Following the Spanish American War, the United States became embroiled in a guerrilla war with Filipino insurgents who had sought independence from Spain. They objected to the purchase of the Philippine Islands by the United States. The result was the Philippine American War, 1899-1902. At that time, the United States Army had no written doctrine and provided no formal training in the prosecution of a guerrilla war. This study traces American success in the Philippines to reliance on a proven technique utilized by colonial armies of the period: recruitment of native allies. American General Henry Ware Lawton served in the Indian Wars. He was directly responsible for the surrender of Apache leader Geronimo, who surrendered after Lawton’s dogged pursuit over thousands of miles. Lawton was assisted by Apache scouts. In the Philippines, he recognized how advantageous it would be to have the support of indigenous recruits. General Lawton was the driving force behind the development of an indigenous force that altered the way in which the United States Army approached irregular warfare. Relying on an examination of primary sources including letters, diaries, official reports, and newspaper articles, this dissertation explains American success in the Philippine American War in the context of global imperialism and the colonial practice of depending on indigenous recruits.