championed the *illustrados,* the upper class educated Filipinos. Nevertheless, Spain viewed any dissent as an inherent threat. As a result, the Spanish found themselves in an almost impossible position. Spain had no desire to institute reforms that would antagonize the Catholic Church. At the same time, its ability to deal with the growing unrest was hampered by a small military force that was already overextended by efforts to pacify the Moros in southern Philippines. Added to this mix of social and economic turmoil, the *Katipunan* came to the attention of Spanish authorities in 1896. The *Kataataasan Kagalang-galang na Katipunan nang mga Anak ng Bayan* [Highest and Most Venerated Association of the Children of the Nation] was a nationalist organization that advocated the overthrow of the Spanish government. This is exactly what Spain most feared: where Rizal had advocated modest reforms favoring the *illustrados*, the *Katipuneros* sought complete independence.

Spain began arresting those identified as being even loosely connected to the organization. Andres Bonifacio, leader of the *Katipunan,* called for open warfare. The *Katipuneros* were quick to respond and gained control of the Tagalog region near Manila. But the *Katipunan* was plagued by personal conflicts. It was reported that knives and guns were routinely drawn at council meetings. On 22 March 1897, the Cavite province faction pushed out Bonifacio and installed Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy as head of the resistance. Aguinaldo's

[163] Library of Congress. "The World of 1898: The Spanish-American War." Accessed 30 September 2017.

supporters arrested, tried, convicted, and executed Bonifacio. The way was clear for Aguinaldo. There was no one who dared to oppose him.

The interpersonal squabbling, however, resulted in a serious setback. Filipino volunteers assisted the Spanish forces to break the *Katipunan* hold on Cavite. Many *Katipuneros* simply gave up the fight and returned to their homes and occupations. Others scattered into the hills. Aguinaldo established his headquarters at Biak na Bato, far into the mountains of Bulacan Province.

The *Katipunan* resistance evolved into a full-blown revolution. While the Spanish had intended to impress on the Filipinos that there was no future in resistance, they taught a far different lesson instead: that there was no future in nonviolence. Aguinaldo was not the voice of the people. He spoke for the elites. But many Filipinos believed there was little choice. On 1 November 1897, the revolutionary council approved the constitution of the Biak-na-Bato Republic. Aguinaldo named himself *el presidente.*

But Aguinaldo's revolution would be dogged by its greatest weakness: it was not a social revolution. Aguinaldo and his followers were determined to secure power for themselves. They made no pretense of sharing that power with the populace. This resulted in weak support by the people. The people supported the revolution when it suited their interests, but they were just as easily persuaded to work with first the Spanish and then the Americans. An insurgency requires the support of the local population. According to T.E. Lawrence, who led a guerilla war in the Middle East, insurgents "must have a friendly population, not actively friendly, but sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel movements to the enemy." Lawrence argued that such a struggle could be successful with as little as two percent active participation from the populace as long as the nonactive people are supportive. Likewise, Mao Zedong observed that a guerilla

war had to cultivate the sympathies and support of the people. He asserted that "the moment that war of resistance dissociates itself from the masses of the people is the precise moment it dissociates itself from hope of ultimate victory."[164] Aguinaldo's resistance was not a movement that would benefit the majority of Filipinos. It was not designed to encourage the support or even the acquiescence of the population as a whole.

Ignoring this fatal flaw, Aguinaldo forged ahead. He divided captured territory into zones, placing each one under a regional commander who answered to the *jefe superior politico-militar* [superior political-military supervisor]. Despite Aguinaldo's best efforts, the revolution spiraled out of control. Locals on Panay, inspired by the revolution on Luzon, managed to break the Spanish hold on the island and force them into Iloilo City. The fighting on Mindanao was even more vicious, involving a three-sided battle between the rebels, the Spanish, and the Moros.

In the end, Aguinaldo's revolution was not successful. The Spanish purchased it for the sum of $800,000 and the promise that Aguinaldo would leave the country. When he went into exile in Hong Kong, the resistance faded out and the Spanish assumed they had seen the last of him. They were very wrong.

Thinking he had found a strong and reliable ally in the Americans, Aguinaldo was determined to continue the fight and returned to the Philippines. The Filipino resistance issued a Declaration of Independence on 12 June 1898 with a long list of grievances and proclaiming that the Filipinos were "already weary of bearing the ominous yoke of Spanish domination…" The declaration lauded the "triumph of our arms, truly marvelous and unparalleled in the history of Colonial revolutions…" It then went on to state "that they [the Filipino people] are and have the right to be free and independent; that they are released from all obedience to the crown of Spain;

[164] T.E. Lawrence. "Evolution of a Revolt." Kindle Edition, Location 321. Joseph C. McAlexander IV. "Hearts and Minds: Historical Counterinsurgency Lessons to Guide the War of Ideas in the Global War on Terrorism"

that every political tie between the two is and must be completely severed and annulled; and that, like all free and independent states, they have complete authority to make war, conclude peace, establish treaties of commerce, enter into alliances, regulate commerce, and execute all other acts and things that Independent States have the right to do."[165]

According to Aguinaldo, Admiral Dewey assured him that "the United States had come to the Philippines to protect the natives and free them from the yoke of Spain. "He [Dewey] said, moreover, that America is exceedingly well off as regards territory, revenue, and resources and therefore needs no colonies, assuring me finally that there was no occasion for me to entertain any doubts whatever about the recognition of the Independence of the Philippines by the United States." Aguinaldo then Dewey asked him if he could "induce the people to rise against the Spaniards and make a short, sharp, and decisive campaign of it."[166] Aguinaldo eagerly returned to the Philippines, certain that the Americans guaranteed his country's liberation from Spain and its future independence. He was in for a rude awakening. Instead of recognizing Philippine independence, the United States purchased the islands from Spain for the sum of $20 million.

In the grand scheme of things, the Battle of Manila was truly not very much of a battle. The Spanish were surprisingly amenable to the idea of leaving the Philippines. A bargain was made: in exchange for the opportunity to fire a few face-saving shots, the Spanish would quit Manila and leave it to the Americans. Unaware of this agreement, Aguinaldo was confused by the progression of events. "The Spanish soldiers in the city forts were not firing on them [the Americans], a mystery that was cleared up at sunset when details of the capitulation….became public property – a capitulation which the American Generals reserved for their own benefit and

[165] Filipino Librarian. "The Philippine Declaration of Independence." Translation from John Taylor's *Philippine Insurgent Records.* Accessed 10 November 2017.
[166] Aguinaldo, 16

credit in contravention of the agreement arrived at with Admiral Dewey in the arrangement of plans for the final combined assault on and capture of Manila by the allied forces, American and Filipino." [167]

As the Americans solidified their hold on the city, General Merritt requested that Aguinaldo withdraw his troops. Merritt pointed out that chances for accidental conflict would increase with a dual occupancy. Aguinaldo, understanding that he was outgunned, reluctantly agreed. He still had hopes that the Americans would honor the agreement he said he had come to with Admiral Dewey.

But Aguinaldo's hopes came to naught. He was stunned to learn that McKinley had decided to purchase the Philippines and annex the islands. "This news was received in the Revolutionary camp like a thunderbolt out of a clear sky. Some cursed the hour and the day that we treated verbally with the Americans; some denounced the ceding of the suburbs, while others again were of the opinion that a Commission should be sent to General Otis to draw from him clear and positive declarations on the situation, drawing up a treaty of amity and commerce if the United States recognize our independence or at once commence hostilities if the States refused."[168] Aguinaldo's opinion was that "the object [of the Americans] was by wounding the feelings of and belittling the Filipino Government to provoke a collision…."[169]

The focus of irregular warfare is generally control of and influence over populations rather than on the enemy's forces. This was the *insurrectos'* biggest failing. Aguinaldo was never

[167] Aguinaldo, 40.
[168] Aguinaldo, 43.
[169] Aguinaldo, 47.

able to garner broad popular support. American forces carried out military operations but also supported civic projects. Military personnel engaged in public works including building infrastructure, establishing schools, providing medical care, training Filipino police and military units, and generally establishing the rule of law. Military force alone would not have achieved success in the Philippines. American pressure gradually wore down the resistance. Aguinaldo's supply lines were cut, and he was driven to the most remote regions of Luzon. Perhaps most importantly, the resistance was separated from the general populace. His movement sought to consolidate the control of the illustrados while failing to offer any advantages to the common people.

The general population recognizing the advantages of aligning with the Americans. The American military was able to successfully combine military activities with civic projects to win over the populace. In the process, the United States completely destroyed the base of support for the resistance. While the Philippine American War is associated with savage treatment of natives by American soldiers, the "pull" factors and policies of attraction the United States offered in programs of civic improvement are often overlooked. It is true that the resistance in general and Aguinaldo in particular made numerous unforced errors. But the United States military should be credited with innovative programs that garnered public support.

The Filipino resistance force was kept on the run by "Lawton's bloodhounds." They were tired, hungry, and short of supplies. Aguinaldo was captured in March 1901 with the assistance of the native Macabebe Scouts who chose to throw in their lot with the Americans. On 19 April Aguinaldo issued a proclamation calling on his fighters to lay down their arms and accept the governance of the Americans. The United States was successful in its first foray into global imperialism.

CHAPTER 5: THE WAR OF THE FLEA

> He [the Indian) excelled at guerilla warfare – at hit and run raids, at harassment, at exploitation of the environment for his own advantage and the enemy's disadvantage. Except when surprised or protecting his home, the Indian fought only on his terms, when success seemed certain. Man for man, the Indian warrior far surpassed his blue-clad adversary in virtually every test of military proficiency. Robert Utley[170]

Irregular warfare is a natural choice for an insurgency that faces a foe that is militarily more powerful. A conventional battle between two such forces presents the likelihood of defeat for the weaker combatant. The insurgency is more likely to achieve victory by forcing the opponent into an exhausting long-term war of attrition. A conventional force seeks a successful outcome on the battlefield. An insurgency can afford to be patient, wearing the enemy down over time.

In his 1960s classic on guerilla war "The War of the Flea," author Robert Taber asserts that guerilla warfare makes perfect sense in "a war in which few of the battles would be described by military men as more than skirmishes, yet one in which the government came crashing down as surely as if an army had been destroyed on the battlefield." Tactics in such a conflict include "hitting the enemy when he is weak, evading him when he is strong, taking the offensive when he falls back, circling around when he advances."[171]

An army deals from strength in order to destroy the enemy. At first glance it may seem that the guerilla deals from weakness. A brief glance at the inequity of the two sides in a guerilla war may lead the observer to assume that because the guerilla is not strong in a conventional sense, the guerilla has no strength. This is a false conclusion. The guerilla does not have the same strengths as a conventional force. Instead, the guerilla finds ways to turn an apparent weakness

[170] Robert Utley. *Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian 1866-1891*
[171] Robert Taber, *War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Potomac Books, 2002 Reprint) 17-18.

into a strength. The guerilla is lightly armed and functions in smaller units. This allows for greater mobility. The guerilla force is not invested in a well-defined territory. The guerilla has a vast resource in the form of the local populace which, if it does not actively support the insurrection, can provide support in the form of ignoring guerilla activities. Perhaps most importantly, time is on the side of the guerilla. The conventional force is under pressure to provide a quick and decisive victory on the battlefield. The guerilla can

Taber writes that a protracted war of attrition can be deadly for the conventional force. "A political solution can obviate the necessity of a military showdown….Cyprus provides a good example of an insurgency that was successful simply because terror, sabotage, and constant disorder made the island too unprofitable and politically embarrassing for the British to remain. They got out, finally, not because they were forced out, but because the adversary could afford to bide time and wear down the opposition. For the guerilla, a public relations victory is as effective as a military victory.as no longer any compelling reason to remain (and there were many good reasons for withdrawing)."[172]

Irregular warfare is more varied than conventional warfare. It is fluid, able to rapidly change dramatically. A successful counterinsurgency requires flexibility and superb intelligence as well as coordination between different agencies and with allies. The counterinsurgency must attract the support of the local population to be successful. In 2009, the United States Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative published the Counterinsurgency Guide. The Initiative is an effort by nine different government agencies to address the challenges of irregular warfare.

[172] Taber,41.

The Counterinsurgency Guide defines insurgency as "the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify or challenge political control of a region. As such, it is primarily a political struggle, in which both sides use armed force to create space for their political, economic and influence activities to be effective."[173] A counterinsurgency requires the coordination of civilian and military efforts to both contain the insurgency and address the root causes.

While all irregular wars have individual characteristics, there are commonalities. Most insurgencies lack a strong central command. Insurgent groups are often an eclectic mix with differing agendas. Some insurgents may be motivated by religious zealotry or political extremism. Others may be criminals who are motivated by the potential for financial gain. This lack of a cohesive agenda can fracture the insurgency into warring factions.
Another obstacle for an insurgency is an inability to encourage or coerce the active assistance of a majority of the native population. That portion of the population that withholds their support can potentially be persuaded by a counterinsurgency that offers viable solutions to improve living conditions.

The Counterinsurgency Guide identifies four key components in the counterinsurgency model:

> **Political**: A successful political component is the foundation of success for a counterinsurgency. Without it, success is nearly impossible. "In general, a COIN [counterinsurgency] strategy is only as good as the political plan at its heart.
>
> **Economic:** The economic function provides services and improves infrastructure, generating confidence in and support of the counterinsurgency among the local population. The economic factor extends beyond encouraging businesses and increasing employment. It includes improving infrastructure as well as building schools and hospitals. During the Philippine American War, Provisional Governor William Howard Taft brought in teachers and medical staff from the United States. He used military personnel to improve roads. Improving the local economy dramatically reduces support

[173] US Government Counterinsurgency Guide. 2.

for the insurgency and reduces the number of potential recruits to the counterinsurgency cause.

Security: This includes the entire security framework. In addition to the obvious military function, it includes establishing a reliable legal system and providing for civilian oversight. In order to promote the support of the local population, civilians must be included in the process. Security "is not a precursor to economic and governance activity; rather security, economic and governance activity must be developed in parallel." Civilians will be attracted to the source of stability and security. Providing security is a pull factor, one that will attract civilians away from the influence of the insurgency.

Information: This includes both gathering and disseminating information. The counterinsurgency must gather accurate intelligence on the insurgency. The insurgency will be disseminating information of its own. The counterinsurgency must be able to counter that providing honest information to civilians but in a way that resonates with them.

"These four functions contribute to the overall objective of enabling the affected government to establish control, consolidating and then transitioning it from intervening forces to national forces and from military to civil institutions."[174] A successful counterinsurgency is not solely a military effort.

The Counterinsurgency Guide also identifies key needs for a successful insurgency: supporters, active recruits, safe havens, money, supplies, weapons, and intelligence. Supporters do not have to be active participants, thus the distinction between supporters and active recruits. "A robust insurgency can be waged with the support of just a small percentage of a given population." Supporters can be those who do not take an active role in the insurgency, but who also do not actively assist the counterinsurgency.[175] A small number of committed and trustworthy active participants offers advantages. It is easier to maintain tight operational security.

[174] Counterinsurgency Initiative, *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide,* 3.
[175] Counterinsurgency Initiative, *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide,* 7.

Paradoxically, a successful insurgency requires exploitation of success and a robust marketing campaign to garner the passive support of the population. This potentially exposes the insurgency to security risks.

Funding can be a major hurdle for an insurgency. Interested outside groups may provide funding without taking an active role in the insurgency. In the 1980s, the United States provided substantial support for the mujahideen resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, including financial support and weapons. The United States never became actively involved, but support for the insurgency eventually led to the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.[176]

An insurgency will expend the least amount of resources necessary to drive out the counterinsurgents. The goal of the insurgency is not to kill a large number of the opposing force. The goal is not even to defeat the opposing force on the battlefield. The goal is to establish an alternative to the government in power. If the government is unable to control territory and the population, the insurgency becomes the logical choice for stability. It is enough for the insurgency to weaken the government, calling into question the legitimacy of the status quo.

In his 1965 book on guerilla warfare, Robert Taber dubbed insurgent warfare "the war of the flea." It was, he said, the natural tactic of the less powerful combatant. Taber likened irregular warfare to a dog with fleas. A few fleas are an annoyance. But a few fleas become a myriad of fleas. The annoyance becomes a major problem. Eventually, if untreated, the dog could die as a result of the flea infestation. In the same way, a small insurgent force can inflict many small injuries on a larger, more powerful force. The injuries take a toll on the opposing force while attracting new recruits to the insurgency. Small victories can become big ones, wearing down the larger force. The irregular force does not have to win a final victory on the

[176] War History Online. "Jihad With US Arms." Accessed 20 June 2020.

battlefield. A victory in the court of public opinion is every bit as effective, as numerous colonial powers have learned to their detriment.

From one point of view, guerilla warfare is a potent weapon of liberation and social justice. From another perspective it is chaos and terror instigated by armed fanatics seeking to overthrow the established social order.[177] The more powerful force finds itself mired down in an unfamiliar environment surrounded by enemies who can be almost impossible to identify. As quickly as a conflict is suppressed in one area it rises somewhere else. The dog attacks one flea only to be bitten by another in a different location. The torment becomes unbearable. The more powerful force may well conclude that it is time to cut losses, declare victory, and leave. The more powerful force may seek the ultimate decisive victory. The insurgency can be content with a victory in the court of public opinion. It may not be as satisfying as a win on the battlefield. It can, however, lead to the desired end.

The goal of the insurgent is to make the situation so untenable that the more powerful force sees no option but to leave. The insurgency grinds down the opposing force in a war of attrition. The counterinsurgency begins to weaken as the insurgency saps its strength. The insurgency grows stronger as domestic support for a protracted conventional war ebbs away. The insurgents can carry on indefinitely. As the counterinsurgency is weakened the insurgency gains popular support, which is the element most critical for success. The United States was in that very position in Vietnam. An insurgency can declare victory if the situation becomes so untenable that the opposing force simply leaves.

It is more difficult to organize and lead a counterinsurgency than it is to engage in conventional warfare. A guerilla war is not a matter of choosing the best ground and facing a

[177] Taber, 3.

comparable force across a field of battle. There are no "rules of war." It can be difficult to identify the enemy in irregular warfare. A counterinsurgency requires operating in unfamiliar terrain against an enemy that strikes without warning and then vanishes into the local population. With careful planning, a full understanding of small wars, and imagination, a conventional force can turn the advantages of the insurgency against it.

In 2015, four members of European Special Forces units wrote an article for *Military Review.* In it, the authors identify popular support as the foundation of a successful insurgency and by extension the foundation of a successful counterinsurgency. In reference to modern irregular warfare, the authors name popular support as "NATO's Achilles Heel." They write that NATO's biggest weakness in irregular wars "has consistently proven to be failure to effectively promote establishment of a governance authority considered legitimate by the populace of a nation within a reasonable timeframe." In 2010 NATO adopted a strategy that emphasizes resolving conflicts by promoting reliable and acceptable governmental structures. "The strategy is based in part on the assumption that resolution of most modern conflicts will require efforts that go outside the employment of purely military measures." The authors are convinced that in order for NATO to be successful in future conflicts, it will be necessary to seek an understand of how nonmilitary measures can be optimized to appeal to the local population. They acknowledge that identifying and implementing such nonmilitary measures "remains complex and challenging."[178]

Lyautey and Galleini wrote in the latter half of the nineteenth century. In the first half of the twenty-first century Lieutenant General James Mattis and Lieutenant Colonel Frank Hoffman, both of the United States Marine Corps, revisited the concept of building local support.

[178] Lieutenant Colonel Christian Jeppson, et al. "NATO's Approach to Irregular Warfare: Protecting the Achilles' Heel." *Military Review,* September-October 2015. 28.

They observe that the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have caused American military leaders to think about conflict in different terms. Technology has taken a backseat to the Special Forces. Military thinking "has been altered once again by history's enduring lesson about the predominant role of the human dimension in warfare." Forgetting Von Clausewitz's dictum to always understand the nature of the current conflict, military leaders were seduced by the desire to fight the kind of war they wanted. The authors note that the enemy "has a vote in the competitive process we know as war, and does not have to play by our rules." There is no way to force the opponent to engage in the desired means of combat. The desire of military leaders to fight one type of war will never be enough to alter the nature of the war."[179]

Local support is crucial to both the insurgents and the counterinsurgents. It is particularly helpful in gathering intelligence. In 1847, West Point Professor Dennis Hart Mahan wrote, "There are no more important duties, which an officer may be called on to perform, than those of collecting and arranging the information upon which either the general, or the daily operations of a campaign must be based." He goes on to say that reliable intelligence was so valuable that "having it, the general makes his dispositions with confidence; without it he acts hesitatingly; and thus communicates to others that want of confidence in his own mind."[180]

Reliable intelligence is key to successful military operations. According to *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual,* "Effective operations are shaped by timely, specific, and reliable intelligence, gathered and analyzed at the lowest possible level and disseminated throughout the force."[181] Indigenous and civilian scouts have proven capable of

[179] James Mattis and Frank Hoffman. "Future Wars: The Rise of Hybrid Warfare." *U*.S. *Naval Institute Proceedings Magazine.* V. 132/11/1,233. November, 2005.
[180] Denise Hart Mahan, 105-6.
[181] *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*. 41.

performing intelligence gathering tasks. Indigenous scouts are particularly valuable when mounting a counterinsurgency.

Civilian personnel serve as force multipliers, freeing military personnel to focus on combat duties. Experienced scouts are able to fulfill the intelligence needs of the military force and can be more effective than military personnel. Military tactician Peter W. Connors addressed the advantages of relying on indigenous personnel: "Scouting, reconnaissance, trail watching, order surveillance, safe have identification, and patrolling operations can be expanded using indigenous soldiers, whose knowledge of the local terrain, people, and language is far greater than that of the intervention force….Indigenous forces can also serve as spies and informants, and pose as insurgents in pseudo operations as they did during the French wars in Algeria and Vietnam."[182]

Indigenous auxiliaries as well as experienced frontiersmen assisted military actions beginning in the earliest days of exploration in North America. The history of the United States military is far more complex than reliance on conventional warfare alone. The tactic of trusting in and relying on scouts and guides goes far back in American history as evidenced by John Gorham of Barnstable, Massachusetts. He began recruiting for a ranger company in the summer of 1744. His first efforts met with disappointment. It was common for local governments to offer generous bounties for scalps as an enticement to encourage experienced men to join the rangers. But the Barnstable government offered only meagre bounties for scalps gathered by Gorham's company. Rangers simply moved on until they found a locality that offered more money per scalp. Gorham found only twenty New England frontiersmen willing to join him. In order to form a complete company, Gorham recruited twenty-two Mohawk Indians. He was not by any

[182] Peter W. Connors. "Tactical Employment of Indigenous Forces." Working Paper.

means the first to rely on indigenous scalp hunters to fill the ranks. He was continuing a family tradition. His grandfather led a joint colonist-Indian ranger company in King Williams War (1689-1697).[183]

In *The First Way of War*, historian John Grenier argues that American military tradition is more closely rooted in the tactics of the indigenous inhabitants of North America than it is in the conventional warfare of Europe. As early as the 1600s colonists were learning a new way of war from the natives. According to Grenier, the conflicts between the colonists and the natives were crucial in developing America's "First Way of War": first in the sense that it was first technique practiced by European colonists in the new land, and first in the sense that it became the preferred method. Grenier asserts, "It inaugurated the American ranger tradition." He adds that Americans could not have been militarily successful without the instruction of the Indians to guide them in adapting to this new style of warfare.[184]

The advanced military technology of the Europeans gave them an advantage, but the traditional European tactics they brought with them did not suffice in the new environment against a new opponent. Colonists had to adopt a new way of war to cope with the unfamiliar enemy. They combined their military technology with the irregular warfare of the natives. Just as the Indians instructed European colonists in suitable methods of agriculture, they also instructed the colonists in suitable methods of warfare.

The conflicts were not limited to those between Europeans and Indians. Europeans transported their political struggles to the new lands. The indigenous inhabitants were inevitably drawn into the hostilities. European military forces were equipped and trained for conventional warfare. They found indigenous allies to be convenient and useful. This is not to say that

[183] Grenier, 69.
[184] Grenier, 33.

relations between settlers and Indians were always affable. As Europeans moved west, they pushed Indians beyond the Mississippi. The most graphic example is the Trail of Tears when President Andrew Jackson approved the removal of the Cherokee from the east to marginal lands in the Trans-Mississippi West in a forced march that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of men, women, and children. Eventually pushing the Indians beyond the Mississippi was not enough.

The struggle for the newly designated Indian lands became increasingly violent as settlers saw the advantages of moving west. But frequently enough, the natives found it useful to ally with Europeans. At different times and for different reasons tribes chose to serve as allies to the French, the British, the Americans, and the Confederacy.

Accustomed to functioning in the forested hills of the east, the United States Army faced a challenge in the vastly different environment of the west. John Bourke served with General George Crook on America's frontier from 1870 to 1886. In *On the Border with Crook*, Bourke describes the reactions of Easterners who were both enchanted with and daunted by the new world in which they found themselves: "Dante Alighieri, it has always seemed to me, made the mistake of his life in dying when he died in the picturesque capital of the Exarchate five hundred and fifty years ago. Had he held on to this mortal coil until after Uncle Sam had perfected the 'Gadsden Purchase' he would have found full scope for his genius in the description of a region in which not only purgatory and hell, but heaven likewise, had combined to produce a bewildering kaleidoscope of all that was wonderful, weird, terrible, and awe-inspiring, with not a little that was beautiful and romantic….There were stretches of country picturesque to look upon and capable of cultivation, especially with irrigation; and other expanses not a bit more fertile than so many brick-yards, where all was desolation, the home of the cactus and the coyote."[185]

[185] Bourke. *On the Border with Crook.* 8.

In his study of conflict on the American frontier, historian Paul Andrew Hutton described the Army as "almost wholly a creature of the frontier….Frontier needs dictated the periodic enlargements of the regular army in the nineteenth century. For a century, the regulars worked the frontier West."[186] The Army faced unanticipated challenges as the westward expansion resulted in increased conflicts with Indians. Both friendly and hostile Indians belonging to numerous different tribes could inhabit the same village with little to distinguish one from another. Army personnel were rarely able to differentiate between hostile and friendly groups, instead assuming that all inhabitants of the same village were either friendly or hostile. That automatically made the entire village one or the other in the eyes of the Army. The presence of one "hostile" marked everyone living in that village as hostile, and they were treated accordingly. Native scouts eased the task of identifying hostile and friendly Indians. They were also familiar with native dialects, the location of safe water sources, the terrain, and the environment.

The use of indigenous scouts in the nineteenth century was not without controversy. Military personnel as well as the public were often skeptical about the wisdom of relying on indigenous personnel. Historian Mark Van de Logt examines the alliance between the Army and its Pawnee scouts. "In 1867 Colonel Christopher C. Augur defended his use of Indian scouts against criticisms from officials in the Interior Department who believed that military service retarded efforts to 'civilize' these Indians. According to Augur, not only were Indian scouts effective military allies, but their service would also prepare them for entrance into white society."[187]

[186] Paul Andrew Hutton, ed. *Soldiers West: Biographies from the Military Frontier.* 3.
[187] Van de Logt, 3.

Colonel Augur was not the first officer to recognize the value of native scouts, nor would he be the last. Officers who worked directly with these scouts developed a profound respect for them while officers who worked behind desks far from the action were less likely to understand how valuable they could be. Skepticism was deeply embedded in the upper levels of the Army.

Officers who enlisted the skills of native scouts often felt compelled to defend that decision. Superior officers frequently put up a strong resistance against utilizing the services of such scouts. They mistrusted them, considering them unreliable savages who were all too likely to betray the Army. It was one thing to recruit experienced frontiersmen of European descent. The natives were in a different category.

The Army had no written doctrine regarding the employment of indigenous scouts. Neither officers nor enlisted men received formal training or guidance in how to identify potential reliable allies and utilize them effectively. They had to learn on their own through trial and error as they developed successful methods of integrating the natives into the overall force.

General Crook had a longstanding feud with General Nelson Miles about Crook's reliance on Indian scouts. "The antagonism between Crook and General Nelson A. Miles is emphasized in a series of letters to Lieutenant L.W.V. Kennon, 1889-90. Crook speaks disparagingly of the 'Literary Bureau' controlled by Miles, a publicity ring responsible for newspapers stories that cast doubt on the loyalty of Crook's Indian scout system and emphasized Miles' part in the final surrender of the Apaches. Crook believed, and wrote, that Miles was consumed with an ambition that overruled other considerations."[188] It took his own hard experience on the ground for Miles to finally appreciate the value of indigenous scouts.

[188] George Crook. *George Crook: His Autobiography.* Kindle Location 123-127.

Today the Department of Defense recognizes this long history of utilizing the expertise of native personnel. "In virtually every instance of warfare in the colonial period, whether in conflict with other whites or with the indigenous people themselves, colonists were allied with or had as auxiliaries members of native Indians, adopting clothing, weapons and tactics….Not a single major expedition or combat operation, British or French, occurred during this war [French and Indian War 1754-1763] without contingents of Indians on either side. The tribes provided scouts and guides, translators, security for settlements and fortified garrisons, as well as larger forces for combat."[189] As Americans moved west, Indian allies continued to play an active role in the expansion of the United States.

Frank Burnham was an early scout for the Army in the Southwest, primarily in Arizona Territory. He gained experience fending for himself from the age of twelve. He sometimes found older and more experienced frontiersmen who served as his mentors. After working for the U.S. Army in the Southwest, he ventured to Africa where he scouted for the British. British Lieutenant General Sir Robert Baden-Powell described Burnham as "a most delightful companion….amusing, interesting, and most instructive. Having seen service against the Red Indians he brings quite a new experience to bear on the Scouting work here [Africa]. And while he talks away there's not a thing escapes his quick roving eye, whether it is on the horizon or at his feet."[190] Baden-Powell relied on Burnham's techniques and experience not only in his military exploits, but in the formation of his new organization, the Boy Scouts.

Burnham became a legend on two continents. He served as the model for a gunman in Zane Grey's *To the Last Man,* a fictional account of Arizona's Pleasant Valley War 1882-1892.

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[189] Department of Defense. *Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats.* Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2010.
[190] Burnham, Kindle Location 58-61.

He was also author H. Rider Haggard's inspiration for adventurer Allan Quartermain who in turn was the inspiration for movie hero Indiana Jones. Burnham scouted for Crook in the Apache War. When he thought the West had become too civilized, losing its romance and adventure, he and his wife ventured to Africa where he scouted for Cecil Rhodes in Rhodesia. For his work with the British Army, King Edward VII awarded Burnham the Cross of the Distinguished Order of Service.

Burnham had absolutely no doubt about the value of reliable scouts. "Every commanding officer in the Apache wars suffered from lack of information as to where the Indians were from and the difficulty of getting in touch with them. It was for this reason that Crook, Miles, Chaffee, and Lawton made frequent use of fast-running Indian scouts."[191] Burnham successfully translated his experience with native scouts to Africa, just as Lawton would later translate his experience with Apache scouts to the Philippines.

In 1868, General Philip Sheridan engaged in something of an experiment. He put Major George Forsyth in charge of a fifty-man elite scouting unit. Sheridan had relied on two such units to respond to the guerilla tactics used by the Confederates in the Shenandoah Valley. His success during the Civil War gave him the confidence to return to the tactic in the American West against the Indians. Forsyth's scouts were specially chosen, and they were armed with the most advanced repeating rifles. The unit was not successful. It came out on the losing end of an engagement with the Sioux and Cheyenne at Beecher's Island. But that did not stop other commanders from experimenting with elite units. General Crook thought even his best men were inferior in performance to Indians. General Miles was convinced that a carefully chosen and trained elite unit could match the skill of the Indians.[192]

[191] Burnham, Kindle Location 1045-1047.
[192] Birtle, Location 1395.

The Army's experiments with counterinsurgency tactics were the foundation of success in the West. Elite units, guided by indigenous scouts, relentlessly tracked their quarry. These units used a combination of flying columns of light cavalry and mounted infantry. They were armed with the most advanced weapons and used tactics adapted to the needs and abilities of small units. Birtle notes that, "Not all commanders could do it, but the Army possessed enough talented, experienced, and resourceful officers and men who could and did rise to the occasion. By flexibly adapting conventional structures to fit unconventional situations, the Army managed to find, follow, and defeat the American Indians of the trans–Mississippi West."[193]

In addition to native scouts, the Army also relied on experienced frontiersmen of European descent. Civilian scouts have a long and storied history with the United States military. Perhaps the most famous of them all was Buffalo Bill Cody. Cody was a master of self-promotion and knew how to get his name in the newspapers. He went on to glorify his exploits with the Army in his famous Wild West show. Cody's penchant for showmanship does not, however, negate his scouting skills. After serving in the Union Army during the Civil War, he enlisted as a scout with the Army in 1866. He worked with General Crook in the Powder River Campaign and scouted for Custer. In 1876, Cody was starring as himself on Broadway. After the defeat of Custer's 7th Cavalry at Little Big Horn, General Crook asked Cody to return to his position as a scout. When Cody arrived at the army encampment, the soldiers broke into cheers. They were familiar with Cody's survival and tracking skills. They knew they were in good hands with him to guide them. An engagement at Warbonnet Creek in Nebraska in July, 1876 was Cody's last action as an Army scout.

[193] Birtle, Location 1409-1411.

Tom Horn was also a civilian scout. He had a penchant for self-promotion, writing an autobiography in which he credited himself for much of the Army's success against the Apache. He may have inflated his exploits, but there is no doubt that he provided valuable service. He originally signed on as a muleskinner. As he was familiar with the region and knew Spanish (which he referred to as Mexican) as well as several Indian dialects, he became valuable as a scout. Horn noted that he could speak Mexican like a native. He said that after spending time in the Southwest, "I learned all that the Indians and Mexicans both knew."

In 1886, Horn served as scout for a supply train that was joining up with Lawton. Horn demonstrated the value of an experienced scout. When the expedition reached a particularly narrow canyon, Horn had the soldiers wait while he scouted ahead. He came across a fresh trail and determine that about twenty Apache were present in the area. He returned to the soldiers and took precautions. He instructed them to make sure their weapons were loaded. He had the soldiers put lariats on the horses, allowing the loose rope to drag on the ground. If a rider was thrown or had to dismount, he could easily grab the rope and keep his horse secure. The soldiers then entered the canyon one at a time, keeping about a hundred yards between them. The Apache would be able to focus on only one man at a time. The party passed safely through the canyon. Several weeks later the soldiers learned that the Apache were prepared to attack, but changed their minds based on the precautions that Horn had taken.[194]

The United States stumbled onto a plan for successful prosecution of an irregular war in the Philippines. Counterinsurgencies have often followed a plan based on the conventional Westphalian state model that developed in the eighteenth century. In this configuration, security

[194] Larry D. Ball, *Tom Horn in Life and Legend* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2014), 80-1.

and stability are projected from the top down to maintain order. To effect change in this model, it is necessary to influence the uppermost level of government.

Military planners are likely to assume that this top-down model works the same way for irregular warfare as it does for conventional warfare between recognized nation states, but this is not the case. Actions that adversely impact the general population, even if well-intentioned, will have a negative result for the counterinsurgency. Culturally insensitive policies, for example, run the risk of alienating the very people the counterinsurgency is ostensibly trying to help. The support of the local population is every bit as crucial to the counterinsurgency as it is to the insurgency. The United States was fortunate in the appointment of William Howard Taft as the provisional governor of the Philippines. Taft's policies of improving the infrastructure, building hospitals, and expanding the availability of educational opportunities undermined Aguinaldo's appeal for the people who had supported him against Spain.

CHAPTER 6: THE NIGHT GENERAL

> The American People seem to desire a great spilling of blood, and seem to think where casualties are small, nothing has been accomplished and there was no resistance. It has been my pride to whip my enemy with trifling cost to myself and to punish them equally heavily, and my men soon dropped on to the fact that I did not rush them on to the enemy thoughtlessly and without any consideration. The best compliment I have had was when I passed a group of men, I overheard one say: "Oh, there goes Lawton, somehow I feel safe when he is along!" Henry Ware Lawton[195]

The United States went to the Philippines with no objective. Officers in the field were largely left without guidance. Possible actions ranged from a brief show of force to the total occupation of the Philippines. Military commanders had to chart a course without any stated purpose. The situation was mired in indecision and confusion. Newspapers reported that the administration was "perplexed as to what will be done with the Philippines," noting that "International questions raised may prove difficult to solve and cause trouble."[196] Seemingly reluctant to express any strong conviction on the matter, President McKinley allowed events to sweep him along. Historian Stanley Karnow describes McKinley as "trailing rather than shaping events."[197]

General Nelson Miles argued for the occupation of Manila but nothing more ambitious. He felt that Dewey's request for five thousand troops was inadequate for a full occupation, and an attempt to seize the entire archipelago would require at least three times that number. General Wesley Merritt rejected any idea that Filipinos were eager to be organized and led by Americans. He nonetheless urged a seizure of the Philippines. He acknowledged that "it seems more than probable that we will have the so-called insurgents to fight as well as the Spaniards."[198] This did

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[195] Shay, 244-5.
[196] *The San Francisco Call.* "Future of the Islands." 8 May 1898.
[197] Stanley Karnow, *In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989), 107.
[198] Karnow, 107.

not dissuade him from urging a complete conquest, a task that would require regulars in addition to the volunteers.

The lessons of the Civil War forgotten, Admiral Dewey's destruction of the Spanish fleet at Manila in 1898 engendered wild enthusiasm. He was hailed as "the hero of Manila Bay." His face was plastered on everything from shaving mugs to jewelry. Schools displayed his portrait in classrooms. Americans were feeling full of themselves. There seemed to be no limits to what the country could accomplish.

Americans did not comprehend that the great victory at Manila Bay was only the beginning. Dewey understood that ground forces would be necessary to wrest control of the Philippines from the Spanish. But by the time American troops arrived the Spanish were surprisingly amenable to leaving. It was hard for Spain to justify the continued expense of maintaining the colony. The arrival of the Americans presented an opportunity for Spain to rid itself of an expensive and increasingly contentious colony while recouping some of the losses. Prepared to fight a conventional war against the Spanish as was required in Cuba, the United States found itself quickly and surprisingly in possession of the Philippines. That is when the true challenge began.

A growing dispute with Spanish had begun long before Americans arrived in the islands. A force under the direction of Emilio Aguinaldo presented a threat to continued Spanish possession of the islands. When Dewey's fleet arrived, Filipinos assumed the Americans had come to liberate the islands from Spanish control. They felt betrayed when instead of liberating the Philippines the United States purchased the colony from Spain for twenty million dollars. What began as the Filipinos' conventional fight against Spain for independence quickly turned into a fight against the United States for independence. It did not take long for Aguinaldo to

realize that the American military force was a far more formidable opponent than Spain had been. The resistance required a change of tactics to have a hope of success.

General Henry Ware Lawton was a key figure in American success in the Philippine-American War. He brought the experience and calm demeanor that the American Army badly needed to cope with an unexpected irregular war in an unfamiliar and unforgiving environment. At six feet four inches tall, Lawton was a commanding presence. He was a highly esteemed officer who earned the respect of his men with his combination of toughness and fairness. General O.O. Howard said of Lawton, "To his men a kinder officer never lived, and the one thing that made him so popular was that he would never send any one to a place where he would not go to himself."[199] Lawton died as he had lived, at the front of his men.

Henry Ware Lawton was one of the officers responsible for the Army's success first in the Indian Wars and then in the Philippines. According to the United States Army, Lawton "greatly distinguished himself in several Indian campaigns in the history of the army, crowning his many signal achievements with the capture of Geronimo and his band of hostile Apaches in 1886….On January 19, 1899 he was sent to the Philippines and soon after his arrival at Manila began active operations against Filipino insurgents, and met with remarkable success by adopting the tactics he had learned in his campaigns against Indians. On April 10 he captured Santa Cruz, a Filipino stronghold. His next engagement was at San Rafael, where a large number of insurgents were hidden on all sides in the jungle. Had it not been for his experience in Indian warfare the US would have suffered a great loss."[200]

Lawton was born in Manhattan, Ohio, a suburb of Toledo, in 1843. After his secondary education, he entered Fort Wayne Episcopal College. He had no plans to enlist in the army. His

[199] Howard. 184-6.
[200] Arlington National Cemetery. "Henry Ware Lawton." Accessed 5 April 2017.

plan was to study law and settle down to a quiet, respectable life. Then the Civil War intervened. Lawton answered his country's call at the age of eighteen, and the Army quickly got into his blood. After a brief attempt to return to the law, he surrendered to the lure of the army. He spent the rest of his life as a soldier.

Lawton grew from a raw recruit into a highly respected general. His troops followed him willingly and mourned him when he was killed in combat. They understood that Lawton valued his men and would not sacrifice them needlessly. He took pride in eating what his troops ate and sleeping where they slept. He could always be found on the frontlines.

Lawton's military career began when he enlisted as a private with the 9th Indiana Volunteers. His family embodied the Civil War as a conflict of "brother against brother." Lawton's brother George also enlisted in the Union Army. But his brother Manley, with whom he was very close, was living in Texas at the time and enlisted in the service of the Confederacy.

Lawton's Indiana unit of volunteers was mustered out after ninety days. Lawton was not comfortable leaving the fight when he knew it was far from over. He wasted no time in reenlisting in the 30th Indiana Volunteers. On April 6, 1862 Lawton's unit was among the 42,000 Union soldiers commanded by Major General Ulysses S. Grant. They camped at Pittsburgh Landing on the west bank of the Tennessee River while Grant waited for Major General Don Carlos Buell to join him with an additional 30,000 men. Grant believed that Confederate General Albert Sidney Johnston was camped more than twenty miles away at Corinth. Unbeknownst to Grant, Johnston was actually less than a mile away with 40,000 men.

In the morning, pickets ran into the camp of Brigadier General William Tecumseh Sherman, warning that a heavy Confederate force was quite literally on their heels. Sherman quickly formed a defensive line. But his men slowly gave ground under the Confederate assault.

The only saving grace was that hungry Confederate soldiers paused to loot the Union camp and eat the breakfast prepared by Union troops. The day ended with Union troops holding a line more than two miles to the rear of where they began. The Battle of Shiloh was underway.

In spite of the retreat, Union forces began the following day in a much stronger position. Major General Lew Wallace arrived with fresh troops, as did Buell. Lawton was in the ranks of the relief force. He was dismayed by the large number of troops huddling in the shelter of the riverbank. They had seen enough fighting. Ambrose Bierce observed, "Whenever a steamboat would land, this abominable mob had to be kept off her with bayonets; when she pulled away, they sprang on her and were pushed by scores into the water, where they were suffered to drown one another in their own way. The men who were disembarking insulted them, shoved them, struck them. In return they expressed their unholy delight in the certainty of our destruction by the enemy."[201]

Lawton displayed the determination and intrepidity under fire for which he became known. On May 17, 1862 he was promoted to the rank of captain. Remembering the day he received his promotion Lawton told a friend, "When it was handed to me, I would not have changed places with King or Kaiser. I was nineteen years old, and though my upper lip was as bare as a girl's, I was a captain in a fighting regiment."[202] Lawton did not remain a captain. His ability to lead men was recognized and by 1865 he was a lieutenant-colonel. On March 13, 1865 he was brevetted to the rank of full colonel. He participated in over twenty battles during the Civil War, including Shiloh and Corinth. He was awarded the Medal of Honor for his service at Atlanta. After a successful career as an enlisted man and then an officer, Lawton was discharged

[201] Ambrose Bierce. "What I saw of Shiloh." *The Devil's Dictionary, Tales, & Memoirs.* 665-66.
[202] Michael E. Shay. *Henry Ware Lawton: Union Infantryman, Frontier Soldier, Charismatic Leader* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2016), 17.

from the Army on March 13, 1865. Having enlisted as a private at the age of eighteen, he left the Army as a twenty-two-year-old lieutenant colonel who had commanded a regiment in battle.

Following the Civil War Lawton faced a common problem among officers. The War Department made drastic cuts in the size of the Army. There was almost no opportunity for older, seasoned officers to advance, and it was even worse for younger officers. It was not uncommon for an officer to hold the rank of lieutenant at the age of forty. Many officers saw no future in further military service and Lawton was one of them. He returned to his original plan of becoming a lawyer, leaving the Army and entering Harvard Law School.

In 1886 while he was at Harvard, Lawton received an unexpected offer. Major General Philip Sheridan asked Lawton if he was interested in a commission as a second lieutenant. Lawton envisioned only a dim future in the Army and declined. Sheridan urged him to reconsider. After finishing his studies at Harvard and graduating, Lawton reevaluated his prospects. He realized that he was at heart a military man. Sheridan assured him the offer was still open. In May 1867 Lawton accepted the commission.

Back in the Army, Lawton had the good fortune to serve under Colonel Ranald Mackenzie who commanded the 41st Infantry. Mackenzie had graduated first in his West Point class. He was quickly promoted and was Brevet Major General at the close of the Civil War. He led from the front and was wounded three times. One of the wounds tore off the first two fingers of his right hand. The Indians called him "Bad Hand." No less than Ulysses S. Grant named Mackenzie "the most promising young officer in the army."[203]

The 41st Infantry was not a plum assignment for an officer with such an admirable career. The 41st was an all-black regiment that consisted primarily of former slaves with virtually no

[203] Ulysses S. Grant. *Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant.* Vol. 2. 772.

military training. But the post-Civil War Army was a shell of its former self. For the next thirty years it numbered between 24,000 and 28,000 men.[204] There was not enough room for all the officers who wanted to retain their rank and continue serve. Mackenzie knew he would have to make the best of a less than promising situation.

It was not easy to be a Yankee soldier serving in the South during Reconstruction. It was even more challenging to be a black Yankee soldier. Mackenzie was a hard taskmaster, sometimes called "irascible, irritable, and difficult to deal with."[205] But he was a fair man and fiercely protective of his black troops who were routinely the targets of racial prejudice. He molded the 41st into a fine unit with the lowest desertion rate in the entire Army.

Lawton took careful note of Mackenzie's leadership style and took those lessons to heart as he rose up the ranks. An unconventional foe waited for the troops as the Army moved out onto the Great Plains. There would be no set-piece battles. Lawton quickly learned just how unprepared the Army was for a different type of warfare.

In 1858 Captain Randolph B. Marcy wrote *The Prairie Traveler.* It is a detailed guide to surviving on the Great Plains, covering everything from properly loading a pack horse to adopting Indian methods for tracking. Marcy's book was widely read among officers stationed in the American West. Marcy recognized that formal military doctrine was completely inadequate when applied to fighting Indians. He wrote, "The military system, as taught and practiced in our army up to the time of the Mexican war, was, without doubt, efficient and well adapted to the art of war among civilized nations. This system was designed for the operations of armies acting in populated districts, furnishing ample resources, and against an enemy who was tangible, and made use of a similar system…but useless against an enemy who is here to-day and there to-

[204] Shay, 39.
[205] Shay, 41.

morrow….who assembles at the moment of combat, and vanishes whenever fortune turns against him.[206]

According to the United States Army Command and General Staff College, fighting against such an enemy required tactics that deviated from the accepted military doctrine. Civilian and indigenous scouts were an important element of those efforts and were integral to the success of the United States Army in the Indian Wars. In his work on utilizing indigenous recruits Major Victor Holman writes, "Without a doubt, the conquest of the southwestern United States falls squarely on the shoulders of the dedicated officers and men of the U.S. Regular Army. However, the achievements of the Indian Scouts must also be taken into account."[207] As the Army was forced to adjust from conventional warfare to unconventional, officers and men had to develop new tactics. They were not formally taught. They had to learn from experience. It was a matter of survival.

The Indian Wars were prolonged in part because of a deadly combination: the Indians utilized guerilla tactics and the Army was slow to respond. The focus of Army command was always on conventional rather than irregular warfare. When the Army suddenly and unexpectedly found itself facing an irregular foe, there was no formal doctrine to serve as guidance. Fortunately, there were officers and men who recognized the need to adjust to a different type of threat. They adopted appropriate tactics not because of training or doctrine, but because it was practical. They first relied on frontiersmen who offered guidance based on their experience. They moved to incorporating indigenous scouts into their ranks. The United States

[206] Randolph B. Marcy. *The Prairie Traveler.* 200-1.
[207] Victor Holman. *Seminole Negro Indians, Macabebes and Civilian Irregulars: Models for the Future Employment of Indigenous Forces* (US Army Command and General Staff College, Kindle Edition) 247-248.

Army was forged in the unconventional fighting of the Indian Wars as much as it was on the battlefields of the Civil War.

Following the Civil War, the country's attention turned to westward expansion. The Army moved west to facilitate the settlement and development of the American West. A vast expanse of the country was still under threat of Indian attack. Raids on homesteads were not uncommon. But funding for the military response was less than robust. Congress was reluctant to fund posts that were considered temporary. Many of these posts were haphazard affairs, a collection of random and poorly constructed buildings, described as "hovels." Sherman demanded funding for adequate housing for officers and enlisted men as well as the families who ventured west with them.[208] This was beyond a matter of morale, which in itself was important. It was directly related to the health and safety of the troops. And the troops in turn were crucial for the protection of the health and safety of settlers.

Permanent posts were the responsibility of the Engineer Department. That was not the case with temporary posts which were under the oversight of the Quartermaster Department. With a growing number of temporary posts in the West and a decreasing number of experienced officers, the quartermaster duties often fell to less experienced junior officers.

The duties of the quartermaster were wide-ranging. They included the construction and maintenance of temporary posts. But the quartermaster was also responsible for procuring and transporting supplies as varied as horses and mules, clothing, tools, equipment, forage, and general supplies. The quartermaster had to handle and account for large sums of money. Frequent transfers meant that one officer seldom functioned as quartermaster for very long.

[208] Shay. 43.

During 1870 there were about 150 quartermasters on the payroll, but over 400 men served in those position.[209]

In February 1868, Mackenzie's unit was transferred to Fort Clark in Texas, close to the Rio Grande River. While many western forts were considered unhealthy because of the environment, such was not the case with Fort Clark. The fort had access to good water, which was a prime factor. Positioned on a rise, the cool breezes from the Gulf of Mexico often relieved the dry heat.

Lawton received plaudits for his work at Fort Clark. The quartermaster department reported that Lawton "has acquitted himself with distinguished merit; he appears to be an earnest, driving and most capable business man, with a knowledge of men and things that fits him admirably for promotion in the Department, should an opening be offered to merit."[210]

From Fort Clark, Mackenzie and his troops moved further west to Fort McKavett on the San Saba River in May 1869. The Texas Historical Commission describes the site as "standing atop a remote windswept hill." General Sherman once described it as "the prettiest post in the west." The Army established the fort in 1852 to protect settlers and provide a stagecoach station. In 1858 a decrease in Indian hostilities prompted the Army to close McKavett. As soon as the fort was closed, Comanche attacks increased. The fort was reopened in 1868. It was a major staging point for military campaigns as well as scientific expeditions.[211]

Whatever Sherman may have said, the fort wasn't all that pretty when Mackenzie and his troops arrived there. Like so many western posts, it had fallen into disrepair. After years of neglect and disuse, it was not habitable. Mackenzie ordered the complete restoration of the fort.

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[209] Erna Risch. *Quartermaster Support of the Army: A History of the Corps, 1775, 1939* (Washington DC: Center of Military History, 1889) 484-491.
[210] *Annual Report.* Lieutenant Colonel S.B. Holabird, July 8, 1874. HWI 1.2.
[211] Texas Historical Commission. "Fort McKavett Historical Site." Accessed 21 May 2019.

Lawton immediately went to work supervising the repair and reconstruction of all the buildings. He was responsible not only for restoring the dilapidated buildings but also for a major expansion of the fort. McKavett eventually became home to Buffalo Soldiers as well as families of the officers and a contingent of laundresses.

In December 1870 Mackenzie took command of the 4th Cavalry. He discovered that his troopers were posted at nine different posts sprawled out across Texas. He also discovered that his new command was sadly lacking in military discipline. Officers were accustomed to spending their time hunting and fishing. Less acceptable activities like drinking and consorting with prostitutes were also evident. Mackenzie immediately began instituting a program of strict military discipline. He also requested Lawton's transfer to the 4th Cavalry.

Lieutenant Robert G. Carter, a Civil War veteran whose gallantry and bravery during the war earned him an appointment to West Point, was also posted to the regiment. Carter recorded his adventures with the 4th Cavalry in an extensive volume. He was an open admirer of both Mackenzie and Lawton. He and Lawton became life-long friends.

In order to respond to the increasing hostility of the Comanche and Kiowa, Mackenzie decided to consolidate his cavalry at Fort Richardson, located near Jacksboro, Texas. He arrived to find a fort that was in a sad condition. The buildings were poorly constructed around a central parade ground. They were drafty in the winter and leaked whenever it rained. Once again, Lawton took on the challenging task of rebuilding a neglected fort. Carter observed, "He [Lawton] never seemed to eat or sleep; he was here and there, and at all places at all times."[212] Fort Richardson closed a few years later, but the well-positioned fort was instrumental in the actions of the 4th Cavalry.

[212] Carter. *On the Border with Mackenzie.* 114.

General Sherman paid a visit to Fort Richardson in the spring of 1871. The Kiowa raided a wagon train bringing supplies to the Fort on the day of Sherman's visit. Most of the teamsters were killed. Sherman ordered Mackenzie to immediately mount a detail to find and capture the perpetrators. Mackenzie personally led four companies of cavalry troopers accompanied by Tonkawa scouts. The Comanche and their Kiowa allies had a longstanding feud with the Tonkawa, who were more than willing to assist Mackenzie on his mission. This was Lawton's first opportunity to observe native scouts in action.

The Tonkawa belong to a linguistic family of loosely related sub-tribes. Today the Tonkawa describe the tribe as "one of the most warlike tribes during nearly two centuries of conflict with their enemy tribes on the Western plains and with the Spanish and, later, American settlers in the Southwest. Their men were famous warriors, and their chiefs bore many scars of battle. The Tonkawa women were also strong physically and vindictive in disposition." They planted a few crops primarily survived by hunting bison and deer. They were accomplished with the bow and are and the firearms they acquired first from the Spanish and then from Americans. Once they obtained horses they became widely known as formidable warriors. They eventually drifted down to the Texas-Mexican border and became allies of the Apaches.[213] They proved to be invaluable to Mackenzie. While Mackenzie was unsuccessful in capturing the perpetrators, it was a valuable lesson for Lawton in how to attract useful native allies by exploiting intertribal rivalries. The experience factored into his success in both the Apache War and in the Philippines.

Mackenzie continued to rely on the Tonkawa In the summer of 1871, the Kiowa under Kicking Bird left their reservation near Fort Sill in Indian Territory (later the state of Oklahoma). Sherman ordered Mackenzie to find Kicking Bird and take him and his custody. After his failure

[213] Tonkawa Tribe Official Site. "Tonkawa Tribal History." Accessed 24 May 2019.

to capture all the perpetrators of the wagon train massacre the previous year, Mackenzie was determined to successfully carry out this mission.

As quartermaster, Lawton was responsible for providing transport wagons as well as provisions for the troopers and their mounts. Each man was allotted a daily ration of three quarters of a pound of meat, one pound of hardtack, and coffee. A good quartermaster – and Lawton was a very good quartermaster –would also supply sugar, salt, beans, and flour. The horses and mules were far more demanding. Lawton had to provide fourteen pounds of hay and twelve pounds of grain each day for the hardworking animals. Besides a horse for every trooper, each of Lawton's wagons was pulled by six mules. In addition to food the expedition required ammunition, horse and mule shoes, cooking gear, medical supplies, and tents. Each wagon was loaded with 4,000 pounds of supplies.

Under ideal circumstances, the wagons could travel at a speed of two and a half miles per day. Circumstances in the unforgiving environment of the Southwest were far from ideal. Numerous rivers presented a series of obstacles. At the Little Wichita River, the soldiers built a rudimentary bridge. At the Big Wichita River Lawton had to create a ford for the heavy wagons. As the troopers worked to get the wagons across, they could see the smoke of a prairie fire. Lawton brought the wagons down to the riverbank and saved the crucial supplies.

Lawton served as Mackenzie's quartermaster on several more expeditions. He learned to adapt to an unfamiliar and unforgiving environment. The Llaano Estacado – the Staked Plains – were the daunting heart of the territory that the Comanche knew as *Comancheria.* While the Comanche were familiar with and comfortable in the Llano Estacado, the same could not be said for the Army. Soldiers venturing onto the high plains found themselves in an alien landscape. The first written reference to the area came from Francisco Vazquez de Coronado who wrote to

the King of Spain in 1541. “I reached some plains so vast, that I did not find their limit anywhere I went, although I travelled over them for more than 300 leagues….with no more land marks than if we had been swallowed up by the sea….there was not a stone, nor bit of rising ground, nor a tree, nor a shrub, nor anything to go by.” US Army Captain Randolph B. Marcy became familiar with the Llano Estacado and agreed with Coronado, writing in 1852: “It is much elevated….very smooth and level….without a tree, shrub, or any other herbage to intercept the vision….the almost total absence of water causes all animals to shun it: even the Indians do not venture to cross it except at two or three places.”[214]

The Llano Estacado was the epitome of desolation and isolation. Streams were unreliable, at times running full and, at the height of summer when water was needed most, all but dried up. These streams form steep-sided gullies known as arroyos. They are difficult enough for travelers on horseback but traversing them with wagons is a daunting task. Travelers face steep escarpments, some of them as high as three hundred feet. Early Europeans thought the cliffs of the Mescalero Escarpment looked like a palisaded fort, hence the name Staked (or Palisaded) Plains. In 1844 Thomas Falconer referred to the cliffs as “elevated or palisaded much as palisaded sides of a fort.”[215] The lack of landmarks and trail markings meant that anyone unfamiliar with the area could easily become disoriented and hopelessly lost. Those who ventured across the High Plains often left various types of markers from piles of stones to wooden stakes driven into the ground. These were not foolproof as they could shift due to the severe weather or they might be knocked over by animals. Combined with a scarcity of water in an area that is, at best, semi-arid these challenges made traveling the Llano Estacado a venture not to be undertaken lightly. In spite of all these trials the development of the Llano Estacado

[214] Art Leatherwood. Handbook of Texas online. “Llano Estacado.” Accessed 5/29/2019.
[215] Art Leatherwood. Accessed 5/29/2019.

began in the 1870s. By 1886 there were at least thirty large named ranches with recognized brands. But at the time Mackenzie led his troopers across the High Plains, it was still nearly uninhabited by any but the Comanche.

Mackenzie's first foray to look for the Comanche was not successful. While he found tracks of a cattle herd and signs of a Comanche party, he was never able to catch up with them, even with the guidance of his Tonkawa scouts. Nevertheless, this expedition offered a lesson: Mackenzie had established the ability of an armed force carrying their own supplies to maneuver through the Llano Estacado. It no longer offered a safe haven for the Comanche.

In 1863 and 1864 General Alfred Sully discovered the secret to defeating the Indians. He quickly learned that his slower, heavily laden cavalry horses could not keep up with the Indian ponies. Instead of trying to chase the Indians down, he focused on the provisions the tribes depended on to survive. Sully ordered his men to destroy teepees and burn dried buffalo meat. They went as far as punching holes in cooking pots so they could no longer be used. Anything that could be of use was destroyed. Mackenzie followed that model. When he attacked a village, he destroyed all the supplies and captured ponies. Although the Comanche were often able to recapture many of the ponies within a few days, there was no replacing valuable provisions and shelter.

Mackenzie's efforts did not go unnoticed. General C.C. Augur wrote, "This is the first instance in my knowledge where troops have been successfully taken across the Staked Plains. This fact, that troops can be so moved, and the general knowledge of the country, and the specific knowledge of the routes and modus operandi of the cattle thieves, obtained by Colonel Mackenzie, I regard as very important and well worth the summer's labor."[216] Every expedition

[216] C.C. Augur to Assistant Adjutant General (Texas). *Annual Report of the Secretary of War on the Operations of the Department, Fiscal Year June 30, 1872.* 28 September 1872. 55-56.

that Mackenzie took into the Llano Estacado increased his confidence and the Army's knowledge both of the area and how to cope with the extreme conditions. He could not have negotiated the Llano Estacado without the guidance of his Tonkawa scouts.

There was no formal Army training regarding irregular warfare. There were no manuals and no training. Experience was the most valuable teacher, and Lawton got that experience under Mackenzie's command. He came to understand the value of native scouts. He learned to respect their knowledge of the terrain and their skill in tracking the enemy. It was an aspect of irregular warfare that he would incorporate into his tactics first in the Apache War and then in the Philippines. He was fortunate to serve under Mackenzie and Crook, two officers who understood how to rely on native scouts against an unconventional enemy. Crook went so far as to integrate Indians into his ranks not just as scouts. He gave them an active role in his fighting force. This was looked upon with great skepticism by other officers but proved so successful that it was a was adopted by Lawton in the Philippines.

Lawton was reassigned to Boston where he served as a recruiting officer. He thought a return to civilization would be good for his family, but he missed the West and his comrades in arms. On June 25, 1876 Lawton had a reason to leave Boston and return to the West. The defeat of Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer and his 7th Cavalry at the hands of a force of allied Indian tribes came as a shock to the entire country. The event made headlines from coast to coast. "Massacred! Gen. Custer and 261 Men the Victims!" blared the *Bismarck Weekly Tribune.* The *Chicago Daily Tribune* wrote of the "Appalling Tale of Indian Butchery." It was inconceivable that a band of wild savages could have brought down the gallant Custer. General Sheridan viewed it as "a mystery, and so incredible that he could not believe it."[217]

[217] "Massacred." *Bismarck Weekly Tribune,* July 12, 1876. "Appalling Tale of Indian Butchery Confirmed." *Chicago Daily Tribune.* July 7, 1876, 1. "The Massacre." *New York Herald.* July 7, a876. 2.

It went without saying that President Grant and General Sherman were not about to let the massacre go unanswered. They quickly made plans for another expedition. Mackenzie was ordered to the Powder River with six companies of the 4th Cavalry. When he heard of the arrangement, Lawton applied to set aside recruiting duties in Boston so he could rejoin his old regiment. His request was granted and, leaving his family and most of his belongings behind, he boarded a westbound train. At Cheyenne, Wyoming, he joined two other troopers and they took the stagecoach to Fort Laramie.

Mackenzie was delighted to have Lawton back in his command, and immediately appointed him regimental quartermaster. Lawton wasted no time getting to work. He had to know how much forage and grain the horses and mules would need and how much food to acquire for the troopers. He made lists of horse and mule shoes, tools, like shovels, and replacement parts for the wagons and harnesses. He requisitioned enough wagons and mules to transport the needed supplies. He put in long hours, but he was happier in the West than he ever had been in Boston. The expedition would prove to be highly useful as Lawton continued his education in irregular warfare as it fell under the command of General George Crook, a noted and highly successful Indian fighter.

The newspapers expressed the opinion that a winter expedition in Powder River country was out of the question. A report from a correspondent that appeared in the *Bismarck Tribune* was typical. “It seems to me, and I have expressed it before, that the campaign of 1876 is closed for all practical purposes.”[218] But the correspondent got it wrong. General Crook was no stranger to the unforgiving winters of the Great Plains, and he was not daunted by the severe weather. He took an expedition out in late 1876.

[218] “The Sioux War.” *Bismarck Tribune.* September 13, 1876, 1.

The expedition was a massive undertaking. It took two months to make all the preparations. At last, the force set out. The public expressed confidence in the ability of the Army to quickly get the situation under control. “If report speaks accurately of General Mackenzie’s temperament he is likely to lead his portion of the command to vigorous and decisive action should an opportunity present itself and orders permit it.”[219] The cavalry set off at a fast pace, but Lawton’s supply train straggled behind, plagued by broken wagons and a trail not suited to wheeled transport.

During an engagement at a Cheyenne village, Lawton demonstrated that he was far more than a simple quartermaster. Lieutenant John McKinney was fatally wounded, and panic began to spread through the ranks. The troops showed signs of breaking. Lieutenant Dorst observed, “Lieut. Lawton who was close by, rushed at them and succeeded alone in stopping them and turning them” Lawton remained a presence of calm confidence throughout the battle. Dorst noted that “No one but a man of extraordinary force, perfect coolness and great determination could have done it. It was the most critical moment of the whole engagement, and it was very fortunate for us that a man was at hand who was equal to meeting it.” With the loss of McKinney, Lawton was put in command of Company M.[220]

The American public, hungry for revenge for the massacre at Little Big Horn, devoured the news about Crook’s campaign. Headlines in the *New York Herald* announced “Graphic Details of the Battle at Crazy Woman’s Fork” about Mackenzie’s rout of a Sioux village that was taken by surprise. Mackenzie’s Arapaho and Sioux scouts garnered the credit for finding the village, guiding Mackenzie “through a country with the topography of which our white guides were wholly unacquainted. Without their assistance we might have searched months and then not

[219] “The Winter Expedition on the Eve of Departure.” *The New Northwest.* December 1, 1876, 4.
[220] Shay, 87-88.

found the den of hostiles, so securely was it concealed among the hills." The correspondent was especially impressed with the ability of the Indian scouts to tell friend from foe. One of the scouts "called attention to two back away to the left. Before any white man could do more than barely discern their existence, he told us they were two Sioux scouts who had remained behind to learn something more about the village."[221]

While the weather began fair, it did not stay that way. A blizzard moved in and "the snow and wind were so blinding that everything beyond a few yards from us was obscured from view….The thermometer for the next few days wouldn't register as the mercury was congealed."[222] Crook was not about to hold back for the weather. The expedition was a long and miserable one. The terrain was challenging. The soldiers resorted to feeding their mounts bark and twigs from cottonwood trees. Crook had to admit that the chase had reached its end when his scouts could find no more signs of the Cheyenne. The expedition began the long return to Fort Fetterman on December 22. While short of completely destroying the Cheyenne, the mission was not a total failure. Lawton wrote that the soldiers destroyed everything they could find. "They did not get away with anything, not a blanket, a saddle or a butcher knife." The troopers captured 600 ponies.[223] They Cheyenne faced a bleak winter as they suffered from the loss of their shelter, provisions, and horses.

Lawton was assigned to escort Cheyenne prisoners to Fort Sill. He provided them with Army tents and even loaned rifles and horses to them so they could hunt. He hoped that in time his show of humanity and respect would engender good feelings among them. "Did my best as a

[221] "General Mackenzie's Fight." *New York Herald.* December 11, 1876, 6.
[222] Crook, 3194.
[223] Shay, 88.

philanthropist with the Indians coming down….Think that in time the good results of my efforts may be seen if not appreciated."[224]

The Powder River Campaign taught Lawton how valuable native scouts were. He continued working with Indian Scouts in the US-Apache War. Rather than being one tribe, the Apache were a loose association of vaguely related bands that inhabited Apacheria, an area that spread across what is now New Mexico and Arizona in the United States and Sonora and Chihuahua in Mexico. The eastern band was known as the Chiricahua. The western branch was the White Mountain. The Mexican border was porous to the Apache, who took advantage of it by raiding and then escaping across the border where Americans were reluctant to follow.

In September, w1881, MacKenzie was ordered to take a battalion of the 4th Cavalry, including Lawton's Company B, from Colorado to Arizona to help put down the Apache uprising. The 1,000-mile expedition took two weeks. The uprising was under control by the time Mackenzie's cavalry arrived. Lawton would continue to gain valuable experience when he was later tasked with capturing the Apache leader Geronimo.

Although not officially a chief, Geronimo was an influential leader who was granted that title by his enemy. He was a strong Chiricahua leader who generally had thirty to fifty followers. With his reputation as a clever warrior, he attracted many additional followers for his raids. In 1885 Geronimo led a breakout from the San Carlos Reservation. They conducted raids and headed south to Sonora and the Sierra Madre Mountains. The Army dispatched General Crook to return them to the reservation. Captain Lawton was among Crook's officers.

Crook was recognized as an accomplished Indian fighter but a humane man. His officers were sometimes frustrated by Crook's insistence on compassionate treatment of Indians. The

[224] Shay, 88.

Indians called him “Three Stars” and said, “His tongue is straight.” What made the biggest impact on Lawton was Crook’s willingness to rely on Indian scouts not just for scouting, but for fighting as well. Crook explained in his autobiography, “I always try to get Indian scouts, because with them scouting is the business of their lives. They learn all signs of a trail as a child learns the alphabet; it becomes an instinct.” Crook believed that “it took an Apache to catch an Apache.”[225]

Crook’s reliance on Indian scouts caused consternation among officers and men. They were particularly bothered by the way Crook allowed Indians to participate in the fighting as well as the scouting. He often recruited large numbers of Indians. He regularly recruited between fifty and one hundred fifty Indian scouts. For his 1885 expedition, Crook organized one hundred Apache scouts to accompany a troop of cavalry with a pack train of supplies sufficient for sixty days.[226] Throughout his autobiography, Crook repeatedly refers to the effectiveness of his Apache scouts and the importance of the information they provided.

General Crook created mixed units of soldiers and Indians. This was in the nature of an experiment, as no one was sure if it would be effective. Crook felt that the Indians were superior to the soldiers when it came to fighting in the terrain that was native to them. General Miles was far more skeptical about Crook’s tactics. Miles eventually came to accept that carefully handpicked men could team with Indians to form an operational unit. According to Andrew Birtle, “Both Generals Crook and Miles employed such units during the 1870s and 1880s, teaming their best soldiers with units of Indian scouts to form small, mobile strike forces. Although Crook found even his best men to be inferior to his native scouts, Miles put great stock in the idea that carefully chosen troops could at least approximate the level of skill exhibited by

[225] Crook, 3559-3561.
[226] Crook, 4245.

native warriors. In 1886 he attempted to prove it by forming an elite force of cavalry, mounted infantry, and Indian auxiliaries under the command of Capt. Henry W. Lawton and Army surgeon Capt. Leonard Wood." Over the course of four months, the men covered over four thousand miles and two thirds of their number had to drop out along the way.[227]

The esteem in which Americans held Lawton was reflected in the newspaper articles about him. An article about "The Fighting Machine" in *The Argus* of Holbrook, Arizona was typical. It reported that an Apache approached Lawton's camp one night. He said that the chief would talk to Lawton, but he had to come alone. His men tried to dissuade him from going but Lawton "smiled sourly at them and told the Indian he was ready." The next morning Lawton faced an "Apache horde." He demanded the chief's surrender. "There was a brief parley. Lawton contemptuously refused to promise anything or to guarantee anything except that he and his followers would be fed. 'Maybe you will be hanged afterward,' he said. 'I don't know about that. Anyhow, you ought to be. But I'll feed you. I'd feed a dog in your fix.'"[228] It is not clear if the chief in this incident was supposed to have been Geronimo. There is nothing in the official record that indicates the supposed event ever took place. Geronimo surrendered a month after the newspaper said the parley took place.

Strictly speaking, Lawton did not capture Geronimo. But his pursuit was tenacious, and Geronimo came to realize that Lawton was not going to give up the chase. Geronimo came to the conclusion that it was pointless to continue running. On March 27, 1886, Geronimo surrendered in Skeleton Canyon near the Arizona-Mexico border. In his autobiography Geronimo wrote, "Troops trailed us continually. They were led by Captain Lawton, who had good scouts."[229]

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[227] Birtle, 1401.
[228] "Henry W. Lawton: The Fighting Machine." *The Argus* (Holbrook, AZ), April 29, 1899.
[229] Geronimo, *Geronimo's Story of His Life,* (New York: Duffield and Company: 1906), 83.

Lawton's determined pursuit of Geronimo garnered admiration across the country and brought his name to the attention of the public. The *Daily Tombstone* of Tombstone, Arizona Territory, reported that Miles, Crook, and Lawton "Receive Great Praise from the War Department on Account of Geronimo's Surrender." The *Bismarck Tribune* of Bismarck, Dakota Territory, reported that Lawton's pursuit of the Apache leader was "one of the most harassing expeditions that ever fell to a soldier's lot….The wiliness of the savages and the wild nature of the country, through which the pursuing soldiers were compelled to travel thousands of miles, adds to the glory of the expedition." The same article appeared in newspapers from coast to coast. An extensive article in the *Los Angeles Daily Herald* detailed "The Story of Captain Lawton's Long Chase."[230]

Lawton was coming into his own as a leader of men. He was commended in general orders on several occasions for his "vigilance, zeal, rapidity and persistence of pursuit" as well as for his "great skill, perseverance and gallantry in service on the frontier against hostile Indians."[231] Lawton followed Crook's example. He pursued Geronimo with a mix of cavalry, mounted infantry, and both civilian and Indian scouts. One of his civilian scouts was Tom Horn, a man who was familiar with the territory and several languages including Spanish and a number of Indian dialects. Horn gained a reputation for himself in scouting for the Army in the Southwest. Some of the Indian scouts gained notoriety as well. Geronimo specifically mentions Kayitah and Nateen, two Apache scouts who worked with Lawton.[232] As Geronimo said, Lawton did have good scouts. It was a lesson that would stay with him.

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[230] "Miles, Crook, and Lawton Receive Great Praise," *Daily Tombstone,* September 8, 1886, 3. "Geronimo's Capture," *Bismarck Tribune,* October 22, 1886, 3. "Geronimo's Capture," *Weekly Herald,* October 21, 1886, 1. "A Hunt for Geronimo," *Los Angeles Herald,* October 21, 1886, 11.
[231] "Californians and the Military: General Henry Ware Lawton," California State Military Museums, Accessed 27 December,2017.
[232] Geronimo, *The Story of His Life,* Kindle Location 1151.

General Miles considered Lawton "one of the most promising officers in the American Army."[233] While opportunities for promotion in the peacetime Army were slow, Lawton had the benefit of Miles' support as well as some fortuitous retirements. His promotion to major was quickly followed by a promotion to lieutenant colonel. He accepted a transfer to the Fort Myer in Washington, DC. There he settled into family life and transferred to the Inspector General's Office.

Lawton spent several years with the Inspector General. He conducted inspection tours from the East Coast to Washington State and California. He enjoyed his hectic schedule. Among his innovations he made changes to the remount service. Instead of purchasing whatever horses were locally available, Lawton recommended the establishment of permanent remount depots. Well-bred horses could be trained for cavalry service. According to Lawton, this change meant that "the trooper will no longer have to depend upon the awkward plow horse or unbroken colt, but may be supplied with a trained saddle horse."[234]

Lawton occasionally found time to break away from official duties. In 1893 he went to Indianapolis for a gathering of the Grand Army of the Republic. He joined thousands of veterans for the festivities. Twenty-two thousand veterans marched in a seven-hour parade. The organizers of the parade offered Lawton a fine horse so he could ride like other officers. He responded, "No, thank you. I'm going to march with the boys from Fort Wayne."[235]

Lawton worked for the Inspector General at an office in California as tensions with Spain increased. Lawton knew that war was on the horizon. He didn't want to spend that war in an office. He wrote to General Breckenridge, his immediate superior. He also wrote to General

[233] Shay, 142.
[234] United States Army. 1893. *Annual Report.* V. 4, 136-40, 731.
[235] "General Lawton: Fort Wayne's Greatest Soldier." *News-Sentinel Sunday Magazine.* October 16, 1921.

Miles. “In the event of immediate war I have the honor to solicit appointment to appropriate command with volunteers in the line, believing that my experience and service will justify such action, and that my services in command of troops will be more valuable than in any other capacity.” Both Breckenridge and Miles were supportive of his request.[236]

Lawton was put to work organizing the expeditionary force. He expected to be sent to Cuba with the troops when they shipped out. He was not happy when he received orders sending him to Georgia where he would organize the incoming volunteers. In a letter to his wife Mary he wrote, “All I wish is a show, and I don’t relish being sent to the rear.” Lawton next went back to Florida to organize the volunteers there. He finally received the orders he was longing for in a telegram from General William Shafter. “Don’t waste a minute longer at Miami then [sic] absolutely necessary and then report here as soon as you can.” [237]

The American flotilla finally set sail on June 14, 1898. Navy warships escorted the transports. Lawton thought June 14 was a day to be remembered since it represented “the first time our Country has sent an expedition to meet a foreign enemy on their own ground.”[238] Lawton brought his division ashore in Cuba. Insurgents who opposed Spain met him and offered to serve as his scouts. This was welcome news to an officer who was comfortable working with Indian scouts in the Apache War. Lawton immediately accepted their offer. Throughout his service in Cuba, native scouts kept him informed of the location and strength of the Spanish force.[239]

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[236] Henry Ware Lawton. Letter to Adjutant General U.S. Army, April 14, 1898.
[237] Henry Ware Lawton. Letter to Mary Lawton, June 15-29, 1898. William Shafter. Telegram to Henry Lawton, May 30, 1898.
[238] Shay, 161. Henry Ware Lawton. Letter to Mary Lawton, June 15-29, 1898.
[239] Evan Thomas, *The War Lovers: Roosevelt, Lodge, Hearst and the Rush to Empire, 1898* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2011), 297.

Lawton's superior officers praised him for his actions, particularly at El Caney and Santiago. Former Confederate General "Fighting Joe" Wheeler, serving once again in the United States Army, noted Lawton's "energy and good judgment."[240] As the fighting died down Lawton was granted a sixty-day leave. He eagerly returned to New York for a reunion with his family.

The military success in Cuba required a civil response. The United States found itself in possession of overseas territories for the first time. The Army created the Department of Santiago to oversee American control of Cuba and put Lawton in charge of the new department in August, 1898. This move came with Lawton's promotion to Major General. This order came directly from President McKinley: "By the direction of the president, a geographical department is hereby established, to be known as the department of Santiago, to consist of all that part of the island of Cuba and the islands and keys adjacent and belonging heretofore, or may hereafter come under the control of the United States. The headquarters of the department will be established in the city of Santiago. Major General Henry W. Lawton, United States volunteers, is hereby assigned to the command of the department of Santiago."[241]

Lawton's sojourn in Cuba did not last long. On December 27, 1898 he received a telegram ordering him to the Philippines. He was to serve as second in command to General Elwell Otis. On January 17, 1899 he shipped out on the *US Grant,* accompanied by Mamie and their four children. After the voyage through the Suez Canal, the *Grant* pulled into Ceylon [now Sri Lanka] for a coaling stop. There Lawton received two cablegrams. Adjutant General Corbin urged him to hurry. General Otis informed him, "Situation critical. Your early arrival necessary." Admiral Dewey worried that a German intervention was possible without the presence of Lawton's troops to discourage it. Lawton ordered his men to purchase supplies regardless of the

[240] Joseph Wheeler to Adjutant General 5th Corps, June 23, 1898, WRS 2.21.
[241] "A Military Order," *The Evening Herald,* (Shenandoah, PA), August 11, 1898.

cost. The ship hurried the process of taking on coal and water. The plan was to arrive in the Philippines without a further stop.[242]

The *Grant* steamed into Manila harbor on March 10, sailing past Admiral Dewey's flagship *Olympia.* Relieved at the arrival of badly needed reinforcements, Dewey ordered the band to strike up "There'll Be a Hot Time in the Old Town Tonight," the song that had somehow become the theme song of the war.[243]

Lawton settled his family into a house in Manila and prepared to go back on active duty. His reputation was as an officer who commanded from the front, never asking his men to go where he would not. He took command of the 4th Cavalry and the North Dakota and Oregon volunteers. His experience in the Indian Wars created a solid foundation for his service in the Philippines. Resistance leader Emilio Aguinaldo dubbed him "the night general" because "I never knew when he was coming."[244] Lawton prepared to set off on what would be his last campaign.

[242] "The Situation at Manila is Most Serious." *San Francisco Call*, February 26, 1899.
[243] "The Situation at Manila is Most Serious." *San Francisco Call*, February 26, 1899.
[244] David J. Silbey., "The Philippine-American War" (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Pa, June 18, 2008).

CHAPTER 7: A BRAVE AND GALLANT MAN

> A sketch of the regiment would not be complete without a mention of civilian W.H. Young and his band of scouts, which were recruited in the main from the Dakotas with a few good men from the Second Oregons and the 4th cavalry. They were foremost in every engagement on Lawton's northern trip, and rendered invaluable service to that indefatigable commander….The voices of Young and Harrington are hushed in the grave, yet at this moment I can hear them cheerily urging scouts on to this attack. Let their surviving comrades, each and all, receive the awards appropriate to their valor. Phil Shortt[245]

When General Lawton arrived in the Philippines, he reviewed the situation and understood that accurate intelligence was both crucial and difficult to come by. He knew that he needed reliable scouts to overcome the disadvantages presented by his lack of knowledge about the local language, culture, and terrain. In the Indian Wars, Lawton learned to rely on experienced civilians, people who were familiar with the environment and who could speak the native language. It was pure chance that he came across the one man in the Philippines who met his requirements. William Henry Young was an American who, like Lawton, had experience in the Indian Wars. Young spoke fluent Spanish and was familiar with the local culture. He established Young's Scouts, the forerunner of the Macabebe Scouts who played a crucial role in America's success in the Philippines.

Military historian Brian McAllister Linn describes Young as a "semi-legendary figure who appears in the Philippines and has a brief career."[246] It is difficult to trace his life prior to the Philippines. In spite of the fact that Lawton seemed to recognize Young as an experienced scout, the name of William Henry Young does not appear on any list of civilian scouts with the army. While it is possible that Lawton recognized the civilian who appeared on his firing line, Young's name would not be familiar to the general. There is evidence that William Henry Young did not

[245] Phil Shortt. "Short the Historian." *Bismarck Weekly Tribune*. 20 October 1899. Bismarck ND.
[246] Brian Linn. Email to the author. 28 September 2015.

start using that name until he left the United States at some time after 1893 for adventures in Singapore, Korea, and China before settling in Manila.

A frontpage article that appeared in the October 19, 1899, *Anaconda Standard* provides a clue about why Young is so elusive in the historical record and sheds some light on his earlier activities. Young had quickly gained national fame for his success as a scout with the American forces in the Philippines and his name had become familiar to Americans. His activities were of great interest on the homefront. The *Standard's* headline proudly blared, "He Was a Missoula Man," adding "His name was a terror to the insurgents."

The newspaper said that citizens would remember the name of one Frank White, "who was well known here during the years when pugilism was a favorite pastime in this section." White was not only a prominent boxer, but he was also a trainer as well. But White "got into a little trouble in this county." He was convicted of burglary on 30 November 1891 and was incarcerated in the Deer Lodge Prison until 30 March 1893.[247]

After he was released from prison, White disappeared. There was no news of him until W. H. Mace of Company E 1st Montana Infantry recognized the proprietor of a bar in Manila. When he excitedly greeted the man as Frank White, the proprietor told him, "Don't call me that. My name is not Frank White here. I'm William Henry Young."

Mace related the information about Young in a letter home. His family then shared the information with the newspaper which printed it in October, 1899. Young had by then garnered a national reputation as Lawton's chief of scouts. The *Anaconda Standard* was quite pleased that Young was identified as a local man.[248] A July, 1898 obituary in the *Anaconda Standard* may explain White's choice of his alias. Perhaps White simply lifted the name of the deceased man:

[247] Melanie Sanchez, Curator Deer Lodge Prison Museum. Email to the author. 21 April 2016.
[248] "He Was a Missoula Man." *Anaconda Standard* (Anaconda, Montana), 29 October 1899.

W. H. Young Dead. A Large Family Left to Mourn the Loss of a Provider. William Henry Young, aged 57, of Upper Birch street died yesterday of Bright's disease. He leaves a wife and five young children. Mr. Young had resided in this city for several years and was engaged for the most part in teaming. The funeral will take place Tuesday afternoon at 2 o'clock from the residence, and there will be services at the ME Church.[249]

But for one mystery solved, another arises. Who was William Henry Young/Frank White and how did he come to be running a bar in Manila? Frank White disappeared in 1893. William Henry Young surfaced in 1898 in, of all places, Shanghai. Oddly enough, he had a connection not only to American diplomat Clarence Greathouse, but to the King of Korea as well.[250]

Greathouse began his career as the editor of a small newspaper in Kentucky. He ventured to San Francisco where he became a lawyer. In 1885 he argued a case before the United States Supreme Court. While in Washington, one of his friends who worked in the administration asked if he would like to serve as consul in Yokohama, Japan. Travel to an exotic location appealed to Greathouse, and he replied that he was willing to undertake that task. He wired his widowed mother, with whom he lived, to pack their belongings and prepare to move to Japan. While there, Greathouse became acquainted with the King of Korea and offered him advice. The King asked him to serve as Prime Minister of Korea. Ever the adventurous sort, he agreed. He and his mother relocated to Korea in 1890.

Greathouse's tenure in Korea came at a time of upheaval over the King's acceptance of Western ideas. In 1894 a violent uprising resulted in the attempted assassination of the King and the successful assassination of the Queen. Greathouse oversaw the investigation which resulted

[249] "W.H. Young Dead." *Anaconda Standard*. (Anaconda MT), 4 July 1898.
[250] "King of Korea's Protector." *New York Times*. September 10, 1898.

in the arrest and conviction of the perpetrators. The cause of the uprising was the King's introduction of Western concepts such as railroads.[251]

A few months later there was an unsuccessful attempt on Greathouse's life. Newspapers reported that Greathouse and his mother had barely escaped being killed. Revolutionaries had placed explosives under their home and planned to blow them up. One of the conspirators had a change of heart and reported the plot in time to save the lives of the Americans. An article in the *Pacific Commercial Advertiser* described the consequences of Greathouse's close call. "The cause of the attempt was the native prejudice against the introduction of American ideas and progress. The conspirators will enjoy the sensation of having a sword separate their heads from their bodies. He [Greathouse] and his mother were moved into the royal palace for their protection, and the King provided them with a bodyguard."[252]

Things remained fairly quiet until 1898. After the assassination of his wife, the King became increasingly concerned for his own safety. His guard was made up of Koreans, and it was Koreans who had killed the Queen. Greathouse suggested that a Royal Guard made up of foreigners might set the King's mind at ease. The King asked Greathouse to travel to Shanghai. There he would be able to recruit competent foreigners in whom the King could have full confidence.[253]

As instructed by the King, Greathouse went to Shanghai in August, 1898. His mission received a great deal of attention from American newspapers. The same information appeared in numerous newspapers all across the country including the *Kansas City Journal*, the *Hawaiian Star,* and the *Sacramento Record-Union.* . "A special to a news agency from Shanghai says that

[251] "He Helped to Rule Coreans." *Omaha Daily Bee*. December 10, 1899.
[252] "Foreign News." *The Pacific Commercial Advertiser* Honolulu. April 11, 1894.
[253] "The Corean King's Chief Counselor Belongs to a Family That Once Lived in This County." *Evening Bulletin* (Mayville, KY) November 9, 1898. "Gen. Greathouse Deposed." *Kansas City Journal*. November 6, 1898.

Clarence B. [sic] Greathouse, the American adviser of the King of Corea [sic], has recruited a strong force of foreigners at Shanghai to act as a body guard of the King, who is said to be afraid to trust the Coreans."[254] William Henry Young was one of the men recruited and was named chief of the Royal Guard of Korea.

This activity led to the eventual downfall of Greathouse's position with the King. It was reported that while the King did not trust the Koreans, neither did he trust the Russians. The Russians kept a large contingent of military personnel in Seoul under the guise of "drill instructors," and there was an implied threat. Greathouse brought a strong Royal Guard back from Shanghai, and it was plain that they would be able to stand up to both the Koreans and the Russians.

This did not suit the Russians at all. They put a great deal of pressure on the King, who dismissed Greathouse and all other American and British advisors. He disbanded the foreign bodyguard. A news report from London noted, "A special dispatch from Shanghai says that Clarence Greathouse, the American advisor of the King of Corea, who recently recruited a foreign bodyguard for his majesty, has been dismissed at the instance of the Russian minister, who objected to the body guard." Greathouse died in Korea the following year.[255]

Greathouse was not the only one who lost his position. William Henry Young also found himself out of a job. Rather than remaining in Korea, which seemed rather risky, he moved on to China. There he managed a mine for a few months. Just as Koreans objected to foreigners protecting their king, China also balked at a foreign presence in the country. Officials decided that foreigners should not have authority over Chinese mines. They dismissed all the foreigners

[254] "Russia downs Greathouse." *The Hawaiian Star* (Honolulu). October 15, 1898. "The King of Corea." *The Record-Union* (Sacramento). September 10, 1898.
[255] "Gen. Greathouse Deposed." *Kansas City Journal*. November 18, 1898.

and once again, Young was out of a job. From there, Young traveled to the Philippines. He might have planned on mining for gold, but he found it more lucrative to run a bar in Manila. It was happenstance that he was in Manila when the Spanish American War evolved into the Philippine American War.

The American mission in the Philippines was ill-defined from the beginning. It did not help that President McKinley refused to articulate his goals or intentions. Once the Spanish departed the Philippines, there was no clear guidance for military commanders regarding the purpose of their mission. General Merritt and Admiral Dewey sought clarification on what they were supposed to be doing in the islands. They cabled Washington asking for clear guidance on the purpose of their mission. Merritt and Dewey wanted to know if the McKinley Administration "was willing to use all means to make the natives to submit to the authority of the United States." The War Department responded that the mission was to protect the people of the Philippines and their property within the boundaries of Manila but prohibited any collaboration with Aguinaldo and his resistance forces. In spite of pressure by Aguinaldo, there would be no joint occupation of Manila in cooperation with Aguinaldo's forces. The War Department informed Merritt and Dewey that "The insurgents and all must recognize the military occupation and authority of the United States."[256]

Aguinaldo initially believed that the United States intended to liberate the Philippines from Spain and assure the independence of the islands. It was a reasonable assumption since the United States had already promised independence to Cuba. Aguinaldo had every reason to believe that a similar offer would be extended to the Philippines.

[256]Wesley Merritt and George Dewey to AG, 13 August 1898, CWS 2:1754. Henry C. Corbin to Wesley Merritt, 17 August 1898, CWS 2:754. Linn, 26.

Aguinaldo said that in early meetings American officials assured him that "The United States is a great and rich nation and needs no colonies." He pressed for written confirmation, but he said Dewey resisted making a formal commitment in writing. Even without getting that assurance in writing, Aguinaldo said he believed that the United States never intended to take control of the Philippines. According to Aguinaldo, Dewey told him, "Have faith in my word, and I assure you that the United States will recognize the independence of the country. But I recommend you to keep a good deal of what we have said and agreed secret at present."[257]

As a result of McKinley's refusal to even consider forming a coalition with Aguinaldo, the United States Army found itself involved in a far different conflict than the conventional engagement anticipated with Spain. The Filipino leader was at first reluctant to resort to guerilla warfare, viewing conventional warfare as the military tactic of choice for civilized countries. He was anxious to prove that the Philippines belonged in that category.

That determination fell by the wayside when Aguinaldo came face to face with the overwhelming power of the United States military. He gave in to guerilla tactics when he realized that the American forces were far more formidable than the Spanish. The new form of warfare took American commanders by surprise and confused the soldiers. General James Parker observed, "The enthusiasm of a national war was absent; even to a soldier there did not seem to be much glory in fighting a weak race whose only crime was a badly timed desire for freedom." Parker understood that the real struggle had just begun. Parker noted that Admiral Dewey had destroyed the Spanish fleet fifteen months prior to Parker's observations, but since that time "little had been accomplished to bring the islands under American control." Parker acknowledged that US troops held Manila and a small amount of the surrounding area, but "all

[257] Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy, 31.

the remaining territory of the islands was in the hands of the insurgents.…Everywhere they [resistance forces] had besieged and captured the Spanish garrisons."[258]

By February, 1899, it was plain that the insurgents rejected United States rule. They had not thrown off the yoke of Spanish domination only to yield to another master. In a dispatch to the War Department General Otis observed, "The insurgent is concentrated around Manila from the Luzon provinces, numbering over 20,000, possessing several quick-firing and Krupp field guns. Good portion of the enemy armed with Mausers, latest pattern.…Insurgents constructed strong intrenchments [sic] near our lines, mostly in bamboo thickets." Otis added that his own troops were "in excellent spirits."[259]

The task of subduing Aguinaldo's forces proved to be more difficult than it originally seemed on paper. The officers who first examined Spanish maps assumed that roads were well-defined, and bridges could stand up to the strain of military movements. Commanders in the field were in for a disappointment. The terrain was hilly and overgrown. Roads turned out to be narrow tracks through dense vegetation. Soldiers found themselves marching alternately on dirt roads where they kicked up choking dust and then flooded tracks where they bogged down in the mud. Where a bridge existed, it was often only a single broad log spanning a rushing stream. The insects were voracious. The heat and humidity were debilitating. Commanders went into the offensive with the expectation of a rapid and easy victory. They learned it was not going to be so easy.

American military leaders identified Aguinaldo as the primary force behind the insurrection even though there was insurgent activity ranging across the islands as far south as Samar on the Leyte Gulf. This prompted commanders to focus their efforts on Luzon. There was

[258] James Parker. *The Old Army* (Mechanicsburg PA: Stackpole Books, 2003), 222, 224.
[259] "General Otis on the Situation." *Oakes Republican* (Oakes ND),10 February 1899.

virtually no understanding that insurgents on the various islands functioned independently. Aguinaldo was the driving force behind the resistance on Luzon, but it was difficult to bring the different tribes together across the widely scattered islands. Each group had its own goals and agenda. A victory on Luzon did not relate in any way to a victory on Samar.

Once the United States purchased the Philippines from Spain, the American force was in possession of Manila but little else. The American force remained static in Manila. At the same time, the Army of Liberation grew in strength. Estimates of the size of the force range from 15,000 to 40,000. The Filipinos spent the next five months strengthening their system of trenches around Manila and placing artillery. There is evidence that Aguinaldo was able to smuggle arms into Manila. He expected the citizens of the city to join in the uprising.

By February, 1899, the American force in the Philippines numbered about 20,000. 3,000 were in Cavite or on transport ships waiting to land. 8,000 were in Manila proper. The rest held a defensive line around the city that ran for sixteen miles. The American troops on the defense line faced significant challenges. Mudflats, creeks, and swamps created breaks in the line. Communication between outposts depended on telegraph lines and prearranged rocket signals. The Americans were particularly vulnerable at the most northeastern point at a loop of the San Juan River. The First Nebraska stationed at that point was exposed on three sides. Colonel John M. Stotsenburg was concerned that random sniping between the opposing forces could escalate into a full-blown battle. He ordered his men to hold their positions without any offensive action. They were to hold their fire if attacked unless directly commanded by a superior to return fire.

Just as Stotsenburg feared, events spiraled out of control. The details are confused and are still a matter for debate. On the evening of February 1, insurgents took control of Santol. It was less a town and more a collection of a few shacks. Americans considered the town to be their

territory and they were not willing to relinquish it to the Filipinos. Stotsenburg took a small party to the town to make his displeasure known to the Filipino commander. The Filipino officer drew a line in the sand and dared Stotsenburg to cross it. Stotsenburg demonstrated restraint and told his subordinates not to respond.

On February 4, he sent a squad under the command of Lieutenant Burt Whedon to take and hold Santol. The village was unoccupied when Whedon arrived, but the squad was aware that there was a Filipino force nearby. In a letter to his family, Whedon described how the Filipinos were attempting to provoke the Americans into firing first. “Our orders had been to avoid getting into a quarrel with them and we had taken insults and banterings which would have quickly been resented under ordinary conditions.” Whedon said he received orders that the Filipinos must keep to the agreed upon lines. The squad should arrest any Filipinos who insisted on advancing. “If it was impossible to arrest them they should be driven back about one hundred yards from Outpost No. 1.”

At about 8:00 p.m., three American soldiers set out on a routine patrol. Whedon reported that the night “was as dark as pitch.” The patrol came upon three Filipino soldiers. It is unclear exactly what happened next. Whedon wrote, “Suddenly, as the books say, ‘a shot rang out in the clear night air.’ The men jumped into the shadow of the building and I ran up the road to the block house to see what was up.” Whedon soon met the returning patrol. The patrol leader told him, “I shot the gentleman.” The Filipinos fired continuously throughout the night while the Americans chose to fire only when they could identify a clear target, conserving their ammunition. Whedon described the Filipinos as “braver than the Spanish and a great deal harder to move.”

Whedon noted that, "The honor of starting the fight rests with the First Nebraska and after the fight was started we had our portion of the enemy cleaned out before any of the other regiments. We have lost seven men killed and about fifteen wounded. The Nebraskans have made a great reputation for themselves among the other regiments here and also with the authorities."[260]

Two very different versions of events emerged. The Filipinos claimed that the Americans fired without provocation. The Americans maintained that they ordered the Filipinos to halt. When the Filipinos continued to advance and cocked their weapons, the Americans opened fire. One of the Filipinos was killed. In his official report, Stotsenburg reported, "Every man of this regiment rendered magnificent service." Newspapers reported on the "glorious deeds of the brave soldiers of the Antelope State."[261] Regardless of who fired first, the fighting had begun in earnest.

American troops poured into the Philippines. North Dakota volunteer John Kinne reported that when he was in Manila on March 3, 1899, he saw mules and cavalry horses being unloaded from the *Tacoma.* They were much larger than horses found in the Philippines and the natives were very interested in the *mucho grande caballos,* the very big horses. On March 4 the American warships *Baltimore, Monterey,* and *Charleston* arrived from Hong Kong. Troops disembarked from the transport *Senator.* On March 5, the transport *Ohio* brought the 4th United States Infantry.[262]

Kinne documented in his diary that there was intermittent firing on American troops occupying trenches about a mile east of Pasay, southeast of Manila. The Filipinos had a clear line

[260] *The Courier.* "Lieutenant Burt Whedon's Letter." Lincoln, NB. 1 April 1899. Page 2.
[261] *Omaha Daily Bee.* "First Nebraska Regiment in Official History." Omaha NB. 8/30/1899. Page 7.
[262] Kinne, diary.

of fire from their position at the top of a ridge. This was a regular occurrence as the American troops went to and from meals, but the insurgents were not good marksmen, and none of the Americans were wounded during these attacks.[263]

On the morning of March 7 several Filipinos emerged from the brush on the ridgeline. They held up a white flag. Major Frank White of the North Dakota Volunteers went out a short distance from the American lines, but when the Filipinos refused to meet him halfway, he returned. That afternoon the insurgents once again came out of the brush with the white flag. This time they came further out into the field in front of the American lines. When White neared them, they pulled out rifles they were dragging behind them and opened fire. White dropped to the ground. His troops rushed out of the trenches to his defense. Although an officer ordered them back, Kinne noted that "not a man stopped until they saw the major returning unhurt." Hawthorne's battery opened fire and killed several of the insurgents while the rest dashed back to the cover of the heavy vegetation on the ridge. Kinne observed, "We decided what to do with a white flag after that." The next day the Filipinos once again emerged with their white flag. The 6th U.S. Artillery opened fire and they disappeared back into the brush.[264]

By the spring of 1899 Aguinaldo's forces had secured much of the island of Luzon. Aguinaldo had designated Malolos as the capital of the First Philippine Republic. It became the objective of the first American offensive. The Malolos Campaign set off on March 25, 1899. The plan was to shift the American force north from Manila to Novaliches where it would split into two columns. One column would cut a railroad line. The other would sweep around the Filipino force in a rapid pincer movement and block the enemy's retreat.

[263] Kinne, Diary.
[264] Kinne, Diary.

The environment proved to be a major difficulty. While his troops easily broke through the Filipino line, Brigadier General Irving Hale's 2nd Brigade was unable to make the quick sweep to block a retreat. His force became bogged down in thick jungle, and soaring temperatures slowed what was supposed to be a rapid movement to a crawl. The troops wilted in the heat and high humidity. In an effort to cope with debilitating conditions, they discarded bayonets, ponchos, and even food to reduce the weight they carried.

Hale ran into heavy resistance at the Tuliahan River. Major J. Franklin Bell led a small unit of the 4th Cavalry ahead to determine the enemy's strength. He found a strong force behind heavy fortifications. The Utah Battery struggled to maneuver their guns to a forward position where they shelled the resistance force, allowing Hale's brigade to cross the river and take the enemy's flank. The incident provided an instructive lesson. There was nothing easy about moving through the jungle where enemy troops could hide in heavy brush and take advantage of their familiarity with the territory. Had Bell not discovered the enemy position, the entire campaign could have come to an abrupt end.

The Americans labored to keep up with the fast-moving liberation forces. Soldiers crossed rickety bridges, forded deep rivers, and made their way through thick jungle overgrowth. They hauled artillery over narrow, muddy tracks. They confronted enemy troops who were dug into fortified entrenchments. They became too tired to eat. They coped with sweltering heat and swarms of insects. Remembering his days chasing Geronimo in the challenging environment of the desert southwest, Lawton ordered his men to travel with the absolute minimum. They carried their rifles, ammunition, canteens, and little else. Transport wagons followed with food and ammunition reserves. Lawton planned to keep Aguinaldo on the move and expected his troops to be highly mobile. His men were played out by the time they reached Norzagaray, and they

required a pause to recover. What had seemed to be a good plan on paper was compromised by enemy resistance and the unforgiving environment. While the campaign ultimately scored some victories and put the Liberation Army on notice that it was in for a serious fight, it could hardly be considered an unqualified success.

Lawton thought he saw a way to bring a quick end to the fighting. He could move his men along the Quingua River to Baliuag and from there to San Ildefonso. If MacArthur moved at the same time along the boundary of the Candaba Swamp, they could catch the Liberation Army between them. But Otis was reluctant. None of the maps had proven to be trustworthy. Otis was quite sure that the route Lawton proposed would be just as challenging as the terrain he had already struggled to traverse. In addition, most of Lawton's pack animals had died in the heat and humidity. Even if his men were up to moving on, it would be difficult for the supplies to keep up with them. These circumstances, combined with the arrival of a peace delegation from Aguinaldo, prompted Otis to order Lawton to retire to Angat. There his men could recover and prepare for a new offensive should peace talks fail. Lawton reluctantly pulled back from San Rafael.

From his Apache War experience, General Lawton knew that he needed eyes and ears before he moved his troops out into the field. He needed someone who spoke the language and knew the terrain. For a short time, William Henry Young filled that role. It was serendipity that the general found the one man in the Philippines who was fully qualified to be his chief of scouts. John Kinne, who served with Young's Scouts, documented his Philippine experiences in his diary. He described how the first meeting between Lawton and Young came about.

According to Kinne, one morning in April 1899, Lawton noticed a civilian, rifle in hand, calmly sitting on a log watching the military operations. When Lawton asked his officers who

the man was, they told him they did not know, but he was frequently on the firing line with the soldiers. They told the man he should not be there, but he ignored their warnings. He joined in the fighting and had proven himself to be a crack shot. The soldiers quickly learned that he could handle himself under fire and responded to his direction.

Lawton was not pleased to have a civilian in the line of fire and ordered the man brought to him. An untrained civilian could endanger not only himself but the soldiers as well. Lawton was having none of it. He planned to dismiss the man immediately and be done with it.

Kinne reported in his diary what happened next. Lawton asked the civilian who he was. "My name is Young. I have been a scout in the Indian campaigns in Montana and the Dakotas, and I thought I would come out here and try to help the boys a little." Lawton explained his change of heart about having this civilian in the line of fire. "I recalled his name as one who had done some gallant work against the redskins and asked if he could pick competent men like himself from the N.D.s [North Dakota Volunteers], 4th Cavalry, and 2nd Oregons. He said he could and I at once offered him the post as chief of scouts at a salary of $150 a month, which he accepted, and the next day was ready for business. During the campaign these men did gallant service."[265] The unit that came to be known as Young's Scouts was born. This quickly became the accepted version of the meeting between Lawton and Young. The first history of the conflict in the Philippines, published in 1900, repeated Kinne's story almost word for word. According to Kinne, "The Scouts worked under the direct order of General Lawton, and the first organized band was 25 men."[266]

[265] Kinne. Diary. 62.
[266]Marshall Everett. *Exciting Experiences in our Wars with Spain and the Filipinos* (Chicago: The Educational Company, 1900) 488-9. Kinne, Diary.

Kinne did not join the Scouts until after Young was killed, but he left the only detailed account of the actions of the Scouts from the time they were formed. The following account of the Scouts is based primarily on Kinne's diary.

The first mission for the Scouts sent them towards San Rafael. James Harrington took part of the unit on one side of the river, followed by the 2nd Oregon, 3rd Minnesota, 4th Cavalry, and 6th US Artillery. Young took the rest of the men on the other side of the river ahead of the 1st North Dakota and 22nd US Infantry. The expedition was uneventful.

The Scouts were next sent to Baliuag and Bustos. Young took twelve men in the advance. The scouts came under fire at Bustos. They initially waited for the 22nd US Infantry to come up, but reinforcements were too slow for Young's liking. The Scouts fired at the insurgents, then chased them across the river into Baliuag. The Scouts took control of the church and fired at the insurgents from the belfry. As the insurgents retreated, the Scouts rang the bell to signal that Americans had control of the town. Lawton brought up the rest of his troops and established his headquarters at Baliuag.

Lawton was anxious to advance, but his men were played out and his supply chain was in a shambles. Wagons broke down from the heavy use and transport animals died from heat exhaustion. General Otis ordered Lawton to remain at Baliuag to reorganize and rest his men. Lawton chafed at the enforced inactivity. Unable to move ahead, he put Young's Scouts to good use. He ordered them to make a comprehensive scout of the area so he would be prepared to move immediately when Otis gave him orders to advance.

While the rest of Lawton's troops paused to recover, there was no rest for the Scouts. The day after they captured Baliuag, Young led them out on the Maasin Road. They had only gone a mile when they came under enemy fire. A Scout shot and killed an insurgent officer, and the

enemy went into a full retreat. The 4th US Cavalry came up as reinforcements, but it was getting dark. Young did not like the idea of moving forward in the dark and took his men back to Baliuag.

The next day, General Lawton ordered Young to plan on being out for eight days. He told the scouts to take ammunition and coffee so they did not carry extra weight. They would survive off the land. Young planned to cover the country from the foothills to the Maritima and the San Miguel Rivers. While they would map insurgent positions, their primary target was enemy supplies. They would destroy any supplies they found to cripple the enemy. Young was also tasked with mapping streams, roads, and trails.

The Scouts set out on May 4 in a pouring rain. That night they camped in an abandoned mill. They had "appropriated" some chickens and had a fine dinner as they dried their clothes over the campfire. During the night, a guard captured three insurgents. They tied up their prisoners and Young gave specific orders: if any of them attempted to escape, they were to be shot.

Young broke camp at 2 a.m. Two men took the prisoners back to Lawton's headquarters. The rest of the scouts kept to the shadows at the edges of the road as they moved. They passed an enemy outpost without being discovered. When they searched a house, they found an insurgent officer and two enlisted men. They made the men take off their uniforms and destroy them. But there were no weapons, so the Scouts left them behind.

At dawn, the Scouts discovered their first cache of enemy supplies. They found a large supply of rice and set it on fire. They took four prisoners. Later in the day they found another storehouse with rice, kerosene, coconut oil, sugar, uniforms, cloth, and sewing machines. Among the supplies were reloading tools, powder, and supplies for making bullets. They set it all on fire.

Young left four men to maintain the fires while he continued on with the rest of the Scouts. For three days they found and destroyed caches of enemy supplies. On the fourth day they reunited with the men they had left behind and set out for Angat. Two men were unable to walk so they rode captured ponies. When they arrived in Angat they found a troop of the 4th US Cavalry and some soldiers from the 1st North Dakota. The Scouts received instructions to follow the trail towards Manila and see if they could find a large body of insurgents who were reported to be moving toward San Miguel. They were also instructed to look for any trails the insurgents might be using.

The scouts left early the next morning, leaving the sick men behind. They camped out that night. The next morning, they set out without having eaten dinner the night before or breakfast that morning. They found nothing unusual or alarming on their scout. They traveled by raft down the San Miguel River to Angat. They arrived exhausted and hungry. From Angat, the Scouts returned to Baliuag. Lawton promised them two days of rest, but the next day they were ordered to move eight miles to Maasin.

Lawton planned on using Maasin as a staging area for an attack on San Ildefonso, his next target. The original plan was for the scouts to reconnoiter the area in preparation for Lawton's arrival. Young knew the lookouts at the outpost would withdraw back to the town at daylight. He decided to take the outpost before they could move. He broke the Scouts into two lines, one on each side of the road. It was so dark that it was difficult to keep together and one group fell behind. Young had to send to men back to find them. Because of this delay, the Scouts would not reach the outpost before daylight. As an alternate plan, Young led the Scouts to a high ridge about nine hundred yards above the enemy position. They concealed themselves in the brush and observed the insurgents.

Young decided to draw the insurgents out in order to better determine their strength. He walked out in plain sight. The insurgents fired three quick shots but did no damage. There was confusion in the enemy camp with officers shouting orders and soldiers scurrying about. The Scouts poured a heavy fire into them, and they likely assumed that they were under attack from a large force.

A scout who had remained in Lawton's camp arrived on horseback with a fresh supply of ammunition. The Scouts tried to flank the enemy on the left but could not find a position that offered advantage. In order to reach the enemy's right flank, they had to cross an open field. The enemy continued to fire at them, but the Scouts did not bother returning the volleys. The enemy now knew they faced only a small body of men and mounted an attack, but the Scouts drove them off.

Young then decided that the scouts would be able to take the town. They charged the insurgents, sending them in full retreat toward San Miguel. The Scouts took control of San Ildefonso in about twenty minutes. Young sent for the 13th Minnesota and the Oregon Volunteers to hold the town. The Scouts returned to Maasin.

Otto Sougstad, serving with the 13th Minnesota Volunteers, wrote about Young's Scouts in a letter home. "On the night of the 11th of My, Lawton's ranks, under Young and Harrington, came to our camp from an expedition into the foothills to explore and burn stores and provisions. They were immediately sent out to find out what they could about the enemy at San Ildefonso. They soon had their outposts engaged, and by their scouting tactics they made the natives feel sick. Word was sent in to us for reinforcements and this was sent at once, and by 3 p.m., San

Ildefonso was in our hands. For their actions, both here and at other places, the band of twenty-five scouts deserve the highest praise. They continued in our advance up to San Isidro."[267]

Young's audacious attack on San Ildefonso was a gift to Lawton. Lawton successfully occupied the town without having to commit his main force. Lawton's next target was San Miguel. After resting for the night, the Scouts set out towards that town. Lawton's aide, Captain William Berkheimer, went with them. They were followed by two companies under Captain James F. Case.

They saw an outpost about a mile and a half outside of San Miguel. When the guards saw the Scouts, they retreated into the town. As the Scouts advanced, they came face to face with enemy troops under General Gregorio de Pilar, Aguinaldo's premier general. Berkheimer estimated the number to be three to five hundred.

The Scouts, however, were not daunted by the size of the enemy force and were not about to wait. Young wanted to attack before the insurgents could become entrenched. The Scouts charged the enemy's right flank. De Pilar's troops wavered, then broke. They retreated across the river with the Scouts in hot pursuit. The Scouts took the bridge, then charged into the town. They held it for several hours until Berkheimer finally brought up the reserves. Thanks to the Scouts, Lawton was able to achieve another objective without committing his main force.

Berkheimer detailed the action in his official report. ""On the 13th day of May, 1899, certain scouts of Maj. Gen. Lawton's command, supported by a battalion of U. S. volunteers, the whole amounting to 118 enlisted men, under my orders encountered the enemy drawn up in line in front of San Miguel de Mayumo, P. I., in an advantageous position, the right flank resting on a stream, the left on an elevation rendered secure by a dense thicket, thus forcing a front attack.

[267] Otto Sougstad. Letter to Mr. Monteith. 25 June 1899.

The total strength of the enemy was ascertained subsequently to have been about 600 men; and, while firing was going on with the enemy's deployed line I carefully scanned the latter and estimated at the time that it contained about 300 men. Without waiting for the supporting battalion to reinforce them or be in a position to do so, a squad of ten scouts, following their leader, Civilian W. H. Young and Private James Harrington, Company G, Second Oregon, U. S. V., one of their number, making twelve altogether, charged the enemy's line, about 150 yards distant, which first wavered and then reluctantly but completely gave way, only to be followed up and driven from the city and environs of San Miguel, a place of great importance."[268]

During the engagement, Young was at the forefront. As the Scouts took the bridge, he was shot and received what appeared to be a superficial wound. According to Kinne, "Young was hit with a Remington bullet, and fell. He kept firing as long as he could see any niggers, then bound his knee. When his men found him, he was sitting up with his wound bound, and surrounded by empty shells. The ambulance soon came up to take Young back. As they put him in the ambulance, he handed his Mauser to McIntyre, and told him to keep it if he did not return."[269]

Sougstad remembered, "At the bridge of Rio Chico de Pampanga, the enemy was once more encountered, heavily intrenched. Here Scout Harrington was instantly killed, standing between two trenches commanding the road and the bridge. He died a noble death. As we marched past we saw his body laid on a bench with Old Glory encircling him. Peaceful, calm, no more war for him, he died a hero and a brave man. Just as we passed him, we were told by a signal corps man that Young, the scout who apparently was but slightly wounded at San Miguel, was also dead. Of him, Gen. Lawton said: 'He is the bravest man I have ever met.' He needs no

[268] *Bismarck Weekly Tribune.* "Short [sic] the Historian." Bismarck ND. 20 October 1899. Page 5.
[269] Kinne, Diary.

nobler eulogy than that. Thus passed away to of the men who have won honor and glory for our country in these islands."[270]

Young was taken to Manila by ambulance. His wound turned septic. He died shortly after he arrived at the hospital. Lawton sent a message to Young telling him that Scout James Harrington had died of his wounds at five o'clock the previous night. Lawton received a message from the surgeon. "Young died at five o'clock last night."[271]

Young's death was a blow to Lawton. He knew that the volunteers would be mustered out, but he was determined to keep the Scouts together as long as he could. They needed to fill out their ranks for those who had been killed or were sick. Kinne joined the scouts at this time.

Captain Berkheimer told Lawton he was willing to take command of the Scouts. The unit was notorious for their less than military bearing. Kinne noted that they bore no official identification, but they were known for their long hair, unshaven appearance, and casual clothing. Pictures of the Scouts bear this out. Berkheimer said he could whip the Scouts into shape. Lawton was satisfied with the Scouts performance. He knew he needed good scouts, not a unit that would pass inspection on the parade ground. According to Kinne, Lawton told Berkheimer, "Leave my scouts alone." Instead, Lawton put Lieutenant Thornton of the 4th Oregon in command of the unit.

On June 3, the Scouts set out for Pasig. They spent the night near there, and the 1st North Dakota played host. The next day, the 1st North Dakota and one gun of Scott's Battery split from the 1st Washington, 12th U.S. Infantry, and the other gun from Scott's Battery. The intention was to force Aguinaldo's Liberation Army out of its strongholds near Manila, but Kinne acknowledged that "it did not work out right."

[270] Otto Sougstad. Letter to Mr. Monteith. 25 June 1899.
[271] Kinne, Diary.

The Scouts, tasked with delivering a message to General Hall, moved through the countryside with confidence. They regarded the regular troops with an air of superiority. Kinne noted that as they approached Hall's headquarters at Antipolo, they observed the 12th U.S. Infantry "hugging the ground behind the ride paddies, with not a nigger in sight, and not a bullet flying." Once they delivered the message to Hall, "we started back, taking our time and foraging by the way. We got nine eggs and a big fat Peking duck." They had boiled eggs and grilled duck for dinner that night. They continued to be successful with foraging. They entered the town of Angona without resistance where "someone had carelessly left a flock of turkeys loose in this town, and we had a 'Thanksgiving dinner' the next forenoon."[272]

On June 5, the Scouts took the lead for 1st Battalion of the 1st North Dakota as they advanced to the town of Binangonan. Kinne noted that it was some of the worst mountain terrain they had encountered, observing that the view was worth the effort when they reached the top. They met no resistance as they entered the town. From there they advanced to Morong.

Kinne described Morong as "a fierce place." The Filipino uprising against the Spanish began in Morong. Houses were still riddled with bullets. "The place had a desolate, deserted appearance, but the men made it as comfortable as possible." Kinne discovered there were advantages to being in the Scouts. "Scouts were relieved of guard and outpost duty, and the rainy season had begun, making guard and outpost duty very disagreeable."

Morong was, indeed, a fierce place. The troops endured torrential downpours, with forty-six inches of rain falling in July and August. The men withered in the high temperatures and debilitating humidity. The terrain around Morong was the most difficult they had encountered. There were virtually no roads, and barely any trails. It was crisscrossed with ravines and gullies.

[272] Kinne. Diary.

The area was dotted with wallows of shallow water and deep mud. The small unit of Scouts was able to move about while maintaining unit cohesion. Larger bodies of troops, however, had more difficulty when they moved through the challenging terrain. Enemy snipers targeted the few trails that existed. Companies had to move in extended skirmish formation. They got strung out and became isolated in small groups. With the imminent withdrawal of the volunteers, Otis hoped a strong push would clear the area between Laguna de Bay and Manila Bay. He mounted the Zapote River Campaign in June.

The Scouts made regular excursions into the countryside to establish the location of insurgents. On June 8 they came across an outpost and came under light fire. They returned to Morong without suffering any casualties. On June 9, it was a different story. They returned to the enemy outpost and found that it had been abandoned. They came across insurgents a short way down the road. “Two of us spied a goo-goo [insurgent] running across the clearing, and began shooting at him, alternately. We got him before he took to the trees.”

The Scouts came under heavy fire. A small body of insurgents moved to the left flank of the Scouts and caught them in a crossfire. The Scouts retreated. Private John “Dad” Killian, who was acting as the leader of the Scouts, had been badly wounded. Kinne and Michael Glassley found a door and used it as a makeshift stretcher and continued their retreat. “At one place where we had to let him down, the niggers were so close to us someone suggested that we leave him and save ourselves, as he was dead anyway. But Killian moved his lips to show he was still alive, so we continued to carry him.”

Kinne went ahead to meet troops coming to their aid. He urged the Hospital Corps to hurry. “But by the time the hospital steward got to Killian, he was dead. This made the third leader of the scouts who had been killed.” This caused some confusion for Kinne’s family and

friends. “His name being similar to mine, and knowing at home that I belonged to Young’s Scouts, it was assumed that there was a misprint, and that I was the one who had been killed. Two days later, a message was received by Fargo papers from Jamestown pointing out that John Killian was a member of Company H, and the correction was made in the Fargo papers.”[273]

The fighting was some of the heaviest that had yet occurred. It was not uncommon for insurgent resistance to evaporate in the face of strong opposition. After hiding their weapons and uniforms, they could easily pass as *amigos*. This was not the case in the Zapote River Campaign. The river formed a natural defense for the insurgents, and they were determined to hold it. Kinne reported larger numbers of American troops killed and wounded than he had previously. There were also high numbers of enemy casualties. Kinne referred to reports of 3,000-5,000 insurgents killed, although that number was not corroborated and may have been wildly exaggerated. When he saw the 4th U.S. Cavalry with sixty-five prisoners, the troopers told him this was all that was left of six companies of insurgents.

A rumor began circulating that Otis had given orders for the volunteers to be sent home as soon as transports were available. June 13 marked the sixty-day limit for the volunteers, and it was time for them to be discharged. On June 17, their hopes for a quick return home were dashed. They drew rations for ten days, signaling that they would not be leaving the Philippines in that time.

On June 22, the Scouts went out on an excursion. They saw insurgents crossing a bridge and opened fire. Kinne reported that the Scouts “got a few, very good shots at the goo-goo’s. They dropped a few pretty close to us.…We returned to town without trying to drive them out.”[274]

[273] Jamestown, North Dakota was Killian’s hometown.
[274] Kinne. Diary.

The troops had to cope with increasing illness. A Chinese cook died of cholera on June 22. On June 23, Kinne said he was "the only well private of Company B in camp." The Scouts had to fill in on guard duty as the company was depleted by illness. A major arrived from Manila to assess the sanitary conditions at Morong. "After making his rounds, he was heard to say that he had seen enough to convince him. We hoped he meant that he would condemn the place as being unsanitary." On June 28, another sick soldier was sent back to Manila. That left only thirty privates fit for duty. The American force was so reduced that Scouts had to fill in on guard duty.

On June 30, word came that the transport *Grant* had arrived from San Francisco. There was hope that the 1st North Dakota would be going home on her. "We were happy to think that soon we would escape the land of hot weather, heavy rains, long marches, Mauser bullets, canned beef, and hardtack, and that our last tour of guard duty in the Philippines had ended." The 1st North Dakota returned to Manila on July 7. They were glad to be done with the town they had labeled "More Wrong."[275]

On July 9, the remaining members of Young's Scouts were summoned to headquarters. Those who had been recommended for a Medal of Honor had to have two affidavits from others who had been present during the engagement. They completed the paperwork, turned in their Krag-Jorgensen rifles, and prepared to leave the Philippines. A typhoon delayed their departure. On July 29 the 1st North Dakota finally boarded the *Grant* for their journey home.

Young was an ideal candidate for the position of Lawton's chief of scouts. He had experience as a military scout in the Indian Wars with General O.O. Howard. He spoke Spanish and was familiar with the local culture. He was a crack shot and quickly became a recognized and respected leader of troops. It was a serious blow to Lawton when he lost his chief of scouts.

[275] Kinne. Diary.

The remaining Scouts continued to function for several more months. Once these volunteers were mustered out, Lawton found himself once again without eyes and ears. It was a setback for Lawton, who was in critical need of reliable intelligence. The next step was to devise a replacement for Young's Scouts.

According to West Point's Combat Studies Institute, "Reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance are battlefield missions as old as military history itself and missions for which many armies have created specialized units to perform. In most cases, these units were trained, equipped, and used differently from the majority of an army's fighting units." Prior to World War I, reconnaissance was primarily the responsibility of the regimental or company commander. These commanders rarely had dedicated scouting units. They took soldiers off the line and temporarily designated them as scouts.[276]

Lawton deviated from the traditional practice of taking soldiers off the line and assigning them to scouting duties. He took his Indian Wars experience to the next level and created a dedicated scouting unit. He assigned soldiers as permanent scouts. The bond that formed between the scouts proved to be an advantage. A modern Army scout describes the importance of that bond. Spc. Serrano Brooks observes, "We spend a lot of time together, so we get to know all about each other. And that's important because you want to know the guy next to you is someone you can trust. And after spending enough time with them, I know they have my back, and they know I have theirs."[277] As a permanent unit, Young's Scouts was able to develop this type of camaraderie. They functioned independently, often relying only on each other for days at a time without the immediate support of the larger military command.

[276] John J. McGrath. *Scouts Out: The Development of Reconnaissance Units in Modern Armies* (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 2008), 1, 4.
[277] Chris Stephens. "Infantry Scouts Experiences." Accessed 30 October 2020.

The modern United States Army still describes the scout as the "eyes and ears of the commander during battle."[278] The advantages of a dedicated scouting unit are clear. The scouts gain valuable experience as they focus their attention on the task required of them. Pulling soldiers from the line to act as scouts yields less than ideal results as those scouts are unable to gain experience over a period of time. West Point's Modern War Institute notes that the practice of temporarily assigning duties such as scouting results in "soldiers that are constantly shifted across various weapons systems and vehicle platforms, and leaders who find themselves in front of formation types they have little experience with." The Institute concludes that the Army should "work to create a population of infantrymen who receive specialized training and experience in a specific field. Doing so will greatly increase professional expertise and, thus, enhance the lethality of our infantry forces….Each type of infantry plays a valuable role in the Army's overall warfighting capability. Different formations have strengths and weaknesses that make each type ideal for a given type of combat, whether that be rapid deployability, defending against a near-peer armor threat, mountain or jungle fighting, etc. What makes each of these formations better suited for different forms of combat is their differing compositions; they are *intended* to provide distinctly different capabilities. As such, each type of formation is task organized differently, provided with different equipment, and assigned unique tasks on its mission-essential task list."[279]

General Lawton recognized the advantages of a dedicated unit and can be credited with being ahead of his time in establishing Young's Scouts. The unit proved its value in destroying the enemy's supplies, disrupting the enemy's communication, shielding Lawton's forces from

[278] United States Army. "Careers and Jobs." Accessed 30 October 2020.
[279] West Point Modern War Institute. "Highly Specialized, Highly Lethal: Why the Army Should Replace Its One-Size-Fits All Infantry Model." Accessed 30 October 2020.

enemy scouts, and informing Lawton of the location and size of the enemy force. It was crucial for Lawton to replace this unit as quickly as possible. He did it in the most innovative way possible: he entrusted his intelligence to indigenous recruits.

CHAPTER 8: LAWTON'S BLOODHOUNDS

> Have you ever heard of the Macabebe Scouts, the sleuth hounds of the Philippines? We have almost one thousand of them in our army. They form a part of every brigade, and in every march a company of them goes ahead to develop the enemy. With bolos and rifles they slip through the bamboos. They ford rivers; they climb mountains; they wind this way and that through the high grass, fairly smelling out the Tagalogs who are lying in ambush. When on the scent they will trot along for days without tiring, watching all night for fear of surprise. *The Saint Louis Republic*[280]

General Otis followed standard practice when he authorized the recruitment of Filipinos as scouts in support of the Army's mission. While there was no written doctrine at the time that covered the procedure, it was a common practice of the United States Army to enlist native assistance in military actions. Major James D. Campbell notes that, "This traditional practice of raising, training, and working closely with indigenous groups to assist in the prosecution of what we now term 'low-intensity' military operations began in the colonial period, reached a level of doctrinal maturity during the fighting on the Western plains and in the Southwest after the Civil War, and achieved its ultimate expression in the incorporation of the Philippine Scouts into the Regular Army in 1920." Campbell goes on to explain, "Raising local troops and working closely with the local and tribal leadership to suppress insurgency and lawlessness in loosely governed or newly conquered areas were not carried out by special troops or elite units, but rather were the norm throughout the Army."[281]

Lieutenant John W. Ward, who commanded a company of Macabebe scouts, reflected on the alliance with natives. In 1902 he wrote an article for the *Journal of the Military Service Institution of the US,* Ward noted, "When a country acquires new territories, and her boundaries are enlarged, it is but natural that new and important questions arise. One of the most important

[280] "Macabebes, the Bloodhounds of the Philippines." *The St. Louis Republic*. September 9, 1900.
[281] James D. Campbell. *Making Riflemen from Mud: Restoring the Army's Culture of Irregular Warfare* (Carlisle PA: 2007), 2.

of these which the acquisition of extensive Island territory has brought to the United States, is the use of Native troops in the government of these new possessions. The question is of pressing need in the Philippines only, for in our other Island possessions it may be considered as settled. But in the Philippines, it now has the serious attention of those concerned in the welfare of the Islands, both in regard to their earlier pacification, and to the future security of peace and order when established."[282]

The United States fit comfortably into the company of the world's colonial powers. Ward embraced the prevailing attitude of colonial powers towards their new subjects. Ward observed, "Although he has few characteristics of the American negro, like the negro, the Filipino does not want his commander to be of his own people; he does not and will not trust them, while his trust and reliance in his American officers amounts almost to worship. Then the higher standard of the Americans in everything is one that they emulate. His strength, strictness, and justness, win their respect and admiration, and they readily serve, giving their love and respect to their officer, one whom they consider their superior." Ward concluded, "I know that the natives of the Philippines make good soldiers, and if properly handled they will be loyal, and of inestimable value to the Government in these Islands, and believe that no expense should be spared to properly organize and equip them."[283]

There was no formal doctrine regarding the practice of enlisting natives because there was no need for one. It was engrained in American military practice. Officers and men knew what was required of them and enlisted natives because it was accepted practice and because it worked. It fell out of favor when the United States began to focus almost entirely on

[282] John W. Ward. "The Use of Native Troops in Our New Possessions." *Journal of the Military Service Institution of the US* (Nov/Dec 1902): 793.
[283] Ward, 794.

conventional warfare during World War I. The World Wars solidified military thinking, focusing planning on conventional war. This mindset became so deeply engrained that Vietnam was prosecuted almost solely as a conventional conflict, with irregular aspects largely ignored. The United States military did not embrace irregular warfare again until the Second Gulf War (2003-2011).

In the late Nineteenth Century, a significant number of officers and enlisted men had learned the lessons of irregular warfare through direct experience in the Indian Wars. It was only natural that they relied on that experience to adjust to the conflict in the Philippines. Their acceptance of native recruits reinforced the prevailing attitude that natives could be useful to an invading force.

General Lawton was pleased to have come across William Henry Young. Lawton thought very highly of Young and his scouts. He noted, "The services of these scouts have been from the beginning peculiarly valuable, and are daily increasing in value as a result of experience. The individuals detailed were in all cases men who had either lived for years on our Indian frontier, were inured to hardship and danger, and skilled in woodcraft and use of the rifle, or had demonstrated during their service in these islands peculiar fitness for the work contemplated."[284] The unit was, indeed, notable. Members of Young's Scouts earned twelve of the forty-six Medals of Honor awarded in the Philippine-American War.

When Young died as the result of a combat wound, General Lawton was left without his Chief of Scouts. Lawton's original plan was to keep the elite scouting unit intact and place them under the command of an officer from the Oregon Volunteers. That was not realistic as most of Young's Scouts were North Dakota and Oregon volunteers with only a few regular soldiers from

[284] Marple, 77

the 4th Cavalry. Volunteers were scheduled to be mustered out. This left Lawton facing two challenges at the same time: the lack of intelligence combined with a serious shortage of manpower.

Understanding the blow to counterinsurgency operations caused by the loss of Young's Scouts, Lieutenant Matthew Batson of the 4th US Cavalry devised a solution. He approached Lawton with his audacious plan. Batson proposed forming a unit of indigenous scouts to assist American forces. Many American officers expressed a healthy skepticism, but Lawton thought the idea had merit. Lawton had served under General George Crook, noted as one of the foremost Indian fighters in the United States Army. Crook utilized Indians not only as scouts, but in fighting roles as well. Relying on his experience in the Indian Wars, Lawton gave his approval for Batson to proceed with his plan. Lawton understood the value that Batson's indigenous scouts would offer. They knew the language. They understood local culture and traditions. They could easily pass as both locals and insurgents. They would pick up on signs of danger that the Americans might miss. They understood the terrain and could function in the hot and humid environment of the Philippines.

Lawton was by no means the only officer suffering from a lack of reliable intelligence. One officer described the army as "a blind giant," noting that "The troops were more than able to annihilate, to completely smash anything that could be brought against them in the shape of a military force on the part of the insurgents; but it was almost impossible to get any information in regard to those people." While General Otis preferred to rely on the elite of Manila for information, officers in the field needed intelligence closer to the ground. They developed their own sources of information. According to military historian Brian Linn, these officers took steps

"to hire guides and interpreters, and to cultivate contacts among the many Filipinos who were hostile to the revolutionaries."[285]

Commanders in the field knew that they needed the support of locals as American forces occupied more territory. The formation of local governmental bodies drew natives into a supporting role. The process was often an informal affair. On 6 May 1899, General Lawton formed a local government at Baliuag by simply calling a town meeting where the residents voted for a mayor and a town council.[286]

By giving locals a say in their own government, Americans provided a positive incentive for Filipinos to support what many had seen as a colonial usurper. The revolutionary movement was an elitist movement driven by the desire of the upper class *illustrados* to regain the property and the power they had lost under Spanish rule. The establishment of local rule was a powerful incentive for the working class who were in large part omitted from the promise of Aguinaldo's revolution. Strong local control supported the Army's mission by securing sources of clean water and other infrastructure such as waste disposal that helped to decrease incidents of disease among the troops. Local government also provided an incentive for natives to control the *ladrones* [robbers] who infested Luzon. Such improvements in living conditions also benefitted local residents in a classic win-win situation.

Filipinos who aided the Americans did so with an understanding of the very real danger that they were in. While American troops did their best to protect their allies, it was an impossible task. American troops could not be everywhere. There were instances of mayors and members of town councils being publicly executed as revolutionaries sought to dissuade them from assisting Americans. The promise of self-rule, however, was a powerful inducement.

[285] Linn, 129.
[286] Linn, 129.

Officers and men who had served in the Indian Wars were especially open to recruiting native manpower. According to Major Allan Marple, "By 1898 when American military power was projected halfway across the world to the Philippines, the precedent had already been set within the U.S. Army experience to augment the use of military scouts with indigenous civilians."[287] This use of indigenous personnel was so ingrained it was taken for granted that officers would utilize locals in a support role. According to the US Army War College, these contacts with locals "were not pursued by a corps of elite or specially trained soldiers – they were made by regular, conventional officers who were merely following customary practice as established through military culture and experience beginning in the 1600s." Historian William Holden notes that the suppression of the insurgency was successful in large part because the Army was "led by officers experienced fighting Native Americans."[288] The formation of an indigenous force was a logical extension of prior practice. General Henry Ware Lawton was a product of that tradition. He worked closely with both indigenous and civilian scouts in the 1865 Powder River Campaign and in his pursuit of Geronimo. This experience set the stage for his later success in the Philippines.

Major Frederic Russell Burnham offers unique insight into the value of a reliable scout to a military force. Burnham was an experienced military scout, first with the United States Army in the Indian Wars and then with the British in South Africa. Burnham described the qualities of a proficient scout: "It is imperative that a scout should know the history, tradition, religion, social customs, and superstitions of whatever country or people he is called on to work in or among. This is almost as necessary as to know the physical character of the country, its climate and products. Certain people will do certain things almost without fail. Certain other things, perfectly

[287] Marple, 2.
[288] Holden, 8.

feasible, they will not do. There is no danger of knowing too much of the mental habits of an enemy. One should neither underestimate the enemy nor credit him with superhuman powers."[289]

Lieutenant Ward reflected Burnham's assessment of the value offered by indigenous recruits. He observes that every local civilian was a potential source of intelligence for the resistance. Ward notes, "All watch you like your shadow, and at the least suspicious movement warn those you are pursuing, long before you can overtake them. The difficulty of offensive operations, under these conditions, are incalculable; adding ignorance of the language, customs manner of thought, ways of living, and of the character, they usually amounted to nothing; and it can readily be seen what a herculean task our army had before it."[290]

The situation changed when the Army enlisted natives. According to Ward, "They knew the people, the language, their organizations and leaders, whom to watch, and the country, better than a white man could ever hope to know these things. Through them and their friends information came in, and results were attained. The greater the number of scouts enlisted, the more people broke away from insurgent organizations, until ever [sic] time the guerillas came out of the mountains into the plains, around the villages and towns, it was at once reported, and they ceased to be able to rob and terrorize an unarmed community; and, week by week, it became harder for them to live."[291]

Lieutenant Matthew Batson was a key figure in the formation of the Macabebe Scouts. Batson entered military service in 1888 as a private in the 2nd U.S. Cavalry. By 1891 he was a second lieutenant and was assigned to the 9th U.S. Cavalry, the famed Buffalo Soldiers. He

[289] Burnham, 444-449.
[290] Ward, 798.
[291] Ward, 798-99.

served as a topographer and aide-de-camp during the Spanish-American War in Cuba and had his first experience with native recruits.[292]

Batson was a thirty-three-year-old first lieutenant when he went to the Philippines with the 4th U.S. Cavalry. He came with a solid military record that he earned in Cuba at San Juan Hill and Santiago. Failure to receive what he considered proper recognition led to his disillusionment with the Army, which he called "this rotten institution." He felt that others who had done less received promotions and commendations while he was overlooked.[293]

Shortly after arriving in the Philippines, Batson hired a Filipino servant. In his correspondence he described an amiable and educational relationship with Jacinto. "My muchacho Jacinto and I are getting along famously together. He is learning English (such as I am master of) from me and I Pampangan from him. Pampangan is one of the true principal languages spoken in Luzon. Only natives living near Manila understand Spanish. Jacinto can write his language as well as I can mine and has taught me to count up to 100,000 but I believe he learns English faster than I learn Pampangan. We are living very well lately as we are able to buy young chickens, fresh eggs, mangoes, bananas etc. and Jacinto is a good cook. He also keeps my clothes washed. In fact he is an indispensable assistant."[294] Jacinto was an invaluable teacher in introducing Batson into life in the Philippines, including the conflict between Macabebes and Tagalogs that created an opening for Batson to recruit a unit of native scouts.

Batson was in the thick of the action. On July 26, 1899, his unit came under heavy fire from revolutionaries entrenched on the opposite side of the San Juan River. Batson and Captain Hugh McGrath swam across the river. They inspired thirty-five soldiers to join them. They

[292] John F. Giblin. "An Uncommon Hero." Army Heritage and Education Center. 30 June 2008. Accessed 28 August 2020.
[293] Matthew Batson. Letter. 14 December 1899.
[294] Matthew Batson. Letter to Florence. 21 May 1899.

surprised the enemy force and took the position. Batson was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for his actions. His citation reads simply, “Swam the San Juan River in the face of the enemy's fire and drove him from his entrenchments.”[295]

When Batson proposed forming a unit of indigenous scouts, he had a plan. He knew that there was a long history of animosity between the Macabebes, a minority tribe, and the Tagalogs, the dominant tribe on Luzon and the driving force behind the resistance. The Tagalogs harbored a deep animosity towards the Macabebes because they had allied with the Spanish. Tagalogs beheaded Macabebes whenever they were taken prisoner. Batson was sure that the Macabebes would be willing to throw in their lot with American forces. He was correct.

The Macabebes inhabited the province of Pampanga. Located in the southern portion of the province, Macabebe territory was key to American success. It is bordered by the crucial towns of Calumpit and Baluacan. The Rio Grande de Pampanga River runs through Macabebe territory. The river and its tributaries form an important transportation route that both American and resistance forces used. The English translation of Macabebe is “surrounded by rivers.”[296]

Strictly speaking, Macabebes are a subset of the Kampampangan tribe. In fact, they were the first known Kampampangans. They became known as “Macabebes” because of the town of Macabebe that they considered their primary home. The Tagalogs, with whom the Macabebes had a longstanding conflict, are also a subset of the Kampampangans.[297]

The conflict between Tagalogs and Macabebes has deep historic roots. During the era of Spanish colonial rule, Macabebe was considered one of the oldest and most important towns in Pampanga. For three hundred years the Macabebes had served in the Spanish army. As a result,

[295] Congressional Medal of Honor Society. “Matthew Batson.” Accessed 28 August 2020
[296] Kampanganku. “Macabebe.” Accessed 26 August, 2020.
[297] Kampanganku. “Macabebe.” Accessed 26 August, 2020.

they were the recipients of privileges not offered to other tribes. Their service to Spain and their elevated status caused conflicts with other tribes, notably the Tagalogs.

In 1839, Apolinario de la Cruz, a Tagalog, formed his own friar order, *Cofradia de San Jose*, [Confraternity of St. Joseph], based on the Catholic Church but not a part of it. A charismatic man, de la Cruz attracted followers even though religious authorities refused to recognize his group and its activities. Religious officials put pressure on secular authorities to act against de la Cruz. Religious authorities made a convincing argument that rather than being a legitimate religious organization, the *Cofradia* was a potentially explosive insurgent movement. The government sent troops to Tayabas Province. They arrested the *Cofradia* leadership and a large number of members. De la Cruz and two hundred of his followers were executed. De la Cruz's body was dismembered and, in a move, reminiscent of medieval Europe, his severed head was stuck on a pole and placed by the roadside as a reminder to all of the fate of rebels.[298] De la Cruz illustrated the seething resentment of many Filipinos towards Spain. While he was not directly related to Aguinaldo's uprising, his movement was a forerunner of it. De la Cruz brought to the forefront both religious and old tribal conflicts that would later play out in the Philippine American War.

The Tagalogs felt their status as the dominant tribe in southern Luzon was threatened by what they saw as the unfair elevation of the Macabebes. Most of the *illustrados,* the upper class, identified as Tagalog. As the they saw it, the Macabebes attained an elevation of status solely due to their alliance with Spain. When Spain abandoned the town of Macabebe in in June 1898, Tagalogs saw an opportunity to regain elite status and take revenge against those they saw as

[298] Luis H. Francia. *A History of the Philippines: From Indios Bravos to Filipinos* (New York: Overlook Press, 2014),105.

traitors to the Filipino people. They overran Macabebe, looting and burning the town. The Tagalogs captured and beheaded Macabebes who they identified as having aided the Spanish.[299]

American military commanders were able to exploit the animosity between Tagalogs and Macabebes. Recruiting natives in the service of empire was a common approach of colonial powers as they pitted one portion of the indigenous population against others. The French called it *politique des races*: race politics. It served two purposes. It provided a badly needed and relatively inexpensive source of manpower, and it drew natives into the cause of colonialism. Once in the colonial military force, native recruits developed an attachment to the colonizer. Military training reinforced cohesion as young men formed strong bonds with both their fellow native troops and those of the colonial power. They transferred this attachment to their civilian families and friends. Civilians came to identify with the colonizer and exhibited a sense of pride in their connection.

Regular troops during the colonial era developed a healthy respect for native recruits. During the Second Sikh War (1848-1849) a British regiment paused in their march at the camp of the 72nd Native Infantry. A British soldier reported that his regiment formed up in front of the Native Infantry and "gave three lusty cheers" for the native troops. Private Robert Waterfield remembers, "This Regiment had fought gallantly by our side, and would face a forlorn hope cheerfully with us."[300] This bond was not one-sided. It bolstered the imperial aims of colonial powers and it also provided material gains to the native recruits and their families.

The American impression of the Macabebes reflected European understanding of some natives as "martial races." The Macabebes fell into that category having clearly demonstrated their martial prowess in their service to Spain. Colonial powers routinely identified some natives

[299] Amber Tarnowski. United States Army. "Macabebes and Moros." Accessed 26 August, 2020.
[300] Robert Waterfield. *The Memoirs of Private Waterfield* (London: Cassell Books, 1968), 107.

as being particularly aggressive in nature while others were considered passive and unsuitable for military service. Military historian Rob Johnson observes that such an attitude can be self-fulfilling. According to Johnson, the British propagated the theory of "martial races" during the nineteenth century, applying it primarily to groups in South Asia and India. According to this theory, certain groups, primarily from pastoral settings like the Madrassis, were less warlike. Other groups, such as the Gurkhas or those with long military traditions like the Sikhs were of a more aggressive nature. "There was also a psychological dimension: the martial races were constantly reminded of their elite status, which created its own dynamic of wishing to retain their reputation. This emphasis on certain groups became self-reinforcing. Treating selected ethnic clans as martial, and elevating their status accordingly, tended to reinforce their own self-perception and make them more willing sub-imperialists. Entire groups were labelled in ways that suited European tastes and preferences…The British and the French were pragmatic rulers and they made use of a variety of cultural factors within indigenous societies to draw the people into the imperial system."[301]

The Americans convinced the Macabebes to enlist in the colonial cause by a combination of push and pull factors. The Tagalogs and their animosity towards the Macabebes provided convincing push factors. The Tagalogs represented a significant threat not only to Macabebe fighters, but to their families as well. Should the Tagalogs be successful in driving out the Americans, the Macabebes could foresee their removal from the province they called home at best, or death for the fighters and the enslavement of their families at worst.

The Americans offered pull factors. These pull factors were a positive inducement to convince the Macabebes to ally with yet another invading force. Pull factors included offering

[301] Rob Johnson,16.

privileged status, monetary recompense, and protection for the families of recruits. In a letter to Batson, Corporal James Conway of the 4th Cavalry described the benefits that Macabebes derived from an alliance with the Americans. "The Alcaldi [mayor] thanks you for leaving a guard here as he still fears an attack from the insurgents, this time he expects it from the vicinity of Guagua if they come they will not remain very long as it will be too warm for them. The wives of most of the married men call every day in a body and want to know when the Scouts are going to be paid, most of them have children and no food. They requested me to write you that if you pay them to have them send a portion home to feed the children."[302]

In an interview printed in the Colorado newspaper *Elk Mountain Pilot,* Batson explained why he had such a high level of confidence in the Macabebes, saying, "There are no troops we can muster in the United States so well adapted to this peculiar warfare as the Macabebes." After six months of working with them Batson remembered, "Whenever we came to a river there was never any hesitation about crossing it. The command would march up to it and into it with scarcely so much as a preliminary halt, and I found to my astonishment, that every man could swim, and swim well. I rode a Filipino pony during the greater part of my service in the field with my Macabebes, and I soon learned that the ponies swam as well as the men, or very nearly so. The idea soon occurred to me that a picked organization of Macabebes on Filipino ponies would be a most powerful force in ending the lawlessness on the island of Luzon." Batson's reference to the Filipino ponies illustrates one way he made adaptations to the environment. The American horses were considerably larger than the native mounts. In his diary, North Dakota Volunteer John Kinne observes that the Filipinos took note of the *mucho grande caballos,* the "very large horses." He observed that Filipinos were generally intimidated by the size and

[302] Corporal James Conway. Letter to Matthew Batson. 6 October 1899.

aggressive nature of the American cavalry horses.[303] The smaller Filipino horses provided an advantage for Batson. Accustomed to surviving on native vegetation, they did not require as much forage as the American cavalry mounts. They were acclimated to functioning in the hot and humid environment of the Philippines. As Batson noted, they were excellent swimmers, an advantage in a terrain crisscrossed by numerous rivers and broad streams.

Batson explained that the Macabebes could live off the land and did not require a baggage train. Batson expected that as the insurgents were pursued, they would move into the increasingly challenging terrain of swamps and jungles. "They [the Macabebes] know the country and they hate the Tagalogs, and they are splendid fighters."[304] With the Philippines serviced by narrow, often muddy trails that served as roads and bridges that were not designed to stand up to heavy military traffic, a force that could function without a massive baggage train had the advantage.

Batson submitted a formal proposal for the formation of a unit of indigenous scouts. He recommended forming a unit of one hundred native recruits. They would be trained and led by American officers and noncommissioned officers. Batson specifically focused on the Macabebes because of their longstanding animosity with the majority Tagalogs who formed the backbone of Aguinaldo's forces on Luzon.[305]

Americans demonstrated skepticism about the wisdom of recruiting the Macabebes. The *Abbeville Press* noted that "Many were of the opinion that the Macabebes would prove disloyal and that they would either sell or confiscate their equipments [sic]." The newspaper acknowledged that the Macabebes were traditional enemies of the Tagalogs, but over the years

[303] John Kinne. Diary.
[304] *Elk Mountain Pilot.* "The Macabebe Scouts." Irwin CO. 1 May 1900.
[305] John Campbell. *Making a Rifleman from Mud: Restoring the Army's Culture of Irregular Warfare*, 1.

strong bonds had formed between the tribes, largely through intermarriage. "It was feared, therefore, that some of these men would join the scouts to secure guns and ammunition and then desert and join the insurgents." The newspaper acknowledged that these fears proved to be unfounded. The *Abbeville Press* reassured readers, "They are very proud of their equipment and take great care of their carbines, which are never out of their sight. They show deep respect for their American officers – a respect which closely borders on love – and in return they are treated with utmost kindness."[306]

The Macabebe Scouts garnered attention almost immediately. At first, they were viewed as something of a curiosity. The *Argus,* a newspaper in Holbrook, Arizona, printed an article that was typical, with Batson getting most of the attention. "Lieut. Batson, Fourth Cavalry, organized four large companies of Macabebe scouts, had advance of Lawton's troops, and attended Young's cavary [sic] in Northwestern Luzon."[307]

As an American fighting unit, the Macabebes quickly attained elite status as "Lawton's Bloodhounds." They also demonstrated that Filipinos were not nearly so united as Aguinaldo would like Americans to believe. This was noted in an article in the *Pacific Commercial Examiner* that described the Macabebes as "the band of fighting scouts who have done so much for the cause of Uncle Sam in Luzon." In addition to providing valuable and badly needed allies for American troops, the Macabebes proved that Aguinaldo did not have the unanimous support of the Filipino people. The newspaper observed, "The Macabebes practical co-operation as scouts with the forces under General Otis has been a standing refutation of the claim of the Aguinaldistas that they represented the unanimous voice of the natives."[308]

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[306] *Abbeville Press.* "Our Macabebe Scouts." Abbeville SC. 27 December 1899.
[307] *The Argus.* Lieut. Batson Wounded." Holbrook AZ. 23 December 1899.
[308] *Pacific Commercial Examiner.* "Macabebe Leader Here on Hancock." Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands. 25 April 1900.

Otto Sougstad served in the 13th Minnesota US Volunteers. He made a similar observation on the relationship between the Macabebes and Tagalogs. In a letter to a Minnesota newspaper he wrote, "I do not believe that any other than a dictatorial government established by Aguinaldo was ever proclaimed by the Tagalo [sic] race. I say Tagalo [sic] because I have yet to learn that any other than a member of that tribe ever held a seat in either Aguinaldo's cabinet or the congress of the so-called Filipino republic. All the leaders of the revolution and all of Aguinaldo's chief advisors were members of that tribe or else claimed connection with it." Sougstad noted that Aguinaldo never intended a democratic government that answered to the people. "Not even municipal affairs were left in the hands of the citizens. A president local and a secretario were appointed by Aguinaldo The approbation of the citizens of the different sections and cities was not considered imperative."[309]

Strictly speaking, the Macabebes were not military recruits. They were employed as civil contractors. Batson recruited American soldiers to provide military training for his scouts. After a month of training, Batson identified several likely Macabebes he felt were qualified to serve as noncommissioned officers. All the officers were Americans. When he was satisfied with their progress, Lawton authorized arming the scouts with Krag Jorgenson carbines.

Not everyone in Lawton's camp viewed the Macabebes with wild enthusiasm. Robert Carter was Lawton's civilian quartermaster. Carter thought it was far too easy for Filipinos to fight against the Americans, then hide their weapons and pass as *amigos.* In a letter to his family, Carter described *amigos* who "claimed to be Macabebes, a friendly tribe who are endeavoring to drive the insurgents from their domain.…The soldier's opinion is that they are half-hearted *insurrectos* sneaking into our lines, taking good care to bring no arms with them. On the shirt of

[309] Otto Sougstad. Letter to *The Journal.* Dec. 18.

one, I noticed an ancient stain at the waist where formerly a belt [ammunition belt] had been worn."[310]

Generals Otis and MacArthur were equally skeptical. They were cautious about arming men who had fought on the side of the Spanish. Batson's cause was bolstered by Brigadier General Samuel B.M. Young, who expressed his "full faith in the loyalty and efficiency of the Macabebes as soldiers."[311] Otis understood that in order to execute the fall campaign, Lawton needed reliable scouts and guides. The Macabebes fit the bill and they were willing to serve. Otis agreed to allow Batson to closely supervise a small group of Macabebes in limited operations as a test case. Batson received formal approval on 1 September 1899 to move forward with the program.

The reticence on the part of top commanders to recruit the Macabebes belied the long American military tradition of relying on native assistance. According to Lieutenant Colonel James Campbell, "Raising local troops and working closely with the local and tribal leadership to suppress insurgency and lawlessness in loosely governed or newly conquered areas were not carried out by special troops or elite units, but rather were the norm throughout the Army. Any officer could be expected to either raise local scouts or work with existing tribal organizations to accomplish his unit's goals."[312] Campbell's assertion is bolstered by records of virtually every American conflict leading up to the Philippine-American War.

Early American military leaders embraced what some military historians view as a uniquely American style of war. According to Grenier, "For the first 200 years of our military heritage, then, Americans depended on arts of war that contemporary professional soldiers

[310] Michael E. Shay. *A Civilian in Lawton's 1899 Philippine Campaign: The Letters of Robert D. Carter* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2013), 67.
[311] Amber Tarnowski. United States Army. "Macabebes and Moros." Accessed 26 August, 2020.
[312] John Campbell. *Making a Rifleman from Mud: Restoring the Army's Culture of Irregular Warfare,* 2.

supposedly abhorred: razing and destroying enemy villages and fields; killing enemy women and children; raiding settlements for captives; intimidating and brutalizing enemy noncombatants; and assassinating enemy leaders."[313] Rather than emphasizing conventional warfare, the early American military embraced the tactics of irregular war. This included the practice of relying on native scouts and allies. The individual rifleman rose to a legendary status. An American mythos grew up around the resourceful frontier soldier and his alliance with his native partner. Dime novels were full of fanciful renditions of frontiersmen like Kit Carson and Buffalo Bill Cody.

In an undated essay, Batson recalled the beginnings of the Macabebe Scouts. He wrote that on September 2, 1899, he was summoned to Lawton's headquarters. Lawton "turned abruptly toward me and remarked 'Batson, I want a company of Macabebe Scouts to accompany me in a campaign I am about to begin. Do you think you are the best officer I have to organize and command such a company?'"[314]

Batson expressed surprise at Lawton's suggestion. He was not prepared for the offer. "In the first place, while I had had some small experience with Cubans as scouts it was only with small numbers at a time and nothing like a company. It is true that I had some weeks before in a letter to the Commanding Geneneral [sic] of the Division reccommened [sic] the organization of such a company for the purpose of patroling [sic] in bancas the nipa swamps lying north of Manila and between the Manila Dagupan railroad and the bay." Batson understood that Department and District commanders had reviewed the letter and judged the suggestion to be too dangerous to undertake, "It being feared that such organisations [sic] could not be depended

[313] Grenier, 5.
[314] Matthew Batson. Undated Essay. Page 1.

upon to remain loyal to the Americans but that they would eventually desert with the arms we had given them to the insurgents."[315]

Realizing this was a delicate situation, Batson expressed reservations. He said the success of such an organization would depend heavily on the officer in charge. He observes, "It would probably be best to select some officer more enimately [sic] acquainted with the native character, posibly [sic] Quartermaster who had used them as laborers." Batson was also reluctant to give up his command of a cavalry troop. His was one of only three having sufficient mounts. He told Lawton, "Frankly I did not consider myself the best officer best qualified for this duty." Lawton listened carefully to Batson. Then he told Batson that they were getting into Lawton's carriage for a trip to see General Otis. Otis had not approved the project, but Lawton hoped to get one company.[316]

When Batson was escorted in to see Otis, the General made no secret of his skepticism. He asked, "Batson, do you have implicit confidence in those Macabebes?" Batson replied that he had confidence in their loyalty "and thought they could be used to great advantage." The General's response did not express great faith in the project. According to Batson, Otis told him, "My opinion is that they will put a *bolo* [machete] in your throat and then we will have more American rifles to fight." Lawton remembered General Crook's statement that "It took an Apache to catch an Apache." He was convinced he needed native help and pressed his case. Otis relented and signed the authorization for one company. There was no doubt who would be placed in command. Batson said Otis "gave his official approval to the scheme and informed Gen. Lawton that I would be appointed to command them."[317]

[315] Batson. Undated Essay. Page 2.
[316] Batson. Undated Essay. Page 2.
[317] Batson. Undated Essay. Page 3.

Batson went a step further than the informally accepted practice of recruiting natives as scouts. He recruited a company of one hundred Macabebes who were employed as civilian auxiliaries. He planned from the beginning to employ them not only as scouts, but in a combat role as well. By the end of the month the scouts were functioning so well that they were entrusted with Krag Jorgenson rifles. Batson's Macabebe Scouts were the first of a Filipino auxiliary force that would eventually grow to over 15,000.

The Macabebe Scouts received a short training session in drill and tactics. Once they advanced enough to be armed with Krag Jorgenson rifles, they formed into four-man *banca* [canoe] teams. These teams demonstrated their ability to gather intelligence and disrupt enemy communication.

Batson's scouts quickly proved their worth at Arayat in fall of 1899. Ambushed by revolutionaries, the scouts charged the enemy line. Fierce hand to hand fighting forced the insurgents to withdraw. General Samuel Young noted that Arayat was "....the first real fight in which the Macabebe Scouts had been engaged, and there was considerable doubt as to how much dependence could be placed on them." But the Macabebes demonstrated that they were determined fighters, and Young noted, "They could be trusted to fight efficiently against Tagalogs."[318] In addition to proving their worth in combat, the Macabebes showed that a small, agile force could move fast, hit hard, and decisively defeat a larger force.

General Samuel B.M. Young had arrived in the Philippines in July, 1899 to take charge of Lawton's 3rd Brigade. In October 1899, he made a move towards San Isidro. After resting his men at Cabiao, he continued his march with the Scouts in the lead. A few miles outside of Cabiao, Young discovered a resistance force in the process of sabotaging a bridge. The Scouts

[318] Marple, 86.

charged without hesitation and held the crucial bridge until the infantry arrived to drive off the enemy.

Young quickly learned to depend on Batson and his Macabebe Scouts. On 11 November 1899, Young sent a message to Batson: "I wish you to move with all possible dispatch to Binalonan early tomorrow morning. If Balanie is at Villasis I wish him also to move to Binalonan. The condition of affairs makes this move urgent. I send this dispatch by a native courier. Please acknowledge receipt and direct him to carry it to me at Asingan where I will be at 9 o'clock. You should move by direct route through Jirdaneta."[319]

Lawton was pleased with Batson's support of Young. In a telegram to the Chief of Staff Lawton requested an expansion of the program. "Macabebe scouts doing excellent services and are proving model soldiers for this service. They are worth twice their number of our inexperienced men. Should we not employ them when they may be had for the asking at less than half the cost of one of our own soldiers, particularly that we need their services so badly at this time? I can secure a regiment in forty-eight hours, and should have them. At least let me have a full battalion."[320] Otis had to admit that the Macabebes had lived up to Batson's expectations. He authorized three more companies of Macabebes. Two were assigned to Lawton and one to MacArthur.[321] Lawton had no doubt who he would assign to oversee the expanded recruitment of Macabebes.

Batson reported, "We arrived on west bank of river about same time the force entered San Isidro. Gen'l Young at once sent for me and handed me a telegram from Gen'l Lawton directing me to report to him at once to return to Macabebe to raise two more companies. I

[319] General Samuel Young. Telegram to Matthew Batson. 11 November 1899.
[320] Henry Ware Lawton. Telegram to Chief of Staff Schwan. 18 October 1899.
[321] BLinn. *The Philippine War*, 128.

selected 3 good banqueros [canoe men] and with Jacinto got into my *banco* and proceeded down the river. It was about nine o'clock and dark as pitch when I reached Caboo. After considerable trouble I found Gen'l Lawton's Hdqrs. The general was in back where I reported. He [Lawton] said 'I am very much pleased with the Macabebes. I want you to go back to Macabebe and organize two more companies. How long will it take you?'" When Batson said he could have two more companies ready in five days. Lawton replied, "Well, that is all right but four days would suit me better."[322]

Batson believed that the Macabebe Scouts could be expanded even further into a full combat unit. On March 23, 1900, he sent a proposal to the Adjutant General. He requested a promotion to Colonel of Volunteers and that he be "authorized to enlist, organize and equip as Cavalry a regiment of the Narives [sic] of Luzon known as Macabebes." Batson explained that the Macabebes had proven to be loyal allies. "Such a regiment can be recruited entirely from young men to to [sic] 30 years of ago [sic], who have been [in] service. These soldiers under General Blanco were considered the best troops Spain in the Philippines, and remained loyal to Spain until the Secretary of the islands passed [to] the United States, since which time they have been equally loyal to the United States." Batson gave assurances that the Macabebes had refused to assist Aguinaldo, a stand that "has frequently cost them heavily both in lives and in property."[323]

In his letter, Batson detailed his experience with the Macabebes. He called them fearless and noted that they were "almost impossible to ambush." Batson noted that during his early days with the Macabebes, "I was the only white officer on duty with them, and I had but one white

[322] Batson. Letter to Florence. 10 November 1899.
[323] Batson. Letter to Adjutant General. 23 March 1900.

non-commissioned officer with me. All the non-commissioned officers of the companies were natives, yet I found no difficulty in handling them."[324]

Batson's suggestion for a native cavalry unit harkened back to the Army's experience in the Indian Wars. Batson proposed officially elevating the Macabebes from scouts to soldiers. "I have no doubt that a regiment of Macabebes would be more effective than a regiment of volunteers, and would be only about one-half as expensive."[325]

The Macabebe Scouts lived up to Batson's expectations and they functioned better than most of the officers dared to hope for. They were finally officially sanctioned by an Act of Congress on 2 February 1901. According to Section 36 of the Act:

> That when in his opinion the conditions in the Philippine Islands justify such action the President is authorized to enlist natives of those islands for service in the Army, to be organized as scouts, with such officers as he shall deem necessary for their proper control, or as troops or as companies, as authorized by this act, for the Regular Army. The President is further authorized, in his discretion, to form companies, organized as are companies of the Regular Army, in squadrons or battalions, with officers and noncommissioned officers corresponding to similar organizations in the cavalry and infantry arms…When in the opinion of the President, natives of the Philippine Islands shall, by virtue of their services and character, show fitness for command, the President is authorized to make provisional appointments to the grades of second and first lieutenants from such natives, who, when so appointed, shall have the pay and allowances to be fixed by the Secretary of War, not exceeding those of corresponding grades of the Regular Army.[326]

George Van Horn Mosely, a First Lieutenant in the 1st US Cavalry, served with the Macabebe Scouts. Mosely was pleased when Congress recognized the scouts as part of the regular Army. Mosely wrote, "By the Act of Congress of February 2, 1901, the Philippine scouts became a part of the regular army of the United States, and they have, under the influence and discipline of the regular establishment, applied by competent scout officers, the majority of

[324] Batson. Letter to Adjutant General. 23 March 1900.
[325] Batson. Letter to Adjutant General. 23 March 1900.
[326] Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1904, Report of the Philippine Commission (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1905), XII, 17-18.

whom came from the army, become efficient, well-disciplined organizations, making a fine showing in field and garrison, and casting credit on the army generally."[327]

American commanders in the Philippines understood the necessity of incorporating the local population into the counterinsurgency. The native scouts played a crucial role in keeping American commanders informed and went on to be reliable and necessary allies in combat. They provided intelligence, disrupted enemy communication, shielded the American force from enemy intelligence, and destroyed enemy supplies. The U.S. Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual notes that "while firepower is the determinant of success in conventional warfare, the key to victory in counterinsurgency is intelligence.…one of the Principles of Counterinsurgency is that 'Intelligence Drives Operations.'"[328] The United States mimicked successful colonial powers in recruiting natives to serve the empire. The native recruits of the Macabebe Scouts and the accurate intelligence they provided were key factors in American success in the Philippines.

[327] George Van Horn Mosely. "A Colonial Army." *Journal of the Military Service Institution of the US* (Mar/Apr 1904): pp 243-51.
[328] U.S. Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. xviii

CHAPTER 9: NO FRIENDS BUT THE MOUNTAINS

> Wars must vary with the nature of their motives and of the situation which gives rise to them. The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive. Carl von Clausewitz[329]

Clausewitz argues that while the underlying nature of war is enduring and unchanging, the character of each war differs, depending on the agents involved, the methods used, environmental conditions, and the purpose behind the conflict. Fortunately for the United States General Henry Ware Lawton clearly understood the character of the Philippine American War. He did not err by "mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature." Instead, he had the experience to adapt to the war in which he found himself. He understood the difference between the enduring nature of war and the changing character of war. Lawton's experience in the Indian Wars gave him the confidence to rely first on a civilian scout and then on native scouts. In doing so, he carried on a long history of colonial empires relying on the indigenous population for support.

Throughout history empires have depended on local connections to achieve and maintain colonial ambitions. The British, French, and Germans all enlisted indigenous recruits into their military forces. Local support can be obtained either voluntarily, through coercion, or by a combination of both. Indigenous recruits offer valuable assistance in many forms including supplying provisions, providing intelligence, and contributing their knowledge of the local language and customs, as well as actively participating militarily.

Insurgencies struggling against an invading force also take advantage of the local population. Local support provides crucial assistance. It offers invaluable intelligence that allows

[329] Von Clausewitz, 141.

the insurgency to allocate resources in the most effective manner. Insurgents have the advantage of being able to blend in with the local population. They are familiar with the language, culture, and environment. The insurgency can create havoc among the enemy and then disappear, only to reappear as local civilians.

An insurgency is under no pressure to win a military victory on the battlefield. The object is to make the situation so difficult and expensive that the invading force will simply abandon the attempt and leave. There are many examples of successful insurgencies that did not win militarily. Great Britain occupied Cyprus from 1878 to 1960 when Cyprus gained independence. A Greek Cypriot paramilitary group mounted an insurgency from 1955 to 1959 in an effort to push the British off the island. Great Britain did not lose on the battlefield in Cyprus. The terror and chaos sewn by the insurgents made remaining in Cypress both unprofitable and embarrassing for the British.[330] There were many reasons for Great Britain to withdraw and few to warrant remaining.

The insurgency does not have to win a military victory. The insurgency just has to not lose. Aguinaldo understood this, and he correctly identified the American center of gravity not as its military force but as the public opinion of the American people. General Francisco Macabulos observed that the aim of the insurrection was not to defeat the American military force on the battlefield. Instead, the aim was "was to inflict on them constant losses."[331] The hope was that a rising death toll would lead to the electoral defeat of President McKinley and the election of William Jennings Bryan. The leadership of the insurrection believed that Bryan would be more

[330] Andrekos Varnava. "*Punch* and the British Occupation of Cyprus in 1878." *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies*. Vol. 29, Issue 2 (2005) 167-186.
[331] Linn, 187.

willing to make peace and vacate the Philippines. While this was a reasonable short-term strategy, McKinley's victory demoralized the insurgents.

Achieving local influence is crucial when engaging in irregular warfare. Establishing a firm local base, however modest, is a platform on which to build broader support. In addition, a solid local base denies resources to the enemy. Colonial empires have repeatedly achieved success by developing a solid foundation of local support. Such support does not guarantee success, but the lack of it make victory less likely. The Anglo-Afghan War (1839-1842) ended in disaster for the British who were unable to attract local support. The Russians came to the same end after a ten-year war in Afghanistan, a country that has come to be known as the "Graveyard of Empires."

In October 2012, a new statue took its place in New York City near One World Trade Center in Lower Manhattan. The statue is called *De Oppresso Liber*: To Liberate the Oppressed. It is the motto of the United States Army Special Forces. The sixteen-foot-tall monument depicts a modern American Special Forces soldier armed and outfitted for combat. But there is an eye-catching incongruity: the modern soldier is mounted on a small, feisty Afghan horse. The monument honors the Green Berets who were the first American troops in Afghanistan following the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, 11 September 2001. The statue captures an iconic moment in American military history and is a testament to the adaptability and dedication of the American soldier. It is also a testament to the indigenous people of the region who chose to throw in their lot with American forces.

There is yet another interpretation of the statue. It can be seen as an acknowledgement that the conflict in the Middle East is unlikely to take on a conventional format. It is unlikely that opposing conventional forces will face each other across a recognizable field of battle in the near

future. Instead, it is far more likely that the conflict will continue for the foreseeable future as an irregular, and that NATO will continue to rely on Special Forces.

In 1959, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) conducted an in-depth analysis of the potential value of the Kurds as regional allies. The CIA identified a primary motivation that might by exploited to encourage their alliance with the United States. The report notes, "The outstanding characteristic of the Kurds has been the desire to be left alone to conduct their own affairs." Assurances that the United States would support Kurdish independence could prove to be a motivating factor in attracting their alliance. The report downplays the military aid that Kurds might offer. The report observes, "Today, however, the dashing, 'trigger-happy' horseman is no match for forces that effectively employ aircraft and unit communications. If properly equipped and led, the Kurds have a great potential for harassment and guerilla warfare but they are no longer capable of meeting organized armies on terms of equality."[332] Ironically, it was those very qualities of the independent Kurdish horseman that proved so useful to the United States in the Middle Eastern conflict. The CIA report concludes that irregular warfare is a thing of the past. Current events have proven that conclusion to be false.

Throughout history, powerful military forces have been forced to resort to irregular warfare. Both the British and the French recruited native in King William's War [French and Indian War, 1689-97]. Americans relied on indigenous allies to engage in irregular tactics during the American War of Independence. Wellington fought beside Spanish guerillas against Napoleon on the Iberian Peninsula. Mao Zedong was a master of irregular warfare and understood the importance of local support. Indigenous allies do not guarantee success, as the United States discovered in Vietnam. But the failure to develop the support of indigenous allies

[332] "Geographic Intelligence Report: The Kurds in 1959" (Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1960), 4.

all but guarantees failure, a concept illustrated by the British in Cyprus and the Russians in Afghanistan.

According to military expert Thomas Huber, "A crucial aspect of the complementary relationship between regular and irregular forces is the way in which they increase the number and variety of threats faced by the enemy. Irregular force operations pressure an enemy to disperse forces that otherwise would be concentrated against regular forces."[333] Gaining support from the local population is key to winning a counterinsurgency.

General Henry Ware Lawton did not know it in 1899, but he was waging compound warfare. That term was not coined until 1966. Compound warfare describes conventional and unconventional forces working together. The commander utilizing compound warfare increases military leverage above and beyond that of either conventional or unconventional warfare used separately. The irregular force can provide intelligence while denying intelligence to the enemy. The irregular force can provide supplies to the conventional force while denying them to the enemy and can also impede the enemy's ability to maneuver. This is exactly what Lawton did in the Philippines that eventually led to Emilio Aguinaldo's surrender. Aguinaldo had abandoned conventional warfare and resorted to guerilla warfare alone. He did not have the personnel or the armaments to support both a conventional and an unconventional war at the same time.

While the term was new in 1966, the tactic was not. There are many examples of compound warfare throughout history. The Continental Army in the Revolutionary War, Wellington against Napoleon in Spain, both combatants in the American Civil War, and the Chinese Communist Army under Mao Zedong all utilized compound warfare. Huber observes, "In these and many other cases the practice of employing regular and irregular forces together

[333] Thomas Huber, vii.

was not only applied, but also instrumental in bringing victory to the side that at the beginning of the conflict seemed clearly inferior to its opponent."[334]

Huber describes compound warfare as providing distinct advantages to the side that employs it well. "Regular force movements pressure an enemy to concentrate forces that he would like to disperse to counter irregular force attacks. Unless the enemy has forces large enough and mobile enough to engage all threatening actions by both types of forces simultaneously and effectively, the side possessing regular and irregular forces should be able to achieve local superiority in certain places at certain times. That local superiority is critical because it establishes a foundation upon which to build a larger, more capable force structure and fight even harder."[335]

Napoleon Bonaparte was driven out of the Iberian Peninsula by compound warfare. He called it "that fatal knot." Napoleon's army is not the only example of a powerful force that met its end at the hands of guerillas working in concert with conventional forces. The United States suffered the same fate in Vietnam. Without having a name for it, Lawton relied on his experience in the Indian Wars and resorted to compound warfare to defeat Emilio Aguinaldo in the Philippines.[336]

Going beyond basic compound warfare, Lawton instinctively moved to "fortified" compound warfare which Huber has called "almost insurmountable." In fortified warfare, the conventional portion of the force is strengthened in some way. This might mean being shielded by traditional physical fortifications, but not necessarily. "Fortified" is used in the sense of "to

[334] Huber, vii
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[336] Huber, vii.

strengthen." It can include other forms of strengthening such as forming strong alliances, utilizing technology, and developing effective intelligence.[337]

Two factors figure in creating such a formidable force. The first is a safe haven for the conventional troops where they can rest and recoup in safety and where provisions and supplies will be out of the enemy's reach. The second is an ally which is at least a peer of the opposing force. Lawton had both. Aguinaldo had neither. Lawton was able to protect his resources and he formed an effective alliance with the Macabebes. Aguinaldo resorted to irregular warfare, but he was never able to properly fortify it. His support dwindled until he was eventually run to ground, just as Lawton had run Geronimo to ground in the American Southwest.

An alliance with an indigenous population is a proverbial double-edged sword. As noted, native recruits offer numerous advantages to the colonial force. Such partnerships also present potential dangers. If native recruits determine that their colonial allies are not living up to the alliance agreement, they are likely to defect to the insurgent force. Should they take that step, they would take with them training, equipment, and intelligence. This could pose a grave threat to the colonial force as well as broader global interests.

A 1948 Central Intelligence Agency report addresses the breakdown of colonial empires and how that breakdown was likely to ripple out and affect seemingly uninvolved governments. The report concludes that the dismantling of colonial possessions not only weakened European states, the process "has major implications for US security, particularly in terms of possible world conflict with the USSR. This shift of the dependent areas from the orbit of the colonial powers not only weakens the probable European allies of the US but deprives the US itself of assured access to vital bases and raw materials in these areas in event of war." In the assessment

[337] Huber, 3.

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According to the CIA, "the unresolved conflict between France and the rapidly growing nationalist movement in French possessions, especially in Tunisia and Morocco" presented the major challenge to colonial powers in North Africa. While France recognized the need for reform, the determination to maintain colonies would override any will to grant a degree of internal autonomy. "The French will not make concessions which will endanger their strategic control of the area or destroy the privileged economic position of the settlers of French descent."[340]

The upheaval of World War II gave momentum to global nationalist movements. Great Britain withdrew from India/Pakistan and Burma. France and the Netherlands gave up on east. The Central Intelligence Agency observed, "While the colonial issue in most remaining

[338] Central Intelligence Agency, "The Break-Up of the Colonial Empires and Its Implications for US Security (Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1948), 1.
[339] Central Intelligence Agency. "The Break-Up of the Colonial Empires and Its Implications for US Security" (Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1948), 1.
[340] Central Intelligence Agency, "Probable Developments in North Africa" (Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1954), 1.

dependencies is not yet acute, native nationalism in many of these areas too will exert increasing pressure for autonomy or independence.[341] The promise of autonomy is a powerful "pull" influence to lure potential recruits away from the invading force and towards an indigenous independence movement. At the same time, the refusal of colonial powers to grant concessions in autonomy is a "push" factor that drives away potential indigenous allies. The CIA warned, "unless the US itself adopts a more positive and sympathetic attitude toward the national aspirations of these areas and at least partially meets their demands for economic assistance, it will risk their becoming actively antagonistic towards the US."[342] nationalist movements were not going to dissipate on their own. Aspirations for independence would only go stronger.

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[341] Central Intelligence Agency, "The Break-up of the Colonial Empires and Its Implications for US Security," 1.
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[343] Huber, vii.
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[348] Central Intelligence Agency, "The Break-up of the Colonial Empires and Its Implications for US Security," 1.

influence to lure potential recruits away from the invading force and towards an indigenous independence movement. At the same time, the refusal of colonial powers to grant concessions in autonomy is a "push" factor that drives away potential indigenous allies. The CIA warned, "unless the US itself adopts a more positive and sympathetic attitude toward the national aspirations of these areas and at least partially meets their demands for economic assistance, it will risk their becoming actively antagonistic towards the US."[349] In short, nationalist movements were not going to dissipate on their own. Aspirations for independence would only grow stronger.

The lot of the indigenous recruit is an uncertain one. After the conflict, their loyalty is rarely rewarded commensurate with their contributions. On October 6, 2019, President Donald Trump announced his unilateral decision to withdraw American troops from Syria. This left America's Kurdish allies at the mercy of hostile Turkish and Syrian forces. Throughout America's conflict in the Middle East following the terrorist attack of 9/11, the Kurds served as America's most determined and loyal allies. Their reward was abandonment. It came as no surprise to them. It was not the first time. Throughout their history the Kurds have allied with various powerful forces and received a similar reward. They have a saying: No friend but the mountains. They know that, in the end, they can only rely on themselves.

The Kurds are far from the first indigenous allies to meet such a fate. After the final surrender of Geronimo in 1886, Apache who remained in Arizona were arrested and sent into exile in Florida. Some of those Apache fought tenaciously against the United States. But most of them were loyal scouts who had served first with General Crook and then with General Miles. Their loyalty was rewarded with betrayal.

[349] Central Intelligence Agency, "The Break-Up of the Colonial Empires and Its Implications for US Security," 3.

In 1985, political observer Jack Anderson wrote about the abandonment about American allies in Nicaragua. The United States recruited members of the Miskito, Sumo, and Rama tribes to fight against Communism. The CIA equipped the guerrilla force called the Misura, named for the tribes that made up its ranks. The force once numbered as high as 2,000. The CIA then abandoned the Misura in favor of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force. Abandoned by the United States, out of favor in their homeland, veterans of the Misura fled to Honduras where they lived in poverty. Anderson wrote, "The question is not whether the CIA should have recruited these guerrilla fighters. The CIA did recruit them. It is wrong now to abandon them and pretend they don't exist." The Misura veterans observed, "No mama, no papa, no Uncle Sam."[350]

The vast colonial empires disintegrated following the end of World War II. The need for indigenous recruits in the traditional sense gradually became a thing of the past. Global powers continued to rely on the military cooperation of indigenous forces in a different form: proxy wars. According to Professor of Security and Intelligence Studies Tyrone Groh, "Proxy wars are interventions in which a foreign state supports an indigenous actor to influence political outcomes in a country or region. Support for proxies can be either material (weapons, intelligence, supplies) or immaterial (training, advising, politically advocating for the cause)." Groh explains that there are several different motivations for engaging in proxy war. The entity behind a proxy war may seek a decisive victory, as the United States did in Nicaragua when it backed the Contras against the Sandinistas. A proxy war can be an attempt to maintain the status quo. In supporting Hezbollah, Iran's goal is to keep Israel's influence in check. A proxy war can offer an opportunity to probe the weaknesses of an opponent. An example of this is the air support that the United States provided for anti-Qaddafi forces in Libya. Pakistan provided

[350] Jack Anderson. "Foreign Outlook: Once Again the CIA Is Forsaking Its Allies." *Washington Post,* September 13, 1985.

support for Pashtun and Tajik militias when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in an effort to prevent encroachment into Pakistan's western regions.[351]

Proxy forces offer many of the advantages that indigenous recruits offered to colonial powers. They know the local language. They are familiar with the local terrain and environment. Being familiar with the local culture and customs means the proxy force is more likely than the intervening force to be able to offer appropriate push and pull offers to encourage local support.

Proxy wars allow global powers to engage in conflict while avoiding human, financial, and political costs. They allow a power to gain access to an area as well as to exert influence, all while providing the opportunity to act in secret and plausibly deny involvement. The intervening power must weigh the risks and benefits related to the prosecution of waging a proxy war. Exerting more control increases the possibility of a desired outcome but decreases the ability to maintain plausible deniability. Increased control leads to increased scrutiny. Israel engaged in a low-key proxy war in Lebanon in the 1970's and 1980's. This resulted in a low level of control over the Lebanese Christian proxy force. When Israel's proxy partner engaged in the massacre of Palestinians in refugee camps, the political consequences were immediate.[352] The Israeli government suffered a public relations disaster and felt compelled to end the relationship with the proxy. Israel thereby lost the ability to influence the political situation in Lebanon.

In a 1984 interview, CIA Director William J. Casey discussed the growing dangers of proxy wars. He referred to "the destabilization and subversion of countries around the world by a combination of the Soviet Union and its Cuban, Vietnamese, Ethiopian, and Libyan proxies….Hence the KGB and its auxiliaries – the East Europeans, the Vietnamese, the Cubans, the Nicaraguans – apply increasing amounts of manpower, money, and subversive skills in their

[351] Tyrone Groh, Lawfare "The Utility of Proxy War." Accessed 21 November 2020. (Underlining is the author's).
[352] Groh, "The Utility of Proxy War."

effort to destroy us and our capabilities."[353] Casey did not acknowledge that the United States also explored the advantages of proxy wars.

A proxy war is advantageous to the intervening power only as long as its objectives align with those of the proxy. A proxy relationship is not an alliance. The proxy is not a true partner sharing common goals. The objectives of the two parties typically diverge as the situation changes. This is illustrated by the American experience with the mujahideen in Afghanistan. The mujahideen developed a well-organized but poorly equipped force to resist the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979-1989). The CIA offered material support. After the Soviet departure from the country, the mujahideen evolved into the Taliban. Based on a fundamentalist interpretation of sharia law, the Taliban imposed severe restrictions on behavior including requiring women to wear the head-to-toe burqa, banning music, and punishing men who shaved their beards.[354] This is ultimately increased the chaos in the region, certainly not the outcome that the United States had expected.

The Taliban became a powerful organization, eventually controlling ninety percent of Afghanistan although that has decreased with NATO intervention. The Taliban carried out operations outside of Afghanistan and was responsible for the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa. The United States lost control of its onetime proxy and was drawn into a long and costly war that continues in spite of an agreement signed on 29 February 2020.

Military forces around the world have concluded that the new character of irregular warfare is here to stay. As a result of its increasing prevalence, global military leaders are trying to come to grips with that reality. Hungarian Lieutenant Colonel Fabian Sander details the evolution of irregular warfare in his 2015 article. Sandor describes four types of threat:

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[353] "Confronting Undeclared War." *American Legion Magazine.* June 1984.
[354] Council on Foreign Relations, "The Taliban in Afghanistan." Accessed 21 November 2020.

conventional, irregular, catastrophic terrorist, and disruptive. Hybrid warfare is a combination of two or more of these types of warfare. The Israelis coined the term "hybrid warfare" to describe Hezbollah's success against Israel in the Second Lebanon War in 2006. Hybrid warfare offers distinct advantages for practitioners of it in which they "not only gain a physical advantage through the combination of conventional technology and organization with unconventional tactics and applications, but also gain a cognitive advantage by the very lack of social restrictions that conventional state forces must adhere to such as the Law of Land Warfare, Geneva Convention, and Rules of Engagement."[355]

The 2006 United States Quadrennial Defense Review recognized the existence of the threat of irregular warfare, but the Department of Defense still struggles to develop a comprehensive plan.[356] According to a Department of Defense directive issued in 2008, it is Department policy to "recognize that IW [irregular warfare] is as strategically important as traditional warfare. Many of the capabilities and skills required for IW are applicable to traditional warfare, but their role in IW can be proportionally greater than in traditional warfare."

While European nations are no longer scrambling for colonies, the reliance on indigenous populations continues. The United States Department of Defense recognizes the unique challenges of an irregular war. A 2010 document addresses the "irregular warfare problem." According to the Department of Defense assessment, the modern challenges of irregular warfare are many and varied. "In the 21st century's complex operating environment, adaptive adversaries present irregular threats that seriously challenge military-only responses in what are essentially contests for influence and legitimacy. Irregular threats including terrorists, insurgents, and criminal networks are enmeshed in the population and are increasingly empowered by astute use

[355] Fabian Sandor, "Hybrid Warfare Revisited" (*CTX*, V5, No. 2, 2015),
[356] Department of Defense Directive. "Subject: Irregular Warfare," No. 3000.07, 12/1/2008.

of communications, cyberspace, and technology to extend their reach regionally and globally. Subversion and terrorism are not readily countered by military means alone, just as legitimacy and influence cannot be achieved solely by rapid, decisive application of military power."[357]

Since the threat is not solely a military one, it is unlikely that the successful result will be achieved only by a military response. It is improbable that the outcome will be the decisive victory ingrained in the American psyche. The Department of Defense predicts, "Success will more often be defined by long-term involvement to remedy, reduce, manage, or mitigate the conflict and its causes. The joint force thus must find multidimensional approaches in tandem with other partners to solve them…"[358]

There are lessons that the modern military can learn from America's prosecution of the Philippine-American War:

- Conventional forces can adjust to functioning in unfamiliar and challenging environments as they did in the Philippines.
- The opportunity for success increases with the cooperation of indigenous personnel.
- The combatant that has local support is most likely to be successful.
- An irregular force that lacks popular support is not likely to maintain operations against even a modest opposing force.
- Terroristic tactics can be successful for a short period of time, but those tactics will be unsuccessful if they alienate the local population.
- A positive relationship with the local population will benefit the conventional force.
- A small conventional force with effective leadership can defeat an irregular opponent.

[357] Department of Defense. *Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats* (Washington DC, 2010), 14.
[358] Department of Defense. *Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats* (Washington DC, 2010), 14.

- ❖ Superiority in weapons and equipment does not guarantee success against an irregular opponent.

In their book *Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias,* Richard Schultz Jr. and Andrea Dew observe, "War since 1990 has, with the exception of Desert Storm and the first phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, been different from the modern Western understanding of armed combat. But the policymakers and military commanders of modern states – including the United States – have often failed to grasp this new battlefield."[359]

On the contrary, the battlefield to which the authors refer is far from new. I argue that insurgent warfare is the bedrock of the United States military and conventional warfare is the aberration. Alliances with indigenous people go back to the earliest days of the European colonization of North America. The US Army War College notes that Batson's Macabebe Scouts should serve as a model for the use of indigenous forces by the Army today: "In order for our Army of today to succeed, we must regain the organizational culture that allowed Batson and his contemporaries to so easily conduct unconventional operations."[360]

[359] Richard H. Schulz Jr. and Andrea J. Dew. *Insurgents, Terrorists and Militias*. (New York: Columbian University Press, 2006), 11.
[360] Making a Rifleman from Mud. 21.

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